Utilising taxation incentives to promote private sector funded conservation by Werren, Kip A.
  
UTILISING TAXATION INCENTIVES TO PROMOTE PRIVATE SECTOR FUNDED 
CONSERVATION 
 
KIP A WERREN 
 
A thesis submitted in accordance with the requirements for the award of the degree of Doctor of 
Philosophy 
 
 
2015 
 
School of Law, University of Western Sydney 
 
 
Supervisors: Professor Donna Craig, Associate Professor Scott Mann, Professor Paul Martin 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
i 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
I am indebted to my supervisors for their understanding, encouragement and support. Professor Paul 
Martin started me on this journey and he bore the brunt of my many queries and consternations. 
Professor Donna Craig and Professor Michael Jeffery provided me with insights, advice and guidance. 
Overall my supervisors demonstrated herculean patience in nurturing me through some dark episodes. I 
hope this dissertation adequately represents their hard work, patience, and dedication. Thank you also 
to Miriam Verbeek who provided editorial support and who turned down other work so that she could 
concentrate on honing my dissertation. 
Many thanks to the landholders across Australia who contributed to the research project by completing 
the survey. Without their feedback, I would not have been able to compare and contrast the differing 
behavioural aspects of the funding models. Their dedication to natural resource management is 
unfortunately under recognised by the wider community. 
I would like to express my appreciation to my mother, Betty Patricia (Pat) Werren who provided 
constant support not only through my doctoral candidature, but my entire professional and academic 
career. Thank you to my brother in law James Day who promoted the survey through his extensive 
networks, provided support to other family members in my absence, and lightened the mood on many 
occasions 
To my wife Julia who has been with me through all the ups and downs and who was eternally patient, 
listened to my endless diatribe on taxation law and environmental law, picked me up, and provided 
ongoing love and encouragement. She was there for the late nights, the early mornings, and the 
constant juggling of commitments. Without her support and sacrifice this dissertation would not have 
been successfully completed. To my three sons, Christopher, Mitchell and Alexander thank you for 
your patience, care and the unconditional love that you have shown me throughout the whole process.  
 
 
 
 
 
ii 
 
STATEMENT OF AUTHENTICATION 
The work presented in this thesis entitled Utilising Taxation Incentives to Promote Private Sector 
Funded Conservation is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, original except as acknowledged in 
the text. I hereby declare that I have not submitted this material, either in full or in part for a degree at 
this or any other institution. 
The survey presented in this dissertation was approved by the University of Western Sydney Human 
Research Ethics Committee on 4 April 2011. 
 
Mr Kip Werren 
 
Contribution to jointly published work by the Candidate relevant to the dissertation 
1. Martin, Paul, Kip Werren and Susan Shearing, 'Concepts for Private Sector Funded 
Conservation Using Tax-Effective Instruments' (UNE 57, Land and Water Australia, 2007). 
2. Martin, Paul and Kip Werren, 'Discussion Paper: An Industry Plan for the Victorian 
Environment?' (Victorian Government Department of Sustainability and Environment, 2009). 
3. Martin, Paul and Kip Werren, 'The Use of Taxation Incentives to Create New Eco-Service 
Markets' in Lin-Heng Lye et al (eds), Critical Issues in Environmental Taxation: International 
and Comparative Perspectives (Oxford University Press, 2009) vol VII, 511. 
 
 
 
iii 
 
Contents 
Acknowledgements................................................................................................................................... i 
Statement of Authentication .................................................................................................................. ii 
List of tables ............................................................................................................................................ ix 
List of Figures ......................................................................................................................................... xi 
Table of Abbreviations ......................................................................................................................... xii 
Abstract ................................................................................................................................................. xiv 
I Introduction ....................................................................................................................................... 1 
A Overview ........................................................................................................................................ 1 
B The Research Problem ................................................................................................................... 4 
C Methodology .................................................................................................................................. 5 
1 Paradigm - Worldview ............................................................................................................... 7 
2 Approach .................................................................................................................................... 9 
D Justification for the Research ....................................................................................................... 10 
E Chapter Outline ............................................................................................................................ 13 
F Concepts and Definitions ............................................................................................................. 15 
1 Conservation, Sustainability and Sustainable Agriculture ....................................................... 15 
2 Biodiversity .............................................................................................................................. 18 
3 Taxation Incentives and Government Grants ........................................................................... 19 
4 Eco-Services (Environmental Services) ................................................................................... 21 
5 Transaction Costs and Institutions ........................................................................................... 21 
6 Externalities .............................................................................................................................. 23 
G Which Mechanism is the Best for Promoting Conservation? ...................................................... 23 
H Summary ...................................................................................................................................... 33 
II Conservation Funding and the Requirement for a New Conservation Funding Model.................. 35 
iv 
 
A Overview ...................................................................................................................................... 35 
B The State of the Environment ...................................................................................................... 37 
C OECD Report on Australia’s Environment Performance ............................................................ 44 
D The Importance of Private Landholdings ..................................................................................... 48 
E A Disjoint Between Funding Capacity and Responsibility ......................................................... 57 
F Environmental Expenditure ......................................................................................................... 60 
G Required Expenditure .................................................................................................................. 69 
H Budget Pressures .......................................................................................................................... 73 
I Requirement for a New Funding Model ...................................................................................... 75 
J Lack of Accurate Information on Natural Resource Management .............................................. 77 
K Is Valuation in Monetary Terms and Monitoring Prerequisites for Taking Conservation Action?
 80 
L Summary ...................................................................................................................................... 84 
III Behavioural Aspects ....................................................................................................................... 87 
A Overview ...................................................................................................................................... 87 
B Command and Control – Unintended Consequences .................................................................. 90 
C Motivation and Constraints on Participants ................................................................................. 91 
D Behavioural Change Theories ...................................................................................................... 95 
E Drivers for Behavioural Change ................................................................................................ 101 
F Transaction Costs ....................................................................................................................... 105 
G Summary .................................................................................................................................... 110 
IV Government Grants ....................................................................................................................... 114 
A Overview .................................................................................................................................... 114 
B Government Grant – Concept and Definition ............................................................................ 116 
C Advantages and Disadvantages .................................................................................................. 118 
v 
 
D Parliamentary Control of Public Spending ................................................................................ 119 
E Funding Arrangements and the Legislative Capacity of the Commonwealth ........................... 120 
F Government Grant Administration ............................................................................................ 123 
G The Recipient’s Regulatory Burden ........................................................................................... 126 
H Are Government Grants Effective and Efficient Funding Mechanisms? .................................. 130 
I A Representative Sample of Government Environmental Programs ......................................... 132 
J Taxation Treatment of Grants .................................................................................................... 141 
K Summary .................................................................................................................................... 143 
V Regional On-site conservation Program and the use of Tax Incentives to encourage Conservation 
Investment ............................................................................................................................................. 145 
A Overview .................................................................................................................................... 145 
B An Outline of the ROCP ............................................................................................................ 147 
C Joint Venture Arrangement with Non-Government Organisations ........................................... 151 
D Spatial Aspects ........................................................................................................................... 155 
E Transaction Costs and ROCP ..................................................................................................... 159 
F Taxation Incentives - a Mild Form of Government Intervention............................................... 161 
G Tax Incentives and Philanthropic Donations ............................................................................. 162 
H Tax Incentives and Investment .................................................................................................. 164 
I Capital Raising Aspect of the ROCP ......................................................................................... 168 
J Landcare ..................................................................................................................................... 172 
K Summary .................................................................................................................................... 183 
VI Methodology – Empirical Component .......................................................................................... 186 
A Overview .................................................................................................................................... 186 
B Context of Research for the Hypothesis .................................................................................... 186 
C Approach .................................................................................................................................... 188 
vi 
 
D Challenges of a Mixed Methods Inquiry.................................................................................... 190 
E Hypothetical Funding Models .................................................................................................... 191 
1 The Tax Model ....................................................................................................................... 191 
2 The Grant Model .................................................................................................................... 192 
3 The ROCP (Hybrid) Model .................................................................................................... 193 
F Data Collection Method ............................................................................................................. 194 
G Question Format ......................................................................................................................... 195 
H Data Collection Procedure ......................................................................................................... 196 
I Units of Analysis ........................................................................................................................ 197 
J Cover Letter and Informed Consent ........................................................................................... 199 
K Analysis ...................................................................................................................................... 199 
1 Quantitative Analysis ............................................................................................................. 200 
2 Qualitative Analysis ............................................................................................................... 201 
3 Integration of Data.................................................................................................................. 202 
L Biases and Preconceptions ......................................................................................................... 202 
M Summary ................................................................................................................................ 203 
VII Responses and Data Analysis of Survey .................................................................................... 205 
A Overview .................................................................................................................................... 205 
B Online Survey Statistics ............................................................................................................. 205 
C Biographical Attributes of Participants ...................................................................................... 206 
D Ranking of Conservation Funding Models ................................................................................ 212 
E Reasons for Preferred Model ..................................................................................................... 213 
F Comments on Reasons for Ranking Models .............................................................................. 218 
G Choice Limited to Taxation Incentive and Government Payment ............................................. 219 
H Reasons when Choice Limited to a Taxation Incentive or Government Payment .................... 227 
vii 
 
I Directions for Future Research .................................................................................................. 228 
J Summary .................................................................................................................................... 228 
VIII Conclusion ................................................................................................................................. 230 
Bibliography.......................................................................................................................................... 241 
A Articles / Books / Reports .......................................................................................................... 241 
B Newspaer Articles ...................................................................................................................... 264 
C Cases .......................................................................................................................................... 264 
D Legislation .................................................................................................................................. 266 
E Explanatory Memorandum ........................................................................................................ 269 
F Quasi-Legislative Material ......................................................................................................... 269 
G Treaties ....................................................................................................................................... 269 
H Electronic Resources .................................................................................................................. 269 
I Submission to Government Inquiries ......................................................................................... 270 
J Looseleaf Services ..................................................................................................................... 271 
K Other........................................................................................................................................... 271 
Appendices ............................................................................................................................................ 271 
Appendix 1 – Background Information on Taxation and Conservation ........................................... 272 
A Overview .................................................................................................................................... 272 
B Deductibility of Conservation Expenditure ............................................................................... 273 
1 General Deduction Provision ................................................................................................. 274 
2 Specific Deductions ................................................................................................................ 277 
3 Primary Producers .................................................................................................................. 284 
4 Non-Commercial Business Losses ......................................................................................... 285 
C Tax Offsets ................................................................................................................................. 286 
1 Research and Development .................................................................................................... 287 
viii 
 
D Conservation Philanthropy ......................................................................................................... 288 
1 Ancillary Funds ...................................................................................................................... 289 
2 Conservation Covenants ......................................................................................................... 290 
E Taxation Incentives and Conservation Investment .................................................................... 292 
F Forestry Managed Investment Schemes .................................................................................... 293 
G Pooled Development Funds ....................................................................................................... 295 
H Early Stage Venture Capital Limited Partnership – A Flow through Tax Entity ...................... 296 
I Concerns over the Use of Taxation to Encourage Conservation Projects ................................. 298 
J Tax Liability for the Provision of Eco-Services ........................................................................ 300 
K Tax Evasion, Tax Avoidance and Tax Planning ........................................................................ 302 
L Suggested Taxation Strategies to Encourage Conservation ....................................................... 305 
Appendix 2 – Questionnaire Cover Letter ........................................................................................ 306 
Appendix 3– Survey Questionnaire .................................................................................................. 309 
Appendix 4 – Participant Comments on Reasons for Ranking Models ............................................ 317 
Appendix 5 – Participant Comments when Choice Limited to Taxation Incentive and Government 
Payment ............................................................................................................................................. 330 
Appendix 6 – Institutions Contacted and Asked to Publicise the Survey ......................................... 338 
 
 
  
ix 
 
LIST OF TABLES 
Table I-1 'Prisoners Dilemma' for Graziers Using Open Access Land ................................................... 26 
Table II-1 Land Tenure in Australia, by Lands Category ....................................................................... 49 
Table II-2 Total Land Tenure - by Jurisdiction and Category ................................................................ 50 
Table II-3 National Land Use - Australia ............................................................................................... 51 
Table II-4 Commonwealth Natural Resource Management Timeline .................................................... 65 
Table II-5 ABS Experimental Supply Estimates of Environmental ($ million) by Industry and Product 
2010-11 ................................................................................................................................................... 68 
Table II-6 Allen Consulting Group Estimated Expenditure in 2001 for Commonwealth Government to 
Achieve its Proposed Resource Management Targets ............................................................................ 71 
Table IV-1 Allen Consulting Group Estimate for the Victorian Not-For-Profit Sector ....................... 129 
Table IV-2 Water for the Future Initiative - On-Farm Efficiency Program Round Three ................... 133 
Table IV-3 Caring for Our Country - June 2013 Innovation Grants .................................................... 134 
Table IV-4 Biodiversity Fund - Round Two: 2013-14 ......................................................................... 136 
Table IV-5 Drought Relief Assistance Scheme .................................................................................... 138 
Table IV-6 Smarter Resources, Smarter Business Program - Capital Funding .................................... 140 
Table VII-1 Quantitative Questions Completed by Participants .......................................................... 206 
Table VII-2 Biographical Questions Completed by Participants .......................................................... 206 
Table VII-3 Primary Decision Maker on the Property ......................................................................... 206 
Table VII-4 Gender ............................................................................................................................... 207 
Table VII-5 Age Group ......................................................................................................................... 208 
Table VII-6 Highest Level of Education ............................................................................................... 209 
Table VII-7 Land Usage ....................................................................................................................... 210 
Table VII-8 Total Receipts ................................................................................................................... 211 
Table VII-9 Ranking the Taxation Incentive 1
st
, 2
nd
 and 3
rd
 ................................................................. 212 
Table VII-10 Ranking the ROCP 1
st
, 2
nd
, 3
rd
 ........................................................................................ 212 
x 
 
Table VII-11 Ranking the Government Payment 1st, 2nd, 3rd ............................................................ 213 
Table VII-12 First Preference for Funding Models .............................................................................. 213 
Table VII-13 Preference where Choice Limited to Taxation Incentive and Government Payment ..... 220 
Table VII-14 Biographic Information (Demographics) - t-test where Choice Limited to Taxation 
Incentive and Government Payment ..................................................................................................... 221 
Table VII-15 Biographic Information (Demographics) - Independent Samples Test where Choice 
Limited to Taxation Incentive and Government Payment .................................................................... 222 
Table VII-16 Primary Decision Maker – Chi-square Test .................................................................... 223 
Table VII-17 Gender – Chi-square Test ............................................................................................... 224 
Table VII-18 Land Usage – Chi-square Test ........................................................................................ 226 
Table Appendix 1-1 Tax Expenditure - Environmental Protection Activities 2007-08 to 2010-11 ..... 279 
Table Appendix 1-2 Tax Expenditure - Carbon Sink Forests 2007-08 to 2010-11 .............................. 282 
Table Appendix 1-3 Tax Expenditure - Horticultural Plants 2007-08 to 2010-11 ............................... 283 
Table Appendix 1-4 Tax Expenditure – Water Facilities 2007-08 to 2010-11 .................................... 284 
 
  
xi 
 
LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure II-1 Commonwealth Whole of Government Environment Related Estimated Expenditure 2001-
02 to 2010-11 .......................................................................................................................................... 61 
Figure II-2 Commonwealth Specific Purpose Payments to Support State and Territory Environment 
Services 2007-08 to 2014-15 .................................................................................................................. 66 
Figure III-1 Conceptual Diagram of the Theory of Planned Behaviour ................................................. 98 
Figure III-2 Schematic Overview of an AES ........................................................................................ 107 
Figure V-1 Schematic Overview of the Regional Onsite Conservation Program ................................ 149 
Figure V-2 Summary of Ecological and Institutional Scales based on Kim et al ................................. 156 
Figure V-3 Landcare Structure ............................................................................................................. 174 
Figure V-4 Summary of Landcare Australia Limited Funding 2003-04 to 2012-13 ............................ 177 
Figure V-5 Summary of Landcare Australia Limited Use of Funds 2003-04 to 2012-13 .................... 178 
Figure VI-1 Hypothetical Taxation Incentive Model ........................................................................... 192 
Figure VI-2 Hypothetical Government Grant Funding Model ............................................................. 193 
Figure VI-3 Hypothetical Regional On-site Conservation Program ..................................................... 194 
Figure VII-1 Autonomy – Representation of Likert-type Responses ................................................... 215 
Figure VII-2 Representation of Likert-type Responses ........................................................................ 215 
Figure VII-3 Support - Representation of Likert-type Responses ........................................................ 216 
Figure VII-4 Paperwork - Representation of Likert-type Responses ................................................... 216 
Figure VII-5 Encouragement - Representation of Likert-type Responses ............................................ 217 
Figure VII-6 Increase - Representation of Likert-type Responses ....................................................... 217 
 
  
xii 
 
TABLE OF ABBREVIATIONS 
ABN Australian Business Number  
ABS                        Australian Bureau of Statistics 
AES Agri-Environmental Schemes 
ANAO Australian National Audit Office 
ATO Australian Taxation Office  
AUSLIG Australian Surveying & Land Information Group 
BES                        Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services 
CGT Capital Gains Taxation  
DAFF Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry  
DFE Direct Forestry Expenditure  
DGR Deductible Gift Recipient  
DRAS Drought Relief Assistance Scheme (Queensland) 
EBC Enterprise Based Conservation 
EPA Environment Protection Authority  
EPBC  Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 (Cth) 
ESA Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 USC § 1531 (2012) 
ESVCLP Early Stage Venture Capital Limited Partnership 
FDI Foreign Direct Investment  
GDP                       Gross Domestic Product 
GFS Green Funds Scheme  
GST Good and Services Tax 
HSIA                      Humane Society International Australia 
KPIs Key Performance Indicators 
ITAA1936 Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Cth) 
ITAA1997 Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 (Cth)  
IUCN                      International Union for Conservation of Nature 
MA Millennium Ecosystem Assessment 
MERI Monitoring, Evaluation, Reporting and Improvement  
MIS Managed Investment Scheme/s 
MMR Mixed Methods Research 
NHT                       Natural Heritage Trust  
NIE New Institutional Economics  
xiii 
 
NRM                       Natural Resource Management 
OECD  Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
OEPR2008             OECD Environmental Performance Reviews: Australia 2008 
PDF Pooled Development Fund  
PES Payment for Environmental Services 
Pt IVA Part IVA of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Cth) 
R&D Research and Development  
ROCP Regional On-site Conservation Program 
SCARM Standing Committee on Agriculture and Resource Management 
SCT                        Social cognitive theory 
SME Small and Medium-Sized Enterprise  
SOE2011                Australian State of the Environment 2011 Report 
SPPs                       Specific Purpose Payments               
SPSS IBM SPSS Statistics software  
TEEB                     The Economics of Ecosystems and Biodiversity in Business and Enterprise 
TPB                        Theory of Planned Behaviour 
TRA                       Theory of reasoned action 
US United States of America 
UN                          United Nations 
WCMA Western Catchment Management Authority 
WTA Willingness to Accept 
WTP Willingness to Pay 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
xiv 
 
ABSTRACT 
An individual’s behaviour cannot be fully explained by their reaction to financial inducements and self-
interest. Much of the public discussion of natural resource management centres on the assertion that 
landholders should be motivated by ideals of sustainability and good environmental outcomes to 
sacrifice their individual interests in order to protect the collective interests of society.  At the other end 
of the spectrum, many institutional designers take the view that they cannot rely on the virtue of 
landholders but instead must rely on regulations and market incentives which appeal entirely to the 
self-interest of landholders.  Perhaps a better view is that individuals may be subject to self-interest but 
they are not bereft of other motivations or concerns such as community interest.  Suitable incentives 
coupled with the goodwill of landholders, are the key ingredients to the promotion of conservation. The 
problem lies in finding sufficient funds to meet the ever expanding requirements of environmental 
conservation. The economic and environmental pressures facing Australia suggest that the underlying 
funding capacity of Australian governments and landholders to meet conservation activities will rapidly 
decline. 
This dissertation explores the following intertwined research issues: 
1. Contrary to economic conventions, is there a justification for a taxation based approach to 
economic incentives to encourage private rural conservation, from a policy and behavioural 
perspective? 
2. Is there a policy rationale for an alternative to the existing approaches to funding rural natural 
resource conservation and restoration activities on private farmland? 
3. To what extent is there a behavioural rationale for a tax-leveraged privately funded approach to 
rural natural resource governance? 
4. Is there a basis for the hypothesis that there is an important behavioural difference between 
government grants, taxation incentives and a farmer-led taxation leveraged approach to rural 
natural resource governance? 
The caveat in addressing these issues is that this dissertation is an initial investigation of the key 
ingredients for promoting conservation works. As such, it is beyond the scope of this dissertation to 
provide conclusive evidence in relation to these issues. This is in part because of the limitation of 
resources and in part because of the paucity of knowledge and empirical data on these issues. 
The research approach adopted in this dissertation is similar to an applied public policy research 
approach, which requires input from various disciplines, including law, economics and other social 
xv 
 
sciences, to fully appreciate the relevant social problem and to explore the research issues. The issues 
canvassed in this dissertation involve economic principles, finance principles, budgetary restraints, 
socio-economic forecasts, resource management concerns, behavioural responses, and policy issues.  
Thus, the dissertation moves beyond a doctrinal research and legal formalism approach.  
The dissertation adopts a pragmatism worldview which values both objective and subjective 
knowledge. This dissertation uses a doctrinal and purposeful enquiry method to explore the large policy 
and taxation issues. Fiscal analysis is used to assess the funding capacity of Australian governments. 
For gathering the empirical evidence component, this dissertation adopts a mixed methods research 
approach, using both qualitative and quantitative methods within the same study. One of the advantages 
of a mixed methods approach is the potential for gaining a deeper and more complete understanding of 
the research issues by uniting both a qualitative and a quantitative stance. 
 
1 
 
I INTRODUCTION 
‘But since I am alive and I’ve noticed we’ll be crossing Yankee and Confederate lines a few times, I thought you might tell 
me where we’re going.’ – Blondie 
The Good, the Bad and the Ugly: Extended English-Language Version (Directed by Sergio Leone, Metro Goldwyn Mayer, 
2003) 1:26:12. 
The author of this dissertation had the movie playing in the background while writing. The quote represents a point in the 
writing process where various ideas coalesced. 
A Overview 
Economic theory does not distinguish between the behavioural impact of taxation incentives, 
government grants, and other funding models; all are subsidies. This was highlighted after several 
working groups, seminars, and presentations on the Regional Onsite Conservation Program (‘ROCP’), 
a funding model conceptualised to encourage private funding into conservation activities within a 
framework of landscape change on private landholdings. The ROCP concept was expanded in reports 
and articles authored by Paul Martin and the author of this dissertation.
1
 The ROCP was created to 
respond to the fact that economic and environmental pressures facing Australia suggest that the 
underlying funding capacity of Australian governments and landholders to meet conservation activities 
will rapidly decline. This suggests that an alternative funding model is required in order to encourage 
conservation activities on private landholdings. The model is designed to provide financial and non-
financial incentives to private landholders, encourage unincorporated joint venture arrangements with 
non-government conservation organisations, build social capital, encourage cooperative practices, 
facilitate innovation, and develop conservation works on an extensive spatial scale 
An underpinning rationale of the ROCP business model is that taxation incentives will encourage 
private market funding which can then be distributed to fund conservation activities. It was reasoned 
that such incentives would have a significant behavioural impact upon certain individuals, encouraging 
them to invest. By offering tax incentives, the government would be able to leverage its outlay (ie, tax 
incentives reduce taxation funds) to encourage privately funded production of public goods such as 
                                                 
1
 Paul Martin, Kip Werren and Susan Shearing, 'Concepts for Private Sector Funded Conservation Using Tax-Effective 
Instruments' (UNE 57, Land and Water Australia, 2007); Paul Martin and Kip Werren, 'The Use of Taxation Incentives to 
Create New Eco-Service Markets' in Lin-Heng Lye et al (eds), Critical Issues in Environmental Taxation: International 
and Comparative Perspectives (Oxford University Press, 2009) vol VII, 511; Paul Martin and Kip Werren, 'Discussion 
Paper: An Industry Plan for the Victorian Environment?' (Victorian Government Department of Sustainability and 
Environment, 2009).  
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biodiversity, habitat protection, conservation capacity and carbon sequestration. In discussions with 
several economists about the ROCP framework, the comment was that, from an economic point of 
view, tax incentives are subsidies and as such, their behavioural impact is the same as offering other 
subsidies, such as government grants. This position stands in stark contrast to the anecdotal evidence 
from professional accountants / tax agents that a high proportion of their clients seeks ways to minimise 
their tax burden close to the end of the financial year and will respond differently to tax compared to 
other incentives. 
The kernel which inspired the design of the ROCP framework is the contention that the fiscal capacity 
of Australian governments to meet conservation activities will come under pressure because of shifting 
environmental conditions, an ageing population, and increased demands on government services. There 
is a variety of ways in which governments can and do support conservation on private lands, but 
ultimately their capacity to do so is limited. Governments could wholly rely on regulation to promote 
conservation but this may lead to economic inefficiencies, resistance from private landholders, political 
conflict and the possibility that government intervention will bring about an even more inequitable 
outcome than leaving the situation to the unregulated market. This is not to suggest that the ROCP is 
the only (or even the ideal) model for encouraging conservation in every scenario. It is an instrument 
that could be used to decrease reliance on government-funded conservation programs, provided that its 
behavioural effect is greater than a mere subsidy. 
There are many mechanisms that a government may use to address environmental problems, such as 
regulation, taxation, property rights, market mechanisms, and education programs. As environmental 
problems have different characteristics, and different classes of individuals have dissimilar reactions to 
various incentives, several policy instruments may have to be used together to achieve an effect (this is 
known as smart regulation: an integrated approach using economic, social and environmental 
instruments). This brings us back to the assertion made by several economists that taxation incentives 
have the same behavioural impact as other subsidies. After reviewing the economic literature and 
further discussions with economists, there does not seem to be any compelling empirical evidence for 
this belief. This position also flies in the face of accountants’ observations regarding client readiness to 
invest in tax-effective managed investment schemes in order to minimise taxation but surprisingly has 
not been empirically validated or disproved. 
This dissertation investigates whether there is a difference in the behavioural impact of conservation 
tax incentives, government grants, and other funding models. This issue is addressed by surveying 
3 
 
private landholders on their views on a tax incentive funding model and a direct subsidy funding model 
and a ROCP type funding model. While it is the aim of the empirical aspect of this research to 
undertake preliminary testing of the behavioural differences between the incentives, it is beyond the 
scope of this dissertation to determine the exact difference in the margin of response (the propensity to 
undertake conservation works on private landholdings). This is in part because of the limitation of 
resources and in part because of the paucity of knowledge and empirical data. The aim here is to refine 
the hypothesis for later larger scale testing. 
Information on whether there is a behavioural difference between taxation incentives, government 
grants and other funding mechanisms to encourage conservation upon private landholdings will inform 
discussion on the potential effectiveness of these mechanisms. The research may eventually lead to the 
creation of more effective incentive mechanisms and increased conservation (ie, biodiversity, 
decreased habitat fragmentation). 
There are also important policy concerns to be considered. Laying aside the possible important 
differences in behavioural impact, some economists argue that tax incentives, in comparison to direct 
subsidies, are inequitable and inefficient.
2
 It is their contention that, where government outlays are 
made for the purposes of social policy, it is preferable to use direct government expenditure. These 
arguments against tax incentives ignore transaction costs and positive externalities.
3
 Alternatively there 
is the assertion that the ‘invisible hand’ of the free market and private property rights are superior 
mechanisms for addressing environmental problems than any scheme involving government 
intervention. This position ignores market failure and the free rider effect. When comparing funding 
mechanisms the primary focus should be on which mechanism will do the better job of promoting 
social objectives at the lowest cost. That is, the focus should be on which mechanism will allow 
government to leverage its outlay most effectively. Tax incentives, like any other mechanism used to 
address market failure, are justified if they correct market inefficiencies. 
This chapter, besides outlining the research focus and the research methodology, explains the 
importance of the research, summarises the chapter structure, and provides definitions of important 
terms. As the structure and basic features of an instrument / mechanism to encourage conservation 
works are pivotal this chapter discusses the arguments for and against various institutional regimes.  
                                                 
2
 Stanley S Surrey, 'Tax Incentives as a Device for Implementing Government Policy: A Comparison with Direct 
Government Expenditures' (1970) 83(4) Harvard Law Review 705; Richard L Dorenberg, 'A Workable Flat Rate 
Consumption Tax' (1985) 70 Iowa Law Review 425. 
3
 Edward A Zelinsky, 'Efficiency and Income taxes: The Rehabilitation of Tax Incentives' (1986) 64 Texas Law Review 973 
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B The Research Problem 
The following intertwined research issues are considered: 
1. Contrary to economic conventions, is there a justification for a taxation based approach to 
economic incentives to encourage private rural conservation, from a policy and behavioural 
perspective? 
2. Is there a policy rationale for an alternative to the existing approaches to funding rural natural 
resource conservation and restoration activities on private farmland? 
3. To what extent is there a behavioural rationale for a tax-leveraged privately funded approach to 
rural natural resource governance? 
4. Is there a basis for the hypothesis that there is an important behavioural difference between 
government grants, taxation incentives and a farmer-led taxation leveraged approach to rural 
natural resource governance? 
Underscoring the research issues are basic assumptions that are not tested in this research: 
 The capacity of Australian Governments to fund conservation is limited; 
 Private conservation funding is required to meet the requirements of national environmental 
conservation; 
 Private landholdings are the linchpin of conservation on an extensive scale; and 
 Behavioural motivators and drivers influence private landholder uptake of conservation 
schemes. 
What this thesis does explore is the hypothesis:  
 There may be an important behavioural response difference between government grants, 
taxation incentives, and other funding models (eg a ROCP type funding model). 
The caveat in reviewing these research issues is that this is an initial investigation. It is beyond the 
scope of this dissertation to go beyond the preliminary investigation of these issues, which deserve 
future investigation. Limited resources (eg time, funding) for the empirical component, and because of 
the paucity of knowledge and external empirical data, means that future research must be conducted to 
clarify the degree that different funding models influence the propensity to undertake conservation 
works on private landholdings. This is significant to optimal funding policy. 
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C Methodology 
The research approach adopted in this dissertation is similar to an applied public policy research 
approach, which requires input from various disciplines, including law, economics and other social 
sciences, to fully appreciate the relevant social problem and to explore the research issues. The issues 
canvassed in this dissertation involve economic principles, finance principles, budgetary restraints, 
socio-economic forecasts, resource management concerns, behavioural responses, and policy issues.  
The methodology moves beyond the traditional legal doctrinal research utilised by legal practitioners 
and law students to address ‘practice –oriented’ problems.4 Doctrinal research has been described as:5 
Research designed to collect and organize legal data, to expound legal rules and to explicate or offer exegesis 
upon authoritative sources … [leading] to the production of articles and treatises that identify, analyze, 
organize and synthesize statutes and judicial decision and commentary. 
While the scope of doctrinal research projects may vary, at their heart, they are library based research 
projects that focus on the primary and secondary sources of the law. The doctrinal methodology 
typically takes ‘as its starting-point and its main focus of attention rules of law, without systematic or 
regular reference to the context of the problems they are supposed to resolve or the effects they in fact 
have.’6 The law does not operate in a void. Legal rules are normative in character but doctrine focused 
researchers ‘make no attempt either to explain, predict, or even to understand human behaviour.’7 The 
doctrinal methodology addresses the question of ‘what is the law’, and empirical evidence plays little 
part in this discourse.
8
 The natural and social sciences however rely on empirical evidence as the basis 
of theories or as a means of testing those theories.
9
 
The boundaries of the legal research framework have expanded in recent times.
10
 It now encompasses 
doctrinal research, theoretical research (the conceptual bases of legal rules), law reform research, 
fundamental research (exploring the idea of law as a social phenomenon), empirical research, historical 
                                                 
4
 Terry Hutchinson, Research and Writing in Law (Lawbook Co, 2
nd
 ed, 2006) 11, 19. 
5
 Consultative Group on Research and Education in Law, 'Law and Learning: Report to the Social Sciences and Humanities 
Research Council of Canada' (Information Division of the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada, 
1983) (‘the Arthurs Report’) 52-66. 
6
 William L Twining, Academic Law and Legal Development, Taylor Lectures 1975 (University of Lagos, 1976) 20. 
7
 Paul Chynoweth, 'Legal Research' in Andrew Knight and Les Ruddock (eds), Advanced Research Methods in the Built 
Environment (Wiley-Blackwell, 2008) 28, 30. 
8
 Ibid. 
9
 Ibid. 
10
 Council of Australian Law Deans, 'Council of Australian Law Deans Statement on the Nature of Legal Research - May 
and October 2005' (Council of Australian Law Deans, 2005) 
<http://www.cald.asn.au/docs/cald%20statement%20on%20the%20nature%20of%20legal%20research%20-
%202005.pdf>  
6 
 
research, comparative research, research into institutions and processes of the law, and interdisciplinary 
research.
11
  
This dissertation embraces a broader interdisciplinary approach suitable to policy research. As 
succinctly stated by the Council of Law Deans:
12
 
It is the connections between law as a distinctive and autonomous concept and field of study, and the broader 
stream of intellectual thought, that, without detracting from the core significance of doctrinal research, have 
so enriched legal research in the modern era. … In truth, law falls wholly neither within the humanities nor 
the social sciences. … Much legal research involves a blend of the two: for example, the nature and 
application of legal reasoning. This diversity should be recognised and superficial generalisations avoided. 
Due to their complexity and interrelation with socio-economic factors, environmental and conservation 
quandaries cannot be resolved by one universal method. In addressing environmental concerns, 
recourse may have to be made to diverse tools such as education, command and control regulation, 
fines, taxation, tax incentives, and funding. Addressing environmental and conservation research 
questions require interdisciplinary research methods to fully investigate the diverse relevant issues. As 
noted by Martin et al in discussing environmental law scholarship:
13
 
It is clear that our scholarship will have to expand further, so that we can marry to good doctrinal approaches 
a new set of methods to provide comprehensive and sophisticated governance solutions to a world that is 
increasingly in need of them. This will involve moving to a systems framework, and deepening our thinking 
about instruments and institutions. This can only be done if we can draw upon the knowledge that exists in 
economics, social sciences and biophysical natural sciences, but without submerging the law’s concern for 
social justice and the lawyer’s learned scientism about simple solutions to complex problems. 
The social sciences has conceptualised a number of approaches which can help in understanding 
complex environmental issues. The methodology (the reason for adopting a particular research 
method), the method employed to obtain information (the research technique eg quantitative), and the 
knowledge generated by the research are interdependent. Research contributes to knowledge and 
knowledge ‘is created within the research project through the researcher’s exploration of the 
phenomenon under investigation, by means of the methodology and the methods, which must be 
adequate for the research project.’14  The research philosophy is a foundation for the research 
methodology which in turn provides a foundation for the method employed to obtain the information. 
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1 Paradigm - Worldview 
This section outlines some of the relevant research paradigms / worldviews and compares and contrasts 
them in terms of their ontology (nature of reality), epistemology (nature of knowledge), axiology (the 
value stance taken by the researcher), and the corresponding supported research methodology. It is not 
the intention of this section to debate the paradigmatic frameworks underpinning environmental 
discourse, law, and the social sciences. The objective is to briefly frame the research approach that was 
used within the research philosophies that impact upon this area of research and to demonstrate the 
breadth of the frameworks. 
Thomas S Kuhn in his text about the history of science defined the term ‘paradigm’ as the set of 
practices, theory, application, beliefs, and values that define a scientific discipline at a particular point 
in time.
15
 Kuhn viewed the natural sciences as progressing through episodic revolutions rather than 
through the linear accumulation of knowledge. According to Kuhn, the sciences go through alternating 
periods of an accepted dominating frame of reference and then a ‘paradigm shift’ (revolution), where 
there is a transformation of the scientistic conception of the model of reality. During the period of the 
dominating frame of reference, the majority of scientists act according to the established values and 
norms of the framework. 
Kuhn’s text is an investigation of change within the natural sciences. His ideas ‘do not necessarily 
apply in any other discipline, subject or inquiry.’16 In the preface to his text Kuhn notes that in contrast 
to the natural sciences (ie physics, chemistry, and biology) he was ‘struck by the number and extent of 
the overt disagreements between social scientists about the nature of legitimate scientific problems and 
methods.’17 If we move beyond Kuhn’s argument regarding scientific development, the term paradigm 
has been employed in the social sciences synonymously with the term worldview.
18
 According to 
Creswell and Plano Clark, worldview ‘may or may not be associated with a specific discipline or 
community of scholars but which suggests the shared beliefs and values of researchers.’19 A worldview 
delimits the appropriate topics for investigation, the acceptable research methodology, the appropriate 
research conduct, and the criteria for evaluating the end result. 
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It has been suggested that legal formalism is the dominant paradigm within legal practice and legal 
academia.
20
 Under a pure version of legal formalism, legal reasoning is separated from policy 
considerations. It is believed that the solution to legal issues can be discovered by reviewing the set of 
rules and principles which make up the law. This effectively assumes that the law is independent from 
social and political institutions. This legal worldview is reflected in the separation of powers between 
the judiciary, the legislature, and the executive. Judges are expected to state what the ‘law is’ rather 
than what the ‘law should be.’21 This stance, taken to its logical conclusion, holds that the law is a self-
contained and self-referential discipline.
22
 Legal formalism provides a foundation to the doctrinal 
methodology. 
A purely legal formalism worldview excludes reference to knowledge that exists in other disciplines 
such as economics, social sciences, and the natural sciences. As this research is focused on real world 
actions and outcomes, this dissertation moves beyond a purely doctrinal approach in favour of a broad 
based interdisciplinary approach. It uses methodologies supported by the social sciences. Many 
research philosophies underpin the social sciences. The following discussion will be limited to 
postpositivism, constructionism, and pragmatism.
23
 
Postpositivism is a worldview where researchers accept that their knowledge, values, and theoretical 
stance can influence what is being studied. Postpositivists believe that there is a singular objective 
truth. As a consequence, they use checks and balances to try and eliminate biases.  The overall stance 
of researchers is that they should be distant from the individuals or group being studied and impartial in 
their observation. Researchers test hypotheses to prove or disprove a position. This worldview provides 
a theoretical foundation for the quantitative research methodology, using deductive reasoning to test a 
stated position. 
Under the worldview of constructivism there is the belief that there are multiple concepts of reality. 
Social activity occurs in a social context. As a consequence the individuals or groups being studied 
create their own reality in part through social relationships and social interactions. Researchers seek to 
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understand a social activity through questioning and interaction. An understanding of the social activity 
is formed through collecting the participant’s subjective views. Researchers accept bias. They note 
their biases and interpretational position.  This worldview provides a theoretical foundation for the 
qualitative research methodology as researchers use inductive reasoning to form theories, concepts and 
generalisations. 
Pragmatism is a worldview which values both objective and subjective knowledge. The stance of 
pragmatists is that knowledge is a tool which can be used for action, prediction, and problem solving. 
The research question is more important than the purity of the research methodology or the 
philosophical underpinnings.  In many ways pragmatism mirrors the way that law (and policy making) 
operates in practice. The weight of evidence taking into account objective data and subjective 
interpretation, allows inductive processes to lead to conclusions. For as noted by Morgan, ‘it is not the 
abstract pursuit of knowledge through “inquiry” that is central to a pragmatic approach, but rather the 
attempt to gain knowledge in the pursuit of desired ends.’24  This dissertation adopts a pragmatism 
worldview. 
2 Approach 
As a response to complexity, policy research is characterised by a pragmatic mix of methods.
25
 As no 
comprehensive methodology for policy research exists, researchers may selectively apply several 
methods to address the research issue.
26
  This dissertation uses a doctrinal and purposeful enquiry 
method to explore the large policy and taxation issues. This involves the selective review and 
integration of information from multiple disciplines. The gathered information is used to the extent that 
it clarifies the research issues. This involves interpretative and qualitative analysis. This approach relies 
heavily on a normative foundation but extends to consider human behaviour.  
Fiscal analysis is used to assess the funding capacity of Australian governments. Natural resource 
management expenditure by governments includes that pertinent to managing, maintaining, protecting, 
promoting, improving, and mitigating human impact.  A detailed analysis of government accounts was 
needed to obtain a reasonable estimate of how much is actually invested by governments in the 
environment. This allows a comparison to be made between a reasonable estimate of actual 
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environmental expenditure and an estimate of the expenditure required to meet natural resource 
management targets. 
An empirical approach is used to preliminary test the hypothesis that there is an important behavioural 
difference between government grants, taxation incentives and a farmer-led taxation leveraged 
approach to rural natural resource governance. For the empirical evidence component, this dissertation 
adopts a mixed methods research approach, using both qualitative and quantitative methods within the 
same study. One of the advantages of a mixed methods approach is the potential for gaining a deeper 
and more complete understanding of the research issues by uniting both a qualitative and a quantitative 
stance. The empirical evidence component is outlined in greater detail in chapter VI. This information 
is provided later in the dissertation as a stepping stone into the survey responses and data analysis in 
chapter VII. 
D Justification for the Research 
Eco-services are important to human well-being. They provide food, medicines, fresh water, wood and 
fibre. They regulate flood damage, soil erosion, diseases, nutrient cycles and soil formation. They are 
important for aesthetics, education and recreational purposes. However, current economic and 
environmental pressures (discussed in the body of the dissertation) suggest that the fiscal capacity of 
Australian governments to maintain a sustainable level of environmental capital will deteriorate. Fiscal 
issues will become a fundamental barrier to environmental conservation, a momentous problem at a 
time of land use intensification and climate change. Unless an alternative conservation funding model 
is adopted, governments will have to rely on a diminishing taxation base and regulation, which may 
lead to economic inefficiencies, policy failures and political conflict. Martin and others assert that 
innovative measures to encourage private conservation funding are required to protect Australia’s 
natural assets.
27
 
The importance of the issues discussed in this dissertation is underscored by the findings of the 
Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (‘MA’), requested by the UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan. The 
MA commenced in 2001 with the support of governments bound by international conventions. Its 
objective was ‘to assess the consequences of ecosystem change for human well-being and to establish 
the scientific basis for actions needed to enhance the conservation and sustainable use of ecosystems 
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and their contributions to human well-being.’28 The MA ‘synthesizes information from the scientific 
literature and relevant peer reviewed datasets and models’ that analyses the state of the world’s 
ecosystems and provides summaries and guidelines for decision-makers.
29 
 The statement from the MA 
Board draws ten crucial implications from the assessment:
30
 
 Everyone in the world depends on nature and ecosystem services to provide the conditions for a 
decent, healthy, and secure life. 
 Humans have made unprecedented changes to ecosystems in recent decades to meet growing 
demands for food, fresh water, fibre, and energy. 
 These changes have helped to improve the lives of billions, but at the same time they weakened 
nature’s ability to deliver other key services such as purification of air and water, protection 
from disasters, and the provision of medicines. 
 Among the outstanding problems identified by this assessment are the dire state of many of the 
world’s fish stocks; the intense vulnerability of the 2 billion people living in dry regions to the 
loss of ecosystem services, including water supply; and the growing threat to ecosystems from 
climate change and nutrient pollution. 
 Human activities have taken the planet to the edge of a massive wave of species extinctions, 
further threatening our own well-being. 
 The loss of services derived from ecosystems is a significant barrier to the achievement of the 
Millennium Development Goals to reduce poverty, hunger, and disease. 
 The pressures on ecosystems will increase globally in coming decades unless human attitudes 
and actions change. 
 Measures to conserve natural resources are more likely to succeed if local communities are 
given ownership of them, share the benefits, and are involved in decisions. 
 Even today’s technology and knowledge can reduce considerably the human impact on 
ecosystems. They are unlikely to be deployed fully, however, until ecosystem services cease to 
be perceived as free and limitless, and their full value is taken into account. 
 Better protection of natural assets will require coordinated efforts across all sections of 
governments, businesses, and international institutions. The productivity of ecosystems 
depends on policy choices on investment, trade, subsidy, taxation, and regulation, among 
others. 
The MA Board highlights that eco-services are perceived as ‘free and limitless’ but their full value 
should be taken into account in every human undertaking. The provision of eco-services should be 
recognised and paid for to decrease human impact upon ecosystems. The provision of eco-services 
depends on appropriate policy mechanisms such as taxes, subsidies and regulation. 
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The Australian State of the Environment 2011 Report gives a sobering assessment of ecological 
sustainability in Australia:
31
  
Our ecosystems, biodiversity and heritage are vulnerable to the choices we make. At the same time, we 
depend on them for our survival and wellbeing. Our ecosystems, and the biodiversity they support, provide 
services that are fundamental to human life, such as regulation of the atmosphere, maintenance of soil 
fertility, food production, filtration of water, and pest control. The major future drivers of change – climate 
change, population growth, economic development and associated consumption of natural resources, as well 
as the pressures that these drivers place on the environment - will need to be managed carefully if our society 
is to achieve a sustainable relationship with the Australian environment. 
In 1798, Thomas Robert Malthus asserted that the human population increases geometrically while 
food production increases only arithmetically.
32
 He reasoned that as a consequence, the human 
population would eventually outstrip the power of the earth to provide food. This would lead 
inexorably to famine, pestilence and/or war. Malthus’ mathematical population conjecture is wrong 
because the human population does not grow exponentially. As to food, science and technology has 
transformed production allowing more efficient means of generating food. Since 1800 the population 
has increased from approximately 98 million people,
33
  to over 7 billion people in 2011.
34
 Nonetheless, 
the main thrust of Malthus’ arguments still resonates. Neo-Malthusians contend that the human 
population will outstrip resources such as oil, coal, gas, clean air, clean water, farmland, forests, and 
fisheries. It remains to be seen whether or not human ingenuity will prove the Neo-Malthusians 
incorrect, but the rationale for conservation as risk management is hard to dismiss. 
It is the UN’s position that population growth does not lead inevitably to ‘catastrophic degradation of 
the environment’ but it does place more pressure on natural resources and eco-services.35 Furthermore, 
there are increased demands for energy and increased competition for land and water. ‘What population 
growth does is to scale up what are already formidable challenges’ for sustainability and the 
environment.
36
 Direct government funding is the predominant approach for financing resource 
conservation and restoration activities. Declining fertility and mortality rates which have led to an 
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ageing population means (assuming a similar tax system in the future) that there will be a diminishing 
income taxation base to meet economic welfare objectives such as pensions, social security schemes 
and health care.
37
 With decreasing taxation revenue and increasing budgetary burdens imposed by an 
ageing population it seems highly unlikely that public funds can address the ‘scaled up’ challenges to 
the environment.  
E Chapter Outline 
The rest of this thesis explores the funding and taxation issues using the following structure. 
II Conservation Funding and the Requirement for a New Funding Model  disscusses the 
importance of involving private landholdings in conservation activities. There is no reliable set of 
indicators for assessing the state of natural resources in Australia, and the lack of accurate nationwide 
environmental data affects the assessment of our environment. As a result it is not possible to assess 
what investment is required to achieve a nationally desirable state of the environment (even assuming 
that a national consensus was possible in practice). Drawing on available sources the chapter provides 
information on conservation expenditure by governments, communities, private landholders, 
businesses, indigenous Australians, non-government organisations, and individual volunteers. The 
chapter argues that there is a conservation funding gap between actual and required expenditure, even 
though qualification of this gap is not feasible. 
This chapter outlines why it is necessary to move from the present government and landholder reliant 
conservation funding approach. Without a new model for conservation investment, funding will fall 
well short of the levels required to maintain a reasonable quality of environmental capital. 
III Behavioural Aspects outlines behavioural motivators and drivers that influence private landholder 
uptake of conservation schemes. Behaviour which deviates from the economic rational model may 
occur due to internal factors such as habits, emotions, personal capacity, and biases. Behavioural 
factors influence the outcome of policy arrangements in that they can either complement or constrain 
the effects of policies. The interaction between factors influencing landholder participation and non-
participation is complex and not yet fully understood. Conservation activities are subject to high 
transaction costs, uncertainty, and economic risk. The magnitude of transaction costs can affect 
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landholder participation in conservation schemes as uptake is largely influenced by the perception of 
private transaction costs. 
IV Government Grants considers the role of government conservation grants. Government grants are 
the prevalent funding mechanism for conservation on private landholdings apart from landholder 
funding. The chapter provides a breakdown of the application process, authorisation requirements, 
compliance requirements and training and support. General assertions are made about the opportunity 
and transaction costs of this mechanism to encourage conservation works. 
V Regional On-site Conservation Program and the Use of Tax Incentives to Encourage 
Conservation Investment proposes a funding model to attract private philanthropic and commercial 
funds into conservation investments and to deliver eco-services, including those tied to production. The 
model is designed to deliver high levels of program ownership (echoing the view of the Millennium 
Ecosystem Assessment Board that conservation programs are more likely to succeed if local 
communities are given ownership of them). The model is built upon investment fund management 
structures and taxation arrangements from other areas of public and private good investment. 
VI Methodology – Empirical Component describes the method used to obtain information about the 
views of private landholders concerning conservation funding. The chapter describes the selection of 
participants and survey design. The dissertation adopts a pragmatism worldview which values both 
objective and subjective knowledge. Its purpose is to test if there is sufficient evidence to suggest that, 
contrary to economic orthodoxy, there may be a behavioural difference between taxation and other 
instruments, sufficient to warrant further investigation for the design of more fiscally effective 
landscape conservation. 
VII Responses and Data Analysis of Survey presents the survey data and analyses. Respondent’s 
statements (qualititive data) are coded and interpreted to make assertions as to why the respondents 
have chosen a particular funding model and what factors shaped their choice. The empirical evidence 
presented in this chapter supports (but does not prove) the hypothesis that there is a behavioural 
response difference between government grants, taxation incentives, and other conservation funding 
mechanisms. 
VIII Conclusion draws together the arguments in the previous chapters. This chapter summarises the 
conclusions from the research and discusses the limitations of the research. It reviews the justification 
for a taxation based approach to economic incentives to encourage private rural conservation, from a 
policy and behavioural perspective. It outlines the policy rationale for an alternative approach to the 
15 
 
existing approaches to funding rural natural resource conservation and restoration activities on private 
landholdings. It reviews the behavioural rationale for a privately funded approach to rural natural 
resource governance. It suggests that there is a basis for the hypothesis that there is an important 
behavioural difference between government grants, taxation incentives and a farmer-led taxation 
leveraged approach to rural natural resource governance 
Appendix 1 contains background information on the interaction of the taxation system and 
conservation. This information underscores many assertions in this dissertation. This information is in 
an appendix because placing this information in the body would have disturbed the flow of arguments. 
It is noted that taxation is a blunt tool. By using it to encourage social objectives, there may be 
unintended side effects. This appendix considers tax evasion, tax avoidance, tax planning and the 
general provision to counter arrangements designed to avoid tax. At the end of this appendix, 
suggestions are made as to how tax may recognise positive externalities produced by conservation and 
encourage conservation on private land. 
F  Concepts and Definitions 
1 Conservation, Sustainability and Sustainable Agriculture 
The Macquarie Dictionary defines conservation as ‘the preservation or conserving of natural resources, 
as water, coal, etc.’38 The International Union for Conservation of Nature (‘IUCN’) defines 
conservation as ‘[t]he protection, care, management and maintenance of ecosystems, habitats, wildlife 
species and populations, within or outside of their natural environments, in order to safeguard the 
natural conditions for their long-term permanence.’39 These definitions are passive. For the purposes of 
this dissertation, conservation also includes: restoring the environment after damage; operations to 
prevent or mitigate social and economic activities impacting on the environment; and enhancing habitat 
to encourage the growth of native fauna and flora. 
A term that is used in conjunction with the term conservation and sometimes interchangeably with it, is 
sustainability. The IUCN defines sustainability as: 
40
 
… the adequate access, use and management of the natural resources, to ensure that the men and women of 
present and future generations are able to meet their basic needs on an uninterrupted basis. Pattern of behavior 
that guarantees for each of the future generations, the option to enjoy, at the very least, the same level of 
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welfare enjoyed by the preceding generation. Emphasis is placed on the intergenerational equity of 
development.  
Sustainability is formed at the intersection of environmental, economic and social (community) 
interests.
41
   Social interests include: peace and order, public health, safety, security of public 
institutions (religious, family, legal, political and economic), general progress by development, quality 
of life, and the conservation of social resources. Environmental interests include waste minimisation, 
promoting ecological production techniques, mitigating harmful effects on natural resources, 
biodiversity protection, communication and edification of environmental issues, preventing landscape 
degradation, maintaining water and air quality, and habitat conservation. Economic interests include 
maximising national economic benefits, taxation, social security, employment, upholding productive 
property rights, promoting technological development, safeguarding legal institutions, constructing 
infrastructure, promoting competition, and maintaining access to natural resources. 
As sustainability exists at the intersection of environmental, economic, and social (community) 
interests it may be believed that all interests have to be considered on an equal basis. Stephen Morse, 
among many commentators, suggests that often more emphasis is placed upon economic interests to 
the detriment of ecological or social sustainability.
42
 However, sometimes priority is given to 
environmental interests to the detriment of social and economic interests. For example, commentators 
argue that water allocation from the Murray-Darling Basin (a stressed river system) under the Water 
Act 2007 (Cth) favours environmental interests over the socio-economic interests of local basin 
communities.
43
 Reduced water allocation to landholders directly leads to reduced food production, 
reduced farm profitability, and reduced on farm employment.
44
 In relation to indirect impacts, the 
Victorian Farmers Federation notes that:
 45
 
 
The indirect impacts of reduced water availability on regional communities are many and varied. 
They can however all be directly tracked back to reduced farm profit as a direct result of reduced 
water availability. 
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Indirect impacts are not merely limited to the increased costs in service provision borne by 
the remaining irrigators when water is transferred out of a region. A secure off farm income 
source becomes vital[.] [H]ealth and wellbeing of farm families begins to deteriorate due to 
increased stress and community support for various activities shrinks. 
 
These perspectives suggest that to some degree ‘sustainability’ is and will always be politically 
contestable. 
Sustainable agriculture is another term which is sometimes used. Definitions of sustainable agriculture 
lack precision. For example, s 16 of the Natural Heritage Trust of Australia Act 2007 (Cth) states: 
(1) For the purposes of this Act, sustainable agriculture means the use of agricultural practices and 
systems that maintain or improve the following:  
 (a)  the economic viability of agricultural production;  
 (b)  the social viability and well-being of rural communities;  
 (c)  the ecologically sustainable use of Australia's biodiversity;  
 (d)  the natural resource base;  
 (e)  ecosystems that are influenced by agricultural activities.  
(2)  To avoid doubt, for the purposes of this Act, property management planning in relation to the farm 
unit is taken to be sustainable agriculture.  
The above definition broadly encompasses viability, sustainability, natural resource management, and 
planning. The Standing Committee on Agriculture and Resource Management (‘SCARM’), in 1998, 
adopted indicators of the sustainability of Australian agriculture:
46
 
 Long Term Viability and Resilience of Farm Income; 
 Quality of Farm Managerial Skills; 
 Socio Economic Viability of Rural Communities; 
 Minimisation of Off-site Environmental Impacts (ie salinity, chemical residues); and 
 Conservation and Enhancement of the Resource Base (ie nutrient base, soil condition). 
The SCARM indicators are useful for assessing the level of sustainability achieved by the agriculture 
sector, but are only of slight relevance to determining whether or not ecological goals are achieved. 
While the terms sustainability, sustainable agriculture and conservation are sometimes used 
interchangeably, they for the most part have different goals and outcomes. For example, for the purpose 
of sustainability in agriculture production, chemicals may be used to retain soil structure, decrease 
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salinity, and retain moisture in semi-arid areas but this can have the effect of degrading water and air 
quality which affects conservation objectives such as the management and maintenance of 
ecosystems.
47
 Moreover, under the definition of sustainability there is no basis for differentiating 
among resources as the concept is based on ‘stocks and flows’ rather than resource units.48 One way to 
distinguish among resources is to consider the uniqueness of a particular resource and the ability to 
reverse the loss of a resource once it is gone.
49
 Natural capital is difficult or impossible to replace and 
there is the expectation that natural capital will provide future products and services, many as yet 
undiscovered.
50
  Other resources such as factories, buildings and other man-made structures can be 
rebuilt if lost or alternatives can serve an analogous purpose.
51
 Thus it can be argued that some 
resources, those unique or impossible to replace, should be protected above replaceable resources.  
2 Biodiversity 
As living organisms do not exist in isolation, biodiversity conservation becomes a factor in ensuring the 
survival of irreplaceable resources such as native fauna and flora. If we take a human centric position 
then biodiversity is important to the wellbeing of humanity as it provides ‘the broadest possible range 
of species that humans rely on for food, medicines and industrial uses.’52 Furthermore, biodiversity 
protects the ‘life-supporting ecosystems’ and facilitates the adaptation of fauna and flora to 
environmental change.
53
  
Article 2 of the Convention of Biological Diversity, opened for signature 5 June 1992, ICCBD 1 
(entered into force 29 December 1993) defines biodiversity as ‘the variability among living organisms 
from all sources including, inter alia, terrestrial, marine and other aquatic ecosystems and the 
ecological complexes of which they are part; this includes diversity within species, between species 
and of ecosystems.’ The key components of any definition of biodiversity are:54  
biodiversity is not just about numbers of species, but about appropriate and intact communities and the 
complex interaction between species, habitats, generations, genetic variability within species, habitats, 
generations, genetic variability within species, climate and so forth. The term ‘biodiversity’ acknowledges 
that the natural world is a whole living system, and we are part of it. 
Biodiversity encompasses genetic diversity, species diversity, and ecosystems. 
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3 Taxation Incentives and Government Grants 
A taxation incentive, also referred to as ‘tax expenditure’, ‘is a provision of the tax law that provides a 
benefit to a specified activity or class of taxpayer that is concessional when compared to the “standard” 
tax treatment that would apply.’55 Taxation incentives ‘can be provided in many forms, including tax 
exemptions, tax deductions, tax offsets, concessional tax rates or deferrals of tax liability.’56 Tax 
incentives can encourage expenditure, investment and commercial activity. 
Government grants are direct financial payments usually distributed by a government department to 
fund a specific project or activity such as climate change adjustment programs and biosecurity. Most 
government grants require the submission of an application and are limited by eligibility criteria. If 
successful in receiving funding, there are usually conditions on how the funds can be utilised (ie as set 
out in the funding deed) and some form of review, compliance and reporting.  
The major difference between taxation incentives and government grants is the process for obtaining 
the benefits. The benefit of taxation incentives by their very nature are obtained under the tax system. 
However, in order for a particular tax incentive to be attractive and potentially change the behaviour of 
the targeted audience, the transaction costs of obtaining the benefit should be low. ‘In some countries 
businesses forgo incentives because of the high indirect costs of obtaining them. For example, many 
Canadian firms gave up the tax incentive for research and development because the approval and audit 
processes were too costly.’57 Sebastian James suggests that if government wishes to minimise costs to 
taxpayers, minimise monitoring costs, and mitigate tax evasion and avoidance, the following should be 
considered when designing a tax incentive:
58
 
 Automatic Endowment – Eligibility should be based on clear and concise rules with taxpayers 
attaining the benefit upon satisfying the stipulations of the relevant tax provision. When tax 
incentives are discretionary in nature and based on an approval process then the taxpayer may 
face considerable costs in terms of time and administration. Moreover, under a discretionary 
provision there is no guarantee that the incentive will be granted, and as a consequence 
taxpayers may decide that it is not worth the bother of applying; 
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 Incorporation of the Provisions into the Tax Legislation – This will ensure that the incentive 
is administered by the tax agency that has the capacity and experience in such matters; and 
 Compliance Mechanisms – For monitoring purposes the lodgement of tax returns and relevant 
forms should be compulsory as a precondition for obtaining the tax benefit. 
Under these guidelines tax incentives to encourage conservation works will be received automatically 
upon satisfying the conditions required by the tax legislation, be administered by the Australian 
Taxation Office, and the lodgement of a tax return will be a precondition for obtaining the benefit. 
Consequently, the taxpayer will determine whether or not they meet the requirements as set out in the 
tax law on a self-assessment basis. Moreover, an individual will be required to expend funds before 
they can obtain the benefit. 
In contrast, government grants provide direct revenue but the application process, the eligibility 
criteria, the expenditure constraints and reporting requirement are different and may all be onerous but 
in some situations funds may be distributed without a written application (eg electric vehicle grants). 
As such, because of the different processes for obtaining the benefits, it is the contention of this 
dissertation that taxation incentives bring about a different behavioural response in comparison to 
government grants. 
Under economic theory, the argument is that the opportunity cost of government grants, as opposed to 
taxation incentives, is higher for income producing landholders than for non-income producing 
landholders. Scarcity, the fundamental economic problem, is the strain between unlimited wants and 
limited resources. As a result of scarcity, choosing between different activities and resources requires 
the weighing of benefits, costs and trade-offs. Opportunity cost is the cost of an activity measured in 
terms of the best alternative activity forgone. That is, it is a measure of the trade-off of using a resource 
in one activity compared to using the resource in another activity (the opportunity lost). Opportunity 
cost is wider than just financial costs (forgone income, increased expenses etc.) It also includes non-
monetary notions such as time, quality of life, and pleasure.
59
 As such, opportunity cost is partly 
subjective as only the individual affected by the trade-off can assess the value of the forgone activity.
60
 
The magnitude of opportunity costs can influence landholder participation in conservation schemes.  
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4 Eco-Services (Environmental Services) 
One of the fundamental undertakings in conservation schemes is the transaction of eco-services 
(property rights) between landholder producers and eco-service buyers / investors. The IUCN states 
that the term eco-services (environmental services) describe:
61
 
… qualitative (even spatial) functions provided by the natural resources. Three types of environmental 
services usually exist: a) deposit services, which reflect the functions of the natural household environment 
as an absorbent dump of the waste originated by household productive activities and industrial activities in 
general; b) productive, with respect to water, land and air resources, [(]which reflect the economic and 
ecological functions for human consumption, energy, and agricultural purposes, etc.); c) recreational and 
socialization services, covering the basic functions of the environment to meet the recreation and 
socialization needs as well as the cosmology of certain societies. 
If a broad view is taken of the above definition, natural resources provide food, water, clean air, energy, 
biodiversity, medicines, habitat protection, conservation capacity, minerals, nutrient cycling, carbon 
sequestration, waste decomposition, disease control, cultural services, and recreation. 
Private landholders manage natural resources in ways that produce eco-services. For the most part, the 
provision of these services goes unrewarded (positive externalities). In this dissertation it is argued that 
good natural resource management should be recognised and incentives should be provided to 
encourage the generation of eco-services. For example, incentives could be made available to private 
landholders who provide wildlife corridors in order to overcome fauna habitat fragmentation. 
5 Transaction Costs and Institutions 
The magnitude of transaction costs can affect landholder participation in conservation schemes. A 
transaction cost is the cost of carrying out a transaction, in addition to the price paid for a good or a 
service when participating in a market. Transaction costs may include checking that the proprietary title 
lies in the seller, verifying the market value of similar items, negotiating a binding legal agreement, 
monitoring compliance with the agreement, and enforcing rights. The major transaction costs 
categories comprise market based costs, administrative/managerial costs, and political costs:
62
 
Market TC consist mainly of costs of information, bargaining/negotiation over transactions, contracting 
(formal or informal), monitoring and enforcement of agreements, and search and information costs. In order 
to carry out a market transaction, it is relevant to discover the corresponding participants in the transaction, to 
conduct negotiations or communications leading up to an agreement or contract, to draw up the contract 
(formal or otherwise), undertake relevant monitoring and enforcement activities and so on … Managerial TC 
comprise the costs of setting up or establishment and/or adaptation of organizational features, costs of 
operating an organizational entity, including those of information gathering and processing as well as 
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alternative modes of resource deployment. Political TC are quite general, and need to be specified in terms of 
system characteristics for specific assessment. In general, these could also be conceived as a set of costs of 
broader institutional configurations within which other institutions and organizations exist (or are allowed to 
operate). 
Transaction costs may affect landholder participation in a conservation scheme, and low participation 
reduces the potential benefit of the scheme. An insight in how transaction costs could affect 
participation in grant programs to encourage conservation may be gleaned from income support 
programs (aimed at supporting groups such as the elderly, the disabled, families etc.) in the US.
63
 It has 
been suggested that transaction costs associated with enrolling in income support programs (ie filling in 
forms, participating in interviews, collecting and providing documentation, and visiting offices) 
discourage participation.
64
 ‘The result is that the [seemingly] small costs associated with take-up – 
sometimes referred to as hassle costs - might have a bigger impact on participation than … accounting 
would indicate.’65  Transaction costs can also lead to procrastination.66 
Scott Steele notes that transaction costs may affect the mode of exchange for conservation services.
67
 
Unlike mature markets for consumer goods and services, markets for conservation services are 
‘underdeveloped or non-existent and require the development of legal and institutional structures.’68 
The development of markets to appropriately price eco-services and the administration of those 
markets involve transaction costs. The many eco-services (ie fresh air, bio-diversity, salinity control, 
nutrient cycling, fauna habitat etc.) that may be obtained from landholders and the many potential 
buyers and sellers of eco-services, make transaction costs a significant concern.
69
 ‘In the environmental 
service area, adjusting markets and policy to account for a changing environmental circumstances and 
advances in scientific understanding creates adjustment costs – an additional type of transaction cost – 
which can be large, depending on institutional design.’70 
Where markets are thin (lack of supply and demand), as may be the situation for certain eco-service 
markets, then transaction costs are likely to be high as competitive forces will not operate effectively to 
lower costs. However, the market is only one of many institutions to facilitate the allocation of 
resources. Institutions are basically rules which enable transactions to be processed. For the purposes of 
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this dissertation institutions are a system of ‘hierarchical man-made rules that structure behavior and 
social interaction.’ 71 Different mechanisms will have different effects on transaction costs and as such, 
some mechanisms will be more effective in minimising transaction costs than others. This is because 
the rules and associated arrangements can generate or reduce transaction costs by shaping the terms of 
administration, contractual arrangements, enforcement, and information distribution. 
6 Externalities 
Private landholders manage natural resources in ways that produce negative or positive externalities. 
Competitive markets can only be efficient when all benefits and costs are allocated to the parties to the 
transaction.
72
 An externality is a benefit or a cost that affects an individual other than those involved in 
the transaction.
73
 An example of a negative externality is pollution from a factory which enters a river 
and adversely affects individuals downstream. On a worldwide scale, human activities have led to the 
negative externality of environment destruction and the consequent loss of environmental services. An 
example of a positive externality is where a beekeeper maintains bees to produce honey and the bees 
also pollinate surrounding crops. The result of externalities is that the prices of goods do not reflect 
their true cost.  Moreover, negative externalities lead to over investment and over consumption and 
positive externalities lead to under investment and under consumption (ie undersupply of non-market 
eco-services such as biodiversity). 
G Which Mechanism is the Best for Promoting Conservation? 
When proposing the research topic, it was suggested by several individuals from the commercial world, 
that the ‘invisible hand’ of the free market and private property rights are superior mechanisms for 
addressing environmental problems than schemes involving government intervention. Institutions are 
the rules of the game such as the legal system, the financial system, informal social norms, and self-
imposed ethical codes.
74
 Organisations are the players in the game such as firms, universities, law 
societies, farmer associations, and environmental agencies.
75
 Institutions and organisations have a 
symbiotic relationship. Organisations arise because of incentives (eg tax incentives) created by the 
institutional framework but the institutional framework is developed and amended through the political 
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lobbying of organisations. In promoting conservation, the position of this dissertation is that the focus 
should be on which organisation / mechanism ‘will do the better job of promoting social objectives at 
the lowest cost in a given situation.’76 This matter is central to the discussions regarding funding 
mechanisms in the proceeding chapters.  
Under economic theory, the justification for government involvement in natural resource management 
is market failure such as negative externalities, the tragedy of the commons, missing markets and loss 
of public goods. An individual's pursuit of self-interest leads to results that are inefficient such as the 
under provision of conservation. Market failure occurs where inefficient allocation of goods and 
services leads to socially undesirable results such as inequities.
77
 The outcome is not Pareto optimal. 
Pareto efficiency (named after the economist Vilfredo Pareto, 1848 - 1923) occurs where no additional 
allocation of resources is possible that will make at least one individual better off without making 
another individual worse off.
78
 Economists view inefficient allocations as undesirable as they detract 
from the optimality of social net benefit. Government intervention (eg indicative rules, monetary 
incentives, regulation, legal private monopolies, public monopolies) may improve inefficient market 
outcomes. 
Ronald H Coase in “The Problem of Social Cost”79 demonstrated, from an economic point of view in 
contrast to a legal point of view, the counter intuitive idea that negative externalities are not the fault of 
one party but rather are the reciprocal problem of two parties engaged in conflicting activities. For 
instance, in reviewing Bryant v Lefever (1879) 4 CPD 172, Coase argued that both parties were 
responsible for smoke nuisance. The plaintiff and the defendants were neighbours and after more than 
twenty years the defendants raised the walls of their house such that it obstructed the free access of air 
to the plaintiff’s chimneys and caused his chimneys to smoke. In the first instance the jury awarded 
damages in favour of the plaintiff. It held, in substance, that: for more than twenty years there had been 
free access to air; the plaintiff had a right to that free access. By raising their walls, the defendants had 
interfered with the plaintiff’s enjoyment of his property.  The defendants appealed. The Court of 
Appeal held that no cause of action could be maintained on the ground of a prescriptive easement or on 
nuisance. Lord Justice Cotton asserted that the plaintiff had no legal right to an uninterrupted flow of 
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air. It was the plaintiff who created the smoke which interfered with his own enjoyment.
80
 By Coase’s 
economic logic, which is an anathema to torts law, both parties caused the damage in that there would 
not have been a problem if the defendants had not raised their walls and there would not have been a 
problem if the plaintiff had not lit his fires.
81
 In Coase’s view, ‘[i]f we are to attain an optimum 
allocation of resources, it is therefore desirable that both parties should take the harmful effect (the 
nuisance) into account in deciding on their course of action.’ 82 
A justification for government involvement in natural resource management may be where property 
rights are uncertain.  As with externalities, goods may not reflect their true cost where property rights 
are unclear or incomplete. Under the tragedy of the commons theorem (popularised by Garrett Hardin) 
because common property resources (open access resources) can be accessed by all, no individual has 
an incentive to conserve these resources. 
83
 Hardin argued that ‘the incentive is toward using as much 
as you can before someone else gets it.’84 For example, fish in open territorial waters may provide an 
incentive for overfishing.
85
 If there is no mechanism to protect the fishery ecosystem, more boats will 
enter the fishing fleet to exploit the fish stocks until revenue falls below the costs of operating the 
boats; this point, the signal of unprofitability means some of the operators leave the industry. But the 
signal may be too late to return to fishing sustainability and economic efficiency. As long as each boat 
is profitable, the incentive is to continue fishing until overfishing ruins the fish stocks and the 
profitability of the operators. 
The importance of encouraging co-operative conservation action on an extensive spatial scale can be 
ascertained in the application of the prisoner’s dilemma. The dominant strategy equilibrium (the 
prisoner’s dilemma), a subset of the Nash equilibrium also helps in understanding the tragedy of the 
commons. The Nash equilibrium is an important component of game theory. Game theory is the study 
of mathematical equations which represent strategic decision making of individuals. The Nash 
equilibrium is a solution concept of a game involving two or more individuals under which each 
individual is assumed to know the strategies of the other, and no individual has any unilateral incentive 
to change their own strategy. Each individual has a set of actions from which they are allowed to 
choose. When each individual uses a strategy that maximises their own reward, given the choices of the 
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other, then equilibrium will occur.
86
 Under the dominant strategy equilibrium an individual (player) in 
pursuit of self-interest adopts a strategy which is preferable to the other strategies regardless of the 
strategy adopted by the other individual (player). For example, if two graziers use open access land and 
the land has an optimal grazing level of head per hectare, the pursuit of unilateral self-interest will lead 
to over grazing and thus fewer dollars per head upon sale due to lower body weight.  Using arbitrary 
numbers, the payoffs for two graziers (Bob and Sue) under a ‘prisoner’s dilemma’ scenario are 
represented in table I-1.
87
  
Table I-1 'Prisoners Dilemma' for Graziers Using Open Access Land 
G
ra
zi
er
 -
 B
o
b
  
Grazier - Sue 
Small Mob of Cattle Large Mob of Cattle 
Small Mob of Cattle 200, 200 80, 260 
Large Mob of Cattle 260, 80 120, 120 
Both graziers can run a small mob or a large mob of cattle. Running a large mob of cattle will 
detrimentally affect the other grazier. The first number in the cell is Bob’s payoff and the second 
number in the cell is Sue’s payoff. If Bob believes that Sue will run a small mob of cattle then he will 
do better if he runs a large mob of cattle. On the other hand, if Bob believes Sue will run a large mob of 
cattle then he will still be better off running a large mob of cattle. A payoff of 260 is better than 200 if 
Sue chooses a small mob and 120 is better than 80 if Sue chooses a large mob. The same reasoning also 
applies to Sue. The dominant strategy to run a large mob of cattle leads to a collective payoff of 240 
(120+120). 
The dominant strategy does not lead to the best overall reward. The graziers would have been 
collectively better off if they had co-operated and both had chosen to run a small mob of cattle (200 + 
200 = 400). ‘The prisoner’s dilemma shows that without appropriate incentives the pursuit of self-
interest can be self-defeating.’88 This idea of an appropriate incentive represents the crux of this 
dissertation. That is, an appropriate incentive will promote conservation works at a reasonable cost, 
with minimal administration.  
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Promoting conservation activities within a framework of landscape change on private landholdings 
brings to the forefront environmental public good, such as biodiversity, clean air, the ozone layer, 
scenic views, free flowing rivers, and the enjoyment of open spaces. Pure public goods are ‘non-
excludable’ and ‘non-rival.’ Non-excludability refers to the situation where once the good is provided it 
is impossible or exorbitantly expensive to exclude others from enjoying the benefit. Non-rivalry refers 
to the situation where an individual’s consumption of the good does not reduce the amount of the good 
available to others. For example, breathing of clean air by one individual does not prevent another 
breathing clean air. Not all public goods are perfectly non-rival.
89
 For instance, the enjoyment of a 
national park will be affected by overcrowding. Consequently, a national park is a congestible public 
good under which high levels of use affect the enjoyment of the resource. Irrespective of whether a 
resource is a pure public good or a congestible public good, they are subject to the ‘free rider’ effect. A 
free rider is an individual who derives a benefit from a resource without paying for its supply. Once 
public goods are supplied, individuals have an incentive to be free riders because they can enjoy the 
benefit while using their retained resources to acquire private goods.  
It may seem that the obvious solution to the free rider effect is a method to control access to the 
resource, using market forces to determine the level of demand. This would lead to an inefficient 
supply. ‘With public goods, the problem is on the demand side. The ordinary market process will lead 
to a low efficient demand for public goods (possibly a zero demand), despite the fact that the public 
needs these goods.’90 It is inefficient from an economic point of view to exclude an individual from a 
non-rivalrous public good where the cost of allowing them access is zero.  
In applying public good theory it is noted that individuals and non-government organisations undertake 
significant private conservation activities. However, they do not have the wherewithal to offset the 
increasing environmental degradation (this underscores the assertion in this dissertation that private 
conservation funding is required to meet the requirements of national environmental conservation). 
While public goods theory implies that the free market will undersupply public goods it does not mean 
that there will always be a zero provision. It may be that some services are inaccurately designated by 
economists as those which can only be provided by the government. For instance, Coase underscores 
how lighthouses were erroneously employed as illustrations of a service which would not or should not 
be provided by private enterprise.
91
 In reviewing the historical background of lighthouse services in 
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England and Wales, Coase discovered that lighthouses had been ‘built, operated, financed and owned 
by private individuals, who could sell the lighthouse or dispose of it by bequest.’ 92 Later, all lighthouse 
services were delegated to Trinity House, a private corporation which pursued the public interest. The 
incentive for private enterprises in building and operating the lighthouses were tolls (lighthouse duties) 
which were collected by agents of the private enterprise from ships visiting ports. This is different to a 
totally free market situation where supply and demand would determine price, regulation stipulated the 
toll that could be charged. ‘The role of the government was limited to the establishment and 
enforcement of property rights in the lighthouse.’93 While his research did not allow him to conclude 
which is the most appropriate method for organising and financing lighthouse services, Coase did not 
see any tangible basis for the assertion that lighthouse services should be paid for out of general 
taxation funds in order to ensure economic efficiency. 
Paul A Samuelson argues that the supply of public goods (eg conservation) will be efficient where the 
sum of all individual’s willingness to substitute ‘private consumption goods’ (willingness to pay) 
equals the marginal rate of transformation of the private consumption goods into ‘collective 
consumption goods’ (public goods).94 The more the community increases its demand for a particular 
public good, the higher the sacrifice of private goods that is required in order to produce that public 
good.
95
  If we assume that all the discrete ‘private consumption goods’ can be expressed in a fixed 
price (numéraire goods) then another way to express the Samuelson efficiency condition is that the 
supply of a public good will be efficient where the marginal social benefit (the collective benefit from 
the provision of the public good) is equal to the marginal cost of providing that public good. In this 
instance, the marginal social benefit can also be viewed as the aggregate demand or the aggregate 
willingness to pay. Samuelson notes that the market system, which he calls a decentralised pricing 
system, will not produce truthful preference revelation for public goods as it is in ‘the selfish interest of 
each person to give false signals’ so as to reduce their financial liability for the production of public 
goods.
96
 Samuelson states that another method for ascertaining aggregate individual preferences for 
public goods is required but the stumbling block is in discovering an appropriate method which will 
reveal the collective willingness to pay:
 97
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The failure of market catallactics in no way denies the following truth: given sufficient knowledge the optimal 
decisions can always be found by scanning over all the attainable states of the world and selecting the one 
which according to the postulated ethical welfare function is best. The solution “exists”; the problem is how 
to “find” it. 
One of the underlying assumptions of this dissertation is that the capacity of Australian Governments to 
fund conservation is limited. Governments often pay for public goods via general funds raised through 
borrowings and taxation. In practice, ministers and government officials decide what is best for the 
community with all decisions ultimately constrained by a budget allocation.
98
 It is probable that a free 
market will undersupply public goods but by relying on the assessments of ministers and government 
officials there is also the probability that public goods will be supplied in an inequitable manner. If a 
government agency has a strong conviction in the public goods it provides to the community and it can 
back this up with relevant evidence, then it may argue for a budget allocation above that strictly 
required for economic efficiency.
99
 On the other hand, political ideology and decreasing public 
revenues may mean that a budget allocation is below that required. 
Where public funding is limited Australian governments may turn to other tools to address market 
failure and environmental problems. Other policy options include command and control regulation, 
fines, taxation, tax exemptions, tax incentives, creation and enforcement of property rights, cap and 
trade schemes, public purchasing programs, education programs, and information provisions (ie 
product labeling). As environmental problems may have different characteristics, several policy 
instruments may be used in conjunction.  
A popular government intervention method in addressing negative externalities is Pigouvian taxes 
(named after the economist Arthur Cecil Pigou, 1877 – 1959).100 A Pigouvian tax, is a tax imposed that 
is equal in value to the cost of the negative externality. Theoretically the Pigouvian tax “internalises” 
the cost to those parties producing the negative externality and closes the gap between marginal private 
interests and marginal social interests. Pigou, in The Economics of Welfare, argues that economic 
optimality will be achieved where the tax is set equal to the marginal social cost,
101
 as the harm does 
decrease the quantity of harm to the point where the marginal benefit (alternatively the marginal 
abatement cost) equals the marginal external cost (alternatively the marginal benefit from 
abatement).
102
  Pure Pigouvian taxes are created in order to change the behavior of a harm doer and any 
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revenues raised as a consequence of the imposition of the tax are of ‘secondary importance.’103 It is 
probable that firms will pass on their increased costs to their customers by increased prices but this 
must be balanced against the tax payments to the government, which if used efficiently and effectively, 
benefit society. 
A problem with Pigouvian taxes is the inability to accurately measure the marginal social costs of 
negative externalities. If regulators are not provisioned with full information, then the point at which 
the tax is set is arbitrary. If the tax is set too low then harms may result above that which is socially 
optimal. If the tax is set too high then this may result in excess resources being allocated to abatement. 
A further problem with the implementation of Pigouvian taxes is the political and policy process. A 
decision to apply a tax and the level at which it is set may be based more on policy goals and budgetary 
confines rather than on a paramount desire to decrease negative externalities. For instance, Thomas A 
Barthold in critiquing Federal environmental excise taxes in the US and, particularly, a tax on ozone-
depleting chemicals which had the prima facie goal of reducing the use of chlorofluorocarbons, 
noted:
104
  
 Environmental taxes deviate from the dictates of economic theory because the economic models 
do not take into account political considerations or the real-world problems of design and 
implementation;
105
  
 Primacy may be given to fiscal issues and secondary consideration may be given to changing 
the behaviour of polluters.
106
 Furthermore, the base rate of the tax may be determined by its 
effect on the public budget, such as employing a figure which creates budget neutrality, rather 
than determining the base rate by reference to the environmental harm;
107
 
 Pigouvian tax theory specifies that the tax should be imposed on the activity which creates the 
externality but high administrative costs may mean that the tax is imposed on a party who is 
easily identifiable but whose activities are preliminary to the creation of the externality; 
108
 
 Contrarily, a high cost administrative structure may be adopted if it supports another policy 
agenda. For instance, if there are concerns about the competiveness of domestic firms, the tax 
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may be imposed on imported products which contribute little to the negative externality. In the 
same vein of thought, an exemption may be granted on exports;
109
 and 
 ‘[P]oliticians prefer to confer benefits rather than impose costs. If costs must be imposed, there 
is a preference for hidden costs.’ As such, command and control regulation is favoured over 
Pigouvian taxes as the benefits of the regulation may be claimed in advance to implementation 
and the costs are hidden. With a Pigouvian tax, the costs of the tax are very public but the 
‘benefits are hidden in the working of the invisible hand.’ 110  
In addressing market failure such as conservation, there is the possibility that government intervention 
will bring about an inequitable outcome. Government failure occurs when government intervention 
brings about inefficient allocation of resources and, hence, further inequalities than would have 
occurred without interference in the market.  The systemic pressures within government may bring 
about an inefficient solution to the problem.
 111
  
Theoretically conservation on private land can be promoted without government intervention by 
applying the Coase theorem (ie ‘internalise’ an externality). In “The Problem of Social Cost” he argued 
that where property rights are well defined and there are no transactions costs, negotiation between 
parties will lead to an efficient allocation of resources even in the presence of externalities.
112
 Coase 
used the example of straying cattle which destroy crops on an unfenced neighbouring property to 
demonstrate that, without transaction costs, it is economically irrelevant who is assigned the initial 
property right (the right to allow cattle on to the neighbouring property or the right to exclude the 
cattle) because the parties would negotiate an agreement which maximises the value of production. If 
the farmer had the right to exclude cattle from her crops but it was economically effectual for the cattle 
to continue to wander onto the neighbouring property, then the grazier would pay the farmer damages. 
If the grazier had the right to allow her cattle to wander onto the neighbouring land but it was 
economically effectual to minimise the damage to the crops, then the farmer would pay the grazier to 
reduce her herd. If it is more cost effective to physically prevent the cattle from destroying the crops, 
then the outcome of the negotiations would be the building of a fence regardless of the allocation of 
liabilities and rights. 
A profitable party could pay the other party to waive their proprietary rights or to change their conduct. 
Under this scenario, the initial property rights allocation determines only the directions of the 
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distribution of funds under an agreement and not the economic efficiency of the agreement (the sum of 
the economic benefits and costs of the parties involved that is the total value of steers and crops). 
However, Coase acknowledged that it was unrealistic to assume no transaction costs:
 113
 
In order to carry out a market transaction it is necessary to discover who it is that one wishes to deal with, to 
inform people that one wishes to deal and on what terms, to conduct negotiations leading up to a bargain, to 
draw up the contract, to undertake the inspection needed to make sure that the terms of the contract are being 
observed, and so on. These operations are often extremely costly, sufficiently costly at any rate to prevent 
many transactions that would be carried out in a world in which the pricing system worked without cost. 
Transaction costs stand as a major impediment to promoting conservation on private landholdings. 
Transaction costs mean that the initial allocation of property rights ‘does have an effect on the 
efficiency with which the economic system operates.’114 From an economic perspective, a property 
right should be allocated to the party who will use it the most efficiently but no one knows before the 
event what the most efficient use of a resource is. Accordingly, Coase reasoned that a mechanism 
which can achieve the altering and combining of rights at less cost than the market ‘would enable the 
value of production to be raised.’115 Pure contractual institutions, firms, hybrids (a combination of 
market pragmatism and government support), taxation, and subsidies as well as some other form of 
government intervention should all be considered. Assuming no transaction costs, all institutional 
forms are capable of achieving an efficient economic outcome. However, because transaction costs 
exist in the real world, institutions can be evaluated on their ability to minimise transaction costs. 
Different mechanisms will have different effects on transaction costs and as such, some mechanisms 
will be more effective in minimising transaction costs than others.  
Theoretically, mechanisms to promote conservation on private landholdings, such as those discussed in 
this dissertation, can be compared and evaluated on their ability to maximise net social benefits (social 
efficiency).
116
 Social efficiency is measured by taking into account all benefits and costs. From an 
economic point of view, optimal social efficiency occurs where marginal social benefit equals marginal 
social cost. The difficulty in using this method to compare institutions whose objective is to promote 
conservation lies in the inability to accurately measure the benefits of environmental services. 
Economic valuation techniques provide a broad estimate of economic value but the methodologies 
suffer from many limiting factors. In addition, it is difficult to see how some environmental issues such 
as the conservation of threatened species and biodiversity can be fully evaluated in purely economic 
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terms.
117
 We cannot bring a species back once it is extinct and we are unclear as to the exact 
relationship between ecosystems and human wellbeing. If a government aims to prevent the extinction 
of a species, then the notion of efficiency may be irrelevant. From this observation comes the 
suggestion that best way to compare and contrast new funding models is by their ability to minimise 
transaction costs. It is beyond the scope of this dissertation to estimate the transaction cost 
consequences of funding models. 
What seems clear from the above discussion is that there is not one all-encompassing institutional 
arrangement or mechanism which can solve all environmental problems. In addressing market failure 
(eg under provision of conservation) some form of government invention is required. However, the 
fiscal capacity of Australian governments to meet conservation activities will come under pressure 
because of shifting environmental conditions, an ageing population and increased demands on 
government services; this is why recourse should be made to private sector conservation funding. 
H Summary 
This chapter provides an outline of the research problem, the methodology, and also highlights those 
factors which form the foundational information. A justification of the importance of the research was 
presented which noted the significance of eco-services, and the possible need for an alternative 
conservation funding model. An outline of the dissertation structure was also provided. The concepts 
and terms of significance to the central arguments of the dissertation were discussed and defined. The 
chapter then discussed and contrasted pertinent institutions. It was contended that the focus should not 
be on which institution is always the better one but rather the focus should be on which institution will 
do the better job of promoting social objectives at the lowest cost in a given situation.  
The research approach adopted in this dissertation is similar to an applied public policy research 
approach, which requires input from various disciplines, including law, economics and other social 
sciences, to fully appreciate the relevant social problem and to explore the research issues. The issues 
canvassed in this dissertation involve economic principles, finance principles, budgetary restraints, 
socio-economic forecasts, resource management concerns, behavioural responses, and policy issues. 
Under economic theory, the justification for government involvement in natural resource management 
is market failure such as negative externalities, the tragedy of the commons, missing markets and loss 
of public goods. Humans depend on natural capital to provide the conditions for a decent, healthy, and 
                                                 
117
 Harris, above n 84, 112. 
34 
 
secure life.  With public goods (biodiversity, clean air, the ozone layer, scenic views, free flowing 
rivers, and the enjoyment of open spaces) the ordinary market process will lead to a low efficient 
demand for public goods despite the fact that the public needs these goods. The market system will not 
produce truthful preference revelation for public goods as it is in the selfish interest of individuals to 
conceal their true preferences so as to reduce their financial liability. Another method for ascertaining 
aggregate individual preferences for public goods is required but the problem is in finding an 
appropriate method which will reveal the collective willingness to pay. 
Regardless of the policy tools used to address market failure, there is the possibility that government 
intervention will bring about an inequitable outcome. Government failure occurs when government 
intervention brings about inefficient allocation of resources and, hence, further inequalities than would 
have occurred without interference in the market.   
Governments often pay for public goods via general funds raised through borrowings and taxation. In 
practice, ministers and government officials decide what is best for the community with all decisions 
ultimately constrained by a budget allocation. With decreasing taxation revenue and increasing 
budgetary burdens imposed by an ageing population it seems highly unlikely that public funds can 
address the ‘scaled up’ challenges to the environment. Budgetary issues will become a fundamental 
barrier to environmental conservation. Unless an alternative conservation funding model is adopted, 
governments will have to rely on a diminishing taxation base and increased regulation, which may lead 
to economic inefficiencies, policy failures and political conflict. 
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II CONSERVATION FUNDING AND THE REQUIREMENT FOR A NEW CONSERVATION FUNDING MODEL 
‘Two hundred thousand in gold. It’s yours, just get me water.’ – Bill Carson 
The Good, the Bad and the Ugly: Extended English-Language Version (Directed by Sergio Leone, Metro Goldwyn Mayer, 
2003) 1:06:51. 
The author of this dissertation had the movie playing in the background while writing. The quote represents a point in the 
writing process where various ideas coalesced. 
A Overview 
As previously noted, as environmental problems have different characteristics, and different classes of 
individuals have dissimilar reactions to various incentives, several policy instruments may have to be 
used together to achieve an effect. The concept of smart regulation encompasses an integrated approach 
using policy instruments such as command and control, direct funding, taxation, property rights, market 
mechanisms, and education programs.  
This chapter focuses on positive conservation activities (eg restoring the environment after damage; 
operations to prevent or mitigate social and economic activities impacting on the environment; and 
enhancing habitat to encourage the growth of native fauna and flora) and explores the funding capacity 
of Australian governments to meet the ever expanding requirements of environmental conservation. It 
highlights that budgetary constraints may lead to a conflict between conservation goals and other 
important societal services and public goods. If, as is argued, there is a future curtailment in 
governmental expenditure on the environment then an alternative instrument must be found to address 
environmental problems. Australian governments could force private investment by increasing their 
reliance on command and control mechanisms but this may bring about the complicating factors of 
political backlash, increased bureaucracy to monitor compliance, stagnated innovation, inefficient 
allocation of resources, increased transactions costs, and administration inefficiencies. Also, regulation 
cannot force sustained positive action on private land. Alternatively, economic incentives may have the 
potential, in comparison to command and control, for cost savings, innovation, and effectiveness.  
Individuals and non-government organisations already undertake significant private conservation 
activities but sometimes they face debilitating constraints such as regulatory requirements.
118
 They do 
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not have the wherewithal to offset the increasing national degradation of water quality, air quality, and 
biodiversity.
119
 As underscored by the Industry Commission in its report on Ecologically Sustainable 
Land Management:
120
 
The voluntary actions of individuals, not-for-profit organisations and private firms are not likely to be 
sufficient to prevent each and every irreversible loss of natural capital – the transactions costs will simply be 
too great. The transactions costs of voluntary collective action are likely to increase with the scale of the 
habitat or ecological process in question. 
A logical inference is that an alternative funding model is required to reduce reliance on direct 
government funding and to avoid increased regulation. One option is a mechanism which stimulates 
extensive private investment into conservation. If extensive private conservation investment is to 
become a reality then Australian governments must define eco-service proprietary rights, clarify rights 
and responsibilities for conservation, create eco-service markets (ie cap and trade), enact rules which 
define, delimit and support the implementation of eco-service markets, remove regulations which 
constrain conservation on private landholdings, provide information and advice, set up institutions 
which will collect and maintain environmental data over the long term, encourage corporate investment 
into the environment for example through regulatory requirements, and implement appropriate 
institutional arrangements to minimise transaction costs.
121
  
This chapter begins with a review of the Australian State of the Environment 2011 report and the 
OECD Environmental Performance Reviews: Australia 2008. Both of these reports appraise the 
condition of the Australian environment and provide recommendations for improvement. A basic 
assumption of this research is that private landholdings are the linchpin of conservation on an extensive 
scale. An outline of the importance of private landholdings to conservation activities is provided. The 
lack of accurate information on natural resources is discussed concerning its detrimental effect on 
assessing conservation effectiveness and conservation return on investment. The discussion then 
considers the disjoint between the funding capacity of the Commonwealth and the responsibility for 
natural resource management and land use shared between the states and the Commonwealth. This 
chapter considers actual environmental expenditure, required expenditure, the curtailment of funding 
capacity due to pressures on government budgets, and the requirement for a new funding model. 
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In discussions with several economists it was asserted that conservation on private landholdings should 
be delayed until natural resources are valued in economic terms. Furthermore, in discussions with 
environmental scientists it was suggested that conservation on private landholdings should be delayed 
pending reliable environmental monitoring. These issues are raised in the latter part of the chapter. 
Based on the various assertions for and against immediate conservation intervention, it is argued that 
conservation works should not be delayed until there is an economic valuation of natural resource and 
nor should it be delayed until monitoring is completed. A major concern is that delay may increase the 
magnitude of funding required to combat environmental degradation. Delay may also result in 
threatened or endangered species going extinct. Overall this chapter considers the following research 
issues: 
1. Contrary to economic conventions, is there a justification for a taxation based approach to 
economic incentives to encourage private rural conservation, from a policy and behavioural 
perspective? 
2. Is there a policy rationale for an alternative to the existing approaches to funding rural natural 
resource conservation and restoration activities on private farmland? 
B The State of the Environment 
The Australian State of the Environment Report (SOE2011) appraises the condition of the Australian 
environment and provides recommendations for improvement.
122
 This report underscores the ever 
expanding requirements of environmental conservation. It is important to review these issues as a step 
in understanding the extent of funding required to protect, prevent or mitigate pressures on the 
environment from human activities.  
The Australian State of the Environment 2011 report (SOE2011) noted that there is no consistent set of 
indicators for assessing the state of natural resources.
123
 There are many ‘unconnected means’ by which 
the State of the Environment Committee gathers information about to the Australian environment but in 
some cases the data does not exist.
124
 Consequently, an accurate foundation for measuring 
improvements or deteriorations to natural resources is unavailable. Private landholders may be 
providing environmental benefits such as carbon sequestration, and improved water quality which are 
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unmeasured and consequently unrewarded.
125
 The SOE2011 is the best source of collective information 
that we have on the condition of the environment, the risks to the environment, and the general 
direction in which the environment is heading.
126
 This section presents a summary of the findings in the 
SOE2011. 
The major environmental risk drivers are climate change, population, and economic growth.
127
 Climate 
change is a ‘prime determinant of the Australian environment and its condition’ with the likelihood of 
an increased annual average temperature of one degree Celsius by 2030, increased warm nights, fewer 
frosts, longer heat wave duration, increased duration and frequency of droughts, decreased rain fall in 
southern areas of Australia, and more extreme and frequent intense rainfall events. Population growth 
is a potential cause of environmental degradation with increased demand for resources, an expansion in 
the surface area taken up by settlements, and more waste being pushed into the environment.
128
 It is 
projected that Australia’s population will rise to 35.9 million by 2050.129 There is strong historical 
evidence that a growing economy exerts pressure on the environment. This leads to the view that 
economic growth will increase consumption of resources and increase waste production.
130
 Under the 
base scenario it is projected that the average annual growth in real gross domestic product will be 2.7% 
up to 2050, with per capita increases of 1.5%.
131
 These drivers individually and cumulatively affect the 
atmosphere, inland water, land, and the marine environment. 
When discussing atmospheric conditions the Committee opined that ‘[a]s inhabitants of the driest of the 
world’s inhabitable continents – much of which is unsuitable or only marginally suitable for agriculture 
– Australians have more at risk than most in a warming world.’132 The direct environmental effects of 
climate change include increased average temperatures, changes in rainfall patterns, and more extreme 
weather events (ie heatwaves, storms, cyclones, dust storms, droughts and floods).
133
 The indirect 
effects of climate change include:
134
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 Decrease in soil moisture levels; 
 Increase in the frequency of bushfires; 
 Decreased water availability and water security (ie due to increased evaporation and reduced 
rainfall); 
 Higher sea levels which impact coastal areas; 
 Deterioration in biodiversity; 
 Decreasing agricultural productivity because of increased drought and fire frequency; 
 Damage to infrastructure such as communications, water, and energy; 
 Conservation reserves such as the Great Barrier Reef will be harmed; and 
 Human health issues such as increased deaths due to more heatwaves, increased microbial 
infections, the spread of diseases via enlarged mosquito populations, and psychological 
pressures. 
In the view of the Committee, water security, coastal communities, and natural ecosystems are 
particularly vulnerable to climate change as they only have a limited adaptive capacity.
135
 In relation to 
other matters affecting the atmosphere it was noted that depletion of stratospheric ozone will continue 
for a number of years and air quality in urban areas is generally good.
136
 
It was stated that ‘Australia is the world’s driest inhabited continent’ and ‘therefore it is not surprising 
that places where fresh water accumulates either permanently or seasonally – our aquifers, rivers and 
wetlands – are of particular ecological and cultural significance.’137 ‘Australia as a nation could not 
exist without taking water out of the natural environment and using it for domestic and productive 
purposes.’138 Per capita, Australia uses more water than any other country in the OECD except for the 
U S, New Zealand, and Canada.
139
 Water use in Agriculture amounted to approximately 50% of total 
water consumption in 2008-09. It was noted that the ‘relationship between water availability and 
economic sustainability at the farm, community, regional and national scales is clearly a complex 
one.’140 A number of pressures on inland water arise because of drivers such as increased removal of 
water from the natural environment for human use, reduced rainfall, changes in water flows and 
drainage patterns, pollution from land use, impact from pests and invasive species, changing land use 
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and management, and damage to riparian areas.
141
 In a condensed format, current and emerging risks to 
inland water include:
142
 
 Climate change; 
 Further urbanisation which results in loss of wetlands; 
 Run off from lands used for agriculture which results in nutrient pollution and silting of rivers; 
 Minor and major chemical pollution events; 
 Livestock damage to riparian areas; 
 Acidification of wetlands and/or rivers due to drainage of acid sulfate soils; 
 Increased fire frequency or intensity; 
 Invasive fauna and weed invasions; 
 Salinisation due to land clearance and mining development; 
 Increasing water temperatures; 
 Blue green algae outbreaks; 
 Extreme weather events; and 
 Disease outbreak. 
The Committee found that many of the inland water environments are in a poor condition. Some areas 
in northern Australia, central Australia, and Tasmania generally retain their ‘original character despite 
widespread pressures from pests and weeds and changed fire regimes.’143 Australia has the potential to 
improve the protection of inland water environments which will allow it to meet the requirements of 
population growth and economic growth.
144
 However, ‘with some notable local exceptions, relative 
low levels of investment are being made to improve water quality.’145 
In addressing the state of the land environment it was emphasised that land ‘is fundamental to 
Australian identity and purpose.’146 Land is used for agriculture, urban development, infrastructure, 
mining, waste disposal, nature conservation, and it ’also generates the ecosystem services on which 
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human, animal and plant life depend – clean air, biodiversity and fresh water.’147 The major pressures 
affecting the land environment include:
148
 
 Climate change; 
 Vegetation clearing; 
 Habitat fragmentation; 
 Changed fire patterns; 
 Land use and land management, for example grazing; 
 Invasive species; 
 Further urbanisation which may lead to loss of agricultural land; 
 Mining; 
 Waste disposal and contamination; and 
 Changed hydrology, water diversion, and salinity. 
The Committee found that the outlook for the land environment is mixed with encouraging on ground 
initiatives and discouraging trends.
149
 Land environments are likely to be altered by climate change and 
deeply impacted by population growth and the associated increase in food demand and resource use.
150
 
The increased demand for food and biofuel is likely to ‘intensify competition between land use for 
agriculture, bioenergy, wood and fibre production and conservation.’151 To improve the outlook for the 
land environment it was suggested that the following is required:
152
 
 Increased investment in natural resource management;   
 Restoration of degraded landscapes; 
 Avoiding the degradation of further landscapes; 
 Improved methods and techniques to alleviate the pressure arising from climate change, 
invasive diseases, weeds, and grazing; 
 Better fire management regimes;  
 Transforming land use and land management in order to improve sustainability;  
 Dealing with the conflict arising  from competing land uses; and 
 Improved management of urbanisation.  
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The resilience and condition of the land environment depends on effective land management 
strategies.
153
 The integration and collaboration across land tenures and between government agencies, 
and the cooperation of private landholders in implementing conservation connectivity, has the potential 
‘to build resilience to both current and future pressures.’154 
When discussing the state and trends of biodiversity the Committee identified that the near and long 
term survival of species depends on genetic diversity, the diversity and quality of habitat, and nonliving 
components such as rainfall, soil type, and temperature.
155
 The pressures on biodiversity include 
climate change, habitat fragmentation, altered land use, pests and diseases, altered hydrology, grazing, 
altered fire regimes, urban development, and human extraction of resources.
156
 Many biodiversity 
protection strategies adopted by governments have the potential to build biodiversity resilience.
157
 
However, various indicia show that the approaches ‘are not achieving desired objectives, and that our 
understanding of the dynamic interactions between social, ecological and economic processes is 
inadequate to allow us to prioritise investment in biodiversity management’ for a significant number of 
organism categories.
158
 The Committee offered two scenarios for biodiversity, one pessimistic and one 
optimistic. They noted that the reality is likely to be somewhere in between both scenarios:
159
 
 Pessimistic outlook 
 Past land clearance will further bring about the decline of habitat on private land in the 
sheep and wheat belt; 
 It is likely that efforts to reverse the effect of past land clearance will have little effect; 
 As the quality of native remnants decline it is likely that a point will be reached where the 
deterioration will be exacerbated by the decline in the quantity and variety of pollinating 
species; 
 There will be increased rates of soil erosion and a decreased diversity of soil organisms 
such as earthworms, fungi, beetles and spiders; 
 It is possible that there will be an upsurge in the quantity and effect of invasive species 
due to climate change and the lack of investment into research to understand the impact of 
climate change on invasive species; 
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 Declining resources committed to managing conservation areas and only nominal 
investment in conservation connectivity is likely to bring about a deterioration of the 
resources on public land and an inability to cope with the effects of climate change; 
 The effects of extreme weather events (ie floods, storms, winds) are likely to be magnified  
 Costs of water purification are likely to surge due to a decline of native vegetation in 
water catchments and the contamination of the hydrology; 
 Climate change is likely to intensify declining trends; 
 There is the risk that governance approaches will be ineffective in responding to 
challenges and opportunities with the consequential decline in the resilience of 
ecosystems and those social systems which are linked to those ecosystems; and 
 Population growth is likely to lead to periods of resource shortages and pressures on 
quality of life. 
 Optimistic outlook 
 Past land clearance will further bring about a decline of habitat on private land in the 
sheep and wheat belt (this is the same as for the pessimistic outlook); 
 Major increases in investments are likely to lead to a reversal in the impacts of past land 
clearance and a subsequent rise in native vegetation in the landscape may lead to a 
stabilisation of biodiversity in light of climate change; 
 As improvements in the environment are made, it is likely that a point will be reached 
where returns on investment increase exponentially; 
 An increase in the knowledge base and an improved understanding of habitat restoration 
may lead to an enhancement in the ability of native species to cope with climate change, 
pests, and diseases; and 
 It is possible that the impact of population growth will be minimised by the 
transformation of consumption patterns and lifestyles. 
The optimistic outlook depends on prompt action, full recognition of the benefits of biodiversity, the 
use of incentives such as taxation and market driven programs, effective land management, and 
effectual governance approaches.
160
 The pivotal difference between the optimistic and pessimistic 
outlook is the funding required to combat the environmental degradation; the pessimistic outlook 
requires substantially more funding. 
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Overall the Committee found that:
161
 
 The Australian environment is precious. Our ecosystems, biodiversity and heritage are vulnerable to the 
choices we make. At the same time, we depend on them for our survival and wellbeing. Our ecosystems, and 
the biodiversity they support, provide services that are fundamental to human life, such as regulation of the 
atmosphere, maintenance of soil fertility, food production, filtration of water, and pest control. The major 
future drivers of change – climate change, population growth, economic development and associated 
consumption of natural resources, as well as the pressures that these drivers place on the environment – will 
need to be managed carefully if our society is to achieve a sustainable relationship with the Australian 
environment. 
SOE2011 indicates that environmental information and benchmarks are inadequate for decision 
making, there is a lack of co-operation and coordination between the three levels of government which 
curtails their ability to effectively address environmental problems, funding is insufficient to combat 
the major environmental risk drivers, and the effectiveness of conservation programs depends on the 
effectiveness of governance. We now turn to another report which appraises the condition of the 
Australian environment and provides recommendations for improvement. 
C OECD Report on Australia’s Environment Performance 
The OECD Environmental Performance Reviews: Australia 2008 (OEPR2008) examined the extent to 
which Australia met its environmental and sustainable development objectives at a domestic and at an 
international level for the period 1998 – 2007.162 The OEPR2008 scrutinised environmental 
management (water, air, nature and biodiversity), sustainable development (environment-economy 
interface, environment-agriculture interface, environment-social interface) and international 
commitments and co-operation. In the report it was opined that:
163
 
Looking to the future, to face its environmental management challenges effectively, it will be necessary for 
Australia to i) strengthen environmental policies and their implementation in the interest of promoting a level 
national playing field and improving efficiency, where appropriate; ii) further integrate environmental 
concerns into economic and sectoral decisions and iii) further develop international environmental co-
operation. 
The OEPR2008 provides forty five recommendations; these identify areas where further progress can 
be made:
164
 
 Environment management 
 Strengthen the capacity of environmental agencies to enforce regulations by making it 
easier to take action against offenders; 
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 Widen the use of economic instruments in order to underscore the user pays and the 
polluter pays principles for waste, water, and energy; 
 Encourage corporate environmental sustainability reporting and increase the transparency 
in the implementation of environmental voluntary agreements between industry and 
government; 
 Increase the use of performance and cost effectiveness analysis in government agencies; 
and 
 Harmonise regulation and improve co-operation between the levels of government. 
 Water resource management 
 Implement all features of the National Water Initiative which is a shared pledge between 
Australian governments to increase the efficiency of water use; 
 Make sure that all new investments into water conservation infrastructure is subject to 
economic analysis; 
 Strengthen the capacity of regional natural resource management authorities to manage 
the health of river systems; 
 Advance national strategies to deal with the likely effects of climate change on water 
resources; and 
 Promote awareness of water conservation, and the importance of efficient water allocation 
and consumption. 
 Air quality management 
 Intensify efforts to reduce emissions from the transport sector; 
 Expand data collection on air pollution control; 
 Conduct a national cost benefit analysis on air emissions; 
 Continue to collect and provide publically accessible data on identified pollutants; and 
 Set ambient concentration limits on fine particulates by finalising their incorporation into 
the National Environment Protection Measure and examine the role of atmospheric 
transport of fine particulates from intra state and interstate in concentrations in urban 
areas. 
 Nature and biodiversity management 
 Sustain efforts to restore, manage, and protect wetlands; 
 Expand the terrestrial and marine conservation areas; 
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 At the regional level, co-ordinate recovery plans and pest management plans in order to 
facilitate the recovery of ecological communities and endangered species; 
 Make sure that regional resource management plans place appropriate emphasis on 
biodiversity issues and that they synchronise with local authority land use plans; 
 Utilise market-based instruments to encourage and effectively manage biodiversity 
conservation on private landholdings; and  
 Improve the collection of species classification data and present it in a nationally coherent 
form. 
 Environment-economy interface 
 Pursue a decoupling of environmental pressures from economic growth; 
 Widen the use of market-based instruments to promote conservation, to reduce land 
development pressures, facilitate ecological sustainable development, to limit emissions, 
and to assure energy security; 
 Maintain the protection of key natural assets such as the Great Barrier Reef which are 
ecologically significant and have tourism potential; 
 Enhance regulatory provisions to encourage energy efficiency, renewable energy sources, 
and emission reduction; and 
 Seek multiple sustainability objectives via regulatory mechanisms. 
  Environment-agriculture interface 
 Ensure that regional environmental authorities have the capacity, in partnership with the 
agricultural industry, to achieve environmental objectives; 
 Utilise market-based instruments and economic analysis to encourage and develop 
sustainable agriculture; 
 Guarantee independent evaluation of the effectiveness of the voluntary approaches to 
conservation and ensure the distribution of best practice information across the nation;  
 Enhance methods to reduce water loss through irrigation, and reduce environmental 
contamination caused by runoff of excess fertilisers and pesticides;  
 Develop information on the environmental impact of agriculture and the use and effects of 
agrochemicals; 
 Evaluate the effect of climate change on the agriculture industry and take cost effective 
methods to enhance its resilience; and   
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 On lands where it is no longer sustainable to conduct agriculture, support transition to 
other land uses for private landholders and rural communities. 
 Environment-social interface 
 Bring in to line key environmental information and statistics at the state level in order to 
facilitate comparison of data at the national level;  
 Expand whole government approaches (public service agencies working across portfolio 
delimits to meet shared objectives) to integrate ‘indigenous people’ into natural resource 
management programs; 
 Take steps to monitor and ensure equity in the implementation of market-based 
instruments; 
 Utilise public consultation mechanism to ensure stakeholder views are taken into account 
in land use planning; 
 Make sure that vocational and educational curricula include training on minimising the 
environmental impacts of business operations; and 
 Utilise government procurement and operation policies to expedite environmental 
objectives and assist in the development of an environmental services industry.  
 International commitments and co-operation 
 Utilise market-based instruments to place a price on greenhouse gas emissions; 
 Implement cost effective measures to reduce the magnitude of marine pollutant discharges 
from land and marine sources which affect coastal water quality; 
 While meeting required international ratios on Official Development Assistance, integrate 
environmental objectives into agreements; 
 Introduce integrated port service charges, which encompasses a waste reception fee, to 
discourage the discharge of waste at sea by ships; 
 Review whether or not the fines and sanctions which are implemented in Multilateral 
Environment Agreements are of such a magnitude to encourage compliance with 
environmental obligations; and 
 Persist with the protection of at risk marine habitats and sustainably manage commercial 
fisheries. 
Prima facie, the OEPR2008 indicates that Australia has made considerable progress during the 1998 -
2007 period. However, the forty five recommendations suggests that Australia must take further action 
to meet the challenges of climate change, deteriorating water resources, social change, environmental 
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information gaps, declining energy efficiencies, and biodiversity loss. The ‘pricing of environmental 
services is still far from levels necessary for full cost recovery.’ Given the considerable amount of 
native vegetation on private landholdings that require conservation ‘ongoing government funding will 
be required to secure these biodiversity benefits in the long term.’165 These identified concerns aligned 
with the environmental concerns highlighted in the SOE2011. These reports underscore that further 
funding is required to meet the requirements of national environmental conservation and private 
landholdings are the linchpin for conservation on an extensive scale. We now look in detail at the 
importance of private landholdings. 
D The Importance of Private Landholdings 
The Industry Commission proposed three pillars to support ecologically sustainable development and 
environmental land objectives:
166
 
 Restructure regulatory mechanisms so that landholders and land managers consider the 
environmental impacts of their actions; 
 Create or expand markets for natural resources and use economic instruments in preference to 
command and control; and 
 Encourage conservation philanthropy and conservation on private land. 
These three pillars rest on the provision of eco-services by private landholders. Important ecosystems 
in Australia exist to a large extent on privately held freehold land or privately managed leasehold land 
(Crown leasehold).
167
 Under the Australian legal system, freehold title, a fee simple estate, is the 
greatest possible interest an individual can hold in real property. Australian land law has been shaped 
by the English feudal doctrine of tenure under which all land was held directly or indirectly of the 
King. An estate in fee simple ‘is for almost all practical purposes, equivalent to ownership of the land 
itself.’168  The holder of a fee simple estate in general has the right to possess the land, to enjoy the 
land, to determine how the land is used, to exclude others, to income generated from the land, to 
develop the land, and to alienate the land. At common law the holder of a fee simple estate has an 
unrestricted right to use the natural resources which are located on the land.  Unrestricted private 
proprietary rights have been eroded to a large degree by planning and development controls, provisions 
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which vest the control of water, minerals, and native fauna and flora in the Crown, regulations which 
prohibit or restrict land clearing, and property taxes. Nonetheless, the lion’s share of the right to decide 
how to manage the land remains with the proprietor. 
Crown leasehold is also regarded as private land due to the control exercised by the tenant over day to 
day land management and the long duration of some tenancies. The rules governing Crown leases vary 
from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.
169
 The term of a Crown lease is usually substantial or may even be in 
perpetuity.  For example in the Australian Capital Territory all freehold land was resumed by the 
Crown. The territory now operates a leasehold system under which leases are typically granted by the 
Crown for a period of 99 years.
170
 A large proportion of Crown leasehold land throughout Australia is 
used for agricultural purposes, for example pastoral leases (ie grazing livestock).  
Table II-1 provides a summary of land tenure in Australia (based on 1993 data which is the latest 
available).
171
 Aboriginal & Torres Strait Islander land is held by designated communities bound by 
land usage conditions. Public land encompasses nature conservation reserves, vacant crown land, 
sundry crown land, forestry reserves, water reserves, defence land, mining reserve, and mixed land 
(small areas made of overlapping categories). Over 60% of the land in Australia is managed by private 
landholders. 
Table II-1 Land Tenure in Australia, by Lands Category 
Land Category Area (thousand square kilometres) 
Per cent of 
Australia 
  
  
Aboriginal & Torres Strait Islander  1,094.8 14.25% 
Public 1,767.9 23.01% 
Private 4,819.6 62.74% 
          Total 7,682.3 100% 
Table II-2 provides additional detail on land tenure by category and jurisdiction (based on 1993 data 
which is the latest available).
172
 Freehold land makes up one third of all privately held land in Australia 
with two thirds held as Crown leasehold. A high proportion of private land in the Northern Territory 
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(99.05%), Queensland (59.97%), South Australia (72.54%), and Western Australia (81.44%) is held as 
Crown leasehold. One hundred per cent of the private land in the Australian Capital Territory is held as 
Crown leasehold. In contrast, one hundred per cent of the private land in Tasmania is held as freehold 
title. The majority of private land in New South Wales (56.76%) and Victoria (99.94%) is held as 
freehold title. 
Table II-2 Total Land Tenure - by Jurisdiction and Category 
Jurisdiction 
Freehold 
(thousand 
square 
kilometres) 
Per cent 
of 
Freehold 
/ Total 
Private 
Crown 
Leasehold 
(thousand 
square 
kilometres) 
Per cent of 
Crown 
Leasehold / 
Total 
Private 
Total 
Private 
Land 
(thousand 
square 
kilometres) 
Per 
cent of 
Total 
Private 
Land / 
Total 
Land 
Aboriginal & 
Torres Strait 
Islander 
(thousand 
square 
kilometres) 
Public 
(thousand 
square 
kilometres) 
Total Land 
(thousand 
square 
kilometres) 
      
 
          
 
ACT - 0.00% 0.90 0.02% 
                
0.90  0.01% -              1.50  2.40 
NSW 405.50 8.41% 308.90 6.41% 
            
714.40  9.30% 1.50            85.70  801.60 
NT 6.40 0.13% 666.60 13.83% 
            
673.00  8.76% 536.00          137.20  1,346.20 
Qld 627.20 13.01% 939.80 19.50% 
         
1,567.00  20.40% 42.20          118.00  1,727.20 
SA 158.40 3.29% 418.40 8.68% 
            
576.80  7.51% 189.60          217.60  984.00 
Tas 27.20 0.56% - 0.00% 
              
27.20  0.35% -            40.60  67.80 
Vic 155.20 3.22% 0.10 0.00% 
            
155.30  2.02% -            72.30  227.60 
WA 205.10 4% 899.90 18.67% 
         
1,105.00  14.38% 325.50       1,095.00  2,525.50 
  
 
  
 
      
 
  
 
Total 1,585.00 32.89% 3,234.60 67.11% 
         
4,819.60  62.74% 1,094.80       1,767.90  7,682.30 
 
The data above does not outline land usage. The way in which ‘land is used and managed has profound 
effects on Australia’s social and ecological systems’ as there is ‘a strong link between changes in land 
use and environmental, economic and social conditions.’173 Table II-3 provides a summary of land 
usage in Australia (based on 2005-06 data).
174
 Only 7.41% or 569,240 km
2 
has been
 
dedicated to nature 
conservation. Other protected areas, which also includes use by Indigenous Australians, amounts to 
over 1 million km
2
 or 13.21% of the Australian landmass. The dominant land use is livestock grazing 
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on native vegetation (46.30%, 3,558,785 km
2
) and modified pastures (9.37%, 720,182 km
2
), 
approximately 4.3 million km
2
 or 55.67% of the Australian landmass. In comparison to grazing, other 
agricultural activities take up only a small proportion of the total land area. 
Table II-3 National Land Use - Australia 
Land Use 
Area - square 
kilometres 
Per cent of Total 
Use 
Nature Conservation 
                                   
569,240  7.41% 
Other Protected Areas Including Indigenous Uses 
                               
1,015,359  13.21% 
Minimal Use 
                               
1,242,715  16.17% 
Grazing Natural Vegetation 
                               
3,558,785  46.30% 
Production Forestry 
                                   
114,314  1.49% 
Plantation Forestry 
                                     
23,929  0.31% 
Grazing Modified Pastures 
                                   
720,182  9.37% 
Dryland Cropping 
                                   
255,524  3.32% 
Dryland Horticulture 
                                       
1,092  0.01% 
Irrigated Pastures 
                                     
10,011  0.13% 
Irrigated Cropping 
                                     
12,863  0.17% 
Irrigated Horticulture 
                                       
3,954  0.05% 
Intensive Animal and Plant Production 
                                       
3,329  0.04% 
Intensive Uses (Mainly Urban) 
                                     
16,822  0.22% 
Rural Residential  
                                       
9,491  0.12% 
Waste and Mining 
                                       
1,676  0.02% 
Water 
                                   
125,618  1.63% 
No Data 
                                       
2,243  0.03% 
Total 
                               
7,687,147  100.00% 
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Based on the 2010 figures from the Australian Bureau of Statistics, approximately 52% (398,580 
thousand hectares / 769,202 thousand hectares) of Australia's total land area was used for agriculture 
purposes.
175
 A year by year comparison suggests a decline in the area used for agriculture purposes. In 
2001 the area of land allocated to agriculture was 455,723 thousand hectares,
176
 and this declined to 
398,580 thousand hectares in 2010,
177
 representing a decline of approximately 4.5% over that period. 
This decline is probably due to a decrease in livestock grazing, an increase in cropping activities which 
use a smaller land area in comparison to grazing, and the transfer of agricultural land to ‘formal nature 
conservation.’178 Regardless of the exact figure agriculture is the dominant land use in Australia. 
Given the high proportion of land held under private tenure and the substantial amount used for 
agricultural activities, it is unsurprising that many conservation costs fall upon private landholders. In 
its report on public good conservation the Commonwealth House of Representatives Standing 
Committee on Environment and Heritage found that numerous landholders voluntary undertook 
conservation activities but in many cases conservation activities were mandated by government. Little 
or no public financial support was provided to cover the costs associated with implementing public 
good conservation programs.
179
 The Committee found:
180
 
… less public good conservation was occurring than was desirable given the depth of the environmental 
problems facing the nation. Moreover, the landholders who made submissions to the inquiry and who gave 
evidence indicated a high level of frustration and reported anger and resentment in the rural community as a 
result of what were perceived to be inappropriate [government] policies. 
The evidence suggested to the Committee that nothing short of a re-configuration of land use practices in 
Australia is required. Crops and products produced at present will need to be produced in different and more 
sustainable ways. New industries will need to be developed and new markets may well be created.  
The major drivers of the re-configuration of Australian land use will be landholders. 
The Committee found that private landholders do not possess the resources necessary to undertake the 
required conservation activities. As a consequence ‘works are unlikely to occur and the environmental 
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problems facing the nation will remain and only get worse.’181 In its analysis of the role of the private 
sector in the conservation of biodiversity the Productivity Commission opined that:
182
 
Private sector conservation is essential to complement and supplement public sector conservation. For 
example, there are well recognised ecological limitations of the public reserve system. With more than 60 per 
cent of Australia’s land area under private management, conservation cannot be adequately addressed without 
private sector participation. 
Therefore, financial support which encourages the participation of private landholders is essential in 
addressing environmental problems. While private landholder co-operation is crucial in reducing 
environmental degradation, the potential effect of conservation activities upon productive agricultural 
land use also needs to be considered. One option for promoting conservation is to ‘lock up and leave’ 
environmental land (ie to remove the land from productive use).
183
 For example, the Humane Society 
International Australia (HSIA) called for one-fifth of the Australian landmass, beyond the existing 
nature conservation reserves, to be assessed for National heritage listing, affecting both public and 
private land. Listed areas are protected under the Environment Protection and Biodiversity 
Conservation Act 1999 (Cth) (‘EPBC’). Approval must be obtained before any action (project, 
development, undertaking, activity, or alteration), which could have a significant impact on the heritage 
values of the listed area, can be commenced.
184
 The NSW Farmers’ Association labelled HSIA’s broad 
proposition as impractical and called ‘for a fundamental rethink about the current approach to 
environmental management.’185  
A ‘lock up and leave’ strategy may be necessary where a threatened species depends for its survival on 
a critical piece of habitat but to apply such an approach on a wide scale basis could restrain the 
production of food, fuel, and fibre. A ‘lock up and leave’ strategy also raises concerns over the control 
of invasive species (eg foxes, pigs, rabbits) which may find a safe harbour in locked up land.  As noted 
by Lindenmayer, Cunningham, and Young in discussing land sparing, ‘in which more intensive land 
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use is adopted in a given location as a kind of ecological offset for increasing the area reserved for 
conservation in another location,’ the complications of such an approach include:186  
 The possible deterioration of important eco-services provided by an agricultural landscape such 
as pollination and pest control; 
 Some landscapes are so degraded that there is no potential for land use intensification; and 
 In some regions there are limited alternatives for offsetting intensely used land in one location 
with a conservation reserve in another location that has similar spatial attributes.  
Tscharntke et al opine that ‘management regimes and landscape configurations that optimise functional 
biodiversity while maintaining agricultural efficiency and productivity’ are required in the light of an 
estimated doubling of food demand by 2050 and increasing demand for plant-based products to replace 
fossil resources.
187
 Integrating agricultural production with biodiversity conservation is a complex 
subject.
188
 To ‘maximise biodiversity’ the answer is not simply a matter of deciding between ‘land 
sparing’ and ‘wildlife-friendly’ farming. What seems to be clear is that maintaining biodiversity in an 
agricultural landscape is an essential element in eco-service production.
189
  
Agriculture can be viewed as a managed ecosystem in which eco-service production depends on land 
use and land management.
190
 ‘Ecosystem services beyond the production of food, fibre, fuel and 
income include the recycling of nutrients, control of microclimates, regulation of hydrological 
processes, pollination, regulation of undesirable organisms, and detoxification of noxious 
chemicals.’191 Experimental evidence indicates that biodiversity leads to increased soil fertility and 
improved pest control, maintaining acceptable crop yields without the requirement for external inputs 
such as chemical pesticides and fertilisers. 
192
 Key components in sustainable agriculture include 
incorporating diversity into the agriculture landscape, both biological and agricultural, and establishing 
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‘wild habitats’ in order to support populations of pollinators and beneficial insects.193 The boundaries 
of farms can be used in a diversification strategy by planting windbreaks, shelterbelts and ‘living 
fences’ to provide habitat for fauna and beneficial insects.194  
Returning to the importance of incorporating private land into conservation programs, and taking into 
account the benefits of biodiversity in the agricultural landscape, an ‘appropriate role for agricultural 
policy is to maximize the social value of both conventional agricultural products and the ecosystem 
services provided by agriculture’ which in turn can support conservation outcomes.195 Conservation on 
private land, has ‘evolved out of recognition that the protected area network, even if greatly enhanced, 
would not be adequate to meet many biodiversity conservation goals.’196 Some species are only found 
on private land and many migratory species rely on dispersed habitats across regions including on 
private land.
197
 Thus, in promoting conservation across the wider landscape, private land must be taken 
into account to achieve comprehensive and representative conservation targets.
198
  
Pertinent to this discussion is the conception that a landscape contains a matrix, comprising of the 
dominant component present in a landscape (eg agriculture, urban), patches (ie a mosaic of remnant 
patches of forest), and corridors that connect those patches. That the landscape is made up of diverse 
components underpins connectivity conservation using landscape corridors ‘that maintain or establish 
multi-scale connections over entire landscapes.’199 Connectivity conservation recognises that:200 
 Conservation management is required on private land surrounding conservation reserves in 
order to buffer the conservation reserves from threatening processes which are initiated off-
reserve; 
 Land which has been heavily cleared requires large scale ecological restoration and 
rehabilitation in order to connect conservation reserves and to prevent isolation; 
 In areas with high wilderness value, ecological integrity can be maintained by using 
conservation reserves in conjunction with conservation management on private land; and 
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 Conservation planning must take into account the long term requirements of biodiversity such 
as extensive spatial scale dependence, ecological processes and evolutionary processes. 
The components of conservation connectivity include corridor restoration, rehabilitation and 
maintenance, protecting existing connections between large intact areas, and initiating conservation 
management in the landscape matrix surrounding conservation reserves.
201
 The elements of 
connectivity spatial planning encompass core conservation reserves, buffers which protect the 
conservation reserves, conservation management over the wider matrix area (ie the broader landscape 
such as agricultural use in which the conservation reserves are embedded), landscape corridors (eg a 
ridge), stepping stone corridors made up of small patches of native vegetation, and linear corridors (eg 
hedgerows, native vegetation strips, and rivers).
202
 Underlining these concepts is the awareness that 
‘[c]onnectivity across landscapes is a critical consideration in the survival of ecological communities’ 
because the habitat requirements of some species ‘span land tenure boundaries’ between public and 
private lands.
203
   
In summary, taking into account that a high proportion of the Australian landmass is held under private 
tenure and a substantial amount of land area is used in agriculture, the participation of private land in 
conservation programs is essential to address conservation. The success of conservation will depend on 
an understanding the spatial scale dependency and the habitat requirements of a threatened species. 
Some species are found only on private land. Some migratory species rely on habitat spread across a 
region including private land. Connectivity conservation provides a foundation for connecting 
fragmented habitat on private land with conservation reserves, incorporating conservation management 
on private land surrounding reserves, and instituting buffers. The interconnection of reserves with 
conservation management on private land has the potential to support conservation on an extensive 
scale. By incorporating conservation management into productive land usage there is the capacity to 
enhance the ecosystem functionality of the land while maintaining the production of food, fuel, and 
fibre. The linchpin to ensuring the public and private benefits of conservation on private land is 
financial support.  
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E A Disjoint Between Funding Capacity and Responsibility 
The discussion has highlighted the importance of private landholdings for developing conservation 
works on an extensive spatial scale. Real property lies within the jurisdictional boundaries of the States 
and Territories. However, the ability of the States and Territories to direct resources to conservation is 
severely limited by their capacity to raise funds. This section underscores that co-operation between the 
Commonwealth and the States is essential to effectively deal with environmental problems. 
State, territory and local governments have the main responsibility for natural resource management 
and land use. The Commonwealth does not have any direct legislative power under the Australian 
Constitution to deal with environmental issues but its powers (trading and commerce (s 51(i)), taxation 
(s 51(ii)), quarantine (s 51(ix)), fisheries (s 51(x)), corporations (s 51(xx)), people of any race (s 
51(xxvi)), and external affairs (s 51(xxix)))  can be directed towards environmental outcomes.
204
 Under 
the principles of international law the Commonwealth is responsible for the quality of the nation’s 
environment.
205
 The states have traditionally dealt with land use and environmental issues. Given these 
delimits, in addressing environmental issues the states and the Commonwealth for the most part have 
adopted a co-operative federalism approach.
206
 This co-operative approach has manifested in the states 
and the Commonwealth engaging in national policies and strategies under which the Commonwealth 
coordinates at a national level, sets objectives based on negotiations with the states, and assumes 
financial responsibility for the programs, and the states implement the programs.
207
 
To the extent the Commonwealth finances the co-operative environmental programs, this is inimitably 
linked with the Commonwealth’s capacity for fundraising based on taxation, fines and penalties, 
borrowing, fees for services, the sale of products, and income from investments (for example the 
Australian Future Fund). The Commonwealth’s 2014-15 Budget Overview report reveals that  total 
government revenue is expected to be $391.3 billion with the majority (approximately 95.25%) of that 
revenue from taxation (income tax: $183.6 billion, fringe benefits tax: $4.4 billion, superannuation 
taxes: $7.9 billion, company and resource rent tax taxes: $75.3 billion, sales taxes $58.1 billion, fuels 
exercise $17.6 billion, other excise $8.9 billion, customs duty: $9.3 billion, other taxes: $3.8 billion) 
and the minority  (approximately 5.75%) arising through non- tax sources ($22.5 billion).
208
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The Commonwealth’s power to impose income tax is concurrent with the states’ ability to impose 
taxes. Income tax was initially imposed in Australia by the states.  On the 13 September 1915 the 
Income Tax Assessment Act 1915 (Cth) was assented to primarily to fund Australia’s role in World War 
I. Between 1915 and 1942 there existed both a Commonwealth income tax and state income taxes. In 
1942 the Commonwealth assumed sole control over income taxation in part to achieve uniformity 
throughout Australia and to fund Australia’s role in World War II.209 In 1942 the Uniform Tax Scheme 
was brought into life. It imposed Commonwealth income tax at rates corresponding to the amount 
previously collected by the states and the Commonwealth combined. It prohibited taxpayers from 
paying state taxes until their obligations to the Commonwealth were satisfied, and transferred state 
taxation officers to the Commonwealth. The states were in effect reimbursed for their lost income tax 
revenue via grants as long as the relevant state had not levied an income tax in the previous year.
210
 The 
Commonwealth, by imposing a high rate of taxation, left no room for the states to levy an appropriate 
rate to meet their expenditure responsibilities. 
The Uniform Tax Scheme was challenged in South Australia v Commonwealth (1942) 65 CLR 373. 
The High Court held that the acts which provided a foundation to the Uniform Tax Scheme valid. 
When it came to the political reality that the Commonwealth was forcing the states out of collecting 
income taxes, Latham CJ stated:
211
 
Thus the controversy before the Court is a legal controversy, not a political controversy. It is not for this or 
any court to prescribe policy or to seek to give effect to any views or opinions upon policy. We have nothing 
to do with the wisdom or expediency of legislation. Such questions are for Parliaments and the people. It has 
been argued that the Acts now in question discriminate, in breach of sec. 51 (ii.) of the Constitution, between 
States. The Court must consider and deal with such a legal contention. But the Court is not authorized to 
consider whether the Acts are fair and just as between States—whether some States are being forced, by a 
political combination against them, to pay an undue share of Commonwealth expenditure or to provide money 
which other States ought fairly to provide. These are arguments to be used in Parliament and before the 
people. They raise questions of policy which it is not for the Court to determine or even to consider. 
Even though the states were pushed out of collecting income taxes, there were no legal restrictions 
under the Uniform Tax Scheme to stop the States from levying an income tax. In a second challenge to 
the Uniform Tax Scheme in Victoria v Commonwealth (1957) 99 CLR 575 the provision which gave 
the Commonwealth priority in the payment of income tax over the states was held invalid but otherwise 
the validity of the Uniform Tax Scheme was upheld. In effect, the Uniform Tax Scheme restricted the 
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states’ ability to raise taxation revenue to ad hoc taxes, levies and duties such as payroll tax, banking 
taxes, land tax, stamp duties, gaming machine tax, and parking space levies.
212
 
The Uniform Tax System created a ‘vertical fiscal imbalance.’ The Commonwealth raises far more 
taxation revenue than it requires for its own purposes. The states are unable to raise enough tax revenue 
to cover their fiscal responsibilities. As a consequence, the states became reliant on the financial power 
of the Commonwealth. A requirement to overcome a ‘vertical fiscal imbalance’ is revenue sharing. The 
Commonwealth uses an allocation formula under which the amount is based on the state’s needs and 
revenue capacity.  Revenue sharing takes the form of general and specific purpose payments (SPPs). 
General purpose payments allow the states to use the funds as they deem fit to meet their expenditure 
responsibilities. SPPs, also referred to as ‘tied grants’, are subject to conditions on how the funds are 
spent. The use of SPPs allows the Commonwealth to influence areas of state jurisdiction such as health, 
education, business regulation, and the environment.  
The commencement of the Goods and Services Tax (GST) on the 1 July 2000 under A New Tax System 
(Goods and Service Tax) Act 1999 (Cth) significantly impacted the revenue sharing arrangements. GST 
revenue collected by the Commonwealth is transferred to the states based on their agreement to 
progressively phase out various state taxes and duties. However, it ‘is by no means clear that the 
transfer of GST revenues has “freed” the states or completely corrected the [vertical fiscal imbalance], 
because the GST remains a federal tax under the Commonwealth’s ultimate control.’213 
The framework for revenue sharing is laid out in the Intergovernmental Agreement on Federal 
Financial Relations and the Federal Financial Relations Act 2009 (Cth). SPPs are generally granted for 
specific projects for a fixed period of time and are indexed in accordance with the Intergovernmental 
Agreement on Federal Financial Relations. SPPs payments to the states may be aligned with the 
achievement of project milestones in the relevant agreement. 
In summary, the disjoint between funding capacity and fiscal responsibility has arisen in part due to the 
centralisation of income taxation under the Uniform Tax System. The significant vertical fiscal 
imbalance between the states and the Commonwealth means that the states depend on the financial 
power of the Commonwealth. The states are vulnerable to changes in policy at the Commonwealth 
level. The introduction of the GST has helped to alleviate some of the imbalance but as the 
Commonwealth has full control of the GST the states are still vulnerable. The use of SPPs allows the 
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Commonwealth to enter into policy areas traditionally managed by the states. The ability of the 
Commonwealth to use financial incentives allows it to influence how the environment is managed in 
state jurisdictions. Environmental programs reliant on Commonwealth SPPs funding and general 
purpose finding may be subject to Federal Government cost saving measures, reduced funding 
allocations, change in policies, and fiscal priorities.  
F Environmental Expenditure  
The previous section highlighted the ‘vertical fiscal imbalance’ created by the Uniform Tax System. As 
such, the Commonwealth holds the lion’s share of the fiscal power which allows it to influence the 
traditional state responsibility for natural resource management and land use. A basic assumption of 
this dissertation is that the capacity of Australian Governments to fund conservation is limited. This 
section examines the expenditure on the environment by the three levels of government.  This allows a 
comparison to be made between a reasonable estimate of actual environmental expenditure and an 
estimate of the expenditure required to meet natural resource management targets. 
Natural resource management expenditure by governments includes that pertinent to managing, 
maintaining, protecting, promoting, improving, and mitigating human impact. The relevant 
environmental sectors include public land, the atmosphere, indigenous and historic heritage sites, 
human settlements, land, biodiversity, coasts and oceans, and inland water. ‘Whole of government’ 
expenditure on the environment is not normally reported. The last whole of government environment 
expenditure budgetary estimates provided by the Commonwealth Government was in 2007. A detailed 
analysis of the federal accounts was needed to obtain a reasonable estimate of how much is actually 
invested by the Commonwealth in the environment. It is important to understand this level of spending 
in order to compare to the spending required to meet conservation goals. The Commonwealth whole of 
government budgetary environmental expenditure estimates is summarised Figure II-1; based on 
numbers found in reports published from 2004 to 2007, for the period 2001-02 to 2010-11.
214
 
Commonwealth estimated environmental expenditure peaked at around $4.3 billion and then declined. 
Due to the lack of comparable finance data, it is uncertain if the actual whole of government 
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environmental expenditure incurred by the Commonwealth declined, increased, or remained static up to 
the end of the cited period. This is significant because it means that we do not know if spending is 
decreasing or increasing in the face of the environmental risk drivers of climate change, population, 
and economic growth. 
It is impossible to calculate exactly how much is spent by Australian governments on the environment 
due to double dipping (i.e. the Commonwealth contributes funds to the states which is then counted in 
the Commonwealth’s as well as the state’s expenditure figures) and a lack of uniform accounting 
practices between the three levels of government. Furthermore, due to lack of information it is also 
impossible to calculate the environmental expenditure by communities, private landholders, businesses, 
indigenous Australians, non-government organisations, and individual volunteers. This means that 
from a policy perspective it remains unclear how conservation goals can be harmonised with other 
national responsibilities.   
Figure II-1 Commonwealth Whole of Government Environment Related Estimated Expenditure 2001-02 to 2010-11 
 
Figure II – 1 Source: Department of the Environment and Heritage, 'A Sustainability Strategy for the Australian Continent: 
Enviornment Budget Statement 2004-05 ' (Statement by the Honourable Dr David Kemp, MP Minister for the environment 
and Heritage 11 May 2004, Department of the Environment and Heritage, 2004); Department of the Environment and 
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Heritage, 'Environment Budget Overview 2005-06' (Department of the Environment and Heritage, 2005); Department of the 
Environment and Heritage, 'Environment Budget Overview 2006-07' (Department of the Environment and Heritage, 2006); 
Department of the Environment and Water Resources, 'Protecting Australia's Future: Environment Budget Overview 2007-
08: A Long-Term Plan to Protect and Enhance Australia's Natural Environment, Water Resources and Cultural Heritage' 
(Department of the Environment and Water Resources, 2007). 
The Commonwealth Government’s expenditure on natural resource management, and in particular the 
land environment, has been delivered via the National Landcare Program No 1, Natural Heritage Trust 
No 1, Natural Heritage Trust No 2, and Caring for Our Country. The current program commenced in 
2014-15. Table II-4 summarises the timeframe of the programs and lists the approximate 
expenditure.
215
 Detailed analysis was required to distil the precise numbers. 
The National Landcare Program No 1 was instigated in 1989 when the Commonwealth Government 
announced a decade long national Landcare plan.
216
 Commonwealth funds were allocated for 
community grants, facilitators and coordinators to support local groups, education and training, and 
public awareness.
217
 The Landcare community noted that local groups carried excessive responsibility, 
a lack of resources, a shortage of funds for on ground works, a plethora of paperwork, lack of 
coordination between government agencies, and uncertainty over long term funding.
218
  
Funding for the Natural Heritage Trust (NHT) program was initially generated through the privatisation 
of Telstra. The NHT was a ‘quasi-institutional environmental funding and investment mechanism 
based upon individual partnership agreements between the national government, and the six Australian 
states and two territories.’219 A high proportion of the funds were provided directly to community based 
projects.
220
 Phase 1 (1996-97 to 2001-02) of the NHT focused on community participation to 
implement solutions for local and regional environmental and natural resource management 
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problems.
221
 Phase 2 (2002-03 to 2007-08) focused on regional investment by funding regional natural 
resource management bodies.
222
  
Under Caring for Our Country the focus shifted from regional to national targets (reserve system; 
biodiversity and natural icons; coastal environments and critical aquatic habitats; sustainable farm 
practices; community skills, knowledge and engagement; and natural resource management in northern 
and remote Australia).
223
 The program applied a ‘business approach’ to investment with the aim of 
achieving value for money.  The funding methods included open call competitive funding, co-
investment, direct investment, expressions of interest, community action grants, regional level funding, 
and funding for large scale projects.
224
 Applicants were required to link their projects to measurable 
biophysical targets such as the quantity of a particular species on an identified area over a particular 
time frame.
225
 Indicators and measure of biodiversity and ecosystems include genetic diversity, 
geographic distribution, population size, nutrient levels, increased habitat connectivity, water flow, and 
the quantity of invasive species. Community groups noted that the requirement to link biophysical 
targets of national priority to funding for community skills, knowledge, and engagement restricted the 
role that Landcare and other community groups played in natural resource management.
226
  
The Commonwealth’s current expenditure on natural resource management is estimated to be $2 
billion over four years, split between the National Landcare Program No 2, the Green Army, Working 
on Country, Land Sector Package, the Reef 2050 plan, Great Barrier Reef Foundation, and the Whale 
and Dolphin Protection Plan. Information on the latest natural resource program in Table II-4 has been 
split into its component parts as there has been a transfer in responsibility for some components away 
from the Department of the Environment and also a change in the previous allocation patterns. For 
example, responsibility for Working on Country was transferred to the Department of the Prime 
Minister and Cabinet and the Green Army is a new initiative to provide Australians aged 17 – 24 years 
with training and experience in the conservation and environmental fields (participants receive an 
allowance but their income support payment is suspended during the period of participation).  
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National Landcare Program No 2 involves a local delivery of environmental works through a regional 
stream and a national stream.
227
 The strategic outcomes of the program are to:
228
 
 Maintain and improve ecosystem services; 
 Increase the adoption of practices that improve the quality of the natural resource base; 
 Increase engagement and participation of the community; and 
 Increase restoration and rehabilitation of the natural environment. 
Regional funding is only available to regional natural resource management (NRM) bodies. The bodies 
are required to allocate a minimum of 20 per cent of their annual funding to local on-ground projects 
that are delivered by or directly engage the local community, including Landcare.
229
 The regional NRM 
bodies, in consultation with the local community, have self-autonomy in identifying the best ways to 
achieve the programme’s strategic objectives and outcomes.230 
National funding is administered directly by the Commonwealth. The funding stream supports a 
number of initiatives to protect and restore the environment and to encourage and develop sustainable 
agriculture.
231
 The initiatives include the 20 million trees programme (eg conservation corridors, 
habitat for threatened species); target area grants, one-off small grants round in 2014-15; clean up 
Australia and Keep Australia beautiful grants; coastal river recovery; the Cumberland conservation 
corridor; whale and dolphin protection plan; the Kimberley cane toad clean up; weed and pest animal 
biosecurity incursion management; and the Dandenong Ranges programme.
232
 
Under Working on Country the Commonwealth provides funding to indigenous and non-indigenous 
organisations that employ indigenous rangers to deliver environmental outcomes such as management 
of biodiversity, invasive species, fire regimes, and cultural sites.
233
 The Department of the Environment 
is responsible for the Land Sector Package. The package assists land managers to store carbon in the 
landscape.  
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Table II-4 Commonwealth Natural Resource Management Timeline 
Program Title Timeframe Approximate Expenditure 
National Landcare Program No 1 1988-89 to 1996-97 $360 million 
Natural Heritage Trust No 1 1996-97 to 2001-02 
(overlaps with previous phase) 
$1.25 billion 
Natural Heritage Trust No 2 2002-03 to 2007-08 $1.75 billion 
Caring for Our Country 2008-09 to 2013-14 $2.3 billion 
Current Natural Resource Management Program 
National Landcare Program No 2 2014-15 to 2017-18 $1,028.1 million 
Green Army 2014-15 to 2017-18 $525.4 million 
Working on Country 2014-15 to 2017-18 $210.2 million 
Land Sector Package 2014-15 to 2017-18 $203.6 million 
The Reef 2050 Plan 2014-15 to 2017-18 $40 million 
Great Barrier Reef Foundation 2014-15 to 2017-18 $9.4 million 
Whale and Dolphin Protection Plan 2014-15 to 2017-18 $0.6 million 
Total  $2 billion 
A review of the expenditure figures in Table II-4 and comparing them to the corresponding timeframe 
indicates that the current natural resource management expenditure, if it does eventuate as planned over 
the four year period, provides an average annual expenditure of $500 million per year, is the peak thus 
far for annual average expenditure by the Commonwealth. Some parts of the program such as the 
Green Army and Working on Country have multiple social goals so their objectives diverge from a 
purely environmental focus. The Green Army initiative has been criticised for diverting funding away 
from Landcare where for every ‘dollar the government puts into Landcare can attract anywhere 
between $4 and $20 in co-investment from the private sector.’234 Anecdotal evidence suggests that the 
Commonwealth government in the face of budgetary pressures will further seek to direct funding 
towards programs with multiple social objectives in an attempt ‘to stretch the dollar.’ This is significant 
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as overly ambitious ‘win-win’ programs are likely to be ineffective in addressing environmental 
problems. 
The Commonwealth’s specific purpose payments to support state and territory environment services for 
the period 2007-08 to 2014-15 are summarised in Figure II-2.
235
 A detailed analysis of the federal 
accounts was needed to summarise the information. As noted previously, SPPs, also referred to as tied 
grants, are subject to conditions on how the funds are spent. The spike in 2001-12 is attributable to 
allocations for renewable remote power generation, the Tasmanian forests intergovernmental 
agreement, economic diversification projects, the national water security plan for cities and towns, and 
the sustainable rural water use and infrastructure program.  Excluding 2011-12 the trend in funds 
allocated is gradually increasing with an average of approximately $500 million per annum over seven 
years. 
Figure II-2 Commonwealth Specific Purpose Payments to Support State and Territory Environment Services 2007-08 to 2014-15 
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Thus far this section has focused on the Commonwealth Government’s expenditure. The state, territory, 
and local governments contribute substantially to the management of public lands, bushfire mitigation, 
waste management, water management, environmental research and development, biodiversity 
programs, and environmental policies.
236
 Private landholders, businesses, communities, indigenous 
Australians, and nongovernment organisations significantly contribute to natural resource 
management.
237
 The difficulty lies in quantifying their contribution (especially where it is an in kind or 
a voluntary contribution of time and labour).
238
 
The Australian Bureau of Statistics has experimented with integrated environmental and economic 
information. The Australian Environmental-Economic Accounts 2015 provides ‘experimental’ supply 
estimates of environmental services by industry and product for 2010-11. That information ‘describes 
the resources allocated for preserving and / or protecting the environment by different categories of 
economic units as well as the financing of these resources and activities.’239  Table II-5 outlines the 
estimated expenditure by industry and product for 2010-11.
240
 The information in table II-5 indicates 
that local and state government and spent approximately $6.4 billion on environmental services. A 
noteworthy figure and relevant to this discussion is that $4.9 billion was estimated to be expended on 
natural resource management by local and state government departments.  The total expenditure on the 
provision of environmental services in 2010-11 was approximately $32 billion, an impressive figure 
until it is realised that the use of environmental services by consumers extracted approximately $28.5 
billion from the environment for the same period.
241
 The difference between total expenditure on the 
provision of environmental services and the total consumption of environmental services was mainly 
due to ‘capital formation’ in Research and Development – Own Account (approximately $2.6 billion 
for 2010-11), some increase in Resource Management (approximately $573 million) and an increase in 
Protection of Air and Climate (approximately $245 Million).
242
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Table II-5 ABS Experimental Supply Estimates of Environmental ($ million) by Industry and Product 2010-11 
 
What is surprising from the information presented in Table II-5 is that no amount has been allocated to 
Agriculture, Forestry, and Fishing for management of natural resources. This is probably due in part to 
the fact that ecosystem accounts is a developing area,  the absence of data, and the fact that traditional 
agricultural products and eco-services are produced together rather than one being produced to the 
exclusion of the other. As noted by Australian statistician Brian Pink:
243
 
One of the most difficult aspects of environmental decision-making is how to make trade-offs between the 
environmental assets that deliver a range of non-market goods and services, including ecosystem services, 
against development alternatives for which there are clear economic values. … For example land, timber, fish, 
minerals and fossil fuels are included in the national balance sheet. 
However, some environmental assets and many ecosystem services are not transacted in markets, although the 
value of some services may be included in the value of goods and services traded in markets. For example, the 
value of pollination is captured in the value of agriculture crop production, while tourism operators derive 
income from the people visiting natural attractions such as Uluru and the Great Barrier Reef. 
The development of standardised methods for identifying and separately distinguishing the value of 
environmental assets and ecosystem services is an on-going area of work … 
 
It may be some time before we will be can cite precise figures for the contribution of private 
landholders, communities, indigenous Australians, and nongovernment organisations, to natural 
resource management. The lack of comparable data means that it unclear how much individually and 
collectively the three levels of government contribute to whole of government environment related 
expenditure. Based on the experimental estimates the contribution of local and state government 
departments to natural resource management is in the vicinity of $4.9 billion per annum. It is unclear 
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Environmental Products
Agriculture, 
Forestry, 
Fishing Mining Manufacturing
Water 
Supply & 
Sewerage 
Services
Waste 
Management Construction
Local 
Government 
and 
Government 
Departments 
All  Other 
Industries
Total 
Industries
Waste Water Management        6,038         6,038 
Solid Waste Management      185                    175                 8,641               810            535       10,346 
Protection of Air and Climate 
Services                854         2,203         3,057 Other Protection and Natural 
Resource Management (ie 
Biodiversity, soil, groundwater, 
surface water, land, timber,             4,932         2,202         7,134 
Water Management Services        1,231                614            489         2,334 
Research and Development 
Services                      22            255            277 
Research and Development - 
Own Account                 13      223                    142             46                      83               147         1,891         2,545 
                    Total                 13      408                    339        7,315                 8,724               957             6,400         7,575       31,731 
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whether government contribution is in decline, but minimally it seems highly unlikely that 
contributions will significantly increase in the near future. 
If government contributions are static or declining then the funding is insufficient to restore natural 
capital and combat the compounding degradation effects of climate change, population, and economic 
growth. This means that necessary conservation targets will not be met.  
G Required Expenditure 
This section outlines the funding required for landscape and biodiversity conservation. The problem is 
that the required expenditure far exceeds the amount currently being spent. This section picks up and 
builds on the arguments raised in Paul Martin, Kip Werren and Susan Shearing, 'Concepts for Private 
Sector Funded Conservation Using Tax-Effective Instruments' (UNE 57, Land and Water Australia, 
2007). 
It is noted that an answer to the question about how much should be spent on the environment is very 
subjective. It is difficult to obtain a clear picture of the required level of investment due to a lack of 
consensus about what quality of landscape and native biodiversity is sufficient; a lack of accurate 
information on natural resource management; differences of view on strategy, timing and rate of 
implementation, and determinants of success; and a lack of uniform accounting practices.
244
  The actual 
finances required to meet conservation targets may be higher or lower than the projections discussed in 
this section. Nonetheless, the overwhelming impression is that the level of spending required to 
sufficiently meet conservation targets far exceeds the amount currently being spent. 
The available evidence is that ‘neither governments nor landowners and non-government investors 
have been able to prevent the well-documented erosion of environmental values.’245 Martin and Werren 
held that the funding required to protect, prevent or mitigate pressures on the environment from human 
activities is likely to require approximately 2 per cent of Gross Domestic Product per annum.
246
 This 
formulation was founded on inferences drawn from Australian Bureau of Statistics, 'Environment 
Protection Expenditure Australia 1994-95 and 1995-96' (Cat no. 4603.0, Australian Bureau of 
Statistics, 1998). Based on the 2013-14 year the required funding is around $31 billion per annum.
247
 
Unfortunately it was not possible to apply the formulation to provide a breakdown of the funding 
required for landscape and biodiversity conservation. 
                                                 
244
 Martin and Werren, above n 1, 12. 
245
 Ibid 11. 
246
 Ibid 12. 
247
 Australian Bureau of Statistics, 'Key Economic Indicators, 2015' (Cat. no. 1345.0, Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2015). 
70 
 
In 2001 the Allen Consulting Group estimated that the investment required for the Commonwealth 
Government to achieve its proposed resource management targets was $65 billion over 10 years.
248
  
This was estimated on the basis that the Commonwealth Government proposed to:
249
  
 Improve regulatory and planning frameworks; 
 Improve the health of river systems; 
 Increase economic returns based on sustainability; 
 Increase landholder involvement in natural resource management training courses; 
 Increase research and development into sustainability; 
 Promote conservation of flora and fauna; 
 Implement enhanced information management systems; and 
 Improve soil health. 
The Allen Consulting Group noted ‘that it would be extremely difficult to cover this funding need 
directly from public sector budgets’ and as such, those activities that could derive a commercial 
advantage should be financed from the private sector.
250
 Table II-6 is based on table 3.1 from the Allen 
Consulting Group’s report and provides a breakdown of the estimated expenditure.251 
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Table II-6 Allen Consulting Group Estimated Expenditure in 2001 for Commonwealth Government to Achieve its Proposed 
Resource Management Targets 
Landuse and Management Total Investment 
Required (over 10 
years) ($ million) 
Private Sector 
Contribution (%) 
Annual Average Investment 
from the Private Sector ($ 
million) 
Salinity Management 
Commercial Tree Establishment 25,117 50 1,256 
Non Commercial / Biodiversity 
Plantings 
8,365 15 125 
Perennial Pastures 4,507 80 361 
Fencing 5,485 67 367 
Living with Salt Options 2,754 50 138 
Other Management Changes 
Erosion and Soil Structure 2,235 45 101 
Acidity 1,215 90 109 
Biodiversity Protection 5,204 15 78 
Acid Sulfate Soils 88 22 2 
Riparian Zone Protection 1,460 51 74 
Land Clearing Controls 600 - - 
Rangeland Retirement for Biodiversity 722 - - 
Environmental Weed Control 100 60 6 
Environmental Flows 150 - - 
Irrigation Drainage 200 70 14 
Management of Change 1,796 7 13 
Total Capital Investment 59,998 44 2,644 
Maintenance 5,190 38 197 
Total Funding 65,188 44 2,841 
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The Allen Consulting Group’s report was released before the challenges of climate change were fully 
realised. The environmental risk drivers of population growth and economic growth were not taken into 
account. If the environmental risk drivers were fully taken into account and an appropriate inflation rate 
was applied, then it is likely that the monetary figure to achieve the proposed resource management 
targets would be substantially higher today. 
The Commonwealth Government’s current natural resource management program has allocated funds 
of $2 billion over four years (average annual expenditure of $500 million per year). The Australian 
National Audit Office indicates that there is little evidence that the Commonwealth’s natural resource 
management ‘programs are adequately achieving the anticipated national outcomes or giving sufficient 
attention to the ‘radically altered and degraded Australian landscape’…’252 The strategic targets of the 
current Commonwealth program are similar to those underlying the expenditure break down in table II-
6. The difference between the Allen Consulting Group’s estimated required average annual expenditure 
of $6.5 billion ($65 billion over ten years) and the current allocated funds of $500 million per year is 
striking. Even though the accuracy of the Allen Consulting Group’s figures is contestable it cannot be 
denied that deterioration in natural capital has continued notwithstanding investment by the 
Commonwealth through natural resource management programs. This indicates that the current level of 
funding is insufficient to stem the deterioration in the natural landscape and biodiversity. 
A recent study, Waldron et al found that Australia, amongst other countries, was substantially 
underfunding biodiversity conservation.
253
 The researchers accumulated information on global 
conservation spending and created a statistical model that used conservation priorities to determine 
expected levels of spending. They estimated that the total annual expenditure on global biodiversity 
was approximately $US21.5 billion for 2001 to 2008. Average annual spending in Australia was 
estimated to be $US526.113 million. Australia was held to be thirty eighth out of the forty most 
underfunded countries. The model found that Australia is underfunding biodiversity conservation by 
approximately $US275.36 million per annum. Waldron et al noted that highly underfunded countries 
were often neighbours and this was of ‘particular concern in the geographical grouping of Malaysia-
Indonesia-Australia, a region that holds a very large amount of threatened biodiversity.’254 It was 
opined that the potentially large amount that Australia may need to invest may place an onerous burden 
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on its fiscal capacity.
255
 The Waldron et al study underscores that Australia is underfunding 
biodiversity conservation and if this continues it is likely to lead to biodiversity declines. 
While there are no definitive figures, it is estimated that the funds required to meet conservation targets 
are significantly greater than the current government expenditure. The difference between the amounts 
expended on natural resource management, and those required to meet natural resource management 
targets has created a conservation funding gap. Underinvestment in natural resource management leads 
to deterioration of natural capital and erosion of production values. Far more funds must be found for 
conservation. The next section will argue that to raise sufficient public funds to repair, protect, and 
combat the environmental risk drivers is politically unachievable 
H Budget Pressures 
Even if it was accepted by Australian governments that a conservation funding gap needs to be filled, it 
is not simply a matter of allocating extra funding. A recent report from the Grattan Institute noted that 
Commonwealth and state budgets are under pressure from a number of fronts with the possibility that 
from 2016-17 onwards the budgetary position could deteriorate to a deficit of more than 4.5 per cent of 
Gross Domestic Product (approximately $65 billion) by 2024.
256
 The major factors affecting 
government budgets include:
257
 
 Falling terms of trade and lower economic growth - For example, declining mineral prices lead 
to reduced government revenue and reduced economic growth; 
 Increased demand for health care; 
 If real wages grow slowly, then inequality may increase, placing pressure on welfare payments; 
 Australia’s ageing population will place more pressure on budgets in the form of pensions and 
care costs; 
 Previous capital expenditure will place pressure on budgets for interest payments and 
depreciation expenses; and 
 New government expenditure such as the National Disability Insurance Scheme. 
It was stated that budget choices are politically difficult, Australia’s governments are small by OECD 
standards and the bureaucracy operates relatively efficiently. It is difficult to ‘find savings by cutting 
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waste and shrinking non-essential services.’258 The Grattan Institute report detailed options for dealing 
with budget deficits but broadly they boil down to increasing revenue and/or decreasing expenditure.
259
 
Increasing revenue could take the form of broadening the goods and services tax base by removing the 
exemptions for fresh food, and private spending on health and education. Income tax revenue could be 
increased by fully taxing the sale of assets such as by removing the capital gains tax discount and 
limiting tax concessions for superannuation. Decreasing expenditure could take the form of a reduction 
in the payment of aged pensions and removing higher education subsidies. None of these options are 
particularly palatable. This may mean that cuts are made to other relatively smaller expenditure areas 
such as conservation funding. 
One of the major drivers to government budgets is Australia’s ageing population. The Productivity 
Commission in its research paper on an ageing Australia underscored the following key points:
260
 
 Australia’s population is projected to rise to approximately 38 million by 2060; 
 Individuals aged 75 years or more is projected to rise by 4 million from 2012 to 2060, an 
increase from 6.4 per cent of the population to 14.4 per cent of the population; 
 Labour participation rates are anticipated to fall from 65 per cent to 60 per cent; 
 Average labour productivity is projected to be around 1.5 per cent per annum from 2012-13; 
 Total private and public investment requirements from 2012 to 2060 are expected to be more 
than five times that invested in the previous fifty years; and 
 It is projected that Australian governments will collectively face ‘additional pressures on their 
budgets equivalent to around 6 per cent of national GDP by 2060, principally reflecting the 
growth of expenditure on health aged care and the pension. 
The Productivity Commission observed that without an increase in government revenue or cuts in 
expenditures, the fiscal pressures created by population ageing will create a growing fiscal gap (the 
difference between government revenue and expenditure in any given year excluding interest payments 
on debt).
261
 The main options for addressing the fiscal gap include:
262
 
 Borrowing funds; 
 Selling assets; 
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 Increasing tax revenue; and 
 Cutting outlays. 
The size of the total aggregate funding gap facing Australian governments means that to close the gap 
requires total taxes collected by all Australian governments to increase from 28 per cent to 34 percent 
of GDP (a 21 per cent increase) or a similar reduction in expenditure.
263
 State and territory 
governments ‘have limited efficient options to raise additional revenue to fund increasing age-related 
spending.’264 The Commonwealth government has more efficient options in the form of income tax, 
goods and services tax, and fuel excise. While it was stated that it was beyond the scope of the study to 
address taxation optimisation, it was asserted that ‘even with other policy measures, the size of the 
incipient fiscal gap will almost certainly require tax increases.’265 What is obvious from the Grattan 
Institute report and the Productivity report is that there is not likely to be capacity to increase 
government environmental funding to levels required to meet the ever expanding requirements of 
environmental conservation. It is more likely that government expenditure on the environment will be 
curtailed. 
Our present policy approaches to conservation are unlikely to meet the ever expand requirements of 
environmental conservation. The capacity of Australian governments to sufficiently deal with the 
environmental risk drivers is low. This underscores that there is a policy rationale for an alternative 
approach to direct government funding for rural natural resource conservation and restoration activities. 
I Requirement for a New Funding Model 
Taking in to account the importance of private landholdings to conservation outcomes, the requirement 
of financial support to encourage the participation of private landholders in conservation, the impact of 
the environmental risk, the disjoint between funding capacity and environmental responsibility, and the 
emerging budgetary risk, it is expected that without far more private funds then the conservation 
funding gap will grow. Unless new measures attract private sources of investment, Australia risks 
finding itself in a situation where: 
 Conservation is underfunded by governments; 
 The conservation funding gap continues to expand; 
 Australian governments are forced to rely  on command and control mechanisms;  
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 There is increased bureaucracy to monitor compliance and correspondingly, stagnated 
innovation; 
 Direct  government intervention brings about inefficient allocation of resources; and 
 Biodiversity losses increase, with consequent harms to eco-services. 
One alternative funding model to government funded natural resource management is the Regional 
Onsite Conservation Program (‘ROCP’), a funding model conceptualised by Professor Paul Martin and 
expanded in reports and articles authored by Professor Paul Martin and the author of this dissertation,  
to encourage private funding into conservation activities within a framework of landscape change on 
private landholdings. The ROCP is designed to provide opportunities and incentives for investors, 
philanthropists, conservation groups, and private landholders. The ROCP aims to attract funding by 
capturing the value of marketable eco-services, direct philanthropic funds towards conservation works, 
and facilitate research into ecosystems, sustainable agricultural practices, and biotechnology. The 
model aims to provide financial and non-financial incentives to private landholders, encourage 
unincorporated joint venture arrangements with non-government conservation organisations, build 
social capital, encourage cooperative practices, facilitate innovation, and develop conservation works 
on an extensive spatial scale. 
The ROCP involves an investment program operated through an investment trust. This operates three 
subordinate funds aimed respectively at (1) conservation philanthropy, (2) conservation research and 
development, and (3) the production and sale of marketable eco-services. An investor would have the 
choice of allocating funds to the appropriate subordinate funds. Under the philanthropic fund the 
investor / contributor would receive an upfront tax deduction for their contribution but they would not 
receive any future benefit from the fund. Under the research and development fund an investor would 
receive an appropriate tax incentive and there would be the potential to receive future income based on 
the contingent commercial viability of the activities. Under the eco-services fund an investor would 
receive an appropriate tax incentive and potentially an income distribution from the sale of marketable 
eco-services. 
Tax incentives will potentially encourage private investors to contribute to conservation activities. 
Taxation incentives may encourage long term commitment and compensate for lower returns, and 
higher risk relative to other investments. The government can leverage its outlay (ie the decrease in 
taxation funds) to facilitate conservation on private land for the benefit of society with the degree of 
leverage depending upon how attractive investors find the taxation incentives and other benefits on 
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offer. The underlying rationale is that an individual in the pursuit of profit will find an investment more 
attractive if it costs less and taxation support will serve to reduce net costs and potentially leverage net 
gains from that investment. The ROCP and the uses of taxation incentives to encourage conservation 
investment are discussed in greater detail in Chapter V of this dissertation. 
In light of decreasing government spending on the environment and the compounding impact of 
environmental risk drivers, any potential for cost effective intervention to encourage conservation on 
private landholdings (eg the ROCP) must be considered. This is not to suggest that the ROCP is the 
only (or even the ideal) model for encouraging conservation in every scenario but it is illustrative of 
innovative funding models that could be utilised to decrease reliance on government-funded 
conservation programs and minimise regulation. Command and control regulation may curtail negative 
externalities but it is ineffectual in encouraging positive and co-operative action.
266
 Command and 
control cannot force private landholders to take positive action. In addressing environmental problems 
over an extensive landscape, integration and collaboration across land tenures (private and public), 
positive co-operation, and significant investment is required.
267
 Incentives and support for private 
action on private landholdings are essential. However, a hindrance to private conservation investment 
may be the lack of accurate information on natural resource management. 
J Lack of Accurate Information on Natural Resource Management  
A lack of accurate information on natural resource management of information may create uncertainty. 
Uncertainty may cause a number of problems in addressing environmental problems. For example, the 
‘presence of uncertainty substantially weakens the general presumption in favour of market based 
instruments over command and control.
268
 
A common theme in the SOE2011 assessment of the environmental sectors is a lack of accurate 
nationwide environmental data. This ‘not only affects the assessment of our environment, but also 
limits management effectiveness by restricting accurate planning and monitoring of management 
strategies.’269 The OEPR2008 noted that progress is required in the aggregation of environmental 
information. There are inconsistencies in data collection, lack of co-ordination, and a lack of standard 
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indicators.
270
 It was further stated in the OEPR2008 that economic data relating to environmental 
management (ie environmental expenditure, environmental taxes, water prices, environmental 
employment) is ‘sparse.’271  
Lindenmayer and Gibbons state that a ‘paucity of high-quality monitoring lies at the heart of the 
inability to assess the effectiveness of conservation efforts, assess conservation return on investment, 
and ultimately to effectively stem (or reverse) the loss of biodiversity in Australia.’272 Possingham et al 
argue that in biodiversity conservation there are ‘five distinct conservation, scientific and social 
benefits of long-term monitoring:’273  
1. Monitoring the state of a system allows appropriate state-dependent management actions to be 
initialised. For example, the amount of fish that can be sustainable harvested; 
2. Active adaptive management, which is learning by doing, recognises that the collection of 
information is important where there are uncertainties about how a system exactly works. 
Monitoring for learning allows better decisions to be made in the future; 
3. Monitoring allows deteriorations in the state of a system to be brought to the attention of policy 
makers and decision makers. This awareness of an unwanted change in the state of the 
environment may lead to changes in regulatory instrument, resource allocation, and natural 
resource management; 
4. Monitoring may lead to public engagement and thereby leverage off their efforts and support; 
and 
5. Monitoring may lead to a serendipitous discovery.  
Van Djik et al note that there is strong demand for environmental information at the Commonwealth 
level with 17 federal government departments requiring the information for more than 300 individual 
activities.
274
 In the SOE2011 it was opined that the demand for environmental information from 
government departments, the private sector and the community is increasing due to the environmental 
risk drivers of climate change, population growth, and economic growth.
275
 However, ‘the absence of 
clear market signals to investors has resulted in governments at all levels failing to have effective 
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strategies for obtaining environmental information.’276 The failure to invest in environmental 
information at the government and private levels may be the result of the interplay between several 
factors:
277
 
 The scope of users who benefit from environmental information is wide and varied but 
individual beneficiaries rarely pay for the information; 
 There is a misalliance between the long period of time required to gather data and the relatively 
short time allocated to natural resource management planning; 
 Environmental data has a long use by date and the data may be used in unforeseen ways from 
when it was initially gathered and as a consequence, costs are incurred up front but benefits 
may continue over a long period of time; 
 Users of environmental information may not fully appreciate its value; and 
 When gathering data at the local level, little thought is given to how the data may be collated at 
the regional and national levels. 
Some of these factors have been addressed in water, climate, and greenhouse gas emissions 
information.
278
 Van Dijk et al state that in order to advance environmental reporting and accounting in 
Australia, research should be conducted into:
279
 
 Creating common definitions and standards that can underscore environmental management 
objectives; 
 Measures that are scalable from the local to the national level; 
 The means to promote and support long-term research data collection, production and reporting; 
 The use of effectual satellite and sensor network technologies to be used in monitoring and 
collecting data; 
 Developing environmental modelling approaches that can integrate multiple levels of data; and 
 Experimental accounting in order to identify new data requirements and to pursue consistent, 
relevant and credible account and report structures.  
Information on natural resource management is dispersed and private.
280
 ‘Foresters know more than 
other people about the productivity and value of forests for timber; biologists know more about the 
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capability of forests to maintain rare flora and fauna and ecosystems under different management 
regimes …’281 Imperfect information leads to inefficient market outcomes. Accurate information is 
required for conservation investors to construct their true preferences. Imperfect information may lead 
to underinvestment in conservation.  This raises the issue about whether valuation in monetary terms 
and monitoring may mitigate uncertainty. 
K Is Valuation in Monetary Terms and Monitoring Prerequisites for Taking 
Conservation Action? 
When the author discussed the ROCP with economists, inevitably they would state that natural 
resources have to be valued in order to overcome market failure, the tragedy of the commons, and the 
undersupply of public goods. The embedded belief in an economic rationale for environmental policy 
is that monetary incentives, monetary disincentives, property rights, and prices are what drive human 
behaviour. Supporting the conviction is that if natural resources are valued in monetary terms (and paid 
for) then the market will protect the environment. Whilst this represents one aspect of human 
behaviour, it is an incomplete understanding that limits consideration of alternatives that respond to 
other drivers of human behaviour. 
The World Business Council for Sustainable Development in its Guide to Corporate Ecosystem 
Valuation identifies reasons why businesses may wish to value eco-services, including:
282
 
 Improved decision making and thus increased revenues, cost savings and the potential for 
increase in the value of assets and equity; 
 Informing mindsets, behaviour and actions of employees and stakeholders which can generate 
support for business decisions; 
 Sustaining and enhancing revenues by reducing operational costs, enhancing relationships with 
communities and authorities, identifying new income streams such as biodiversity offsets, 
marketing the additional value of ecosystem services preserved, and to maintain a social 
licence; 
 Reducing costs and taxes by identifying potential cost savings by using ecosystem services in 
production activities (in contrast to technological solutions), prioritising the use of limited 
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natural resources, and if allowed under the applicable tax regime, a taxation incentive is granted 
for producing eco-services which benefit society as a whole; 
 Revaluing assets to take into account the real value of natural resources; 
 Assessing liability and compensation by allowing the business to understand the impact of 
regulatory requirements and legal claims; 
 Measuring company value by quantifying environmental performances and allowing external 
users of business reports to take that into account; 
 Assisting the business to more accurately report on its environmental performance; and 
 Optimising societal benefits by improving decision making, providing information for 
negotiating environmental rehabilitation and compensation for damages, and facilitating co-
ordination and planning with other resource users (i.e. private landholders). 
However, the Economics of Ecosystems and Biodiversity in Business and Enterprise (TEEB) Study 
note that:
283
 
In reality, the idea that biodiversity or ecosystem services have economic value is scarcely reflected in the 
measures conventionally used to assess and report on company performance, or to weigh alternative business 
opportunities and risks. As a result, business decisions are made based on a partial understanding of costs and 
benefits. However, the ability to factor BES [Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services] values into corporate 
decision making is becoming more important, as new markets for ecosystem services are developed and as 
new regulations increasingly require companies to measure, manage and report their BES impacts. 
The extent to which economic value (let alone market prices) can or should be the basis for decision making 
about BES is open to debate. 
One method for valuing public goods such as eco-services is by ascertaining the collective willingness 
to pay. Methodologies which have been utilised to try to understand the willingness to pay for 
environmental public goods include: 
 Contingent Valuation – A survey is conducted where the interviewee is asked how much they 
would be willing to pay for environmental services given hypothetical budgetary restraints. The 
major concern with the use of contingent valuation is that the hypothetical nature of the survey 
may lead to bias. It is also noted that there is a prominent discrepancy between willingness to 
pay (WTP) and willingness to accept (WTA). For instance, a question of how much individuals 
would be WTP for the conservation of koalas could be converted into a question of how much 
compensation they would be WTA for the total loss of koalas. The difference between WTA 
and WTP for ordinary goods is minor but there is a substantial difference between WTA and 
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WTP for public and nonmarket goods.
284
 Thus, the WTA the total loss of koalas may be ten 
times the WTP for the conservation of koalas. The difference may be because of individual 
moral and philosophical considerations (the loss of koalas is morally unacceptable)
285
 as well as 
the psychological proposition of loss aversion
286
 (losses are valued higher than gains). 
Whatever the reason for the disparity between WTP and WTA, using contingent valuation may 
understate the significance of environmental public goods.
287
 
 Hedonic Pricing – Attempts to value environmental services as they relate to market goods 
such as houses. The basis for the methodology is that individuals are willing to pay different 
amounts for goods depending on the characteristics of those goods. It is argued that individuals 
would be willing to pay more for a house close to a national park than they would be for a 
house close to a factory. Econometric analysis is utilised to identify the value attributed to 
specific environmental services. Hedonic pricing has the advantage of being based on actual 
market transactions but separating environmental factors from other contributing factors is 
difficult.
288
 Moreover, the methodology is ineffectual for estimating non-localised 
environmental services such as national biodiversity projects.
289
  
 Analysis of Roll Call Votes of Legislators – Attempts to identify WTP based on the voting 
patterns of elected representatives and the characteristics of their electorate. However, 
contemporary empirical evidence indicates that elected representatives place a greater 
weighting on their personal ideology with lesser weighting given to the beneficial interests of 
their electorate.
290
 Accordingly, this method can be criticised on the basis that the relevant 
voting patterns do not reflect the preferences of the electorate. 
 Analysis of Ballot Propositions – Based on research into the voting patterns of Californian 
citizens on environmental ballot propositions.
291
 Ballot propositions are a form of direct 
democracy under which citizens propose and approve legislation and thus bypass their elected 
representatives. An initiative for ballot will qualify for consideration where the sponsor of the 
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proposal collects the required number of signatures. Once the signature requirement is met, the 
proposal appears on the next election ballot and if a majority vote for it then it is passed into 
law. Kahn and Matsusaka argue that the ballot proposition method ‘does not suffer from the 
problems that arise with other methods; the issues to be decided are real, the decisions are 
binding, a lengthy pre-election campaign period exposes voters to arguments for and against 
and allows time for reflection, a wide variety of issues are considered, and there are no 
intervening political agents.’292 This method holds little relevance to Australia as there is no 
equivalent voting regime. 
None of these methods capture the non-monetary values that arise from an individual’s personal 
philosophical stance. Notwithstanding the economic foundation upon which the above methodologies 
are based, valuation of natural resources in economic terms are at best estimates which provide an 
appropriate means for allocating  scarce economic resources, and at worse they gloss over the 
importance of the natural resource. A question that arises is whether valuing natural resources in 
monetary terms is a prerequisite for taking conservation action? 
Sven Wunder argues that it is a misconception that ‘economic valuation is a prerequisite’ for payment 
for environmental services (PES).
293
  Wunder notes that one of the arguments raised for delaying PES 
is that natural resources transcend monetary values. If it unknown how much they are worth then it is 
unknown how much the service provider should charge.
294
 Wunder counters this with the observation 
that payment levels can be determined through negotiations between service providers and service 
buyers or may arise where the service buyer offers a ‘take-it-or-leave-it’ payment.295 ‘In other words, 
even a service of infinite value can be protected through cost-priced PES, as strictly speaking, we don’t 
need to know what the service is worth, as long as we know that we want to keep it.’296 Wunder reflects 
that economic valuation can be a useful tool in the design of a PES program but it is not a prerequisite 
for implementation.
297
 Under generally accepted accounting principles the application of historical cost 
accounting means that purchased items are recorded based on the amount spent to obtain them rather 
than their market value. This means that there is no accounting barrier to recording a PES at its cost 
price. 
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A similar assertion to the valuation argument is that conservation should be delayed pending reliable 
environmental monitoring. The problem with this as highlighted by Lindenmayer, Piggott, and Wintle 
is that there are ‘many examples of threatened or endangered species being monitored until they went 
locally, regionally, or globally extinct.’298 Grantham et al suggest that in certain instances little is 
gained from monitoring for more than two years before taking action.
299
 Grantham et al contend that 
while more data is useful, ‘our study suggests that delaying conservation to collect data when there is 
ongoing habitat loss might not necessarily be the best strategy.’300 Field et al asserts that where a 
species is of high biological value such as a Koala, there should not be a delay in conservation 
activities in order to gather more data to guard against a ‘spurious’ (a false positive) detection in the 
decline of a species.
301
 
Overall monetary valuation of natural resources and data provided by initial monitoring may be useful 
in planning conservation activities and may mitigate uncertainty but they are not prerequisites for 
conservation action and investment. ‘In many cases, environmental degradation is unambiguous and 
urgent and its underlying causes sufficiently well understood to support immediate action.’302 If 
conservation activities are commenced without delay then monitoring may be useful to determine the 
effectiveness of the intervention.
303
 While the valuation of natural resources in monetary terms is not 
essential for the implementation of conservation, it is likely that there will be increased research efforts 
in this area as eco-service markets correspondingly expand. 
L Summary 
This chapter has considered the importance of private landholdings to conservation. Conservation 
reserves are not adequate to meet conservation goals. The participation of private land in conservation 
programs is essential in order to address conservation problems on an extensive spatial scale. One of 
the restraints on private landholder participation in conservation activities is a lack of financial support.  
The condition of the Australian environment is subject to the drivers of climate change, population 
growth, and economic growth. Water security, coastal communities, and natural ecosystems are 
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vulnerable to climate change as they have a limited adaptive capacity. There is historical evidence that 
a growing economy exerts pressure on the environment. This brings about increased consumption of 
resources and increased waste production. Population growth is a potential cause of environmental 
degradation with increased demand for resources, expansion in the surface area taken up by 
settlements, and more waste into the environment. The main pressures affecting biodiversity include 
climate change, habitat fragmentation, altered land use, pests and diseases, altered hydrology, grazing, 
altered fire regimes, urban development, and human extraction of resources. 
Australia has made progress during the 1998 -2007 period in addressing environmental problems. The 
OECD provided forty five recommendations on further action in order to meet the challenges of 
climate change, deteriorating water resources, social change, environmental information gaps, 
declining energy efficiencies, and biodiversity loss. It was noted that given the considerable amount of 
native vegetation on private landholdings requiring conservation, ongoing government funding will be 
required to secure these biodiversity benefits in the long term.  
The lack of accurate nationwide environmental data affects the assessment of our environment and 
limits management effectiveness, restricting accurate planning and monitoring of management 
strategies. The lack of monitoring data should not be used as an excuse to delay conservation activities. 
Neither is economic valuation of natural resources a prerequisite for conservation. A delay to gather 
further data or to value environmental services in economic terms may result in threatened or 
endangered species becoming extinct. 
Government funding is insufficient to combat the major environmental risks. A conservation funding 
gap exists between actual environmental expenditure and expenditure required to protect, and mitigate 
pressures on the environment arising from human activities. There is a disjoint between the funding 
capacity of the Commonwealth and the expenditure responsibilities of the states. The states are 
territories rely on the financial power of the Commonwealth to meet their expenditure responsibilities. 
Given the risks to government budgets such as falling terms of trade and lower economic growth, 
increased demand for health care, a slowing in real wages growth, an increase in welfare payments, and 
higher aged pension payments and aged care costs due to Australia’s ageing population it is unlikely 
that Australian governments can increase conservation funding. There is also the possibility that 
environmental funding by governments will decrease.  
From a policy perspective there is a justification for an alternative approach to funding rural natural 
resource conservation and restoration activities on private landholdings. New measures are required to 
86 
 
attract significant private investment for conservation works. Unless an alternative funding model is 
created it is likely that conservation will continue to be underfunded by governments, the conservation 
funding gap will expand and biodiversity losses will increase. The Regional Onsite Conservation 
Program could help decrease reliance on government-funded conservation programs. The ROCP and 
the uses of taxation incentives to encourage conservation investment are discussed in greater detail in 
Chapter V of this dissertation. 
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III BEHAVIOURAL ASPECTS 
‘You may run the risks, my friend, but I do the cutting. If we cut down my percentage … liable to interfere with my aim.’ – 
Blondie  
The Good, the Bad and the Ugly: Extended English-Language Version (Directed by Sergio Leone, Metro Goldwyn Mayer, 
2003) 0:23:04. 
The author of this dissertation had the movie playing in the background while writing. The quote represents a point in the 
writing process where various ideas coalesced. 
A Overview 
Contrary to the fundamental tenents of economic theory an individual’s behaviour cannot be fully 
explained by their reaction to financial inducements and self-interest. Much of the public discussion of 
natural resource management centres on the assertion that landholders ‘should be motivated by ideals 
of sustainability and good environmental outcomes’ and such a virtuous stance leads to protection of 
the ‘interests of the community at large.’304 At the other end of the spectrum, many institutional 
designers take the view that they cannot rely on the virtue of landholders but instead must rely on 
regulations and market incentives which appeal entirely to the self-interest of landholders.
305
 Perhaps a 
better view is that individuals may be subject to self-interest but they are not bereft of other motivations 
or concerns such as community interest.
306
   
Behavioural motivators and drivers influence private landholder uptake of conservation schemes. The 
behavioural aspects of private landholders must be taken into account when seeking to undertake 
conservation activities on an extensive scale. To illustrate, the co-operation of private landholders has 
‘underwritten’ the survival of the endangered pygmy bluetongue lizard in South Australia.307  A 
scientific investigation by Souter et al revealed that there was no ‘suitable combination of natural 
habitat requirements to support a viable lizard population’ on public conservation reserves.308 All 
known populations of the lizard occur on private land.
309
 To transfer the lizards to a suitably located 
public conservation reserve would require the ‘long-term and expensive commitment’ of creating 
                                                 
304
 Adrian Walsh and Mark Shepheard, 'The Role of Virtue in Natural Resource Management' in Jacqueline Williams and 
Paul Martin (eds), Defending the Social Licence of Farming: Issues, Challenges and New Directions for Agriculture 
(CSIRO Publishing, 2011) 23, 24. 
305
 Ibid. 
306
 Ibid 27. 
307
 Jeremy Roberts, 'Aussie Farmers' Saving of Lizard 'a Lesson for World'', The Australian (Canberra), 24 November 2006, 
4. 
308
 Nicholas J Souter et al, 'Habitat Requirements of the Endangered Pygmy Bluetongue Lizard, Tiliqua adelaidensis' (2007) 
135(1) Biological Conservation 35, 43. 
309
 Ibid, 34. 
88 
 
artificial burrows.
310
 The scientists noted that unless other arrangements could be made, the 
maintenance of existing population would have to rely on the co-operation of private landholders, 
which they had provided over ‘many years.’311  
The Pygmy Bluetongue Lizard is listed as endangered by the Commonwealth under the Environment 
Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 (Cth) (‘EPBC’), and listed as endangered in South 
Australia under sch 7 of the National Parks and Wildlife Act 1972 (SA). Under the 2012 recovery plan 
for the lizards, private landholders can enter into a Heritage Agreement or a Sanctuary Scheme.
312
 A 
Heritage Agreement is a binding agreement (production is not usually allowed on the protected area) 
listed against the land title. This entitles a landholder to receive technical advice, financial assistance, 
rate rebates and fencing assistance. The Sanctuary Scheme is a voluntary agreement which recognises 
the landholder’s commitment to managing the land for conservation purposes. The Sanctuary Scheme 
is not listed against land title and the landholder can revoke the agreement at any time. The holder of a 
Sanctuary Agreement may receive assistance from funding bodies interested in the protection of habitat 
for the purposes of conservation of a species but there is no guarantee that this will occur. The recovery 
plan cost estimate over a five-year period is approximately $1.1 million. Of this overall figure, only 
$5,000 has been allocated for the purpose of encouraging landholders to enter into conservation 
agreements.
 313
 The goodwill of the landholders is the linchpin which has ‘underwritten’ the survival of 
the Pygmy Bluetongue Lizard. The incentives seem slight considering the downside of having an 
endangered species on a property listed under the EPBC; a person without approval cannot take any 
action which will have a significant impact on a listed species.
314
 Economic motivators cannot explain 
the conserving behaviours. 
An example of where EPBC intervention has seemingly damaged goodwill is the listing of the lowland 
native grasslands of Tasmania. The grasslands are important to the survival of ‘20 nationally listed 
threatened species and 60 state listed species.’315 At the time of the implementation it was noted:316 
TASMANIAN graziers have run sheep on the island's lowland grasslands since colonial days, 
defying bushrangers, drought and the elements to carve a significant place in the state's history. 
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However, many of today's graziers believe a recent federal environmental ruling is an insult to their 
stewardship of their historic properties and a threat to their livelihoods… 
Farmers and graziers, fearing the decision ‘locks up’ vast areas of their properties -- in some cases 
up to half -- were further stunned by Mr Garrett's decision in July to knock back a $9.5 million 
program to help them conserve the very same grasslands. 
The anger is palpable on the lowland grasslands, which cover much of the east and midlands as well 
as parts of the Bass Strait islands, the northeast and northwest.  
Sheep farmer John Cotton said he had already agreed to private conservation reserves on his east 
coast property and would have welcomed a ‘co-operative’ approach to further protection. ‘But the 
ongoing viability of this property has to be a prerequisite to those things,’ he said. ‘Instead, we have 
had restrictions imposed on the development of our land by a decision from the federal government 
that will affect the ongoing viability of the land. But we're getting no ... compensation.’ 
Fellow grazier Tom Dunbabin, who has used covenants to voluntarily protect forest on his land near 
Ross, is doing the same for grasslands on the property. He too believes the federal government has 
been heavy-handed and that any bureaucratically imposed restrictions on land use could affect farm 
viability. ‘Like most farmers I know, I'd be more than happy to sit down and talk about it -- but 
that's not happening,’ he said.  
Such examples suggest that even for environmentally co-operative landholders situations will arise 
where without some positive incentive, private landholders are less likely to undertake new 
conservation works which could potentially limit future development upon their land. There is no 
denying that, when it comes to resource management, many landholders do take into account 
community interests. However, self- interest and the profit motive also play a role in resource 
management decisions. Suitable incentives coupled with the goodwill of landholders, are the key 
ingredients to the promotion of conservation.  
This chapter discusses the behavioural aspects of private landholders participating in conservation 
schemes. The chapter briefly looks at the unintended consequences that can arise under command and 
control. The chapter moves on to discuss motivations and constraints upon participation in conservation 
schemes. The chapter then outlines some behavioural change theories with an emphasis on the theory 
of planned behaviour. The drivers of behavioural change are discussed. Attention is given to the 
influence of transaction costs on behaviour.  Overall this chapter considers the following research 
issue: 
4. To what extent is there a behavioural rationale for a privately funded approach to rural natural 
resource governance? 
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B Command and Control – Unintended Consequences 
Unintended consequences may arise through the implementation of command and control regulation. 
For instance, in the US the Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 USC § 1531 (2012) (‘ESA’), which 
aims to support the conservation of endangered and threatened species, has given rise to the negative 
incentive to destroy habitat that may be attractive to a threatened animal. Daowei Zhang provides 
evidence that private landholders whose properties are close to a known or probable Red-Cockaded 
Woodpecker habitat have a ‘high propensity’ to remove trees from their properties.317 The apparent 
rationale is that by removing potential Red-Cockaded Woodpecker habitat the land use limitation 
provisions under the ESA will not be invoked and therefore the properties maintain or increase their 
market value. After analysing the empirical evidence Zhang states: 
The conventional logic is clear: without any financial compensation for providing endangered species habitat 
but facing more governmental regulatory limitation on their land use and management if an endangered 
species comes onto their property, landowners have no incentive to voluntarily provide additional habitat for 
endangered species. Instead, landowners will act in ways that they might not otherwise act-to cut timber and 
eliminate suitable habitat and to do so before endangered species come onto their lands to protect or enhance 
the existing value of their property. Furthermore, they have an incentive to urge their neighbors to do the 
same, because the [Red-Cockaded Woodpecker] on neighboring land increases the vulnerability of them and 
other neighbors as well … Of the vast majority of endangered species that have some or all of their habitats 
on private lands, the likelihood of them thriving is not great if the current policy is not changed … Facing 
isolation, some endangered species could eventually become extinct. 
Zhang’s comments bring to the forefront the degree that landholders can use their land to satisfy their 
economic requirements and avoid the government restricting private usage for the benefit of society as 
a whole. Property rights may be limited by laws in order to manage negative externalities but unless 
there is some positive incentive, private landholders are less likely to enter into conservation that could 
trigger provisions that further restrict land usage. Government intervention in the form of the ‘stick’ 
(regulatory land use limitation) may allow governments to announce that they have taken action to fix 
the problem but whether or not it achieves its objectives is another matter. Regulation cannot force 
private landholders to pursue positive action. Furthermore, command and control may entail high 
monitoring and enforcement costs.  
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C Motivation and Constraints on Participants 
An individual’s entire behaviour cannot be fully explained by their reaction to financial inducements 
and self-interest. Humans are not exclusively financially rational beings. Additionally, ‘behavioural 
factors influence the outcome of policy incentives in that they can either complement or constrain the 
effects of policies.’318 Thus, ‘there is no guarantee that landholders will participate in any funding 
scheme, and low participation reduces the potential environmental benefit of the intervention.’319 It is 
important to take into account landholder behaviour.
320
  
Factors which may influence landholder participation in a conservation scheme include:
321
 
 The voluntary nature of the scheme; 
 Landholder autonomy; 
 Public (off-farm) environmental benefits and private (on-farm) environmental benefits;  
 The nature and extent of the financial and non-financial support; 
 Market forces ie high crop prices may offer an incentive to maintain production;  
 Transaction costs such as reporting requirements and legal expenses; 
 The administration complexity of the scheme; 
 Duration of the scheme; 
 The quantity and quality of information; 
 Awareness of the program; 
 Opportunity costs such as lost production from quarantining areas for conservation; 
 Landholder characteristics such as age, gender, family size, lifestyle, dependency on farm 
income, education, past experience, and training; 
 Landholder attitude towards the conservation; 
 The stress experienced by the landholder (eg high levels of debt) and the ability of the 
individual to cope; 
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 The landholder’s ability to solve problems; 
 The landholder’s business goals;  
 Whether or not there are successors (ie children) to the landholding; 
 Landholding characteristics such as size, production type, and the amount of non-intensively 
used land;  
 Whether the landholding is held as freehold or under a lease; 
 Rate of neighbouring landholder participation; and  
 The amount of government involvement. 
The interaction between factors influencing landholder participation and non-participation is ‘complex 
and not yet fully understood.’322 Sasaki notes that landholders do not just focus on direct monetary 
incentives and as a consequence, ‘a financial incentive is not enough when considering behavioural 
drivers.’323 
Reimer and Prokopy conducted research into conservation program participation in US, examining 
Farm Bill programs offered at the same time in the same geographical location.
324
 The research 
explored farmer preferences for programs which were slightly different in their approaches and 
implementation. The research reviewed the awareness of the program name, acronyms, nature, 
incentives, and eligibility. The surveyed farmers indicated that financial incentives were important ‘but 
for no farmer did they constitute the primary motivation for participation.’325 Other motivations for 
program participation included public (off-farm) environmental benefits such as promoting public 
environmental goods through installing wild life habitats, and private (on-farm) environmental benefits 
such as preventing soil erosion. Most program participants ‘indicated that public (or off-farm) 
environmental benefits were the most significant motive.’326 It was stated that ‘payments allowed them 
to pursue practices that they were otherwise interested in implementing.’327 Barriers to participation 
included lack of awareness of the program requirements and eligibility, lengthy application processes, 
burdensome program requirements, government involvement, and a lack of perceived benefit. 
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Moon, Marshall and Cocklin argue that a ‘[l]andholders’ decision to participate in conservation 
programs will depend on their personal circumstances and social context.’328 Personal circumstances 
‘are represented as the resources of an individual that affect decision making and action’ and include 
education, skills, knowledge, financial security, physical health, mental health, and lifestyle.
329
 For 
example, education, skills and knowledge provide landholders with the capacity to undertake 
conservation works. Social characteristics include social norms, attitudes towards conservation, the 
degree of exchange of goods and knowledge between the scheme and the landholder, and trust in the 
program administrator. 
In their research Moon, Marshall and Cocklin focused on three biodiversity conservation programs 
which used different policy mechanisms to encourage landholder participation. The programs were 
administered by different organisations over different periods of time across three different regions. In 
response to a survey, program participant landholders stated that their preferred incentive was money, 
with on-ground advice as their second most preferred incentive.  The majority of survey respondents 
felt a strong obligation to protect the environment. Overall, landholder participants had significant land 
management experience and kept up to date with land management practices. On the negative side, 
participants noted that there was not enough consultation between them and the program 
administrators, they were not actively involved in the design of conservation activities, and in some 
situations the relevant program was not adequately tailored for individual landholders.
330
 The five 
common reasons given by survey respondents for non-participation were the: 
 Belief that a formal conservation program was not required for bio-diversity protection; 
 Lack of awareness of the program and its features; 
 Possible loss of autonomy; 
 Lack of trust in the government and their programs; and 
 Misalignment between the land management philosophies of landholders and program 
administrators. 
This research suggests that the provision of the appropriate incentives, the use of landholder preferred 
program characteristics, and investment in activities which improve the capacity of landholders (ie 
training) to undertake conservation activities, will increase the willingness of landholders to participate 
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in conservation programs. This stance is underscored by Putten et al who conducted research into 
Tasmanian landholder preferences for conservation incentive programs.
 331
 They came to the 
conclusion that ‘increasing participation is best achieved by offering programs that allow flexibility in 
terms of the legal arrangements, land use options, and other program attributes.’332 Putten et al also 
noted that anecdotal evidence suggested that using conservation covenants may ‘constitute a real 
barrier to participation’ for some landholders.333 Some landholders are concerned about the inflexible 
nature and irreversibility of permanent covenants. Furthermore, Langpap states that many landholders 
‘may not be opposed to providing habitat on their land, but hesitate to do so because they fear 
government intervention or question the fairness of having to assume the costs of providing a public 
good.’334 
 The evidence suggests that different types of landholders and their corresponding operations will 
‘exhibit different participation patterns, which may reflect differences in preferences for conservation 
policy tools.’335 For example, research into the conservation of Box-Ironbark ecosystem remnants in 
northern Victoria found that there was an apparent difference between landholders with large 
landholdings (property area greater than 150 hectares) and landholders with small landholdings 
(property area less than 150 hectares).
336
 Both types of landholders had the basic motivation to 
conserve and manage the Box-Ironbark remnants but they faced different economic constraints. For 
large scale landholders ‘who derive their income largely on-property, considerations for the 
conservation and management of Box-Ironbark remnants must be tempered by the need for the 
property to be productive.’337 Small scale landholders ‘who derive their predominant income off-farm’ 
lack the time and knowledge to undertake conservation activities.
338
 As a consequence, it is suggested 
that a range of incentive measures offered in the same geographical area at the same time may be 
required to fully engage the majority of landholders.  
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A ROCP type approach has the potential to tailor financial incentives and legal arrangements to meet 
individual landholder’s requirements, to provide information, training and technical guidance, to 
promote conservation programs, and to involve participants in the design and implementation of 
conservation. The ROCP provides opportunities for high levels of landholder motivation, initiative, and 
innovation. The model allows local action and focus. Once the goals, objectives and guidelines are set, 
landholders, individually or as part of a collective, choose the best means to carry out the conservation 
activity. 
D Behavioural Change Theories 
Another way to consider landholder motivations to participate in conservation is through the lens of 
behavioural change theories. Micro-economics is itself a behaviour change theory and whilst it has an 
elevated status in policy, it is one theory of among many.  This dissertation does not seek to advance 
behavioural theory other than exploring the possibility that the economic rational model is an 
inadequate basis for understanding an individual’s response to taxation incentives, government grants, 
and other funding models. 
Some of these theories provide an insight into behaviour and others provide a framework for targeted 
intervention. These theories can inform the development (enlighten good practice) of intervention 
strategies that seek to change investment behaviour or habitual behaviour.
339
 Investment behaviour 
occurs occasionally (eg purchasing new equipment).
340
 ‘Habitual behaviour is routine behaviour such 
as switching off the lights when leaving a room.’341 The prevalent theories include social cognitive 
theory, theory of reasoned action, and theory of planned behaviour. 
Social cognitive theory (SCT) is a learning theory grounded on the idea that people learn by observing 
others. People observe the behaviour of others and the consequences of that behaviour; they remember 
the steps in the scenario and use that to guide their behaviour. Behavioural change is determined by the 
interdependent factors of behaviour, personal, and environment.
342
 These factors affect each other. For 
example, personal factors (eg emotion, cognition, biology) may influence behaviour and behaviour 
may influence personal factors.
343
 Likewise, environmental factors (eg physical space, tools, behaviour 
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of others) may influence personal factors and personal factors may influence environmental factors.
344
 
Bandura argues that SCT should be used (eg by providing models of behaviour in the media) to address 
global problems.
345
 For example, to encourage a change in consumption patterns to reduce greenhouse 
gases. 
The theory of reasoned action (TRA) examines the relation between an individual’s attitude, belief, 
intention, and behaviour.
346
 The theory postulates that intention is the most reliable predictor of human 
behaviour.
347
 Intention is the likelihood that an individual will perform a specific behaviour.
348
 
Intention is a function of attitude, and subjective norms.
349
 Attitude towards behaviour is an 
individual’s positive or negative feelings towards performing a specific action.350 An individual will 
hold a positive attitude towards a given behaviour if they believe that performing the behaviour will 
lead to mostly positive outcomes.
351
 An individual will hold a negative attitude towards a given 
behaviour if they believe that performing the behaviour will lead to mostly negative outcomes.
352
 
Subjective norms ‘are a function of the individual’s beliefs that referent others (influential individuals 
or groups) think s/he should or should not engage in this given [behaviour] coupled with the 
individual’s willingness or motivation to comply with these referent others.’353 An application of TRA 
‘may help identify the antecedents of behaviour’ so that intervention programs may be ‘designed to 
change beliefs which will in turn change behaviour.’354 
The theory of planned behaviour (TPB) is an extension of TRA. TPB was fashioned to cover cases in 
which an individual does not control all the factors affecting the performance of a specific behaviour.
355
 
The rest of this section will focus on the TPB as the model is widely used to explain and predict 
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investment behaviour (required for conservation on private landholdings).
356
 The model has been used 
to predict ‘pro-environmental behaviours’ such as recycling, composting, reduced energy use, water 
conservation, sustainable agriculture, and riparian buffer management.
357
 
TPB is based on three assumptions. First, individuals evaluate the implications of performing a 
behaviour / action before engaging in that action. Second, individuals make rational decisions based on 
the information before them at the time of making the decision. Third, individuals evaluate their ability 
to perform the behaviour based on the presence of materials and skills required to facilitate that 
behaviour. Overall, TPB is based on rational choice.  
TPB (as with TRA) asserts that an individual’s intention to engage in a particular behaviour is a 
predictor of that behaviour. Intention is defined ‘as a person’s motivation to perform a specific 
behaviour.’358 Intention is a function of attitude, social norms (subjective norms), and perceived 
behavioural control. Attitudes are the person’s positive or negative belief in the outcome of the 
behaviour. Subjective norms are the person’s perception of societal pressure to perform or not to 
perform the behaviour. Perceived behaviour control reflects the person’s belief about their own skills, 
ability to access relevant resources, and overall, their ability to successfully perform the behaviour. The 
relative importance and weighting of the three factors differs from one behavioural situation to 
another.
359
 The theory postulates that if an intention is held constant, then initiation of the behaviour is 
more likely where there is a high perceived behaviour control.
360
 Figure III-1 illustrates elements in the 
TPB. 
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Figure III-1 Conceptual Diagram of the Theory of Planned Behaviour 
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The TPB framework demonstrates the importance of attitudes in motivating conservation behaviour. 
An attitude is a function of salient beliefs about the behaviour and an evaluation of the consequences of 
performing the behaviour.
361
 The TPB should be tested against specific attitudes as the relationship 
‘between attitudinal variables and behavioural variables are maximally strong when both are expressed 
in the same level of specificity.’362 For example, where the behaviour being investigated is the creation 
of a riparian buffer the specific attitude towards riparian buffers is important (rather than the general 
attitude towards the environment). Knowing the general attitude does not necessarily help in 
understanding behaviour as the individual may have a positive attitude towards conservation, ‘and yet 
still perform behaviours that contradict that behaviour.’363 For example, an individual may have a 
positive general attitude to a national park and wildlife under a conservation program but they may 
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continue to hunt the endangered species which the conservation program seeks to protect.
364
 The 
general attitude to conservation is only slightly relevant to the specific behaviour of hunting.  
A person’s behaviour is influenced by their perception of the expectations and values of significant 
others about whether or not they should engage in a particular behaviour.
365
 ‘Significant others’ include 
family, friends, neighbours, fellow producers, and community leaders. Zubair and Garforth noted that 
‘farmers living in rural areas of Pakistan discuss matters of daily life with their friends and fellow 
farmers when they meet together and are highly influenced by their family in making decisions.’366 An 
Italian study into the uptake of agri-environmental measures found that ‘[f]armers’ normative beliefs, 
namely the opinions of society as a whole, and even more so those of neighbouring farmers, are 
relevant for active adopters, but negligible for passive participants.’367 An American study found that 
the opinions of family members, friends and neighbours, fellow ranchers, and trusted government 
representatives taken as a whole, were influential on rancher’s intention to participate in wildlife 
workshops and field days.
368
 
Perceived behaviour control is influenced by a person’s beliefs about whether they have the required 
skills, access to the necessary resources, and the opportunity to perform the behaviour.
369
 These factors 
are important as people who believe they have the wherewithal to complete the action are more likely 
to engage in the behaviour.
 370
  Perceived behaviour control may also be influenced by the complexity 
of administrative processes, the length of time required to apply for resourcing support, the requirement 
to assign proprietary rights, and the lack of certainty where the resourcing party to the contract has the 
ability to withdraw at will.
371
  
If we apply the TPB to a specific conservation activity then it can be surmised that a person who has a 
positive attitude towards that activity, who believes that community leaders, fellow producers, 
neighbours, family and friends support that activity, and they believe that they have the skills and 
resources necessary to undertake that activity, then they will have a high motivation to perform that 
activity. 
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An understanding of the factors that affect behavioural intention provides a foundation for the targeted 
intervention, such as by educational instruments or peer group measures, to modify specific behaviour. 
However, Garforth et al noted in research reviewing the effect of a single payment scheme upon 
farmers, that the weights that farmers place upon various objectives changed significantly pre and post 
the application of the scheme.
372
 They noted that ‘there is currently no mechanism for estimating the 
changes to weight.’373 The research explored the effect upon farmer willingness to modify their 
farming system, within the conceptual framework of TPB. The research found that ‘attitudes, perceived 
behavioural control and the views of others all have a significant influence on behavioural intentions 
with respect to ‘the single payment scheme.374 The findings suggest that:375 
 Financial incentives are not the primary motive for change, with environmental, lifestyle, and 
societal factors of equal or of higher weighting; 
 Non-economic incentives are long term objectives while economic incentives are short term 
objectives; 
 Classifying different behavioural types allows for more accurate predictions as to behavioural 
adoption; 
 If the relative weights for objectives change with incentives then accurate methods for  
estimating change should be developed; and 
 Uncertainty created by new incentives means that it is difficult to plan future actions. 
Overall TPB research suggests that the behaviour of landholders is not driven primarily by self -
interest. However Wilcock et al note:
376
 
… a farmer’s attitude towards conservation may develop from the value that the individual places upon 
farming; if he values farming as a way of life he may wish to conserve and sustain the land in order that 
succeeding generations  of the family may enjoy the same way of life. Conversely, those who value farming 
as a business may wish only to maximise profit and production without thought of family succession or 
sustainability. Their attitude may be influenced only by the immediate business survival problem. 
Thus, what seems to be clear is that landholder decision making in respect of conservation is a complex 
process influenced by many factors including social, economic, and cognitive. This suggests that when 
implementing a conservation programme, attention should be paid to, and the various conservation 
projects adapted to, the local conditions, local societal values, and individual landholder requirements. 
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E Drivers for Behavioural Change 
In this section the discussion concentrates on the drivers of behavioural change and their significance 
for the successful implementation of conservation. Sasaki highlights three broad categories of drivers 
for behavioural change: external factors, internal factors, and social factors.
377
 External factors 
encompass financial costs and opportunity costs; internal factors encompass habits and cognitive 
processes; and social factors encompass societal norms and cultural attitudes. 
External factors include financial incentives or disincentives and policies that reduce or increase effort 
costs.  Taxation incentives, government subsidies, and competitive tenders may encourage desirable 
behaviour. Taxation and fines may discourage undesirable behaviour. The provision of information and 
training can facilitate desirable behaviour.  Regulation and administrative processes can make 
undesirable behaviour more costly time wise. Overall, these instruments are based on the assumption 
that individuals are economically rational. 
Behaviour which deviates from the economic rational model may occur due to habits, emotions, 
personal capacity, and biases. Habits are ‘routinised behaviour which involve minimal deliberation and 
limit conscious awareness behaviour choice.’378 Furthermore, ‘people’s rationality, willpower and self-
interest are bounded.’379 Bounded rationality reflects that a person’s reasoning is limited by the 
information they have before them, their cognition processes, and the finite amount of time they have 
to make a decision. If a person lacks the skills and the resources to determine the optimal solution they 
may turn to ‘heuristics’, simple rules governing decision making (eg availability heuristic – more 
emphasis is placed on ideas that are easily brought to mind, representativeness heuristic – assessing the 
similarity of persons and things and then basing the likelihood of an event on whether or not something 
is more representative, affect heuristic – judging the risks and benefit of a task based on first 
impressions and gut feelings), and  rules of thumb to simplify the decision making process.  Individuals 
are also susceptible to hyperbolic discounting under which they place less value on future rewards 
compared to rewards that are imminent. Hyperbolic discounting is an important issue for long term 
threats such as bio-diversity loss because ‘individuals fail to apprehend very-long term horizons and 
can be subject to preference reversals and time inconsistencies; characteristics that may be undesirable 
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for public policies.’380 Countering this, social factors may mean that more attention is given to 
intergenerational issues.
381
 
Social factors include networks, norms and social capital which affect individual behaviour and 
collective action simultaneously.
382
 A network is a social structure made up of individuals and groups 
who share similar interest, communicate regularly, and interact for mutual benefit and support. A norm 
is a belief held by a group about how members of that group should behave in certain circumstances. 
Social capital is the links, shared values, and understanding that exist between individuals and groups 
which enables and encourages mutually beneficially social cooperation. The thread which connects 
these concepts is collective action. The theory of collective action postulates ‘that individuals can be 
expected to act consistently with the interest of the groups to which they belong.’383 Collective action is 
important for many conservation issues as collaboration has the ability to increase positive 
environmental outcomes on a spatial scale, provide individuals with access to other member’s 
competencies and skills, reduce transaction costs, provide economies of scale and scope, and increase 
the capacity to undertake future conservation works. Moreover, when people ‘perceive that others are 
behaving cooperatively, individuals are moved by honor, altruism, and like dispositions to contribute to 
public goods.’384 
After reviewing the broad categories of the drivers for behavioural change, Sasaki underscored four 
implications for mechanism design:
385
 
1. A holistic approach is required – Financial incentives are an important component in motivating 
behavioural change but they may not be enough by themselves. What is required is a 
combination of policy mechanisms to influence behaviour; 
2. Behavioural change should be comprehended at the regional level – Each lot of land has its own 
specific characteristics and production capacity. It is important that it is recognised that the 
influence of different mechanisms varies across landscapes and individual landholders; 
3. ‘Nudging’ may be a useful tool to promote change – Nudge theory suggests that motivation and 
decision making can be influenced by indirect suggestions and positive reinforcement. For 
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example, eco-labelling has the potential to influence consumer behaviour and in doing so 
provide recognition to landholders who undertake eco-friendly activities; and 
4. Networks, social norms, and social capital can potentially influence collective action – 
Collective action is related to external and internal factors. Advisory systems, training, the 
distribution of information, and notification of innovation can mould attitudes in favour of 
collective action. Moreover, when people become aware that others are cooperating then they 
become more likely to participate in collective activity. 
Moon, Marshall and Cocklin take a different stance on the drivers for behavioural change.
386
 They note 
that landholders’ decisions to participate in conservation programs ‘depend on their personal 
circumstances and social context.’387 They suggest that landholder’s personal circumstances should be 
maintained or improved in order to increase their capacity to undertake conservation works.
388
 Pro-
environmental and cooperative social characteristics may provide a strong foundation for the pursuit of 
conservation goals.
389
  They provide the following examples of methods that may improve the 
likelihood of landholder participation in conservation schemes:
390
 
 Methods to improve and strengthen personal circumstances  
 Lifestyle and wellbeing  
- Understand that participation in the program is a cumulative stressor. Programme 
administrators should try and minimise its detrimental effects.  
- Minimise the administrative burden placed upon participants. 
- Offer an option for labour support. 
- Adopt flexible program features that can support landholder’s short-term and long-
term landholding objectives. 
 Information, knowledge and experience  
- Provide sufficient relevant information at a regional and landholding level. 
- Provide training at times and at locations convenient for landholders. 
- Encourage the exchange of knowledge between program administrators and 
participants. 
- Allow property level objectives to be incorporated into the program. 
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- Design monitoring schemes that collect information which may help improve land 
management practices.  
 Financial security  
- Scrutinise the economic conditions of primary industries to identify conservation 
opportunities.  
- Calculate and outline the effect of participation on the landholder’s income. 
- Outline further opportunities for the sale of eco-services.  
 Methods to improve and strengthen social influences 
 Attitudes  
- Ascertain the connection between landholders’ attitudes and the land management 
practices. 
- Gather empirical evidence on landholders’ attitudes to determine which program 
features are desirable. 
- Use incentives to modify attitudes which lead to harmful land management. 
 Trust 
- Create networks between program administrators, landholders, and scientists. 
- Foster collective action. 
- Deliver programs over medium to long term time frames.  
- Retain program staff over the long term in order to foster trust between program 
administrators and landholders. 
 Norms  
- Encourage participating landholders to share their beliefs, reasoning and 
understanding with the regional community. 
- Create a shared vision and promote engagement by involving landholders in the 
program design.  
- Devise small-scale programs that appeal to personal norms. 
- Devise large-scale programs that appeal to social norms.  
Taking into account the assessments of Sasaki, and Moon, Marshall and Cocklin, administrators should 
take a holistic approach when implementing conservation schemes. Depending on the requirements of 
individual landholders, they should offer more than financial incentives, including training, workforce 
support, expert advice, guidance on land management practices, and relevant information at a regional 
and individual landholding scale. The input of landholders should be sought to design programs that 
105 
 
offer flexibility, foster a shared vision, meet landholder production objectives, and encourage two-way 
learning between landholders and administrators. The program should facilitate collective action to 
create networks, strengthen favourable social norms and build social capital. In particular, collective 
action will encourage the provision of conservation works on an extensive spatial scale. 
F Transaction Costs 
Transaction costs may affect landholder participation in a conservation scheme, and low participation 
reduces the potential benefit of the scheme. Different program designs will have different effects on 
transaction costs and as such, some program designs will be more effective in minimising transaction 
costs than others. This is because the rules and associated arrangements can generate or reduce 
transaction costs by shaping the terms of administration, contractual arrangements, enforcement, and 
information distribution. For example, centralisation or decentralisation of administrative processes can 
have an effect on transaction costs. Local voluntary conservation programs built on trust and co-
operation will have extrinsically low transaction costs. Centrally administered government schemes 
will have relatively high transaction costs as program administrators, who are accountable for the use 
of public funds, adopt processes that seek to ensure the economic use of public funds; risk mitigation; 
probity; transparency; and enforceability. 
Conservation activities can be subject to high transaction costs, uncertainty, and economic risk. In 
relation to connected conservation, McCann et al state that transaction costs ‘are the resources used to 
define, establish, maintain, and transfer property rights.’391 The magnitude of transaction costs can 
affect landholder participation in conservation schemes as ‘uptake is largely influenced by the 
perception of private transaction costs.’392 Transaction costs associated with environmental policies 
include:
393
 
 Research and information gathering. Time and resources connected with investigating the 
environmental problem and proposing solutions; 
 Enactment. Costs connected to regulatory initialisation, regulatory amendment, and community 
consultation; 
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 Design, setup, and establishment. Costs related to setting up administrative agencies, training 
staff, purchasing equipment, and promoting the program; 
 Implementation and contracting. Time and resources linked to implementing the policy, 
including negotiations with eco-service suppliers; 
 Support and administration. Costs connected to the ongoing management of the policy program; 
 Monitoring, auditing, and accountability. Costs incurred in compliance and reporting; and 
 Enforcement. Costs incurred in enforcing compliance with the regulation, program scheme, or 
agreement.  
The timing of costs and who bears those costs are fundamental issues in understanding the behavioural 
influence of transaction costs. The transaction costs can be broadly categorised as program set up costs 
and recurring transacting costs. Moreover, transaction costs can be distinguished between those borne 
by program administrators and those borne by landholders. McCann et al indicate that all the 
transaction costs listed above are borne in some manner by both environmental agencies and 
landholders.
394
 The magnitude of the transaction costs varies between the two parties. According to 
McCann et al the high transaction costs for environmental agencies are research and information 
gathering, design and implementation, support and administration, monitoring, and prosecution and 
enforcement.
395
 The high transaction costs for landholders are enactment and contracting.
396
 
Mettepenningen, Verspecht and Van Huylenbroeck in reviewing studies on land holders’ transaction 
costs, which they referred to as private transaction costs, under European agri-environmental schemes 
(AES) (ie payments for the creation of nature zones, low tillage farming, reduction in pesticide use) 
found that the costs varied between 4% and 9.1% of the compensation payment. 
397
 However, they 
noted that these studies were ‘mostly restricted to particular countries and cases, often not measuring 
the different components of TCs in any great detail, nor comparing them to other AES-related costs.’398 
In their own research they categorised private transaction costs under AES as: 
 Search costs; 
 Decision making costs; 
 Negotiation costs; 
 Monitoring and Enforcement costs; and 
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 Co-ordination costs. 
As the focus of their research was on private transaction costs they did not go into detail about the 
transaction costs incurred by program administrators, which they referred to as public transaction costs. 
They state that they encompass the administrative costs from operating the scheme and the 
compensation paid to landholders.
399
 They observed that the compensation payment ‘should, ideally, 
cover all extra costs’ borne by the landholder in taking up the scheme.400 In breaking down the costs 
involved in an AES they asserted that the landholder participants are subject to private transaction 
costs, operational costs for producing the service, investment costs to facilitate the production, foregone 
production and profits from previous agricultural products, and an uncertainty cost which arises over 
the effect of the scheme on future agricultural production, possible changes under land planning 
regulation because of the change in the production mix, and possible negative reactions from 
neighbouring landholders.
401
 Figure III-2, which emphasises landholder costs, provides a schematic 
overview of an AES. 
 
Figure III-2 Schematic Overview of an AES         
 
Mettepenningen, Verspecht and Van Huylenbroeck found that the private transaction costs account for 
14.3% of the total AES costs. This amounts to approximately €40/ha per year. When they applied the 
private transaction cost figure to the compensation payment amount they discovered that it represented 
25.4% of the payment. One explanation for this disparity between the percentages is that landholders 
‘experience a different opportunity cost for their labour than the one taken into account, or in other 
words they often fail to take into account the extra labour involved’ when  applying for the payment.402 
Mettepenningen, Verspecht and Van Huylenbroeck discovered that the scheme landholder’s 
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administrative workload increased between 17% and 19%. Administrative costs were 30% higher on 
AES parcels of land when compared to parcels without AES. 
Wundeer, Engel and Pagiola distilled information from a number of case studies on payments for 
environmental services (PES).
403
 They focused on the transaction costs incurred by the program 
administrators. They argued that the transaction costs incurred by landholder participants were 
subsumed into the compensation payments as ‘they would be unlikely to accept a payment unless it 
exceeded the sum of the opportunity costs they face, any implementation costs they must undertake, 
and any transaction costs they bear.’404 They found that the program setup costs were very high and 
varied from one program to another. They were respectively: US$76/ha; US$184/ha; and US$4,800/ha. 
‘These start-up costs consumed amounts corresponding to about 10 yr of payments proper.’405 Such 
high set up costs brought into question the viability of these programs. They could only be sustained 
where external donors subsidised the set up costs or where there were high values attached to the 
environmental services.
406
 The recurrent transaction costs were of a lower magnitude and were 
respectively: US$7/ha/yr; US$3/ha/yr; and $600/ha/yr. Overall Wundeer, Engel and Pagiola asserted 
that finding ways to reduce transaction costs is a significant issue in making PES programs more 
viable. 
Williamson argues that the magnitudes of transaction costs are influenced by asset specificity, the 
frequency of transactions, uncertainty, bounded rationality, and opportunistic behaviour.
407
 In the 
production of eco-services, site specificity (ie specific asset) may generate higher ‘transaction costs due 
to the need to develop non-standard contracts and processes.’408 Site specificity also means that 
investment in environmental goods depends on the physical characteristics of the site, and, the 
knowledge acquired through eco-service production is difficult to transfer to other activities. 
409
 The 
more frequent a transaction is undertaken between the same parties the more likely that transaction 
costs can be reduced by an appropriate contract.
410
 Under eco-service transactions, uncertainty 
‘contributes to transaction cost through collection of information about the best environmental actions 
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given the uncertainty of the outcome, and in clarifying and negotiating contracts.’411 Information is also 
impacted by bounded rationality and opportunism which in turn affect the magnitude of transaction 
costs. Bounded rationality indicates that all ‘complex contracts are unavoidably incomplete’ as 
decisions are bounded by an individual’s cognitive processes and the finite amount of time they 
have.
412
 Opportunism arises where self-interest influences the actions of a contracting party such as 
where they withhold important information from the other party.
413
 
The centralisation or decentralisation of administrative processes can also have an effect on transaction 
costs. Landholder application, administrative and management requirements should be kept to a 
minimum. Mettepenningen and Van Huylenbroeck assert that a decentralised administration approach 
can result in greater accuracy of compensation payments and thus create economic efficiency, lower 
‘private transaction costs’ through the reduction of administration, and lower costs through cooperative 
arrangements.
414
 Organisations which coordinate environmental resources at a local community level 
‘tend’ to influence the management practices and actions of individuals and groups.415 Mettepenningen 
and Van Huylenbroeck note that a landholder ‘who is well informed before starting the contract could 
have lower TCs during contract implementation.’416  They assert that a common ideology will decrease 
transaction cost as there is a lesser need for control.
417
 
In summary, conservation activities can be subject to high transaction costs, uncertainty, and economic 
risk. Landholder participants in conservation schemes are subject to ‘private transaction costs’, 
operational costs, investment costs, opportunity costs, and an uncertainty cost. The magnitudes of 
transaction costs are influenced by asset specificity, the frequency of transactions, uncertainty, the 
centralisation or decentralisation of administration, bounded rationality, and trust.  Depending on the 
structure of a program and its implementation, landholder scheme participants may be subject to high 
transaction costs. One study found that the private transaction costs incurred by landholders amounted 
to 25.4% of the compensation payment. If a program fails to guarantee low transaction costs then it is 
likely that landholder participation in the scheme will be low despite financial support. While it varies 
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from one program to another, program administrators are likely to face high setup costs with lower 
magnitude recurrent transaction costs. High setup costs raise the issue of viability. Reducing 
transaction costs is a significant issue in making conservation programs viable and attractive to private 
landholder participants. 
 Depending on their implementation, ROCP type mechanisms have the capacity to reduce transaction 
costs, uncertainty and risk in the process of promoting conservation activities.  A ROCP type 
mechanism can decrease ‘private transaction costs’ through training, professional advice, providing 
information, simplifying application and contractual arrangements, adopting or formulating a common 
ideology with landholders, streamlining monitoring processes, and building trust. A ROCP type 
mechanism can adopt a decentralised administrative process which may result in economic efficiencies, 
lower ‘private transaction costs’ through the reduction of administration, and lower costs through 
cooperative arrangements. Furthermore, it is asserted that the likely setup costs of a ROCP type 
mechanism will be substantial but as a commercial enterprise these costs can be absorbed in line with 
generally accepted accounting principles and eventually offset against the sale of marketable eco-
service products.  
G Summary  
Research on the motivations and constraints on individuals participating in conservation arrangements 
suggests that an individual’s behaviour cannot be fully explained by their reaction to financial 
inducements and self-interest. Behaviour which deviates from the economic rational model may occur 
due to internal factors such as habits, emotions, personal capacity, and biases.  Consequently, it is 
important to take into account both economic and non-economic behavioural factors when seeking to 
effectively implement a conservation scheme. 
Unintended consequences may arise through the implementation of command and control regulation. 
Government intervention in the form of regulatory land use limitation may allow governments to 
announce that they have taken action to fix the problem but whether or not it achieves its objectives is 
another matter. The lion’s share of the right to decide how to manage privately held land remains with 
the proprietor. Landholders can use their land to satisfy their economic requirements and avoid the 
government restrictions upon private usage. Regulation cannot force private landholders to pursue 
positive action.  Unless there is some positive incentive, private landholders are less likely to enter into 
conservation that could trigger provisions that further restrict land usage.   
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Conservation scheme participation may be motivated by public (off-farm) benefits such as promoting 
public environmental goods (eg biodiversity) and private (on-farm) environmental benefits such as 
preventing soil erosion. Factors which may influence participation in a conservation scheme include the 
voluntary nature of the scheme; landholder autonomy in achieving conservation goals; the nature and 
extent of the financial and non-financial support offered by the scheme; market forces; transaction 
costs; administration complexity of the scheme; duration of the scheme; quantity and quality of 
information; awareness of the program; opportunity costs; landholder characteristics such as 
dependency on farm income; attitude towards the conservation; amount of stress experienced by the 
landholder (eg high levels of debt); the landholder’s ability to solve problems; the landholder’s 
business goals;  whether or not there are successors to the landholding; landholding characteristics; 
whether the landholding is held as freehold or under a lease; rate of neighbouring landholder 
participation; lack of trust in the government and their programs; and misalignment between the land 
management philosophies of landholders and program administrators. The interaction between factors 
influencing landholder participation and non-participation is multifaceted and not fully understood.  
Nonetheless, without economic support landholders are unlikely to pursue conservation practices. 
Another way to consider landholder motivations to participate in conservation is through the lens of 
behavioural change theories. These theories can inform the development (enlighten good practice) of 
intervention strategies that seek to change landholder behaviour. The theory of planned behaviour is a 
rational choice model. Individuals evaluate the implications of performing an action before engaging in 
that action based on the information before them at the time of making the decision. Individuals 
evaluate their ability to perform the behaviour based on the presence of required materials and skills. 
Applying the TPB it can be surmised that a person who has a positive attitude towards a conservation 
activity, who believes that community leaders, fellow producers, neighbours, family and friends 
support that activity, and they have the skills and resources necessary to undertake that activity, then 
that person will have a high motivation to perform that activity. An application of TPA may help 
identify the precursors of intention so that intervention programs may be designed to change the 
precursors of intention (attitude, subjective norm / social norm, perceived behavioural control) which 
will in turn change behaviour. 
Moving beyond the TPB, behaviour can be influenced by three broad categories of drivers: external 
factors, internal factors, and social factors. External factors encompass financial and opportunity costs; 
internal factors encompass habits and cognitive processes; and social factors encompass societal norms 
and cultural attitudes. Internal factors include habits, emotions, personal capacity, and biases. Social 
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factors include networks, norms and social capital which affect individual behaviour and collective 
action simultaneously.  Taking into account the drivers of behavioural suggests that conservation 
program administrators should take a holistic approach to conservation schemes and should offer more 
than financial incentives, including training, workforce support, expert advice, guidance on land 
management practices, and relevant information at a regional and individual landholding scale. The 
input of landholders should be sought in order to design appropriate on ground conservation programs 
that offer flexibility, foster a shared vision, meet landholder production objectives, and encourage two-
way learning between landholders and administrators. 
Conservation activities can be subject to high transaction costs, uncertainty, and economic risk.  High 
‘private transaction costs’ may deter private landholders from participating in conservation schemes. 
Local voluntary conservation programs built on trust and co-operation will have extrinsically low 
transaction costs. Centrally administered government schemes are likely to incur high set up costs and 
impose high ‘private transaction costs’ on private landholder participants to ensure economic use of 
public funds; risk mitigation; probity; transparency; and enforceability. The magnitudes of transaction 
costs are influenced by asset specificity, the frequency of transactions, uncertainty, the centralisation or 
decentralisation of administration, bounded rationality, and trust.  Depending on the structure of a 
program and its implementation, landholder scheme participants may be subject to high transaction 
costs. 
Bringing together the various threads it is suggested that the behavioural aspects of private landholders 
must be taken into account when seeking to undertake conservation activities on an extensive scale. 
Behavioural motivators and drivers influence private landholder uptake of conservation schemes. 
Private landholders are not primarily motivated by economic factors but financial resourcing allows 
landholders to pursue conservation activities that they are unlikely to undertake without monetary 
resourcing. Command and control may lead to unintended consequences. Some landholders may not be 
opposed to providing habitat on their land but are reluctant to do so because they fear restrictions upon 
proprietary rights or they question the fairness of providing a public good at their expense (ie individual 
sacrifice for the common good). The amount of government involvement and a lack of trust in the 
government may be disincentives to entering government led incentive programs. If a program fails to 
guarantee low transaction costs then it is likely that landholder participation in the scheme will be low 
despite financial support. Different program designs will have different effects on transaction costs and 
as such, some program designs will be more effective in minimising transaction costs than others. 
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There are many mechanisms that a government may use to address environmental problems, such as 
regulation, taxation, property rights, market mechanisms, and education programs. As environmental 
problems have different characteristics, and different classes of individuals have dissimilar reactions to 
various incentives, several policy instruments may have to be used together to achieve an effect (this is 
known as smart regulation: an integrated approach using economic, social and environmental 
instruments). 
 
Depending on their implementation, ROCP type mechanisms have the capacity to provide 
opportunities for high levels of landholder motivation, initiative, and innovation. Landholder decision 
making in respect to conservation is a complex process influenced by many factors including social, 
economic, and cognitive. Administrators can take a holistic approach when implementing conservation 
schemes. A ROCP type approach has the potential to tailor financial incentives and legal arrangements 
to meet individual landholder’s requirements, to provide information, training and technical guidance, 
to promote conservation programs, and to involve participants in the design and implementation of 
conservation. Once the goals, objectives and guidelines are set, landholders, individually or as part of a 
collective, choose the best means to carry out the conservation activity. Programs can be tailored to 
facilitate collective action to create networks, strengthen favourable social norms and build social 
capital. Collective action will encourage the provision of conservation works on an extensive spatial 
scale. 
 Depending on their implementation, ROCP type mechanisms have the capacity to reduce transaction 
costs, uncertainty and risk in the process of promoting conservation activities. A ROCP type 
mechanism can decrease ‘private transaction costs’ through training, professional advice, providing 
information, simplifying application and contractual arrangements, adopting or formulating a common 
ideology with landholders, streamlining monitoring processes, and building trust. A ROCP type 
mechanism can adopt a decentralised administrative process which may result is economic efficiencies, 
lower ‘private transaction costs’ through the reduction of administration, and lower costs through 
cooperative arrangements. 
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IV  GOVERNMENT GRANTS 
‘Headquarters has declared we must take that ridiculous flyspeck. Even if all of us are killed. Otherwise the key’ll get rusty 
and just be a spot on the wall.’ – Captain Clinton 
The Good, the Bad and the Ugly: Extended English-Language Version (Directed by Sergio Leone, Metro Goldwyn Mayer, 
2003) 2:10:45. 
The author of this dissertation had the movie playing in the background while writing. The quote represents a point in the 
writing process where various ideas coalesced. 
A Overview 
A government grant is the predominant approach for funding rural natural resource conservation and 
restoration activities on private farmland. In general, a government grant is a direct financial payment 
usually by a government department to fund a specific project or a specific activity such as climate 
change adjustment programs or biosecurity.  There are usually eligibility criteria, conditions on how the 
funds can be used, and compliance and reporting requirements. The important feature is that a grant is a 
funding mechanism which can be utilised by government to encourage conservation outcomes. 
From an economic perspective, grants are subsidies which can be used to increase the supply of goods 
or services or to increase the demand for goods and services. Generally, a subsidy that increases 
demand results in increased prices and a subsidy that increases supply results in lower prices. Largely 
economists dislike subsidies as they distort market allocations but may support their use to address 
market failure such as the undersupply of biodiversity. Graeme Donovan suggests that government 
grants are justified when they are used to encourage innovation, skills training, business start-ups, 
private infrastructure investment, initial project planning, action which benefits society, trade fairs, and 
networks.
418
 However, grants are not justified where they may crowd out supply by private enterprise 
as this will lead to inefficient production due to a lack of market signals. Common property resources 
such as biodiversity are generally non-excludable (lack property rights) and therefore may require 
government support to engage the private sector in their conservation activities because the 
opportunities for private gain are limited. 
Grants vary in form, content and administrative requirements from simple ad hoc grants to complex 
ongoing block grants. They may be competitive, merits based, involve competitive bidding, require 
recipients to match funding, or involve the issue of vouchers to encourage competition amongst 
                                                 
418
 Graeme Donovan, 'When Markets Do Not Work, Should Grants be Used?' (Agricultural & Rural Development Notes 
Issue 9, The World Bank, 2006) 2. 
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suppliers. Funds may be distributed without a written application or there may be the requirement for 
multiple documents. The recipient’s administrative and compliance burden may be low or the grant 
conditions may require financial reports, raw data, progress reports, or service performance reports. In 
some instances grants will only be effective in conjunction with other policy mechanisms. For example, 
a conservation grant may require training, information provision and guidance services in order to be 
effective. 
This chapter discusses the concept of a government grant. It then briefly looks at the policy advantages 
and disadvantages of grants. Background information on parliamentary control of public spending and 
the legislative capacity of the Commonwealth to enter into funding arrangements is provided. Grant 
administration and the recipient’s regulatory burden are outlined.  The chapter then discusses the 
effectiveness and efficiency of government grants. This chapter summarises government grant 
programs relevant to environmental causes. Attention is paid to the program’s priorities, funding 
amount, eligibility criteria, application process, and compliance requirements. A brief summary of 
taxation issues relevant to grants is then provided. 
In addressing environmental problems an integrated approach using economic, social and 
environmental instruments may have to be adopted to achieve an effect. Nevertheless, a conservation 
funding gap exists between actual environmental expenditure and expenditure required to protect, and 
mitigate pressures on the environment arising from human activities. Australian governments lack the 
capacity to increase funding to the required levels. This raises the question of the viability of 
principally relying on government grants to fund rural natural resource conservation and restoration 
activities on private farmland.  
It is arguable that government grants (direct government payments) may be principally relied upon if 
they are efficient and effective in achieving desired outcomes. However, accurate data just does not 
exist to fully clarify this. Government grants may be expensive to administer which impacts on their 
effectiveness. Government grant compliance and reporting requirements impose significant costs on 
recipients. High ‘private transaction costs’ may dissuade stakeholders from applying. Low participation 
reduces the potential benefit of conservation programs. The taxation treatment of grant receipts may act 
as a deterrent to private landholder participation.  Overall this chapter considers the following research 
issue: 
2. Is there a policy rationale for an alternative approach to the existing approaches to funding 
rural natural resource conservation and restoration activities on private farmland? 
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B Government Grant – Concept and Definition 
Under regulation 3A of the Financial Management and Accountability Regulations 1997 (Cth) a 
government grant is defined as: 
an arrangement for the provision of financial assistance by the Commonwealth:  
(a)   under which public money is to be paid to a recipient other than the Commonwealth; and  
(b)   which is intended to assist the recipient achieve its goals; and  
(c)   which is intended to promote 1 or more of the Australian Government's policy objectives; and  
(d)   under which the recipient is required to act in accordance with any terms or conditions specified in 
the arrangement.  
The regulation states that the term ‘grant’ does not include the procurement of goods or services, a gift 
of public resources, a payment of compensation, a payment of benefit to a person, a tax concession, an 
investment or loan, certain payments to a State or a Territory, payments made under legislation listed in 
the regulation, and a payment under Australia's international development assistance program. 
The Australian Accounting Standards Board states that government grants are: 
419
 
 [A]ssistance by government in the form of transfers of resources to an entity in return for past or future 
compliance with certain conditions relating to the operating activities of the entity. They exclude those forms 
of government assistance which cannot reasonably have a value placed upon them and transactions with 
government which cannot be distinguished from the normal trading transactions of the entity. 
 
The definitions suggest that there is a collective understanding as to what constitutes a grant and some 
consistency in the defining features of a grant, but as noted by Peter Grant:
420
 
Grant programs vary widely also in their scale and degree of complexity. Some take the form of simple grants 
for small amounts to community organisations; others involve large-scale funding for complex projects – for 
example, major infrastructure projects with elaborate governance structures and multiple funding partners. 
Likewise, there are wide variations from program to program in planning and decision-making procedures, 
administrative arrangements, level of conditionality, the forms and terms of funding agreements, and in the 
quality and rigour of performance monitoring and evaluation arrangements. For these reasons, and others, it is 
extremely difficult to generalise in the grants domain: for every general observation made, there will 
inevitably be some significant exceptions. 
The broadly termed clauses in a grant funding agreement, in contrast to a commercial contract, 
generally allow governments to vary or terminate funding arrangements at their discretion, with little 
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notice and little recourse to compensation.
421
  For example, clause 19.3 in the Biodiversity Fund Round 
Two: 2013-2014 Funding Agreement - Part B - Standard Terms and Conditions states: 
19.3 Termination for convenience 
(a)   The Department may, at any time by notice, terminate this Agreement or reduce the scope of the 
Project and amount of the Funds immediately. 
(b)   Upon receipt of a notice of termination or reduction from the Department pursuant to this clause, 
the Recipient must: 
(i) cease carrying out the Project to the extent specified in the notice; 
(ii) take all available steps to minimise any Losses resulting from that termination or 
reduction; and 
(iii) continue carrying out those parts of the Project not affected by the notice. 
(c) Where there has been a termination under this clause 19.3, the Department will only be liable for: 
 (i)  costs properly incurred in relation to the Project under this Agreement before the 
effective date of termination; and 
(ii)   reasonable costs incurred by the Recipient and directly attributable to the termination. 
(d)  Where there has been a reduction in the scope of the Project, the Department's liability to the 
Recipient for payment of the Funds will, unless there is an agreement in writing to the contrary, be 
reduced in accordance with the reduction in the Project. 
(e)   The Department will not be liable to pay any costs referred to under this clause in an amount which 
would, in addition to any amounts paid or due, or becoming due, to the Recipient under this 
Agreement, together exceed the maximum amount of Funds specified in Part A. 
(f)  The Recipient will not be entitled to compensation for loss of prospective profits. 
(g)   The termination of this Agreement under this clause 19.3 does not discharge any right that a party 
may have for any prior breach of this Agreement. 
Taking a very broad approach, a government grant is a funding mechanism which allows the 
distribution of funds to a recipient in return for the recipient complying with the terms and conditions 
of the grant. A grant is not a gift as conditions are imposed. A government grant is different to a 
commercial contract as the government does not receive equal economic value in the form of goods or 
services in return for its contribution. A grant can be unilaterally amended and terminated at the 
discretion of the government. 
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C Advantages and Disadvantages 
All policy mechanisms have strengths and weaknesses. Joanne Kelly summarises the advantages and 
disadvantages of government grants as follows:
422
 
Advantages 
 Costs are capped and certain for the government; 
 Grants can be an attractive funding source for certain protagonists; 
 Depending on the design of the program, administrative costs can be moderated; 
 Once in place, they are relatively straightforward to modify; 
 They enable funds to be targeted at specific concerns. For example, grants to purchase specific 
goods or services can ensure that funds are expended in accordance with the intentions of the 
grantor; 
 Ongoing block grants can provide funding certainty to recipients; 
 Competitive grants can ensure that the grantor receives value for money and ensure that funds 
are allocated to quality proposals; and  
 One-off grants can kick-start targeted projects. 
Disadvantages 
 Discretionary grants may lead to the perception of grantor bias; 
 Special interest groups can influence the creation of grant programs and as such, funds may be 
directed towards areas of political pressure rather than areas of greatest need; 
 They can lead to unfair competition, corruption and political nepotism; 
 There is no long term certainty for projects as funding may be cancelled; 
 They can be perceived as gifts by recipients which leads to reduced recipient effort and failure 
to achieve outcomes; 
 The process for obtaining a grant may be time consuming and costly for recipients; and 
 Depending on the design of the program, they can be costly to administer and may be 
inefficient in achieving outcomes. 
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D Parliamentary Control of Public Spending 
Governments have the executive authority to establish grant programs. One of the rudiments of 
responsible government is the principle that money cannot be drawn from the consolidated revenue 
fund (‘consolidated revenue’) without the authority of an Act of Parliament. In Auckland Harbour 
Board v R the Privy Council stated:
423
 
For it has been a principle of the British Constitution now for more than two centuries … that no money can 
be taken out of the consolidated Fund into which the revenues of the State have been paid, excepting under a 
distinct authorization from Parliament itself. The days are long gone by in which the Crown, or its servants, 
apart from Parliament, could give such an authorization or ratify an improper payment. Any payment out of 
the consolidated fund made without Parliamentary authority is simply illegal and ultra vires, and may be 
recovered by the Government … 
The long standing position at common law of parliamentary control of government spending is 
reflected in sections 81 and 83 of the Australian Constitution. Under s 81 of the Australian Constitution 
revenues raised or received by the Commonwealth government must be paid into consolidated revenue. 
Section 83 of the Australian Constitution ensures that money cannot be drawn from consolidated 
revenue unless made under an appropriation made by law (ie an Act of Parliament). Similar provisions 
are found in the Constitution Acts of New South Wales, Queensland, Victoria and Western Australia 
and the Self-Government Acts of the Australian Capital Territory, and the Northern Territory.
424
 In 
South Australia and Tasmania the principles are not expressed in the Constitution Acts but they can be 
found in other legislative provisions.
425
 
In a general sense the term ‘appropriation’ is ‘the conferral of authority upon the Executive to spend’ 
an identified amount of consolidated funds. 
426
 However, the passage of an appropriation Act does not 
create any obligations upon the government to spend the money.
427
 Nor does it give potential 
participants any rights to a distribution.
428
 These last two issues are important as it underscores the 
point that grants can be withheld or withdrawn at the discretion of the government. 
Appropriations can be categorised as annual or standing. Annual appropriations encompass the 
allocations under the government’s budget where certain government expenditure is subject to annual 
approval by Parliament. Standing appropriations are those which are permanent in nature. As a 
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consequence, they are not subject to an annual vote of Parliament. The majority of appropriations are 
now permanent in nature. 
429
 As noted by the High Court in Brown v West: 
430
 
Historically, the need of the Executive Government to seek annual appropriations of the Consolidated 
Revenue Fund 'for the service of the year' or 'in respect of the year' has been the means, and it remains one of 
the critical means, by which the Parliament retains an ultimate control over the public purse strings, but the 
Parliament foregoes its annual-exercised power over expenditure by government when a law containing a 
standing appropriation is enacted. Standing appropriations need not be included in annual appropriations. 
Even though the reliance on standing appropriations has increased, Parliamentary appropriation 
remains an important control over the expenditure of public funds. 
E Funding Arrangements and the Legislative Capacity of the Commonwealth 
The decision in Williams v Commonwealth (‘School Chaplains Case’)431 has curtailed the Executive 
power of the Commonwealth for contractual funding arrangements. It was previously believed that the 
Executive government could enter into contracts for the purpose of the business and affairs of 
government without specific legislative authority.
432
 However, Williams challenged the validity of a 
five year contract between the Commonwealth and the Scripture Union Queensland to provide 
chaplaincy services to a state school. The funds were drawn from a generally termed appropriation for 
the ‘ordinary annual services of the government.’ The High Court433 held that the funding agreement 
was beyond the executive power of the Commonwealth. As such, it was unnecessary to determine 
whether or not there had been a valid appropriation in this particular instance. 
In the School Chaplains Case Hayne J observed that the Commonwealth’s power to spend is not and 
cannot be unlimited.
434
 He further noted that the ‘limit on the power to spend must be consistent with 
the general proposition that it is for the Parliament and not the Executive to control expenditure.’435 As 
the Commonwealth Parliament can control expenditure only by legislation, the limitation must be 
understood by reference ‘to the extent of the legislative power of the Parliament.’436 Consequently, the 
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constitutional limitations of the Commonwealth Parliament meant that the payments were an invalid 
exercise of the Executive power of the Commonwealth.
437
 
French CJ  held that in contrast to a natural person, the Commonwealth’s authority to pay funds and the 
authority to contract to pay funds is constrained by the ‘need for an appropriation and by the 
requirements of political accountability.’438 ‘As a general rule the power of the Commonwealth to 
make agreements has always been regarded as subject to statutory constraints.’439 A general 
appropriation provision which allows for the creation of a project may meet one of the legal conditions 
for the exercise of the expenditure power by the Executive but it does not necessarily meet all the legal 
conditions required to allow a valid disbursement of funds.
440
 What may also be required is a general or 
specific legislative authority to enter into the funding agreement and a general or specific legislative 
authority to expend the funds.
441
 
One week after the decision in the School Chaplains Case was handed down the Commonwealth 
Parliament passed the Financial Framework Legislative Amendment Act (No. 3) 2012 (Cth) in an 
attempt to provide legislative authority government programs whose validity were thrown into doubt 
by the High Court’s decision. 442 In the explanatory memorandum to the Bill it was stated that the 
various amendments would: 
443
 
… empower the Commonwealth, where authority does not otherwise exist, to make, vary or administer 
arrangements under which public money is or may become payable, or to make grants of financial assistance, 
including payments or grants for the purposes of particular programs, where those arrangements or grants, or 
a class including those arrangements or grants, or relevant programs, are specified in regulations.   
Under the amendment Act section 32B was inserted into the Financial Management and Accountability 
Act 1997 (Cth). This states that where the Commonwealth, apart from the power granted under this 
section, does not otherwise have the power to do so, then the section allows the Commonwealth to 
make, vary or administer agreements or grants contained within the Regulations. The amendment Act 
inserted Schedule 1AA into the Financial Management and Accountability Regulations 1997 (Cth) 
which contains a list of programs and grants and which provides a title for the program or grant and the 
objective of the program or grant. Under the heading for the Department of Sustainability, 
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Environment, Water, Population and Communities, the objective for the conservation of Australia’s 
heritage and environment program is stated to be:
444
 
To conserve natural, Indigenous and historic heritage, threatened species and ecological communities, and 
internationally-traded flora and fauna and related biodiversity consistent with the Environment Protection and 
Biodiversity Conservation Act and international obligations 
Daniel Stewart suggests that given that ‘the programs are defined by no more than a title and a broadly 
stated objective’ there does not seem to be any real restrictions placed upon the implementation of the 
programs.
445
 It is unclear whether the broadly termed approval provisions will be effective in 
supporting grants in which the Commonwealth parliament lacks legislative capacity. If further 
litigation is successful in challenging the power of the Commonwealth then State cooperation may be 
required to implement programs in which the Commonwealth lacks legislative power. 
This may have significant implications for Commonwealth funded environmental and conservation 
grant programs which are paid directly to recipients given that the Commonwealth does not have direct 
power under the Australian Constitution to deal with environmental matters. The Commonwealth may 
be able to call upon the external affairs power under s 51(xxix), the corporations power under s 51(xx), 
the trade and commerce power under s 51(i), and the taxation power under s 51(ii) to implement many 
programs but this may not provide legislative capacity to implement all programs.  
The Commonwealth may rely on the grants power under s 96 of the Australian Constitution where 
federal funding may be made to the states on condition that the money is applied to particular programs 
but in this situation the cooperation and consent of the states is required. For example, acting under this 
power the Commonwealth has provided funds for the Urban and Regional Development (Financial 
Assistance) Act 1974 (Cth) and the Natural Heritage Trust of Australia Act 1997 (Cth). 
While the full extent of the legislative capacity of the Commonwealth to directly pay recipients under 
environmental and conservation grants programs is unclear it seems that the High Court has moved 
from a centralisation of government approach to cooperative federalism approach. Moreover, the High 
Court has underscored that there is a requirement for active parliamentary review of public 
expenditure. Anecdotal evidence suggests that there are serious moves within the Commonwealth 
public service to narrow the range of grant schemes and programs to clearly limit Commonwealth 
activities to the bounds of it legislative power. 
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F Government Grant Administration  
Government grant administration and management encompasses steps including planning and design, 
establishing processes for handling, appraising and reviewing applications, documentation of the 
grant’s objectives and conditions, payment of the grant, management of financial agreements, 
monitoring and maintaining an ongoing relationship with the recipient, reporting results, and review 
and evaluation.
446
  
Grant administration by the Commonwealth involves the ‘payment of billions of dollars of public funds 
each year.’447 In his 2008 report on the administration of Commonwealth grant programs Peter Grant 
noted that there ‘is no single, comprehensive source of data’ that outlines the number of individual 
grant programs, the number of grants awarded, or the total funding involved.
448
 During the 2007 year 
more than 49,000 ‘discretionary grants’ were approved under 250 separate funding programs with a 
total value exceeding $4.5 billion.
449
 Grant payments to State, Territory and local governments in the 
2007 year was approximately $32 billion.
450
 Based on these two figures, he estimated that 
Commonwealth expenditure on all forms of grants ‘was likely to be between $40 billion and $50 
billion per annum, or about one sixth of total Commonwealth outlays.’451 
The Commonwealth financial management framework requires that grant programs must be managed 
to promote the proper use of Commonwealth resources.
452
 Similar provisions appear in State and 
Territory legislation.
453
 Section 44(3) of the Financial Management Act 1997 (Cth) defines proper use 
to mean ‘efficient, effective, economical and ethical use that is not inconsistent with the policies of the 
Commonwealth.’ The terms ‘efficient, effective, economical and ethical’ are not defined in the 
financial management framework. The Australian National Audit Office’s (‘ANAO’) guidelines on 
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implementing better practice grants administration states that efficient, effective and ethical grants 
administration aspires to:
454
 
 equitably and transparently select funding recipients that best represent value for money in the 
context of the stated objectives of the grant‑giving activity; and 
 efficiently and effectively deliver Australian Government funding to approved recipients to achieve 
desired government policy outcomes. 
The term ‘economical’ is not elaborated upon in the ANAO’s guidelines. This could be because the 
ordinary meaning of economical encompasses value for money and efficiency in the sense of avoiding 
waste and extravagance. The ANAO’s guidelines state that ‘outcomes and value for money must drive 
the grant giving process.’455  
The Commonwealth Government has established seven principles in grant administration. It is a 
requirement that the various steps and processes of grant administration must be conducted in a manner 
which is consistent with these key principles. These principles underpin the Commonwealth’s efficient, 
effective, economical and ethical grants administration. These principles are:
456
  
 Robust Planning and Design:  The nature of the granting activity, the scale, and the risk 
profile of the activity, all impact upon the design of the grants program. Planning may address 
many issues including defining the objectives of the program, identifying potential risks, 
designing the activity to meet value for money, underscoring transparency, selecting an 
appropriate funding approach, and taking into account legal and policy matters. 
 Collaboration and Partnership: Seeking the input of stakeholders including grant recipients, 
other beneficiaries, and other government agencies can improve efficiency, avoid the 
duplication of similar programs, improve the design of programs, and reduce administration. A 
well designed grant agreement can help to facilitate an effective ongoing working relationship 
with the recipient.  
 Proportionality: There should be a balance between the administration of the granting activity 
and the potential risks to both the government and the recipient. Consequently, small scale one 
off grants with little risk require less administrative safeguards than do complex ongoing 
granting activities. 
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 An Outcomes Orientation: Grant design and implementation should ensure the achievement 
of government policy objectives while also ensuring the efficient and effective use on resources. 
 Achieving Value with Public Money: This is the prime consideration in all grant 
administration steps. The focus must be upon promoting the efficient, effective and economical 
use of resources.  
 Governance and Accountability: Solid governance structures and clear accountability 
safeguard government resources. A well drafted grant agreement, ongoing communication with 
recipients, maintenance of grant documentation, and clearly defined roles and responsibilities, 
are tools which can be utilised to monitor financial accountability. 
 Probity and Transparency: Probity relates to ethical behaviour and encompasses ‘duties such 
as honesty, integrity, impartiality and accountability.’ Transparency signifies the readiness of 
grant administrators and recipients ‘to being open and prepared to be subject to scrutiny about 
grant processes and granting activities (including grant programs).’ 
The various steps address the efficient, effective, economical and ethical grants administration. The 
institutions overseeing grant programs incur considerable internal processing costs. As noted by the 
Management Advisory Committee:
457
 
Red tape directs scarce taxpayers’ funds away from the provision of advice and the delivery of government 
programmes. … [T]he costs include extra time, paperwork and capital outlays, and that red tape ‘deflects 
management from the core activities of the business’. Operationally, red tape can result in confusion about 
objectives and processes, decrease productivity and adversely affect employees’ job satisfaction. The overall 
result is poor outcomes for public servants, the government, the taxpayer and the public. 
 
For its 2011-12 audit on the administration of grant guidelines the ANAO conducted a survey to 
identify all grant programs under the Commonwealth between December 2007 and June 2010.
458
 
Twenty six agencies had administered, collectively, more than 400 one‐off grants.459 Twenty one of the 
26 agencies had administered one or more grant programs which required grant guidelines to be 
developed.
460
 Thirteen other agencies had administered grant programs which required grant guidelines 
but had not administered one-off grants.
461
 Some agencies had created 20 or more guidelines for grant 
programs during the relevant period. For example the Department of Sustainability, Environment, 
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Water, Population and Communities noted that since December 2007 it had produced 46 guidelines for 
grant programs.
462
 The ANAO report did not discuss the internal costs involved in creating guidelines 
or administering the programs. It is expected that the total costs, including time, paper work, collating 
data, reporting, training, capital outlays, internal reviews, and  audits, is substantial.
463
 For instance, the 
cost to the ANAO in reviewing the development and approval of grant program guidelines by the 
relevant agencies was $573,000.
464
 
G The Recipient’s Regulatory Burden  
For government funding agencies to meet their own probity, transparency, value for money 
justifications, accountability, and reporting requirements, recipients are subject to regulatory and 
administrative burdens. In commenting on the administrative burden imposed on the not-for-profit 
sector the Productivity Commission noted: 
465
 
Grants are increasingly made under competitive arrangements, and require disproportionate accountability, 
imposing undue compliance burdens. While recent reforms have moved to reduce this burden, governments 
could go further in reducing the cost of applying for and acquitting grants, consolidating reporting 
requirements and removing unnecessary ‘standard contract’ conditions. 
There was ‘a strong perception’ amongst not-for- profit respondents that governments were trying to 
‘eliminate risk by imposing ever more complex contractual and reporting requirements.’466 The trend in 
compliance costs has meant that some not-for-profit organisations now employ ‘professional staff to 
deal with the administrative burden of government tendering, contractual and reporting 
requirements.’467  
An initial hurdle for potential grant recipients is the application process.  An important step in grant 
administration is structuring the process by which potential recipients can apply for funding. The 
outcomes set by government impact upon the objectives of the grant program which in turn influence 
the process used to pinpoint and select funding recipients.
468
 Payments can be made as a result of open 
competitive funding application rounds, restricted competitive funding application rounds, non-
competitive open rounds, demand driven funding, or one-off (ad hoc).
469
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Open competitive selection entails the review of eligible applications against the program’s selection 
criteria and against competing applications to select those applications deemed best suited to meet the 
requirements of the program. Restricted competing selection or targeted selection is only open to a 
limited number of applicants. A non-competitive selection process is open to all eligible applicants 
over the life of the program. Applications are assessed against the requirements of the program without 
reference to other applications. The selection process allows funding to all eligible applicants up to the 
limit of the allocated funds. As the term ‘one-off’ indicates, ad hoc grants are offered to provide a 
solution for a specific problem or task.  
The different types of application processes impose different burdens upon the potential recipient.  For 
example, a one-off (ad hoc) grant is unlikely to involve a planned selection process if it is aimed at 
addressing an urgent situation.
470
  In contrast, an open competitive grant application may require 
significant investment of time, people and resources. Regardless of the resources employed in 
preparing an application, there is no guarantee that the application will be successful. These sunk costs 
cannot be recuperated. An unsuccessful experience may deter future applications. 
In a survey conducted by the New South Wales Auditor – General, respondents were asked about all of 
the grants that they applied for, and received from, NSW agencies in 2006-07.
471
 The 166 respondents 
applied to over 30 NSW government agencies for 1,700 grants worth $305 million.
472
 Eighty-four per 
cent of these applications were successful (1,421 grants) and $225 million was paid to the survey 
respondents.
473
 Less than one third of respondents viewed the amount of work required to apply for a 
grant as reasonable.
474
 Some survey respondents noted that the amount of work involved in applying 
for some grants was out of proportion with the limited amount of funding available under the relevant 
program.
475
 In another report it is noted that evidence exists that some not-for-profit organisations ‘are 
spending almost as much in resources in applying for grants as they ultimately receive.’476  
If successful, the recipient may be required to submit progress reports, and / or financial statements and 
/ or a final report which outlines whether or not the objectives and outcomes set out in the financial 
service agreement have been met. Many not-for-profit organisations note that the ‘need to meet 
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different and complex reporting standards for government grants and the huge amount of paperwork’ it 
generates places a significant burden upon operations. 
477
 Reporting requirements upon grant recipients 
help ensure accountability and transparency. The administrative burden is a product of a government’s 
policy settings and approaches to and service.
478
  Government ultimately controls the level and 
magnitude of the regulatory and administrative burden. 
The impact of Victorian Government administrative and compliance requirements placed upon not-for-
profit organisations was reviewed by the State Services Authority. 
479
 The following were identified as 
areas in which reforms could generate substantial savings for not-for-profit organisations: 
 Reforming the Associations Incorporation Act 1981 (Vic) to remove the requirement to 
submit annual statements, improving the model governance rules, and removing the prohibition 
against not-for-profit organisations trading; 
 Reforming the Fundraising Appeals Act 1998 (Vic) to simplify fundraising regulation; 
 Streamlining Service Agreements by reducing the duplication in reports and having greater 
consistency in standards across programs and departments; 
 Streamlining Grant Reporting and Applications by adopting consistent applications, 
acquittal processes, and accounting terms for reporting; 
 Improving Regulatory Support by providing better information, enhanced compliance advice, 
and creating online functionality for interaction with departments; and 
 National Reform to create harmonisation of regulations between different jurisdictions. 
As part of the Victorian Government review the Allen Consulting Group was engaged to analyse the 
potential administrative savings and to quantify those savings.
480
 If the proposed recommendations, 
(putting to one side the national reform agenda), were adopted the estimated savings to the Victorian 
not-for-profit sector, 35,955 organisations at the time of the report,
481
 would amount to $24.2 million 
per annum.
482
 The breakdown of the savings is summarised in table IV- 1. 
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Table IV-1 Allen Consulting Group Estimate for the Victorian Not-For-Profit Sector 
Reform Estimated Savings Per Annum $ 
Reforming the Associations Incorporation Act 1981 (Vic) 9,429,000 
Reforming the Fundraising Appeals Act 1998 (Vic) 1,471,000 
Streamlining Service Agreements 12,000,000 
Streamlining Grant Reporting and Applications 770,000 
Improving Regulatory Support 534,000 
Total 24,204,000 
 
The Allen Consulting Group estimated savings based on the Standard Cost Model.
483
 Under this model 
the cost of an administrative activity is the product of the price (labour cost plus on-costs) of the 
activity and the frequency of that activity. The labour rate plus on-costs was estimated to be $55 per 
hour.
484
 Some of the recommendations resulted in compliance cost
485
 rather than administrative cost
486
 
savings. Some of the broader categories could not be calculated in terms of activity based costing; in 
which case alternative cost measurement techniques were used. For example, it was assumed that 3 per 
cent of service agreement funding received by the not-for-profit organisation was spent on reporting 
requirements and in meeting quality standards ($2 billion x 3% = $60 million).
487
 Some not-for-profit 
organisations viewed the 3 per cent figure as low. It was suggested that the actual administrative cost 
figure may be as high as 30 per cent of service agreement funding.
488
 Whatever the true figure is, the 
regulatory burden is substantial. The perception of high transaction costs can deter participation.   
The ‘red tape’ created by funding and service agreements is based in part on ‘hyper-sensitivity to risk 
and high levels of risk mitigation’ and in part because of community expectations of the oversight role 
of government.
489
 ‘The growing reliance by government on private, commercial and [not-for-profit] 
providers to deliver services had been accompanied by a growth in the regulatory bodies oversighting 
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those services.’490 As a consequence, grant recipients are subject to regulatory and administrative 
burdens which may dissuade some stakeholders from seeking the funds, or if they do apply and are 
successful may require the diversion of resources from the delivery of the program’s services. An 
increased administrative burden has the potential to erode goodwill and trust.
491
  
H Are Government Grants Effective and Efficient Funding Mechanisms? 
It is difficult to measure the ‘impact, efficiency, or effectiveness’ of many grant programs due to a lack 
of performance and assessment data.
492
 In a recent performance audit on the Department of 
Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry (DAFF) in administering the Tasmanian Forests Intergovernmental 
Agreement Contractors Voluntary Exit Grants Program, the department advised that it had not 
developed key performance indicators (KPIs) as KPIs could not be meaningfully measured in a 
program which required recipients to exit the industry.
493
 In contrast to the department’s position the 
ANAO stated:
494
 
Notwithstanding the department’s views, the funding provided under the program was intended to achieve 
agreed objectives including supporting the adjustment of the Tasmanian public native forest industry in 
response to industry downturn. As such, measuring the extent to which the program achieved the objectives 
was a key responsibility of the department. Approaches to program evaluation, such as the program logic 
approach, which is used by other areas within DAFF, are scalable and capture the rationale underpinning the 
program by examining and outlining the anticipated cause and effect relationship between program activities 
and periodic outcomes [Caring for Country, MERI Toolkit—Developing and using program logic in natural 
resource management user guide [internet] Commonwealth of Australia, 2011]. Through this mechanism, the 
department could have developed a small number of indicators that were fit‐for‐purpose and supported the 
capture of the short‐term, medium‐term and long‐term impacts on the Tasmanian public native forest industry 
that were expected following the provision of exit payments. 
In many instances the data required to determine whether or not a grant program is efficient and/or 
effective is not available.
495
 Reasons for this include deficiencies in planning, not clearly identifying 
program objectives and desired outcomes which then make it impossible to implement appropriate 
performance indicators, program implementation which does not allow time to review the program’s 
design, and a lack of analytical and evaluative capability.
496
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Ton et al conducted a systematic search on studies from different disciplines and geographical areas on 
the effectiveness of grants in facilitating agricultural innovation on small landholdings.
497
 The evidence 
indicated that agricultural innovation grants to small landholders were more effective in improving 
livelihoods when combined with services such as training.
498
 They noted that studies on the impact of 
the innovation grants are ‘scarce.’499  
Enters, Durst and Brown conducted a regional study on the impact of incentives on forest plantation 
development. In their view, ‘when the general investment climate is favourable and demand for wood 
increases, direct incentives can definitely increase the speed with which the private sector is drawn to 
forest plantations.’500 Loan and grant schemes had mixed impact in different countries. Some were 
more generous than others, but the most effective direct incentives in encouraging private forestry 
plantations were tax concessions.
501
 They note that direct incentives are challenging and expensive to 
administer which impacts on their effectiveness, tax concessions are effective only if the investor pays 
tax, direct incentives may be abused, and direct incentives may be flawed if designed according to the 
interests of the grantor rather than the needs of the recipient.
502
 
Geullec and van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie in quantifying the aggregate net effect of government 
funding on business research and development (R & D) in 17 Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD) member countries found that direct government funding had a positive 
effect. Every dollar granted to firms resulted in a $0.70 average marginal increase in business funded R 
& D (ie $1.70 in total spent on R & D).
503
 The positive impact on spending may not reveal the full 
story. Direct government funding may not only affect the amount spent by firms on R & D but may 
also increase the price of R & D by increasing the demand for scarce resources such as qualified 
research staff.
504
 
Lu et al in investigating the effectiveness of incentives in promoting conservation and successful 
management in the Wolong Biosphere Reserve in China found that government-paid community-based 
conservation programs such as the reforestation program and the protection of the natural eco-system 
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program were the most effective in conserving biodiversity.
505
 However, they noted that the 
management of protected areas is multi-faceted and complex. As a consequence there is no guarantee 
that incentives will be effective.
506
 
From the above discussion, it cannot be concluded whether or not government grants are effective and / 
or efficient in achieving desired outcomes. Furthermore, while the cost efficiency of a program is 
desirable, oversight must be balanced against the requirements of governance, accountability and 
transparency. 
I A Representative Sample of Government Environmental Programs 
This section provides information, drawn primarily from government websites, about grant programs 
relevant to environmental and conservation issues. The information is presented in a table format to 
allow comparisons. It is beyond the scope of this dissertation to provide a ‘scorecard’ for government 
programs. A sample is reviewed to highlight some of the different characteristics. Particular attention is 
paid to the program’s priorities, funding amount, eligibility criteria, application process, and 
compliance requirements.  
Considering the level of funding and the degree of administration required of the recipient suggests 
administrative proportionality.  The guidelines for the Water for the Future Initiative – On-Farm 
Irrigation Efficiency Program Round Three state that the budget for monitoring and reporting activities 
should be no more than 10 per cent of the annual budget. Some not-for-profit organisations suggest that 
the actual administrative cost figure for some grants may be as high as 30 per cent of service agreement 
funding. The 10 per cent allowable allocation may be too low to cover the actual reporting and 
administrative costs.  
The purpose of this section is to underscore that grants vary in form, content and administration. The 
recipient’s administrative and compliance burden may be low or the grant conditions may require 
financial reports, raw data, progress reports, or service performance reports. Government grants vary 
extensively in their objectives, administration, accountability, probity and transparency, funding 
amounts, reporting requirements, and underlying concepts as what constitutes value for money. What is 
evident from the sample is that the ‘red tape’ created by funding and service agreements is significant. 
This may dissuade some stakeholders from applying for the funds. 
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Table IV-2 Water for the Future Initiative - On-Farm Efficiency Program Round Three 
Water for the Future Initiative – On-Farm Irrigation Efficiency Program Round Three 
Jurisdiction Commonwealth 
Department Sustainability, Environment, Water,  Population and Communities 
Website http://www.environment.gov.au/water/programs/index.html 
Description Under the Water for the Future initiative, the Commonwealth Government is 
investing in a range of programs over 10 years to address four key priorities: 
1. taking action on climate change; 
2. using water wisely; 
3. securing water supplies; and 
4. healthy rivers and waterways. 
One of the funding initiatives is the On-Farm Irrigation Efficiency Program Round 
Three which is aimed at assisting irrigators within the southern connected system of 
the Murray-Darling Basin to modernise their on-farm irrigation infrastructure in order 
to allow physical water savings to be returned to the environment. 
Funding $100 million 
Eligibility An entity with direct and demonstrable links to irrigators (ie catchment management 
authority, regional irrigation authority etc.). The entity must be able to demonstrate it 
has the authority under organisational governance arrangements to enter into 
contractual arrangements. Must seek funding for participants located within the 
Southern Connected System of the Murray-Darling Basin. 
Application 
and 
Compliance 
 Open competitive grant application process.  The application must outline the 
economic, social, environmental, technical, value for money, and governance 
issues of the irrigation infrastructure conversions projects intended to be 
delivered. 
 If successful in the application, there is a requirement to enter into a legally 
binding funding agreement. Under the agreement the entity must: 
- Maintain full and accurate accounting records for a period of 7 years; 
- Be willing to undergo an independent audit at the instigation of the 
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department; and 
- Provide the following reports: 
o a progress report (at the completion of each milestone); 
o a financial report (within 60 business days after each financial year); 
o a sub-project type closure report (within 60 business days after the 
completion of the final milestone of each sub-project type); 
o a final activity report (within 60 business days of the end of the activity 
period); and 
o any other ad hoc report as requested by the Department. 
 
 
Table IV-3 Caring for Our Country - June 2013 Innovation Grants 
Caring for Our Country –  June 2013 Innovation Grants 
Jurisdiction Commonwealth 
Department Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry 
Website http://www.nrm.gov.au/index.html 
Description The Commonwealth Government offers multi-year funding for projects that improve 
bio-diversity and sustainable farm practices. Between July 2008 and June 2013 the 
Commonwealth allocated $2 billion. The Commonwealth has pledged funding of $2 
billion over five years from July 2013 to June 2018. 
One initiative is the June 2013 Innovation Grants. The funding is aimed at 
‘innovations’ that ensure natural resources are managed in a sustainable way. 
Innovations may include new technology or practices, or incremental changes that 
allow for the application of technology or practices. Examples include permanent bed 
vegetable production, use of new technology such as smart phone and tablet 
applications, and institutional and market based approaches that increase the adoption 
of sustainable production practices. The proposed project must be underpinned by 
scientific evidence and proof of concept. 
Funding Individual grants between $250,000 to $1.5 million  
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Eligibility The following can apply for funding: 
 Individuals, farmers and fishers 
 Industry associations and bodies, Farming systems groups, Aquaculture and 
commercial fisheries organisations, and Regional natural resource 
management organisations 
 Landcare groups 
 Research and development bodies including Rural Research and Development 
Corporations 
 Universities  
 Local, state and territory governments 
 Community groups 
 Women and youth groups who have been operating in the sustainable 
agriculture and fisheries landscape 
 groups whose membership is predominantly made up of Indigenous 
Australians or people from a culturally and linguistically diverse background 
 agribusiness 
 corporate companies and along the supply chain businesses 
However, those with any overdue reports or acquittals from previous Commonwealth 
funding are ineligible to apply. 
Application 
and 
Compliance 
 
 A non-competitive application. Applications are assessed on the applicant’s 
potential contribution towards managing natural resources in a sustainable way, 
the capacity of the applicant risk, and value. 
 Successful applicants must comply with Monitoring, Evaluation, Reporting and 
Improvement (MERI) activities. These may include: 
- A MERI plan and program logic and six-monthly reports demonstrating 
progress against the funding agreement and the project’s commitment to 
monitoring and evaluation. The budget for these activities is generally no 
more than 10 per cent of the total budget. 
- Further monitoring and evaluation activities to test the outcomes. This is to 
ensure that the impact on the natural resource base is understood, to avoid 
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adverse effects and to maximise outcomes. The allowable budget for these 
activities is generally no more than 10 per cent of the budget. 
 There is a requirement to enter into a legally binding funding agreement. The 
entity must: 
- Maintain accounting records for 7 years; 
- Be willing to undergo an independent audit; and 
- Provide reports, including a final report, as set out in the schedule.  
 
Table IV-4 Biodiversity Fund - Round Two: 2013-14 
Biodiversity Fund - Round Two: 2013-14 
Jurisdiction Commonwealth 
Department Sustainability, Environment, Water, Population and Communities 
Website www.environment.gov.au/cleanenergyfuture/biodiversity-fund 
Description The Biodiversity Fund is an ongoing program under the Australian Government’s 
Land Sector Package of the Clean Energy Future plan. The fund supports landholders 
to establish, restore, protect or manage biodiverse carbon stores. 
The Biodiversity Fund Round Two: 2013–14 provides funds to invest directly in 
targeted locations that are nationally important owing to their uniqueness, potential to 
support wildlife corridors and potential to store carbon. Round Two aims to improve 
the condition, extent and connectivity of native habitat and manage the threat of 
invasive species in connected landscapes. 
Funding Projects are funded to a minimum of $500,000 over two to four years from 2013-14. 
There is no upper limit to the funding. Projects seeking funding over $5 million must 
contact the Department and provide strong justification for their bid. 
Eligibility Land holders in the defined target areas: 
 the Central Australian Connection; 
 Tasmania (excluding Macquarie Island); 
 South-west Western Australia; 
 South Australia - Victoria Connection; 
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 Greater Border Ranges region; and  
 Urban waterways and coastal environments (ie urban waterways include 
rivers, streams, wetlands and estuaries in coastal cities and towns with a 
population greater than 100 000, and all of Australia’s coastline) 
Land holders who are interested in undertaking on-ground activities that link themes 
including: 
 biodiverse plantings; 
 ecological linkages between remnant native vegetation; 
 native wetland and waterway habitats as aquatic 
corridors 
 building the capacity of individuals and organisations to support ongoing 
ecological initiatives; and  
 managing invasive species. 
A landholder must have a minimum project budget of $500,000 (GST exclusive). 
Application 
and 
Compliance 
 
 A non-competitive grant application process. The applications are assessed on 
alignment with the program objectives, the capacity of the applicant, risk and 
value. Applicants seeking a grant of less than $2 million apply via a single step 
application. Applicants seeking a grant of $2 million or greater, apply via a two-
step application process, involving an initial expression of interest and if invited 
a full application. 
 Successful applicants are required to comply with Monitoring, Evaluation, 
Reporting and Improvement (MERI) activities. A feature of the MERI process 
under the Round Two funding is the use of an online reporting tool. Reports may 
include: 
- a summary of monitored measurements 
- a progress report,  
- lessons learnt and necessary changes to design or delivery 
- financial reports. 
 There is a requirement for legally binding funding agreement. Under the 
agreement the entity must: 
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- Maintain accounting records for 7 years; 
- Be willing to undergo an independent audit; and 
- Provide reports, including a final report.    
 
Table IV-5 Drought Relief Assistance Scheme 
Drought Relief Assistance Scheme 
Jurisdiction Queensland 
Department Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry 
Website http://www.daff.qld.gov.au/environment/drought/drought-assistance/drought-relief-
assistance-scheme-dras 
Description The Drought Relief Assistance Scheme (DRAS) is to help primary producers manage 
their livestock during drought and to help restoration of that resource.  
DRAS provides freight subsidies on fodder and water and animals returning from 
agistment and animals purchased for restocking. DRAS also provides a rebate on 
water infrastructure for emergency animal welfare. 
Funding The minimum payment is $25. The maximum which can be claimed is $20,000 per 
property per financial year. This may be extended to $30,000 on approval of a 
property drought management plan by the Local Drought Committee and the Deputy 
Director-General the department or up to $40,000 in the third and subsequent years of 
a drought declaration. 
The freight subsidies vary according to activity (eg fodder, water, and livestock 
returning from agistment or for restocking). By way of example, the subsidy rates for 
the transport of fodder are: 
 Hired Carrier - 50% of the freight cost, or the amount calculated from 13 
cents/tonne/km, whichever is the lower; 
 Private Vehicle - 11 cents/tonne/kilometre; 
 Rail - 50% of the cost of transport; and 
 Ship - 50% of shipping costs on consignments approved by the department. 
The Emergency Water Infrastructure Rebate funds 50 per cent of the cost of purchase, 
139 
 
delivery and labour cost to install water infrastructure for emergency animal welfare. 
Eligibility  Property owner, share-farmer or lessee (horses, beef or dairy cattle, sheep, goats 
or deer) and not a hobby farmer; and 
 The property must be drought-declared.   
Application 
and 
Compliance 
 
The applicant must: 
 supply identification details about the applicant, the livestock and the relevant 
property; 
 list details about the transport involved; 
 sign a declaration stating the requirements of the subsidy have been met; and 
 attach the original documentation (ie taxation invoices, number and class of 
stock). 
For the Emergency Water Infrastructure Rebate: 
 The department will consider eligible applications within six months of the date 
of purchase of water infrastructure; 
 The applicant must provide a Water Availability Statement outlining water 
availability, water infrastructure, watering procedures and watering points, and 
what strategies have been undertaken to reduce the effects of drought on the 
livestock; 
 The applicant must seek guidance from a department officer on the application 
process and the requirements of the Water Availability Statement. The applicant 
must attach all necessary documentation (ie a copy of the Water Availability 
Statement and original tax invoices); and 
 The department may request further information, verify information provided 
and/or refuse an application for rebate at its discretion. 
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Table IV-6 Smarter Resources, Smarter Business Program - Capital Funding 
Smarter Resources, Smarter Business Program – Capital Funding 
Jurisdiction Victoria 
Department Sustainability Victoria (a statutory authority with a board appointed by the Minister 
for Environment and Climate Change) 
Website http://www.sustainability.vic.gov.au/www/html/3601-smarter-resources-smarter-
business-program.asp 
Description The Smarter Resources, Smarter Business program assists medium-sized businesses 
to improve their resource efficiency, to maximise the value derived from energy and 
material resources. 
The capital funding initiative assists medium-sized businesses to implement resource 
efficiency projects. Funding can be for capital expenditure. Examples of material 
efficiency projects include equipment upgrades to reduce wastage or defects, quality 
or precision equipment, packaging equipment, reprocessing equipment, and improved 
product design. Examples of energy efficiency projects include lighting upgrades, 
reduction of compressed air leakage, upgrades or replacement of refrigeration, and 
optimisation of heating, ventilation and air conditioning. 
Funding The Smarter Resources, Smarter Business program is a $10 million, 3 year program.  
The capital funding initiative provides up to $50,000 (excluding GST) towards capital 
expenditure for materials efficiency projects and up to $25,000 (excluding GST) 
towards capital expenditure for energy efficiency projects. 
Eligibility The applicant must:  
 possess an Australian Business Number (ABN); 
 employ between 20 and 199 people; 
 implement the project at a site in Victoria; 
 have not had any Environment Protection Authority (EPA) or WorkSafe 
violations in the past five years; and  
 be willing to co-contribute $1 for every $1 granted. 
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Application 
and 
Compliance 
 
The capital funding initiative involves a competitive, merit‑based application process. 
The projects are assessed on their ability to deliver materials and / or energy 
efficiency improvements, viability, risk management, and implementation timeline 
and duration. 
Applicants fill in a milestone table which outlines the payment schedule for the grant. 
Milestone 1: Commitment to Implement requires evidence that the order has been 
placed and installation contracted, to receive 60 per cent of the project cost. Milestone 
2: Completion of Commissioning requires evidence of completion of the installation 
and an invoice from installer, for 30 per cent of the project cost. Milestone 3: Final 
Report and Monitoring requires a final report including a comparison of material or 
energy data relative to the baseline, to receive the final 10 per cent of the project cost. 
J Taxation Treatment of Grants 
No general provision outlines the taxation treatment of government grants in the hands of the recipient. 
The taxation treatment of grant receipts will depend on the nature of the grant, relevant exemptions, 
and the status of the recipient. In certain instances grants may be exempt from taxation. For example, 
an exemption was given under s 51-30 of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 (Cth) (ITAA1997) for 
income recovery payments to primary producers and small businesses affected by the North 
Queensland floods in 2009. 
A grant receipt may be included in an individual’s assessable income if it is income under s 6-5 of the 
ITAA1997. The taxation consequences of the receipt must be determined from the point of view of the 
recipient and not from the standpoint of the grantor or some other person.
507
 “Income” is determined 
according to ordinary concepts and usages.
508
 Generally, ordinary income includes income from 
employment, from carrying on a business, and from property (ie rent, dividends, and interest). In Higgs 
v Wrightson (1944) 26 TC 73 a grant received by a primary producer from the government for 
ploughing was considered to be income according to ordinary concepts. 
Bounties and subsidies in relation to carrying on a business that are not considered to be ordinary 
income, for example capital receipts, are included in assessable income under s 15-10 of the 
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ITAA1997. As to the term subsidy, Windeyer J in Placer Development Ltd v Commonwealth of 
Australia (1969) 121 CLR 353, 373 stated:  
The word is no longer used in its early legal sense of a grant to the Crown. It ordinarily means today not aid 
given to the Crown but aid provided by the Crown to foster or further some undertaking or industry. A 
subsidy was defined in America fifty years ago as a ‘legislative grant of money in aid of a private enterprise 
deemed to promote the public welfare’: Shumaker and Longsdorf, Cyclopedic Law Dictionary. This I take to 
be, broadly speaking, the sense in which the word is currently used in Australia ... 
In Plant v Federal Commissioner of Taxation 2004 ATC 2364 the taxpayer received a Commonwealth 
grant under the Dairy Regional Assistance Program. The objective of the program was to provide funds 
to businesses in country towns to facilitate the employment of former dairy workers. The conditions of 
the grant included the requirement to spend the funds on a new workshop and to meet performance 
indicators relating to boosting the local economy. The taxpayer argued that the grant was not given in 
relation to carrying on their business and should not be included in their business’ income. The 
Administrative Appeals Tribunal held that the grant was clearly a subsidy for the purposes of s 15-10 
and was received by the taxpayer directly or indirectly in the carrying on of their business, and 
therefore was assessable. 
Under subdivision 20-A of the ITAA1997 a taxpayer must include in their assessable income an 
amount received as a recoupment of a deductible loss or outgoing. For the purposes of Subdivision 20-
A, a recoupment of a loss or outgoing includes any kind of reimbursement, refund, insurance, 
indemnity, a grant in respect of the loss or outgoing, or a recoupment of an outgoing is listed in section 
20-30. The items listed in s 20-30 include deductions for bad debts, rates or taxes, research and 
development activity expenditure, tax related expenses and capital allowances. The provisions in 
subdivision 20-A may apply even where the taxpayer is not conducting a business. 
The grant recipient may have to consider the implications of goods and services taxation (GST). A 
recipient will have to remit one – eleventh of the grant payment to the Australian Taxation Office if the 
recipient is registered or required to be registered for GST, the grant represents consideration for a 
taxable supply, the supply is made in the course or furtherance of an enterprise which is carried on by 
the recipient, and the supply is connected with Australia.  The definition of ‘supply’ under s 9-10 of A 
New Tax System (Goods and Services Tax) Act 1999 (Cth) is broad. It includes a supply of goods, 
services, of advice or information, a grant, assignment or surrender of real property, a creation, grant, 
transfer, assignment or surrender of any right, a financial supply, or an entry into, or release from an 
obligation to do anything, or to refrain from an act or to tolerate an act or situation. 
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Depending on the circumstances, other taxation provisions may also have to be considered. For 
example, Taxation Ruling TR 2006/3
509
 which provides guidance on the tax treatment of government 
payments to industry to assist entities to commence, continue or cease payment, suggests that 
consideration should also be given to the taxation consequence of repaying unused grant funds, capital 
gains taxation, the wine equalisation tax, and balancing adjustments for depreciable assets.  
The taxation treatment of grant receipts will depend on the nature of the grant, relevant exemptions, 
and the status of the recipient. The potential grant recipient may have to consider the taxation 
implications before applying for the grant. This creates transaction and opportunity costs. This may 
constitute a barrier to participation for some landholders. 
K Summary  
Taking a broad stance, a government grant is a funding mechanism which allows the distribution of 
resources or funds to a recipient in return for the recipient complying with the terms and conditions of 
the grant. A grant imposes conditions on the recipient and it can be unilaterally amended and/or 
terminated at the discretion of the government. The advantages of government grants include the ability 
for governments to cap costs, funds can be targeted at specific concerns, they can be an attractive 
alternative funding source for eligible applicants, and competitive grants can ensure value for money 
for the grantor. The disadvantages of government grants include the perception of grantor bias where 
grants are discretionary, funds may be directed to areas of political pressure rather than areas of 
greatest need, funding may be cancelled at the discretion of the government and as consequence the 
ongoing viability of projects is at risk, they may be perceived as a gift which results in reduced effort 
on the part of the recipient, and the opportunity cost in obtaining grant funds may be high. 
Due to Williams v Commonwealth (2012) 86 ALJR 713 is unclear whether the legislative capacity of 
the Commonwealth to directly pay recipients under environmental and conservation grants programs 
has been curtailed. It may be the situation that the Commonwealth will have to rely further on its grants 
power under s 96 of the Australian Constitution to issue tied grants to the states in order to ensure that 
the applicable funds are directed to environmental program participants. This may create further red 
tape and fund leakage. 
It was argued in this chapter that the costs incurred by governments in administering grant programs, 
including time, paper work, collating data, reporting, training, capital outlays, internal reviews, and  
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audits, is substantial. However, as a general proposition, it is unclear whether or not government grants 
are effectual in achieving objectives and desired outcomes. In many instances the data required to 
determine whether a grant program is efficient and/or effective is not available. The cost efficiency of a 
government program must be balanced against the requirements of governance, accountability and 
transparency. 
Compliance and reporting requirements impose significant costs on recipients. Grants are increasingly 
made under competitive arrangements, and require disproportionate accountability, imposing undue 
compliance burdens. The amount of work involved in applying for some grants may be out of 
proportion with the limited amount of funding available under the relevant program. The ‘red tape’ 
created by funding and service agreements is based in part on risk mitigation and in part because of 
community expectations of the oversight role of government. Government ultimately controls the level 
and magnitude of the regulatory and administrative burden.  
The taxation treatment of grants also creates transaction and opportunity costs. No general provision 
outlines the taxation treatment of government grants in the hands of the recipient. The taxation 
treatment of grant receipts will depend on the nature of the grant, relevant exemptions, and the status of 
the recipient. The potential grant recipient may have to consider the taxation implications before 
applying for the grant. This may constitute a barrier to participation for some landholders. 
There may be situations where direct government funding is the only viable option for funding rural 
natural resource conservation and restoration activities on private farmland. However, an alternative 
approach to government grants should seriously be considered where it decreases reliance on directed 
government funding, is more efficient and effective in achieving conservation outcomes, and minimises 
transaction and opportunity costs from the perspective of government appointed administrators and 
private landholders.  ROCP type mechanisms could help decrease reliance on government-funded 
conservation programs. Depending on their implementation, ROCP type mechanisms have the capacity 
to reduce transaction costs, uncertainty and risk in the process of promoting conservation activities. A 
ROCP type mechanism can adopt a decentralised administrative process which may result is economic 
efficiencies, lower ‘private transaction costs’ through the reduction of administration, and lower costs 
through cooperative arrangements. 
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V  REGIONAL ON-SITE CONSERVATION PROGRAM AND THE USE OF TAX INCENTIVES TO ENCOURAGE 
CONSERVATION INVESTMENT  
‘You never had a rope around your neck. Well I’m going to tell you something. When that rope starts to pull tight, you can 
feel the devil bite your ass.’ – Tuco 
The Good, the Bad and the Ugly: Extended English-Language Version (Directed by Sergio Leone, Metro Goldwyn Mayer, 
2003) 0:26:44. 
The author of this dissertation had the movie playing in the background while writing. The quote represents a point in the 
writing process where various ideas coalesced. 
A Overview 
Notwithstanding the exertions of governments, non-government organisations, and academics, 
biodiversity has declined due to habitat loss, overexploitation, invasive species, and climate change.
510
 
Furthermore, conservation funding must battle with other demands on ‘scarce budgetary resources.’511 
Economic and environmental pressures facing Australia suggests that the underlying funding capacity 
of Australian governments to meet conservation activities will rapidly decline. The corollary of this is 
that there is a need for alternative funding mechanisms. 
The Regional Onsite Conservation Program (‘ROCP’) is a funding model conceptualised by Professor 
Paul Martin to encourage private funding into conservation activities within a framework of landscape 
change on private landholdings. The ROCP concept was expanded in reports and articles authored by 
Professor Paul Martin and the author of this dissertation. 
512
 The ROCP is not the only mechanism 
which can be called upon to encourage conservation. There may be situations where direct government 
funding or regulations are the only viable options, and other business models are possible. However, 
the ROCP concept serves to frame the issues requiring investigations as the basis for more fiscally 
sustainable and behaviourally effective investment in rural landscape conservation and restoration. It is 
for present purposes a case study example of an alternative to current program designs. 
In this chapter the focus is upon the ROCP as a potential mechanism to raise funds from the private 
market (capital raising aspect), motivate conservation participants, drive behavioural change, build 
social capital, foster cooperative behaviour, encourage conservation activities on a spatial scale, and 
curtail transaction costs. An important consideration is the ROCP’s ability to use taxation incentives. 
Such incentives potentially have a significant behavioural impact upon certain individuals which would 
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encourage them to invest. It is suggested that by offering tax incentives, the government can leverage 
its outlay (ie a decrease in taxation funds) more than it might with direct subsidies to encourage private 
funded production of public goods such as biodiversity, habitat protection, conservation capacity and 
carbon sequestration.  Taxation incentives provide an opportunity for governments to encourage private 
market investment into conservation and biodiversity and hence, leverage environmental outcomes 
ideally with a relatively slight government investment.  
The taxation system is complicated. Taxation incentives do not exist in isolation. In discussing the 
impact of taxation in encouraging or discouraging positive externalities, consideration must be given to 
the tax deductibility of the inputs that bring about eco-services, the use of the tax system to encourage 
philanthropic contributions, the taxation of marketised eco-services, and the impact of taxation on 
private investment mechanisms. These issues are outlined in appendix 1. Details of the technical 
taxation background were placed in an appendix to maintain the flow of arguments on the research 
issues. 
This chapter will provide an overview of the ROCP, explore its taxonomy (identification and 
classification), discuss the influence of the spatial aspects on conservation works, broadly examine the 
effect of transaction costs on landholder participation in conservation schemes, sketch out the 
interaction of taxation incentives and the capital raising aspects of the ROCP, and discuss the Landcare 
program in light of the ROCP’s ability to fund community driven conservation activity. Overall this 
chapter considers the following research issues: 
2. Is there a policy rationale for an alternative approach to the existing approaches to funding rural 
natural resource conservation and restoration activities on private farmland? 
3. To what extent is there a behavioural rationale for a privately funded approach to rural natural 
resource governance? 
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B An Outline of the ROCP 
The ROCP is designed to provide opportunities and incentives for investors, philanthropists, 
conservation groups, and private landholders. It is intended to address the funding gap for private lands 
conservation that has been outlined in the prior chapters. The ROCP aims to attract funding by 
capturing the value of marketable eco-services and direct philanthropic funds for conservation works, 
and facilitate research into ecosystems, sustainable agricultural practices, and biotechnology. The 
model aims to provide financial and non-financial incentives to private landholders, encourage 
unincorporated joint venture arrangements with non-government conservation organisations, build 
social capital, encourage cooperative practices, facilitate innovation, and develop conservation works 
on an extensive spatial scale.  
The model recognises that landholders may be subject to self-interest but they are not bereft of other 
motivations. The ROCP provides opportunities for high levels of landholder motivation, initiative, and 
innovation. The model allows a great deal of flexibility for local action. Once the goals, objectives and 
guidelines are set, landholders, individually or as part of a collective, choose the best means to carry 
out the conservation activity and negotiate the design and investment. This is different to conventional 
NRM program design, where funding depends upon fitting a project to predetermined criteria. 
The ROCP encompasses an investment program operated through an investment trust. This operates 
three subordinate funds aimed respectively at conservation philanthropy, conservation research and 
development, and the production and sale of marketable eco-services. An investor would have the 
choice of allocating funds to the appropriate subordinate funds. Under the philanthropic fund the 
investor / contributor would receive an upfront tax deduction for their contribution but they would not 
receive any future benefit from the fund. Under the research and development fund an investor would 
receive an appropriate tax incentive and there would be the potential to receive future income based on 
the contingent commercial viability of the activities. Under the eco-services fund an investor would 
receive an appropriate tax incentive and potentially an income distribution from the sale of marketable 
eco-services. 
Conservation project management for the ROCP would be contracted through an incorporated body 
managed substantively by local land holders with the option for unincorporated joint venture 
arrangements with non-government organisations (eg Landcare, Coastcare, Victorian Farmers 
Federation). The involvement of landholders in the incorporated body is desirable as they understand 
the local wildlife, vegetation, soil types, average rain fall, and the agricultural focus of the local area 
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and they own and manage the land. Funding to cover the administrative costs of the incorporated body 
would depend on negotiations between the board of directors and the ROCP investment trust. It is 
suggested that funding would available be to cover the costs of co-ordination, bookkeeping, rent for 
premises, stationery, furniture, telephones and IT resources.  Based on conservation project funding 
from the ROCP investment trust, the incorporated body would provide information, training and 
guidance to landholders. The incorporated body would (through discussions and negotiations with land 
holders) implement and support conservation projects.  
After entering into legally binding contracts (‘land management agreement’), private landholders 
would be paid to (or voluntarily) undertake conservation works that meet the relevant requirements of 
the three subsidiary funds. Figure V-1 provides a schematic overview of the ROCP. 
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Figure V-1 Schematic Overview of the Regional Onsite Conservation Program 
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The mechanisms employed to discourage, encourage or maintain behaviour which affects the 
environment are regulatory instruments, educational instruments, voluntary instruments, and economic 
instruments.
513
 The ROCP combines a mix of intervention types. 
Regulatory instruments are referred to as ‘command and control’ mechanisms. Command and control is 
regulation of individuals or groups by governments through legal rules and the potential imposition of 
sanctions. For example, to control air pollution a government may use regulations which prescribe 
pollution standards with which individual polluters must comply. Command and control mechanisms 
create certainty, ‘are public and accountable, can provide general coverage of industries or activities, 
and carry the authority of the state through the application of sanctions.’ 514 The disadvantages are that 
they are inflexible, can stifle innovation, theoretically they generate inefficient outcomes as a high 
degree of knowledge is required for regulation to be efficient, detract from property rights, can involve 
high compliance costs, are open to political manipulation, and may generate more regulation over 
time.
515
 The ROCP does not have a regulatory component but may indirectly support regulatory 
compliance. 
Education instruments encompass training, the provision of information, sustainability reporting (ie 
Global Reporting Initiative), product certification, and recognition of excellence in conservation (ie 
award schemes). These instruments increase awareness about conservation issues and have the 
potential to create favourable attitudes. Training has the potential to build capacity to undertake 
conservation activities. Passive education programs have a variable impact on behaviour and generally, 
it is only when training is targeted at interested and committed parties that they are likely to be 
effective.
516
 The ROCP may contain an educational component, depending upon the specific design. 
Voluntary environmental programs encapsulate business directed environmental strategies, corporate 
environmentalism, self-regulation, conservation covenants, and voluntary codes of practice. Voluntary 
instruments also include voluntary programs such as Landcare and Coastcare. These programs increase 
landholder awareness of conservation, promote sustainable agriculture practices, provide funding to 
partially cover the costs of conservation activity, allow flexible implementation, build capacity in 
landholders to undertake conservation activities, and increase social capital.
517
 The disadvantages 
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include that they rely on the goodwill and enthusiasm of volunteers, encourage the free rider effect, 
may have high administrative costs, can have a short term focus, may not change the behaviour of 
landholders who are not interested in the environment, may be inconsistent across production sectors, 
and can lack the long term data required to review project outcomes.
518
 The ROCP is intended to foster 
and support voluntary action. 
Economic instruments seek to change behaviour through market signals. Economic instruments can 
penalise undesirable behaviour or reward desirable behaviour. Examples include taxes, charges, load 
based licensing, taxation incentives, subsidies, and tradeable permits. These instruments seek to 
internalise the external costs created through market failure. The advantages include the ability for the 
affected party to flexibly choose the most efficient means to achieve the desired outcome, encourage 
innovation, and less information is required by the administrator (in comparison to command and 
control). The disadvantages include the fact that new taxes are politically unpopular, the 
implementation and administration of such mechanisms may be complex, perverse incentives may be 
created, and they may crowd out voluntary participants. The ROCP uses economic elements to 
motivate and enable voluntary action. 
The ROCP combines many of the features of market, education and voluntary instruments. It has the 
potential to provide targeted information, education and training to interested parties. It is a voluntary 
scheme in the sense that landholders voluntarily enter into an agreement to provide environmental 
services. What is particularly pertinent is that the ROCP employs an economic instrument, leveraged 
by a tax incentive, to raise funds for conservation. Thus, the ROCP is an amalgam, or hybrid, of three 
of the main environmental regulatory instruments.  
C Joint Venture Arrangement with Non-Government Organisations 
The ROCP concept was developed in close consultation with two grower organisations and a state 
farmer organisation. When developing the ROCP with the Liverpool Plains Land Management 
Committee and the Ricegrowers’ Association of Australia and the possibility of involving non-
government organisations, the terms ‘partnership’, ‘collaboration’, ‘non-corporate entity’, and ‘joint 
venture’ were used loosely. From a legal perspective this lacks precision and glosses over the 
consequences of adopting a particular business structure. In describing the ROCP the term 
‘unincorporated joint venture’ was chosen to distinguish the joint enterprise from a general law 
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partnership and the legal obligations that would arise under that structure. The distinction between an 
unincorporated joint venture and a partnership is traditionally:
519
 
 A partnership involves people carrying on a business in common with a view of profit. 
Generally, there must be some element of continuity which indicates the conduct of a business. 
From this flows the aim of generating profit which is divided between the partners;  
 An unincorporated joint venture differs in two material respects. Often the relevant activity will 
not amount to the conduct of a business. Instead, it may be a one-off development or 
undertaking. Also, a joint venture will generate a product rather than a profit (though that 
product may ultimately be profitable). 
Whether a partnership or a joint venture has been created is important because the law of equity 
imposes additional legal obligations ('fiduciary duties') on partners.
520
 Partners are ‘jointly’ liable for 
partnership debts and obligations to the full extent of their personal assets.
521
 Furthermore, partners are 
‘jointly and severally’ liable for the negligent or wrongful acts committed by an individual partner.522 
Those legal obligations widely applicable to common law partners have traditionally been held to have 
limited applicability to joint venturers. The basis of this traditional view is that joint venturers are more 
like parties who are contracting on commercial terms at arm's length. 
A partnership exists between persons carrying on a business in common with a view of profit but does 
not include the relationship that exists between members of an incorporated body (ie company).
523
 
Partnership relationships are essentially contractual. In determining whether a partnership exists regard 
must be given to the true nature of the partnership agreement and the intention of the partners as 
appearing from the whole facts of the case.
524
 The question of intention is one of fact. It does not 
depend on the private intentions of the parties but rather is judged by their conduct.  No one factor is 
conclusive and all the facts and relevant circumstances of the relationship between the parties must be 
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considered. Contrary phrasing in an agreement, such as referring to an arrangement as a joint venture, 
will not avoid the legal consequences of a partnership.
525
 Whether or not a partnership exists is a 
question of law and fact. 
The relationship between partners is fiduciary.
526
 The law presumes that ordinary partnerships are 
based on the mutual trust and confidence of each partner in the integrity of every other partner. The 
utmost good faith is fundamental.  The fiduciary obligations between partners may be varied by an 
agreement involving full disclosure between the parties. The principal fiduciary duties are listed in the 
partnership acts. Other duties under the general law are by implication applicable to partnerships except 
where they are inconsistent with the legislation.
527
 The fiduciary obligations of partners are to: 
 Act with utmost good faith and honesty; 
 Provide full accounts of all information and assets in a partner’s possession or control which are 
material to the partnership business;  
 Avoid conflicts of interest;  
 Avoid profiting personally from partnership opportunities and information; and 
 Account for any benefits obtained from the partnership business. 
The subject matter over which the fiduciary obligations extend is determined by the character of the 
business undertaking, from the written agreement of the parties, and from their conduct. The scope of 
the fiduciary relationship and whether the fiduciary obligations have been breached is a question of 
fact. 
528
 Fiduciary obligations regulate the relationship between partners during the business life of the 
partnership and its dissolution.  Fiduciary obligations only cease upon the final settlement of accounts 
on winding up of the partnership. 
Turning to the concept of an unincorporated joint venture, there is no precise legal definition of a joint 
venture. Mason, Brennan and Deane JJ in United Dominions Corp Ltd v Brian Pty Ltd (1985) 157 CLR 
1, 10 described an unincorporated joint venture:  
The term “joint venture” is not a technical one with a settled common law meaning. As a matter of ordinary 
language, it connotes an association of persons for the purposes of a particular trading, commercial, mining or 
other financial undertaking or endeavour with a view to mutual profit, with each participant usually (but not 
necessarily) contributing, money, property or skill. Such a joint venture (or under Scots’ law, “adventure”) 
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will often be a partnership. The term is, however, apposite to refer to a joint undertaking or activity carried on 
through a medium other than a partnership: such as a company, a trust, an agency or joint ownership. The 
borderline between what can properly be described as a “joint venture” and what should more probably be 
seen as more than a simple contractual relationship may on occasion be blurred. Thus, where one party 
contributes only money or other property, it may sometimes be difficult to determine whether a relationship is 
a joint venture in which both parties are entitled to a share of profits or a simple contract of loan or a lease 
under which the interest or rent payable to the party 
This description provides little help in distinguishing a partnership from an unincorporated joint 
venture. Describing an arrangement as a joint venture does not have any prescribed legal 
consequences.
529
 The fiduciary duties, rights, and obligations of the venturers depend on the facts and 
on the construction of the agreement between the parties.
530
 Problems seem to arise where there is no 
formal written agreement which states the duties and obligations of the parties.
531
 
In the absence of a precise legal definition of an unincorporated joint venture we turn to the 
characteristics discussed in case law to distinguish an unincorporated joint venture from a 
partnership:
532
 
 Each joint venturer receives a predetermined share of the produce of the enterprise rather than a 
share of the profits; 
 If property is purchased by the venturers to meet the requirements of the enterprise then it is 
usually held as tenants in common; 
 If an asset is contributed to the enterprise by an individual venturer then title to that asset is 
retained by that party; 
 A formal joint venture agreement usually states that each joint venturer is responsible for its 
own debts, obligations, and liabilities; and 
 Joint venturers have limited fiduciary obligations to each other, except for those set out in the 
agreement or imposed by the courts in the individual case. 
For any joint enterprise to operate effectually between the ROCP and a non-government organisation, a 
written agreement should be entered into which expressly states the duties, obligations, and 
contributions of the parties. In the absence of such an agreement there is a possibility that the 
arrangement would be a common law partnership with the consequent fiduciary obligations, joint 
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liability for debts, and joint and several liability for any wrongful act committed by the other party. 
Other issues which may be covered in a written agreement include governance structure, management 
arrangements, agent powers, and taxation. 
D Spatial Aspects 
A broad reading of the literature from social scientists, environmental scientists, and geographers 
indicates that the spatial aspects of conservation are a strategic consideration. The form of its 
implementation is determined by the spatial aspects of the targeted environment. Thus, a core focus of 
ecology is determining the habitat selection by fauna and flora.
533
 Eco-services are generated at a range 
of ecological scales and may be demanded by stakeholders at various institutional scales.
534
 Scales of 
eco-services ‘refer to the physical dimension, in space or time, or phenomena or observations.’535 As to 
the hierarchy of institutional scales, they ‘reflect the different levels at which decisions on the 
utilization of capital, labour and natural resources are taken.’536 In their article Hein et al broadly 
outline the level at which eco-services are generated and the institutional scale that may seek these 
services as summarised in figure V-2.
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Figure V-2 Summary of Ecological and Institutional Scales based on Kim et al 
Ecological Scales  
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Lot of Land 
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Plant Individual 
The ecological and institutional scales rarely line up, and stakeholders often ‘cut across a range of 
institutional zones and scales.’ 538 Hein et al assert that an assessment of scales facilitates eco-service 
valuation, allows an analysis of conflicts such as between local landholders who wish to productively 
use their land and national stakeholders who wish to preserve biodiversity. It allows an analysis of 
costs and benefits to determine potential compensation payments.
539
 
To maximise conservation outcomes on private landholdings many activities must be carried out on an 
extensive spatial scale. The focus of this chapter is the ROCP operating at the regional scale.  ROCPs 
could operate at a variety of scales potentially involving a couple of farms, to a large regional scale 
involving many farms. The ROCP area of operation could correspond to the regional boundaries of 
administrative bodies such as the Local Land Services (New South Wales), Catchment Management 
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Authority (Victoria), and Regional Natural Resource Management Bodies (Queensland).  However, 
whilst landholders at a regional level operate broadly under similar economic circumstances, individual 
landholders ‘are faced with considerable differences in the physical characteristics of the landscape, 
such as soil types and climates.’540 Landholdings differ in their habitats and their ability to produce 
ecosystem services. As such, conservation programs must take into account the spatial heterogeneity of 
a region.
541
 Moreover, the identification of key fragmented habitats may highlight opportunities for the 
creation of wildlife corridors and riparian buffers, with potentially very high ecosystem service values. 
Getnet, Pfeifer and MacAlister argue that ecosystem services are better achieved through coordinated 
intervention on an extensive spatial scale because such an approach optimises social, economic, and 
environmental objectives across landholdings by ‘allowing coordinated resource use and 
management.’542 ‘In such a context, individual farms can be persuaded, using appropriate institutional 
and organizational mechanisms [for example the ROCP], to innovate in an integrated manner to 
achieve both farm and landscape scale objectives.’543  
Kim et al found that establishing larger protected areas cost less per unit area than establishing smaller 
ones.
544
 They calculated that larger sites (at tens time the area of smaller sites) can be acquired for one 
seventh the cost of smaller sites. They observed that in acquiring protected areas by fee simple 
contracts or by conservation easement contracts, the fee simple arrangements displayed constant 
economies of scale in line with property size. Conservation easement arrangements displayed 
diseconomies of scale in line with property size. Unfortunately, Kim et al did not contrast maintenance 
costs of large and small parcels of protected areas. It is expected that similar economies of scale exist in 
favour of larger parcels. Kim et al noted that while their analysis supports the acquisition of large lots 
of ‘very general land’ for conservation purposes, there are instances where exploiting economies of 
scale in line with property size are of limited significance such as where particular parcels of land 
contain rare or endangered species.
545
  
Broch et al conducted an analysis into the willingness of landholders to provide eco-services (ground 
water protection, biodiversity conservation, and recreation) based on the influence of spatial 
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heterogeneous variables including groundwater interests, species richness, human population density, 
forest cover and hunting.
546
 They hypothesised that the amount of compensation paid to landholders 
must reflect the provision of eco-services in the particular spatial context.
547
 Largely they found that 
landholders ‘may be reluctant to deliver services which are exclusively a public good or have a 
negative impact on their private welfare (e.g., public access and recreational opportunities)  and rather 
prefer project purposes which are composed of attributes contributing not only to public welfare but 
also their private welfare (e.g., wildlife protection and hunting opportunities).’548 The amount of 
compensation required by landholders to provide recreational services was higher than the amount 
required for provision of ground water protection and biodiversity conservation.
549
 Landholders did not 
want a lot of visitors coming onto their property. This entails negative impacts including littering, 
vandalism, noise, illegal vehicle access, disruption of local fauna, lack of respect for private property 
rights, dogs being let loose, and visitors entering into prohibited areas.
550
  In contrast, it was found that 
a project which increased the prospect of ‘hoofed game’ for hunting decreased the compensation 
required by landholders. 
551
 
Planning at a regional spatial scale has advantages. However, there may be some shortcomings to a 
regional approach. Huber, Creco, and Thorne assert that conservation planning limited to ‘one spatial 
scale will neglect biodiversity patterns and ecological processes that are important at other scales.’552 
Conservation planning at a local level may overlook patterns and processes important to the regional 
level, and regional level planning may overlook patterns and processes important to the local and the 
intraregional level.
553
 In comparing wildlife corridor planning at a local level against a regional level 
they found that many regionally important corridors were not identified at the local scale. Corridors 
connecting locally important core areas were overlooked at the regional scale.
554
 This indicates that if a 
‘purely regional approach to conservation planning is adopted, many areas might not be deemed 
biologically valuable enough to warrant expenditure of finite conservation resources.’555 In 
implementing regional conservation activities, the ROCP should analyse these activities from a local, 
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intraregional, and possibly a state and national perspective to ensure that resources are allocated at 
several spatial scales.
556
 
Overall, using the ROCP to achieve conservation objectives on an extensive spatial scale will face 
challenges and restraints.  As stated by Wilson and Piper: 
557
 
… whether it be promoting wind farms, controlling development of areas at risk of flooding, designing 
energy-conserving settlements and transport, or taking account of climate change in assessment processes – 
this reframing of spatial planning is contentious and difficult. 
The voluntary nature of the ROCP means that a spatially extensive plan depends on the willingness of 
landholders to participate. Thus, a plan to connect fragmented habitat can be hindered by the non-
participation of strategically positioned landholders. Given the benefits of achieving conservation 
objectives on a regional spatial scale, the ROCP should implement conservation programs across the 
region by using the appropriate mixture of incentives taking into account the spatial context, to 
motivate the right mix of landholders to address the issue. 
E Transaction Costs and ROCP 
The issue of transaction costs is pertinent to the ROCP as it is a mechanism for transacting eco-services 
(property rights) between landholder producers and eco-service buyers / investors. A transaction cost is 
the cost of carrying out a transaction, in addition to the price paid for a good or a service when 
participating in a market. Conservation activities can be subject to high transaction costs, uncertainty, 
and economic risk.  High ‘private transaction costs’ may deter private landholders from participating in 
conservation schemes. Low participation reduces the potential environmental benefit of conservation 
intervention.  
New institutional economics (NIE) suggests that organisational innovation may improve economic 
efficiency by curbing transaction costs.
558
 Institutions are the rules of the game such as the legal 
system, the financial system, informal social norms, and self-imposed ethical codes.
559
 Organisations 
are the players in the game such as firms, universities, law societies, farmer associations, and 
environmental agencies.
560
 A fundamental principle of NIE is that institutions and organisations have a 
symbiotic relationship. Organisations arise because of incentives created by the institutional framework 
but the institutional framework is developed and amended through the political lobbying of 
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organisations. The institutional environment can ‘create or reduce transaction costs’ by dictating the 
terms of information distribution, monitoring, enforcement, and administration.
561
 ‘If the institutional 
structure fails to guarantee low transaction costs, clearly define property rights and build strong social 
capital, participation in the schemes remains low despite financial support.’562 Depending on their 
implementation, structures such as the ROCP can reduce the transaction cost for landholder scheme 
participants by simplifying information provision, application processes, negotiations, contractual 
arrangements, and monitoring processes. These organisations can lobby to support landholder 
proprietary rights, promote the valuable social contribution of eco-service providers, and seek the 
amendment of ineffectual legal provisions.  
Another important factor which affects the magnitude of transaction costs is trust. Without ‘basic trust’ 
voluntary conservation schemes will not materialise.
563
 ‘Trust reduces the cost of economic 
transactions and thus facilitates trade.’564 As already noted, eco-service transactions are highly 
uncertain. As a consequence, such contracts are invariably incomplete. ‘Trying to conclude more 
detailed contracts and to stipulate more detailed monitoring will add to costs, and hence form serious 
barriers for cooperation.’565 Contracts and trust may act as complements to each other. If something is 
not stipulated in the contract then a trustful relationship will support the successful completion of the 
activity and, the contract will not always be enforced in a formal way where it would detrimentally 
affect the cooperative relationship.
566
 Over time and interaction, parties learn more about the behaviour 
of the other. If there is an absence of opportunistic behaviour, trust is formed.
567
 Trust is also ‘produced 
at least in part by a sense of community.’568 That is, there is a belief that the community as a whole will 
benefit from cooperation. Taking this into account, it is argued that the ROCP can build trust, and as 
consequence, decrease transaction costs, through honest dealings, local community interaction, 
competency, and delivery on promises. 
The ROCP has the capacity to reduce transaction costs, uncertainty and risk in the process of 
promoting conservation activities. The ROCP can also decrease ‘private transaction costs’ through 
training, professional advice, providing information, simplifying application and contractual 
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arrangements, adopting or formulating a common ideology with landholders, streamlining monitoring 
processes, and building trust. Furthermore, it is asserted that these may be substantial but as a 
commercial enterprise these costs can be absorbed in line with generally accepted accounting principles 
and eventually offset against the sale of marketable eco-service products. 
F Taxation Incentives - a Mild Form of Government Intervention 
An underpinning of the ROCP business model is that taxation incentives will encourage private market 
funding which can then be distributed to fund conservation activities. In this instance the use of tax 
incentives addresses the under provision of conservation (market failure). Regardless of the policy tools 
used to address market failure, there is the possibility that government intervention will bring about an 
inequitable outcome. Government failure occurs when government intervention brings about inefficient 
allocation of resources and, hence, further inequalities than would have occurred without interference 
in the market. The probability of government failure can be minimised by limiting the scope of 
government intervention. Groenewegen, Spithoven and van den Berg assert that the degree of 
government interference from least to highest is as follows: 
569
 
1. Indicative Rules – This mechanism outlines what information should be made available to 
parties before they enter into a binding agreement. These rules expedite transactions while the 
‘private actors retain their autonomy to decide how (and when, and with whom) to transact.’ 
2. Monetary Incentives – Through the use of taxes, subsidies and price regulation decision 
makers are informed and motivated to act in a desired fashion. Individuals are able to decide 
how to transact but because of the monetary incentives, they will act in a different way than 
would be the case without the financial intervention. 
3. Regulation of Quantity and Quality – This kind of mechanism (ie command and control) 
limits the alternatives available to firms which may suppress competition and innovation. A 
government outlines the quality / standards and / or quantity / targets that must be complied 
with in order to avoid sanctions. For instance, to ensure quality only licenced firms may be 
allowed to produce a certain product or to supply a certain service. To limit pollution it may be 
the case that only a certain quantity of product is allowed to be produced. 
4. Strict Regulation of Legal Monopolies – For various policy reasons a government may grant a 
private firm protection from competition. However, in order to prevent abuse of market power, 
strict requirements are set over price, quantity and quality. 
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5. Public Monopolies – When a government intervenes via a monopolistic state-owned enterprise 
it takes over control of production. There may be reasons such as economies of scale which 
make it more efficient to utilise a state-owned enterprises rather than relying on market 
delivery. 
Under the above scheme, taxation incentives are a mild form of intervention. Taxation incentives may 
minimise or obviate the requirements for command and control. It is contended that using taxation 
incentives to encourage private sector conservation has the potential to promote social objectives at a 
relatively low social cost but this depends on the design and implementation of the tax structure.  
G  Tax Incentives and Philanthropic Donations 
One of the subordinate funds under the ROCP investment trust is aimed at conservation philanthropy. 
Under the philanthropic fund the investor / contributor would receive an upfront tax deduction for their 
contribution but they would not receive any future benefit from the fund. A strict application of 
economic doctrine may suggest that individuals exclusively pursue self-interest but ‘real-world 
evidence for altruism comes from donations to charities, which are substantial and difficult to explain if 
individuals are purely selfish’ (non-self-interest is also reflected in the provision of private 
conservation activities by individuals and non-government organisations).
570
 This is not to say that 
individuals are entirely selfless as economic factors do affect human behaviour. The policy reasoning 
behind tax deductible donations to non-profit organisations is that ‘it will increase giving to such 
organisations thus producing more public goods such as research, health and education services.’571 
This begs the question as to whether or not tax incentives in reality encourage increased giving? 
The behavioural effect on Australians of tax incentives to encourage philanthropic donations is poorly 
understood partially because available data is not easily interpreted in price elasticity terms.
572
  In a 
2005 survey conducted under the Giving Australia project it was found that ‘1 per cent of respondents 
or 7 per cent of those aware of new tax incentives indicated that it had impacted on their giving.’573 
Furthermore, ‘everyday individuals’ tended only to claim high donation amounts and failed to claim 
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where they had not collected receipts or could not recall the amount donated.
574
 It was found that 
‘participants mostly agreed that tax incentives did not prompt giving’ but many of the participants, 
especially ‘wealthy individuals’, professed that taxation incentives were important in increasing 
donation amounts. 
575
    
McGregor-Lowndes, Newton and Marsden investigated the impact of taxation incentives introduced 
into Australia in 2000 to encourage philanthropic contributions. They observe that donations had 
increased above the previous patterns of giving.
576
 They assert that ‘some causality must be seriously 
considered’ between the tax incentives and the increased giving by ‘affluent Australians.’577 In 
addressing the conclusion under the Giving Australia research that taxation incentives did not prompt 
donations they conjectured that it is ‘to be expected that direct questions about whether a tax incentive 
motivates a donor elicits a socially constructed response that the gift is for purely altruistic reasons 
rather than personal gain.’578 
Research in Canada suggests ‘that tax incentives have a significant effect’ on donations.579 In applying 
this assertion to the Australian context, caution is required because of the dissimilar tax concessions 
and culture context.
580
 As in Australia, the majority of Canadians in survey studies have indicated that 
tax incentives are of secondary importance in deciding to donate. The percentage of individuals who 
have identified tax incentives as an important motivating factor has steadily increased over several 
years.
581
  What is of central significance is that the research reveals that tax incentives may invoke 
different behavioural responses in different charitable sectors.
582
 This suggests that tax incentives that 
are ‘tailored’ to different charitable fields such as religion, education, health, social services and the 
environment, will be more effective in meeting public policy goals than treating all charitable sectors 
on an equal footing. 
Even if philanthropic tax incentives are not the major motivator for donating, they do play a part in 
increasing donation amounts and help increase awareness about charitable causes. They are an 
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economical means for government to encourage the provision of public goods. For instance, research 
conducted in the USA has established that tax incentives to encourage philanthropy are ‘treasury 
efficient.’583 A mechanism is ‘treasury efficient’ where the funding to the non-profit organisation 
exceeds the cost to the government (tax incentives result in forgone tax revenue). This means that a 
decrease in the donor’s cost of giving (taking into account the tax incentive) ‘by $1 results in more than 
$1 being donated to charity through private philanthropy.’584  
Overall, in comparison to direct government contributions, it is argued that tax deductible eligibility is 
a more cost effective method for government to support non-profit organisations. It is likely that the 
granting of tax deductibility status to the ROCP philanthropic conservation component would increase 
donation amounts and help increase awareness about the conservation focus of the fund. 
H  Tax Incentives and Investment 
The imposition of taxes and hence the availability of tax incentives, can influence the allocation of 
resources.
585
 The policy behind investment tax incentives is that individuals in the pursuit of profit will 
find an investment more attractive if it costs less.
586
 When economists discuss investment they are 
referring to the manufacture of capital goods (machinery, equipment, factories etc.) which can then be 
used to produce consumption goods (televisions, computers, clothes etc.).
587
  This is why the economic 
literature focuses on the effect of tax incentives upon the manufacture and acquisition of plant and 
equipment.
588
  The common usage of the term investment is the acquisition of financial assets such as 
shares, units in managed funds, debentures, and bonds. Investment in financial assets may be used to 
fund investment in ‘real productive assets’ but it may also be used to pay off debt or to purchase other 
firms. In this thesis the focus is upon investment in environmental rather than economic assets. 
                                                 
583
 John Peloza and Piers Steel, 'The Price Elasticities of Charitable Contributions: A Meta Analysis' (2005) 24(2) Journal of 
Public Policy & Marketing 260. 
584
 Ibid 269. 
585
 Brett Freudenberg, Tax Flow-Through Companies (CCH, 2011) 2. 
586
 Robert E Hall and Dale W Jorgenson, 'Tax Policy and Investment Behavior' (1967) 57(3) American Economic Review 
391, 392. 
587
 Investment is the ‘process of adding to stocks of real productive assets. This may mean acquiring fixed assets, such as 
buildings, plant, or equipment, or adding to stocks and work in progress. Investment goods are goods designed to be used 
for investment rather than consumption.’: John Black, Nigar Hashimzade and Gareth Myles, A Dictionary of Economics 
(Oxford University Press, 3
rd 
ed, 2008) 250. 
588
 Hassett and Hubbard provide a good review of  the literature: Kevin A Hassett and R Glenn Hubbards, 'Tax Policy and 
Business Investment' in Martin Feldstein and Alan J Auerbach (eds), Handbook of Public Economics (Elsevier, 2002) vol 
3, 1294. 
165 
 
In 1963 Dale W Jorgenson presented his highly influential neoclassical theory of investment.
589
 The 
user-cost of capital theory states that a business will purchase capital equipment where it is profitable to 
do so taking into account future cash flows, opportunity costs (ie how much income would the business 
receive by leaving the money in the bank), wear and tear, taxation of profits, and taxation incentives. 
By lowering the cost of equipment a tax incentive should spur increased investment in productive 
assets. In contrast is the assertion by Strümpel that senior management decisions regarding capital 
investment are founded almost entirely on considerations of gross profitability and taxation issues are 
only considered in connection with the financing of projects.
590
 In the 1960s Strümpel conducted a 
comparative survey in Europe. He compared the tax systems and the ‘tax morale’ (the motivation to 
pay tax) of the taxpayers of various countries. His evidence suggested ‘the effect of tax incentives on 
investment behaviour’ was relatively insignificant.591 However, recent empirical research supports the 
neoclassical theory that capital good demand is sensitive to taxation.
592
 The studies ‘have reached a 
consensus that the elasticity of investment with respect to the tax-adjusted user cost of capital is 
between -0.5 and -1.0’ and this ‘… suggests that investment tax policy can have a significant impact on 
the path of aggregate capital formation.’593 If this holds true for environmental investment then a tax 
instrument has the potential to leverage greater environmental protection and restoration than a direct 
subsidy. 
From an economic perspective, a closed economy can only invest in capital goods by foregoing 
consumption (ie by relying on the savings of individuals, firms or government). However, in an open 
economy resources can be borrowed from other countries. Foreign direct investment (‘FDI’) is direct 
investment in real productive assets in one country by residents of another country.
594
 Econometric 
studies and surveys of foreign investors in developing countries conclude that the ‘investment climate’ 
of a country is a more important motivating influence than tax incentives.
595
 The investment climate of 
a country encompasses factors such as ‘ease of import and export, availability of local suppliers, 
regulatory framework, adequate infrastructure, and a country’s geographic location.’596 Surveys of FDI 
investors indicate that many investments would have been made without an incentive and ‘investment 
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incentives did not affect the level of investment for many investors.’597 It can be asserted that FDI 
incentives are redundant ‘for investments oriented towards domestic markets and those based on 
natural resources – such as mining and tourism – unique to a country.’598 However, incentives are 
important to export oriented firms as profit margins are slim.
599
 This suggests that a tax incentive aimed 
at environmental protection and restoration (unique to Australia) should be tailored to the needs of 
domestic investors rather than non-resident investors. 
Thus far the discussion has focused on the effect of tax incentives on real productive assets. Now the 
discussion will turn to the effect of tax incentives on financial assets. This is pertinent to the ROCP as it 
is a mechanism for transacting eco-services (property rights) between landholder producers and eco-
service buyers / investors. The demise of agricultural managed investment scheme operators Great 
Southern Plantations and Timbercorp raise thought-provoking issues. The schemes arose from the 1997 
Plantations for Australia 2020 vision goal to treble Australia’s plantation output by 2020 to meet future 
paper demand.
600
  Taxation incentives (an upfront general tax deduction) were an important component 
in encouraging private investment into forestry as it was unlikely that without incentives investors 
would accept ‘the agricultural risk, delayed returns and concentrated income events that create tax 
liability at harvest.’601 Factors that contributed to collapse of the schemes include:602 
 High Cost of Land: The high cost of land decreases the rate of return of a business below that 
required to pay interest on borrowed money. High cost land purchased with investor funds a 
low rate of return. A business operation making very low rates of return will eventually become 
insolvent. ‘In the case of plantations, the vast majority of the investment to grow trees to 
maturity is in the cost of land, and it is this variable that has killed the economics.’603 
 Cash Flow: Harvesting occurs many years after initial planting but the trees still have to be 
looked after. Caring for the trees incurs a negative cash flow which will only be made up if the 
harvest is successful many years later (8 – 25 years). Sufficiently high returns are required to 
justify the risks. Volatile cash flow businesses like forestry MIS are unsuitable for debt funding 
or other leverage arrangements. Many investors used borrowed funds to invest in the MIS 
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projects to maximise their tax benefits. Both scheme operators provided direct finance to 
investors. Even though the operations collapsed, investors who borrowed money were obliged 
to pay the money back. 
 Unsustainable Business Model: This business model relied on receipts from application fees. 
Investors paid fees upfront and upon harvest rather than annually. The operators were 
dependent on new investments to maintain the existing agricultural projects and the scheme 
operator. This encouraged the operators to continually seek further investment. Agribusiness 
MIS operators at the time paid financial advisers upfront commissions averaging 10 per cent of 
the amount invested. It is likely that the desire to obtain the high commission conflicted with 
the financial planner’s fiduciary duties to the investors. By granting a high commission there 
were significant cash outflows from the business. Payments to promoters of the schemes were 
30 per cent to 40 per cent of the gross investment. The promoter fees along with the 
commissions meant that close to half the money did not make it to the on-ground operations. 
The operators directed funds to related entities and charged above commercial rates for project 
services which further affected the cash flow. New investments created obligations to buy more 
land in which to plant trees and run the operations which in turn created the need for more 
investments. 
The MIS scheme experience indicates the disproportionate potential response to a tax incentive, but 
also the governance risk associated with tax driven entrepreneurialism. 
It is easy with hindsight to identify the problems in a failed business. However, even taking into 
account that investors were likely deceived on the business fundamentals of the investment, it is 
suggested that the major motivator for investing in the scheme was the upfront taxation deduction. At 
the time of the appointment of the administrators (April 2009 and May 2009 respectively), Timbercorp 
held $2 billion on behalf of 18,500 grower investors and Great Southern Plantations held $1.8 billion 
on behalf of 43,000 grower investors.
604
 From 1998 till July 2009 agribusiness MIS, with the help of 
tax incentives, raised approximately $8 billion representing 3.2 per cent of the entire retail MIS 
industry.
605
 As at March 2015 the managed funds industry had $2,617.4 billion ($2.6 trillion) funds 
under management.
606
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Slemrod and Kopzuk state ‘there is a growing body of evidence, that at least for high-income 
individuals, the elasticity of taxable income to marginal tax rate is substantial.’607 Possible responses to 
higher marginal tax rates include increased leisure activities (ie the higher tax rate acts as a disincentive 
to work), tax evasion, incorporation (eg sole trader sets up a company to minimise tax liability), 
increased expenditure on deductible items (eg charitable donations), and rearrangement of salary 
package (eg salary sacrifice arrangements).
608
 It is unclear to what degree higher marginal tax rates 
influence the propensity to invest in tax effective financial assets but it cannot be denied that taxation 
incentives have a significant behavioural impact upon certain individuals and can direct the flow of 
funds to targeted causes. Perhaps as asserted by Martin Conlon on investment in agribusiness MIS:
609
 
… the rationale for buying was being dictated almost solely by the insatiable desire to not pay tax. The 
sentiments of the average Australian taxpayer were probably best summed up by Kerry Packer. “Now of 
course I am minimising my tax, and if anybody in this country doesn’t minimise their tax they want their 
heads read, because as a government I can tell you you’re not spending it that well that we should be donating 
extra.” 
Overall, taxation has a very powerful effect on certain individuals. The behavioural impact of taxation 
incentives on certain individuals brings about a dis-propionate response (even in the face of credible 
information about the riskiness of a business operation). Tax incentives have the potential to leverage 
significant funds for environmental protection and restoration. For example, if with the help of taxation 
incentives conservation MISs captured 1% of the current total funds under management then this would 
amount to $26.1 billion (1% x $2,617.4 billion, March 2015). 
I Capital Raising Aspect of the ROCP 
The ROCP has the purpose of raising funds from the private market for conservation activities and 
providing a low transaction cost structure for raising and managing those funds. At the heart of the 
ROCP’s ability to raise funds are taxation incentives. Tax incentives will potentially encourage private 
investors to contribute to conservation activities. Taxation incentives may encourage long term 
commitment and compensate for lower returns, and higher risk relative to other investments. In a 
Canadian report on green bonds (standard fixed income financial assets where the proceeds are applied 
exclusively to ‘green projects’) it was suggested that a healthy and liquid domestic market made up of 
high grade green bonds would require a market size between CAD$10 billion and CAD$20 billion. 
610
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It is unclear how much capital a managed investment scheme for conservation in Australia would 
attract over its lifetime but an appropriate taxation incentive would compensate for lack of liquidity in 
its early development. 
This dissertation suggests that the government can leverage its outlay (ie the decrease in taxation funds) 
to facilitate conservation on private land for the benefit of society. The underlying rationale is that an 
individual in the pursuit of profit will find an investment more attractive if it costs less. Tax incentives 
(ie tax expenditure) ‘are a common channel for financing public policies that may parallel direct 
expenditures in the support of a broad range activities, from social welfare to environmental and 
industrial policy objectives.’611  The advantages of tax incentives over direct subsidies are flexibility in 
operation and the fact that the individual, rather than the government, determines how to best expend 
funding. This overcomes many problems caused by bureaucracy and information requirements.
612
 
Research has found that while other factors are important determinants of investment behaviour, taxes 
have a significant influence.
613
 In research conducted by Ang, Blackwell and Megginson on British 
investment trusts it was found that stock-dividend shares, which could be converted to cash dividend 
shares, sold at a premium when the tax system favoured capital gains. Where the tax system favoured 
income relative to capital gains the cash dividend shares sold at a premium.
614
  Sundar, Hill and 
Lajaunie reviewed the impact of taxes on American stock prices. Favourable capital gains tax 
‘provided an increase in the demand for the smaller capital growth stocks, while the lower marginal 
rate on ordinary income fuelled an increase in the demand for value stocks which provide steady 
dividend income.’615 Overall these studies indicate that investors alter their behaviour due to taxation. 
A real world example of a capital raising mechanism which uses taxation incentives to encourage 
investment in environmentally-friendly initiatives is the Netherlands’ Green Funds Scheme (GFS). The 
Netherlands government launched the GFS in 1995 with the aim to:
616
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 Facilitate projects in nature conservation; 
 Encourage a change in economic activities so that they take into account biodiversity; 
 Promote the distribution of sustainable energy technology; and 
 Support household participation in green projects. 
Initially the four main project categories were building, agriculture, energy, and nature.
617
 Gradually 
the categories were expanded and they now include:
618
  
 Nature, forests and landscape; 
 Organic farming; 
 Green label greenhouses; 
 Agrification (industrial processing of agriculture products into goods other than for human or 
animal consumption); 
 Renewable energy; 
 Sustainable building; 
 Cycle-track infrastructure (bicycle tracks to connect residential areas); 
 Soil decontamination; and 
 Other environmental projects that do not fall into the other categories. 
The GFS is a tax investment scheme which allows investors to contribute to green projects by placing 
their money with an approved financial institution (green institution) at below market interest rates. 
This is partly compensated by the tax incentive.
619
  The green institutions lend money at below market 
rates to companies that undertake certified green projects. The green institutions must expend at least 
70% of the total assets of the fund on certified green projects. The other 30% may be invested 
elsewhere to diversify the risk. To qualify as a green project certain conditions, laid down in the 
scheme, must be met. 
The rate of the tax incentive component has varied over the life of the scheme. At one stage an 
individual investor obtained a 1.2% exemption from capital gains tax combined with a 1.3% reduction 
in personal income tax (total advantage of 2.5%).
620
 This was changed to a 1.2% exemption from 
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capital gains tax combined with a 0.7% reduction in personal income tax (total advantage of 1.9%).
621
 
The income tax reduction came to end in 2014 and now only a 1.2% exemption from capital gains 
remains (total advantage of 1.2%).
622
 
The GFS has been successful in encouraging individuals to contribute funds to green projects. Up to 
2008, even though only approximately 1.4% of the Netherlands’ population invested in the GFS, more 
than €6.8 billion was contributed to finance approximately 5,000 green projects.623  Between 1995 and 
2009 on average there were 433 green projects per year with an average loan of €532,000 per 
project.
624
 By the end of 2009 there were approximately 250,000 households that held an interest in the 
GFS.
625
  
In a study that analysed the extent that the GFS contributed to the Netherlands government’s 
sustainability objectives during the period 2002 to 2012, the social costs of the GFS were compared to 
its social benefits (sustainable profits).
626
 Sustainable profits consists of the three components: 
environmental benefit (ie direct improvement of environmental quality), technological benefit (ie 
sustainable products such as wind power), and community awareness (ie increased awareness and 
activity in making the community more sustainable). Social costs include the opportunity costs of 
private investors in foregoing higher paying investments and the government costs of foregone tax 
revenue due to the implementation of the tax incentives (tax expenditure).  Based on 2011 figures the 
environmental benefits amounted to approximately €360 million per year, offset by the opportunity 
costs to investors of €38 million and government costs of €137 million (net benefit of €185 million). 
The report noted that the environmental benefits were underestimated as it was not possible to place a 
monetary value on all ‘societal effects.’ It was also noted that GFS influence on sustainable profits 
could have been overestimated since multiple factors such as other government policies may have 
influenced some outcomes. In terms of financial leverage, this suggests leverage on government 
investment of almost 3:1. 
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Overall the GFS is a cost effective mechanism in promoting sustainable development leveraging the 
government contribution. The GFS has helped to demonstrate that ‘environmental efficiency can go 
hand-in-hand with economic efficiency,’ underscoring that it is important to take note of non-financial 
performance, and innovation.
627
 It has been asserted that a disadvantage of the GFS is that the program 
‘is targeted at individual investors, limited to soft loans, and restricted to projects that can support 
themselves over time.’628 As a consequence, the scheme excludes potential investors and socially 
valuable but financially low return green projects.
629
 Nonetheless, the GFS provides evidence of the 
potential to raise extensive capital from private investors for conservation activities in Australia with 
relatively limited taxation incentives.  Of course the successful implementation of the ROCP as a 
capital raising mechanism depends on government backing, an appropriate taxation incentive, and the 
willingness of investors to support socially worthy but economically uncertain programs.  
J Landcare  
When discussing the ROCP with farming groups it was noted that Landcare was strongly supported by 
many of the local landholders. A common view was that Landcare was underfunded and ‘drowning in 
red tape.’ It was suggested by the farming groups that the ROCP would be a good mechanism for 
financing and facilitating ‘grass roots’ Landcare operations. There was clear dissatisfaction with the 
bureaucratic / manageralist approach of government departments to the allocation of government 
resources. It was their view that the ROCP was the ‘perfect tonic’ for a lack of on ground 
administrative support (by governments / departments), hierarchical decision making, and a lack of 
recurring funding. 
Landcare is a community-based natural resource management program. The term ‘Landcare’ originated 
in Victoria ‘where soil conservation programs were strong and a major salinity control initiative had 
begun in 1983-84 in affected regions.’630 Joan Kirner, Minister for Conservation, Forests and Lands 
with the help of Heather Mitchell, Victorian Farmers’ Federation President sought to extend the 
program state wide.
631
 In 1986 the Victorian government ‘initiated a multi-disciplinary, community-
based, highly autonomous’ Landcare program.632 The Australian National Landcare Program was 
instigated in 1989 when the Commonwealth Government, with bipartisan support, announced a decade 
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long national Landcare plan. It committed $340 million to fund the program.
633
 ‘Prime Minister Hawke 
declared the 1990s would be the Decade of Landcare, and the concept soon spread to every other state 
and mainland territory.’634 
The strength of Landcare lies in ‘its local focus and character and the fact that community groups and 
networks decide their own visions and set goals for environmental action in their districts and regions.’ 
Landcare’s community based approach comprises:635 
 A philosophical stance directed towards influencing the way individuals interact and care for 
the land; 
 Developing local community support to action the philosophical stance; and 
 Generating knowledge, providing facilitation and coordination, highlighting funding programs, 
and providing a framework of support from district to national levels. 
The activities of local Landcare groups may include rehabilitating rivers, planting native flora, fighting 
salinity, conserving environmental significant areas, flood mitigation, regenerating bushland, pest and 
weed control, and stabilising organic waste.  
The Landcare structure exemplifies an inverted governance pyramid with the administrative and 
coordinating units providing support to the on-ground community programs and providing an 
institutional framework.
636
 Figure V-3 provides an outline of this structural arrangement.   
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Figure V-3 Landcare Structure 
 
 
At the national level, the supporting units are the Australian Landcare Council, the National Landcare 
Facilitator, the National Landcare Network, and Landcare Australia Limited. The supporting units 
work in conjunction with corporate partners, Federal and State government agencies, and other 
organisations such as Greening Australia, to provide policy guidance, strategic direction, technical 
advice, and funding.  
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The Australian Landcare Council provides advice to the Federal Environment Minister and the Federal 
Agricultural Minister on the Landcare movement and on natural resource management.
637
 The Council 
operates under the Natural Resources Management (Financial Assistance) Act 1962 (Cth). The primary 
object of the Act which is to ‘facilitate the development and implementation of integrated approaches 
to natural resource management’ for the purpose of efficient, sustainable and equitable management 
that is consistent with the principles of ecologically sustainable development.
638
 Under s 14 of the Act, 
the Council consists of at least twelve members appointed by the Federal Agricultural Minister. 
The National Landcare Facilitator acts in an advisory role to Landcare Australia. The purpose of the 
Facilitator is to advocate the Landcare movement, encourage consideration of natural resource 
management issues, assist Landcare groups in implementing sustainable practices, and publicising 
Federal government programs.
639
 
The National Landcare Network consists of two representatives from the peak Landcare associations in 
each State or Territory. The objectives of the Network are to:
640
 
 Cultivate a forum to support natural resource management groups; 
 Support partnerships between Landcare groups and other entities such as governments, other 
natural resource management groups, indigenous institutions, industry groups, and community 
groups; 
 Celebrate the achievements of Landcare and other natural resource management groups; 
 Identify, connect with, and represent community-based natural resource management groups at 
the national level in order to nurture resources and knowledge; and 
 Advocate the development of Landcare and interact with relevant stake holders in the 
development of environmental and natural resource management policy. 
Landcare Australia Limited ‘is the leading not-for-profit organisation responsible for raising awareness 
and funding for the Landcare movement to support its role in protecting, restoring and sustaining the 
productivity and value of Australia’s natural environment.’641 The company receives funding from 
‘governments, corporate organisations and private donations.’642 Since 1993 the Commonwealth 
Government’s funds are tied to ‘defined deliverables such as the Landcare Awards and Landcare in 
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Focus magazine.’643 The majority of its funding is sourced from the corporate and non-government 
sector. However, government funding forms a significant amount of its income. Figure V-4 summarises 
the funding sources from 2004 to the 2013. In the 2012 and 2013 financial years corporate and non-
government sector funding dropped. It is unclear whether this is a continuing trend. It does demonstrate 
that funding is subject to the whims of corporate social responsibility. Figure V-5 summarises use of 
funds, mainly on Landcare projects. The distribution of funding to projects over the financial years 
varies between $3.5 million to $6.5 million. Even taking into account the leverage provided by 
volunteer participants, these amounts are inadequate to meet Australia’s natural resource management 
requirements. Landcare ‘grass root’ groups who wish to undertake conservation works that require 
funds higher than can be sourced from Landcare Australia Limited must conduct their own fund raising 
activities including seeking government grants. 
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Figure V-4 Summary of Landcare Australia Limited Funding 2003-04 to 2012-13 
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Figure V-5 Summary of Landcare Australia Limited Use of Funds 2003-04 to 2012-13 
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At the state and territory level the Landcare administrative units interact with other natural resource 
management organisations and government departments and agencies. For example, Landcare NSW 
Incorporated acts as the point of contact to advocate on behalf of ‘grassroots’ NSW Landcare groups, 
takes a state wide view on Landcare activities, acts as a think tank, and provides opportunities for 
endorsed representatives to share ideas, to learn from each other and to disseminate information in their 
regional area.
644
 
Regional Landcare facilitators interact with other regional natural resource management organisations 
and regional government agencies. Partnerships and alliances may be formed to enhance natural 
resources. Regional Landcare facilitators communicate concerns and issues that are raised at the local 
level to the state Landcare body. They disseminate information back to their local networks. The 
regional level encompasses a number of Landcare networks. In 2009 there were approximately 6,000 
Landcare groups operating across Australia.
645
  
Landcare is an effective mechanism in facilitating community participation in natural resource 
management, community partnerships, regional catchment planning, and cost sharing between 
government and private landholders.
646
 It has been asserted (in the GHD report to the Australian 
Landcare Council) that besides the environmental and sustainability outcomes other benefits arise from 
Landcare operations.
647
 These include: 
 Lifelong learning, multigenerational transmission of skills and knowledge, improved 
knowledge base, awareness of natural resource management issues, recognition that the task 
must often be undertaken on an extensive spatial scale; 
 Increased social networking and participation, and contact with the natural environment which 
facilitates physical and mental wellbeing; 
 Expanded social networks of support, reciprocity, and trust; 
 Economic return of between two to five times on the original investment, through volunteer 
contributions of labour, equipment, and donations; 
 Cultural  connection with country; and     
 Builds resilience and adaptive capacity of a community’s social ecological systems. 
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Most landholders perceive Landcare as a way to partner with government to fix problems in their local 
area. This relationship may create drawbacks for landholders.
648
 Cocklin, Mautner and Dibden 
conducted three workshops where landholders discussed their views on sustainability and 
environmental policy mechanisms.
649
 When discussing Landcare the workshop participants identified 
the following pros and cons: 
 Pros 
 The community comes up with the plan; 
 Money can be raised through government grants; 
 The program is driven by need and will; 
 Resources and equipment are shared; 
 Collaborative learning and interaction; 
 Teamwork means that successes and failures are shared; 
 Strengthening community through social interaction; 
 The opportunity to receive expert advice; 
 Promotion and education; and 
 Good value for taxpayers. 
 Cons 
 Volunteer burnout;  
 The voluntary nature of the program; 
 Free riders; 
 Meetings and administration; 
 Judging improvement by what occurs on neighbouring property; 
 Insufficient time to make it beneficial; 
 Deficiency of skills, knowledge, and infrastructure in the local community; 
 Uncertainty as to whether or not the stated objectives will be achieved; 
 Too many hobby farmers involved in the program; 
 It is questionable whether some activities are the best use of government funds; 
 Opportunity costs such as lost production and income; 
 Government places too much responsibility on landholders; 
 Few suitable and willing leaders; 
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 Opportunistic behaviour displayed by some participants; 
 A lot of expenditure on administration and red tape; and 
 Focuses on individual properties rather than taking a broad view. 
This research suggests that many landholders may be reluctant to participate in Landcare programs due 
to the perceived deficiencies of the scheme. When the workshop participants were asked to comment 
on the conditions that would create a successful local land care program they identified the following: 
 Paid local coordinator; 
 More staff to support administration; 
 The involvement, commitment and enthusiasm of the community; 
 On ground support; 
 The community should share the ongoing costs of the activities; 
 Benefits should be observable; 
 Strong leadership; 
 Take a broad view to planning and implementation; 
 Top down and bottom up planning and design; 
 Recurring and adequate funding; 
 Regional or national coordination; 
 Administration support for participants; 
 Protection from legal liability; 
 Adaptable timelines and funding criteria; and 
 Long-term planning.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      
It is noted that the ROCP structure encapsulates many of these features. The involvement of local 
landholders in the incorporated body means that they are aware of the local conditions. The 
incorporated body would provide information, training and guidance to landholders. The incorporated 
body would (through discussions and negotiations with land holders) implement and support 
conservation projects. The ROCP has the capacity to reduce the transaction cost impact on landholder 
scheme participants by simplifying information provision, application processes, negotiations, 
contractual arrangements, and monitoring processes. The ROCP can minimise transaction costs 
through training, professional advice, adopting or formulating a common ideology with landholders, 
and building trust. The ROCP provides opportunities for high levels of landholder motivation, 
initiative, and innovation. The model allows a great deal of flexibility for local action. Once the goals, 
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objectives and guidelines are set, landholders, individually or as part of a collective, choose the best 
means to carry out the conservation activity and negotiate the design and investment. ROCPs could 
operate at a variety of scales potentially involving a couple of farms, to a large regional scale involving 
many farm. In implementing regional conservation activities, the ROCP should analyse these activities 
from a local, intraregional, and possibly a state and national perspective to ensure that resources are 
allocated at several spatial scales.  The ROCP has the purpose of raising funds from the private market 
for conservation activities and providing a low transaction cost structure for raising and managing those 
funds. If significant funds are raised then this would allow the recurrent funding of conservation 
projects. 
While the Landcare movement has many supporters it has been criticised as an instrument which shifts 
responsibility for natural resource management from government to local rural communities. It is 
‘undoubtedly cheaper [for government] to invest in Landcare as a process of awareness raising and 
education than in funding large scale on-ground work.’650 Wilson argues that state government 
agencies and local government ‘hold crucial gatekeeping positions’ with regards to Landcare 
government funding.
651
 There may be instances where agencies co-opt large portions of the allocated 
funding for their own purposes.
652
 ‘Without adequate resourcing and appropriate training of network 
personnel it is likely that networks will be weighed down by poor management and substantially 
increase Landcare member frustration and burnout amongst leaders.’653  
Tennent and Lockie assert that Landcare suffers the tension between community based natural resource 
management, cross-boundary environmental degradation, competing funding demands on government, 
and the need to demonstrate environmental improvement.
654
 There has been a shift in government 
philosophy such that ‘NRM policy is now dominated by business and investment plans, auditable 
targets and standards, hierarchical decision making and other signifiers of an altogether more 
managerialist approach to the allocation of government resources.’655 Tennent and Lockie opine that 
given the reliance of Landcare on government funding ‘it is probable that a continued decline in 
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membership will follow withdrawals of financial contributions, unless community groups are able to 
source alternate funding.’656 
The ROCP has the potential to provide funding to community groups and to support the many positive 
aspects of community action which has been demonstrated by ‘grass roots’ Landcare networks. A 
foundation for this argument can be found in Cocklin, Mautner and Dibden research.
657
 Landholders 
favour environmental mechanisms that are voluntary and ‘support their preference for self-
improvement and independence’ such as through training, education, information provision, and 
research and development.
658
 They pronounced that ‘landholders would be drawn to an initiative that 
gave recognition, support and financial assistance to landholders providing ecosystem services.’659  
K Summary 
There is a need for innovation in conservation funding as the funding capacity of Australian 
governments to meet conservation activities is limited and the total need for investment dwarves the 
capacity of both government and farming landholders.  The Regional On-site Conservation Program is 
an illustration of a possible conceptive structure to reduce reliance on government direct funding. This 
chapter considered the ROCP’s potential as an efficient and effective mechanism for the promotion, 
facilitation, implementation, and funding of conservation works on private landholdings. 
The main policy mechanisms to discourage, encourage or maintain environmental behaviour are 
regulatory, educational, voluntary, and economic instruments. The ROCP is a hybrid, of the 
educational, the voluntary and economic instrument. It is designed to provide financial and non-
financial incentives to private landholders, encourage unincorporated joint venture arrangements with 
non-government conservation organisations, build social capital, encourage cooperative practices, 
facilitate innovation, and develop conservation works on an extensive spatial scale.  
Eco-services are generated at a range of ecological scales and may be demanded by stakeholders at 
different levels (international, national, state, regional, family, and individual). Ecosystem services are 
best achieved through coordinated intervention on an extensive spatial scale. Such an approach 
optimises social, economic, and environmental objectives across landholdings through coordinated 
management and resource allocation.  However, the voluntary nature of the ROCP means that the 
execution of an extensive spatial plan depends on the willingness of individual landholders to 
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participate. The ROCP can implement conservation programs across the region by utilising the 
appropriate mixture of incentives taking into account the spatial context to motivate the majority of 
landholders. As such, the ROCP is an efficient and effective mechanism for engaging Landholders on 
an extensive scale. 
Transaction costs are identified as a constraint to conservation investment. Conservation activities are 
subject to high transaction costs, uncertainty, and economic risk. New institutional economics suggests 
that organisational innovation may improve economic efficiency by curbing transaction costs.  The 
ROCP has the capacity to reduce the transaction cost impact on landholder scheme participants by 
simplifying information provision, application processes, negotiations, contractual arrangements, and 
monitoring processes. The ROCP can minimise transaction costs through training, professional advice, 
adopting or formulating a common ideology with landholders, and building trust.  
It was observed that taxation incentives to encourage philanthropy are ‘treasury efficient,’ an effective 
means to encourage positive externalities. Tax incentives can efficiently encourage private investors to 
contribute to conservation activities and effectually leverage the government contribution. An example 
is the Netherlands’ Green Funds Scheme. The GFS has been successful in encouraging individuals to 
contribute funds of in excess of €7 billion to green projects. The GFS has also demonstrated economic 
efficiency and environmental efficiency can be co-dependent, helped in stimulating innovation, and 
underscoring the importance of non-financial performance. While it cannot be conclusively stated what 
the degree of response is to tax incentives to encourage investment into financial assets, they have a 
significant behavioural impact. 
When discussing the ROCP with various farming groups it was noted that Landcare was strongly 
supported by many of the landholders in the local area. While the Landcare movement has many 
supporters it has been criticised as an instrument which shifts responsibility for natural resource 
management from government to local rural communities. The Landcare movement is also very much 
dependent on government funding which means that a decrease in funding may lead to a decrease in 
membership.   Unless an alternative funding source is found it is likely that government funding will 
decline with the consequent deterioration in membership. A ROCP type mechanism has the ability to 
provide significant funds and support to ‘grass roots’ Landcare networks. 
The ROCP has the capacity to influence conservation activities on a regional scale. Its success is 
dependent on its implementation, and the support of government, investors and landholders. Financial 
inducements will not fully motivate landholder participation and as such, attention should be paid to, 
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and the various conservation projects adapted to, the local conditions, local societal values, and 
individual landholder requirements.  
The risks to government budgets such as falling terms of trade and lower economic growth, increased 
demand for health care, a slowing in real wages growth, an increase in welfare payments, and higher 
aged pension payments and aged care costs due to Australia’s ageing population it is unlikely that 
Australian governments can increase conservation funding. There is also the possibility that 
environmental funding by governments will decrease. A ROCP type mechanism is required to meet the 
ever expanding requirements of environmental conservation. 
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VI METHODOLOGY – EMPIRICAL COMPONENT 
‘I have another system. A little different than yours. I don’t shoot the rope, I shoot the legs off the stool’ – Tuco 
The Good, the Bad and the Ugly: Extended English-Language Version (Directed by Sergio Leone, Metro Goldwyn Mayer, 
2003) 0:46:46. 
The author of this dissertation had the movie playing in the background while writing. The quote represents a point in the 
writing process where various ideas coalesced. 
A Overview 
The methodology (the reason for adopting a particular research method), the method employed to 
obtain information (the research technique eg quantitative), and the knowledge generated by the 
research are interdependent. Research contributes to knowledge and knowledge ‘is created within the 
research project through the researcher’s exploration of the phenomenon under investigation, by means 
of the methodology and the methods, which must be adequate for the research project.’660 The research 
philosophy is a foundation for the research methodology which in turn provides a foundation for the 
method employed to obtain the information. The research methodology is subsidiary to the objectives, 
focus, and hypothesis of the research, which dictate the type of research methodology needed to meet 
the requirements of the research project.
661
   Overall this chapter outlines the research methodology 
adopted in addressing the following research issue: 
4. Is there a basis for the hypothesis that there is an important behavioural difference between 
government grants, taxation incentives and a farmer-led taxation leveraged approach to rural 
natural resource governance? 
B Context of Research for the Hypothesis 
Discussions with several economists between 2006 and 2008 suggest that, economists do not 
distinguish between the behavioural impact of taxation incentives, government grants, and other 
funding models; all are subsidies. This dialogue took place in the context working groups, seminars, 
and presentations on the initial concept for the Regional Onsite Conservation Program (‘ROCP’). A 
representative statement of the economist’s position is that ‘[f]rom an economic point of view, policies 
such as taxation incentives are subsidies ….’662 Economists identify subsidies as assistance (monetary 
or otherwise) given to an individual, firm or economic sector that affects either the demand for a 
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product or the supply of a product. Most subsides arise because of government intervention. Generally, 
a subsidy that increases demand results in increased prices and a subsidy that increases supply results in 
lower prices. Overall, economists view subsidies as inefficient as they distort the allocation of limited 
resources. However, economists may support the use of subsidies in order to address market failure. 
In 2008 the author of this dissertation searched for articles and texts to clarify whether or not there is a 
behavioural response difference between taxation incentives, government grants, and other funding 
models. The search did not reveal empirical studies which illuminated the matter. Studies on taxation 
behaviour focus on taxation compliance and evasion, taxpayer perceptions of fairness, decision making 
by tax professionals, and demand for professional tax services.
663
 In the main, empirical data on the 
behavioural impact of government grants (direct government expenditure) is not available.
664
 Where 
empirical studies have been undertaken, the results appear to be restricted to the specific areas studied. 
General inferences as to behavioural impact, in contrast to theoretical economic modelling which 
pervades the literature, cannot be drawn.
665
  
In comparing taxation incentives and government grants the deliberation has focused on the equitability 
and efficiency of implementing social policy (ie encouraging good social behaviour such as 
conservation) via each strand.
666
 Stanley S Surrey argued that taxation incentives in general were an 
inferior means of implementing social policy compared to direct government expenditure as they are 
less transparent, inequitable as they favour individuals in high tax brackets, inefficient, and  
administratively demanding.
 667
 Zelinsky questions the viability of such economic arguments against 
taxation incentives given that the assertion of inefficiency ‘is subject to assumptions and restrictions 
which often go unrecognized’ and that the economic arguments ignore the creation of positive 
externalities and the probability of lower transaction costs.
668
 He notes that in ‘a world of uncertainty 
and imperfect information, a world in which most significant policy decisions rest on assumptions and 
conjectures, certain reasonable suppositions lead to the conclusion that tax incentives can serve the 
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cause of efficiency.’669 Nevertheless, in the various debates about the equitability and efficiency of 
taxation incentives and government grants there is a prominent absence of empirical evidence.  
Noting the gap in the empirical knowledge, one aim of this research is to investigate in a preliminary 
manner whether or not there is a difference in the behavioural impact of taxation incentives, 
government grants, and a ROCP type funding model. It is not the ambition of this dissertation to do 
more than indicate whether there is a probable difference in behavioural response to taxation incentives 
and other subsidies in relation to conservation investment. To test further the degree or causes of any 
indicated difference would be a major research task in own right. It would require behaviourally 
sophisticated research methods and probably large sample sizes, which are not testable at this early 
stage of the investigation of tax leveraged private conservation investment structures for Australia.  
This preliminary investigation aspect of the research will compare the behavioural impact of a 
hypothetical conservation tax incentive, a hypothetical conservation government grant, and a 
hypothetical ROCP type funding model, which have been designed to encourage conservation activities 
upon private landholdings. Taxation incentives underscore the capital raising aspect of the ROCP and 
the model encapsulates some of the features of government grants. 
A self-administered questionnaire is used to compare three hypothetical models for funding 
conservation activities on private landholdings.  The ultimate aim of this part of the research is to 
indicate whether there is a basis for the hypothesis that there is an important behavioural response 
difference between taxation incentives, government grants, and other funding models. It is not 
necessary or feasible (for resource reasons) within this dissertation to prove the degree or direction of 
difference, only to indicate that there is a behavioural difference. Future research should clarify the 
degree that different funding mechanisms encourage the propensity to undertake conservation works on 
private landholdings 
C Approach 
This dissertation adopts a pragmatism worldview. Pragmatism supports a mixed methods research 
approach in the pursuit of knowledge. Mixed methods research (‘MMR’) is the combined use of both 
qualitative and quantitative methodologies within the same study. Researchers may collect information 
by both quantitative and qualitative methodologies in a single study (‘mixed methods research’), and 
may use both biased and unbiased data. Pragmatists contend that both qualitative and quantitative 
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methodologies have their pros and cons but can be combined to complement one another.  Generally, 
information is collected by the means which works best to addresses the research issues. 
One of the advantages of a mixed methods approach is the potential for gaining a deeper understanding 
of the issues by uniting a qualitative and a quantitative stance. MMR improves the usefulness of 
findings where there is an applied focus to the research. An important aspect of this research is the 
potential real world application of taxation incentives, government grants and other funding 
mechanisms to encourage conservation activities.
670
  
The most common strategy for MMR is the convergent parallel design.
671
 The qualitative and 
quantitative strands are conducted at the same time with equal weight given to both strands. The 
information from both strands is merged into an overall clarification of the research question. This 
strategy has been adopted for this research. Both qualitative and quantitative data is equally required to 
address the research issues, and it is considered that it is the most appropriate design structure to be 
utilised by a sole researcher. 
In adopting this approach, the author is aware that a critical appraisal framework for evaluating this 
research will require that the following elements be clearly described:
672
 
 The context of the research; 
 The rationale for conducting MMR; 
 Transparency about the research process; 
 The quantitative and qualitative strands; 
 The mixing and integration of the strands; 
 Design of the study; 
 Sampling and data collection methods; 
 Data analysis methods; 
 The impact of the researcher upon the study (ie biases, preconceptions, paradigm stance, 
relationships with participants); and 
 Conclusions, interpretation of findings, inferences, and implications of the study. 
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D Challenges of a Mixed Methods Inquiry 
Malina, Nørreklit and Selto argue that a central advantage of MMR ‘is that during the project a 
researcher can return to the qualitative data and reread quotes in context of the larger document.’ 673 
This allows a better understanding of the numeric trend through the integration of specific details from 
the qualitative data.
674
 
A disadvantage of MMR is the requirement for the researcher to have a broad understanding of both 
qualitative and quantitative techniques and how they may be integrated. The validity of MMR may be 
called into question by reviewers who have a taken a strong stance in either the qualitative or 
quantitative camps. Repko suggests that the qualitative versus quantitative debate ‘is largely over’ but 
Malina, Nørreklit and Selto found that in publishing their MMR study they had difficulties with 
satisfying reviewers from different camps.
675
 The more quantitative aligned reviewer was unwilling to 
accept that their study refuted the cause and effect hypothesis of the balanced scorecard performance 
management tool which had been supported by previous quantitative studies in the area.
676
 As a 
consequence, the reviewers requested more and more tests in the belief ‘that the “right test” was 
missing.’677 The more qualitative aligned reviewer requested ‘a richer and more complex story’ in the 
belief that ‘the right story was missing.’678 
Nonetheless, the value of conducting a MMR, especially when the study has taken a ‘problem solving’ 
stance, outweighs the disadvantages. Data from multiple sources ‘simply provides more evidence for 
studying a problem than a single method of data.’679 As concisely stated by Repko ‘[i]f humans were 
studied using just quantitative methods, the danger would arise that conclusions – although 
arithmetically precise – might fail to fit reality or worse, distort that reality. Qualitative methods 
provide a way to evaluate and understand unquantifiable facts …’680 
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E Hypothetical Funding Models 
This section outlines the hypothetical conservation funding models which were used to enable research 
participants to compare, contrast, and subsequently rank a taxation incentive, a government grant, and a 
private sector fund (ROCP type model). These hypothetical funding models provide the foundation for 
the specific survey questions. For instance, the research participants were asked to assess the funding 
model they ranked number one in terms of the following features: 
 Autonomy – The model allows independent decisions on how to best achieve the conservation 
goals; 
 Cash flow – The model provides an external source of funds and as such, the private landholder 
does not have to rely on their own money to start the conservation project; 
 Support – The model provides training and advice; 
 Paperwork – The model minimises paperwork and administration; and 
 Encouragement – The model encourages the private landholder to plan conservation projects. 
The hypothetical taxation incentive funding model, the government hypothetical grant funding model, 
and the hypothetical private sector funding model are based on the attributes as discussed in chapters 
IV and V. The hypothetical funding models are infused with legal concepts such as property rights, 
contractual obligations, commercial interests, taxation liability, income tax and capital gains tax. As 
discussed in Chapter III, these are factors which may influence landholder participation in a 
conservation scheme. Some of the research participants may have found the requirement to read, 
remember and subsequently compare and contrast the various features and attributes in order to form 
an opinion, difficult. This is an acknowledged limitation of this preliminary investigation. 
1 The Tax Model 
The hypothetical taxation incentive presents a 125% tax deduction for expenditure on conservation 
projects on private landholdings. If an individual spent $10,000 on a conservation project they would 
receive a $12,500 tax deduction. To receive the tax deduction, expenditure must be for the sole or 
dominant purpose of the protection, preservation, management, or restoration of native wildlife and / or 
of natural resources such as native vegetation, soil, and water. Funding under this model is limited to 
taxpayers who carry on a business for the purposes of gaining or producing assessable income from the 
use of ‘rural land.’ The land use must be certified by a farm land consultant or by a land conservation 
agency. The taxation incentive allows taxpayers to claim a full deduction for both general income 
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deductions and capital expenditure. There are no restrictions on how little or how much may be spent 
for conservation purposes but expenditure must be substantiated by receipts. In order to claim the 125% 
taxation incentive, the tax payer must pay for the expenditure and then claim the deduction at the end 
of the financial year. The expenditure type and amount is at the discretion of the taxpayer (autonomy). 
This approach offers lower compliance costs compared with a government grant, the tax payer must be 
carrying on a business to claim the deduction, funds must be expended initially by the tax payer and 
then claimed back, and the expenditure must be for the sole or dominant purpose as outlined in the 
relevant taxation provision. Figure VI-1 illustrates the hypothesised funding model. 
Figure VI-1 Hypothetical Taxation Incentive Model 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 The Grant Model 
The hypothetical government grant funding model presents a direct conservation funding program from 
a State government. Under this theoretical program, a number of high value environmental assets have 
been identified by the State government and funding will only be provided for conservation projects 
that deal with those environmental assets. A government department provides training on how to best 
achieve the conservation goals.  Government officers can be contacted for advice and guidance. To 
receive the funds, an application must outline and describe the proposed project, provide a budget and a 
timeline to the relevant government department. It may take up to 10 weeks for the application to be 
reviewed and for the applicant to be notified of a decision. There is no guarantee that the applicant will 
receive funding even if the project meets all the requirements established by the State government. If 
funds are granted then the successful applicant would be required to provide yearly reports to the 
government department on the progress of the conservation project. Under the program the government 
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department has the right to audit the project to ensure that the funding is being utilised in the way as 
stated in the application. Figure VI-2 illustrates the hypothesised funding model. 
 
Figure VI-2 Hypothetical Government Grant Funding Model 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3 The ROCP (Hybrid) Model 
The ROCP incorporated body is managed by local landowners who are very familiar with the local 
wildlife, vegetation, soil types, average rainfall, and agriculture in the area. The program also provides 
conservation advice and training. Private funding is provided in exchange for environmental services 
such as carbon credits, biodiversity credits and native vegetation clearing credits (‘Enviro Credits’). 
Enviro Credits can be created through activities such as feral animal control, weed control, planting 
trees, fencing to exclude stock, and creating habitat for native wildlife.  The amount funded is 
determined by negotiations. Once the amount of funding is agreed the parties enter into a legally 
binding contract. The management committee requires the landholder to seek independent legal advice. 
There is also the requirement of compliance checks for the benefit of the ROCP to ensure that the 
conservation work meets the requirement for creating the Enviro Credits. The private landholder is 
advised that the sale of the Enviro Credits will have income taxation consequences.  This model has 
similar attributes to government grants such as reporting and compliance requirements, and the 
provision of support and training. This funding model also has similar attributes to taxation incentives. 
The expenditure type and amount is at the discretion of the private landholder (autonomy), albeit noting 
that such activities are negotiated with the ROCP management committee, and compliance costs are 
Government department 
Application (may take up to 
10 weeks to be approved) 
applicti 
s 
Landowner 
Conservation 
Program for 
Identified High 
Value 
Environmental 
Asset 
Funds, Advice 
and Guidance 
194 
 
theoretically lower than government grants. From the perspective of the landholder, what distinguishes 
the ROCP from other funding models is that funds are provided by the private sector, the program is 
managed by local landowners who have knowledge of the local environmental conditions, and the 
private landholder transfers property rights (Enviro Credits) in order to access the funds. Figure VI-3 
illustrates the hypothesised funding model.  
Figure VI-3 Hypothetical Regional On-site Conservation Program 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
F Data Collection Method 
The data was collected via an online self-administered questionnaire set up in Qualtrics survey 
software. Qualtrics enables the distribution of questionnaires via an anonymous hyper link, online 
collection of data, storage of the data in a secured online environment, analysis of the collected data or 
the ability to download to specialised analysis software. A copy of the questionnaire is in Appendix 2. 
The benefits of online self-administered questionnaires include the ability to distribute the 
questionnaire quickly, cost effectiveness, the ability to track the progress of respondents, immediate 
results, and the avoidance of bias that may arise in face-to-face interviews.
681
 The disadvantages 
include the potential lack of participant truthfulness, lack of supervision which means a lack of 
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guidance to the participants if they do not fully understand a question, lower participant rates (as it is 
easy to ignore an electronic notification in contrast to a face-to-face request). Potential participants may 
disregard the questionnaire if they have no interest in the topic or the ‘reading level required’ is high.682  
Taking into account the various advantages and disadvantages, and with a particular focus on the 
practicalities of distribution, the avoidance of bias which potentially could arise in face-to-face 
interviews, and cost effectiveness, it was reasoned that the self-administered questionnaire was the best 
research method to address the research question in this particular situation. 
G Question Format 
The survey questionnaire can be found in Appendix 2. The self-administered questionnaire includes 
open-ended questions and closed-ended questions. Open-ended questions allow participants to respond 
in their own words. The questionnaire includes the following open-ended questions: 
 Please comment on why you ranked the funding models in the above order; and 
 Please comment on why you prefer the Taxation Incentive or the Government Payment. 
Closed-ended questions comprise a question or a statement and a set of replies from which the 
respondent selects. The questionnaire includes rank order scaling questions and Likert-type scale 
questions. An advantage of closed-ended questions is the ‘ability to compare responses across groups 
of participants, and they typically take less time to complete than do open-ended questions.’683 Open-
ended questions are more intricate and more challenging to interpret but ‘they can provide the 
researcher with an opportunity to identify the participants’ thoughts and feelings about an 
experience.’684 Moreover, by using both closed-ended and open-ended questions there is the potential 
for a more complete understanding of the responses. 
The questionnaire includes of questions on the personal profile of the participant. This allows 
socioeconomic and demographic characteristics such as age, gender, education, business gross income, 
area of land, usage of land, and previous amounts spent on conservation activities. 
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H Data Collection Procedure 
The online self-administered questionnaire was set up in Qualtrics. Final formatting was completed by 
the end of July 2011. The first questionnaire to be completed by a participant took place on 21 
September 2011.  Access to the survey was shut down on 30 October 2012.  
A number of farming groups, conservation bodies, environmental groups, and other organisations were 
contacted to publicise the online survey. A list of those institutions is in Appendix 6. Contact 
information for the various institutions was obtained from their web sites.  Discussions with the 
different institutions took place between August 2011 and August 2012. 
Initially an e-mail was sent to the organisations which outlined the purpose of the survey, and requested 
the organisation’s help in publicising the survey. A PDF (portable document format) file of the 
questionnaire was provided, with a hyperlink to the questionnaire, and a word document version of the 
invitation to participate (see Appendix 2).  The institution was advised that they could contact the 
researcher’s supervisors (supervisor’s contact details provided in the body of the e-mail) to confirm the 
legitimacy of the survey. 
Those institutions which did not reply to the request within a two week period were contacted via 
telephone to see whether or not they were willing to publicise the survey. Some of these institutions 
indicated that the request would be placed before a committee, in which case the date of the committee 
meeting was recorded and the institution was contacted via telephone within one week after that 
meeting date. 
Some of the institutions who were unwilling to publicise the survey cited ‘survey fatigue’ as the reason 
for not wishing ‘to bother their members.’ Porter, Whitcomb, and Weitzer note that survey non-
response has been increasing.
685
 One of the possible causes often cited is survey fatigue (overexposure 
to survey mechanisms).
686
 They state that the ‘issue of survey fatigue will become increasingly 
important as the costs of designing and administering a survey decrease’ through the use of survey 
software which allow the creation and distribution of web surveys.
 687
 In the context of the research for 
this dissertation it is unclear whether or not the rejecting institutions viewed survey fatigue as a 
legitimate concern or just an excuse for not wishing to publicise the survey. The author promised the 
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institutions that while he would record the institution’s name in a list to be published he would not 
indicate which institutions were willing or unwilling to publicise the survey. 
Those institutions which were willing to publicise the survey did so by means such as placing a short 
introduction with a hyper link to the survey on their website (with the understanding that they could 
remove the information at any time convenient to them), sending out notice via their e-mail directory, 
raising the issue in committee meetings, or sending out notification via their electronic newsletter. 
These institutions were contacted several times via telephone and advised about the progress of the 
survey. Some of these institutions publicised the survey once, while others publicised the survey 
several times. It is likely that the survey was publicised by interested individuals via social media, e-
mail, and word of mouth. 
Several of the institutions requested that they be provided with hard copy versions of the questionnaire. 
It was their belief that some of their members would prefer to fill in paper surveys rather than online 
surveys. A number of cover letters, questionnaires, and reply paid envelopes were provided to these 
institutions. Upon receipt by the researcher, the information from the hard copy questionnaires was 
manually entered into Qualtrics.  
I Units of Analysis 
The population of interest to the research encompasses all private landholders in Australia. At the start 
of the research it was believed that parties with an awareness of natural resource management and a 
connection with sizeable tracts of land (such as primary producers, hobby farmers, or rural residents) 
would be more interested in completing the questionnaire than landholders in metropolitan areas. 
Nonetheless, conservation activities can and do take place in city and urban environments.
688
  
No one source summarises the number, type, and extent of private landholdings in Australia. In 1993 
the Australian Surveying & Land Information Group (AUSLIG) calculated that private land occupies 
around 4.8 million square kilometres or approximately 63% of Australia's land mass.
689
  In 2000 it was 
estimated that most private land, approximately 60% of Australia's land mass, was used for agricultural 
purposes.
690
 During 2009–10, there were approximately 134,000 businesses with an estimated value of 
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agricultural operations of $5,000 or more.
691
 The majority of agricultural businesses were engaged in 
beef cattle, grain growing, sheep, or mixed grain/sheep/beef farming.
692
 The number of farmers in 
2010-11 was approximately 192,600.
693
 
The criterion for participation in the survey was that the individual must be a private landholder.  The 
two main sampling techniques are probability sampling and non-probability sampling. With probability 
sampling ‘samples are selected in accordance with probability theory, using a random procedure that 
gives every member of the population a known (and non-zero) probability of selection.’694 In non-
probability sampling a sample is selected to represent the population but it cannot be stated to be 
‘representative of the population, in any statistical sense.’695 ‘The emphasis in non-probability sampling 
is on the capacity of a relatively small number of cases to clearly and comprehensively illustrate the 
phenomenon under investigation.’696 
As aim of this research is a preliminary investigation whether or not there is a difference in the 
behavioural impact of taxation incentives, government grants, and other funding mechanisms (rather 
than the generalizable statistical margin of response) probability sampling would add little to the 
reliability of the inferences drawn from the responses. Taking into account the practicalities of 
distributing and publicising the questionnaire it was decided to use non-probability sampling 
techniques. In particular, ‘self-selected sampling’ was viewed as a legitimate technique to meet the 
limited requirements of the research. 
Under self-selected sampling the survey is advertised (ie television, newspapers, websites, news letters) 
with a request that those individuals who meet the requirements of the study participate.
697
 Individuals 
self-select. A major drawback is ‘a high potential for sample bias’ as those individuals with a ‘strong 
interest’ in the research issues ‘are most likely to self-select.’698 In the context of the research, the 
advertising of the survey with the help of farming groups, conservation bodies and environmental 
groups meant that there was a further emphasis on rural residents with an interest in natural resource 
management. However, this sampling strategy provides a representative view of those most likely to 
undertake conservation activities, for the limited purpose being pursued.   
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J Cover Letter and Informed Consent 
The ‘cover letter’ (see Appendix 2) to the self –administered questionnaire was the first material that 
potential participants viewed. As a further safeguard to ensure that the individual had considered the 
various issues, following on from the cover letter, potential participants were required to indicate yes or 
no to whether or not they had read, understood and desired of their free will to participate in the study. 
The cover letter was designed to meet the following requirements:
699
  
 Introduce the survey, explain its purpose, and explain the importance of the study; 
 Convince potential participants that their response was important to the success of the study; 
 Highlight the University of Western Sydney connection and integrity mechanisms; 
 Outline what was required of the participant: the types of questions they would be asked, the  
reading component, and time required; 
 Assure potential participants of the voluntary nature of participation; and 
 Assure potential participants of the anonymity of their response. 
K Analysis  
Data analysis in MMR requires analysing separately the qualitative data (using the traditional 
qualitative methods) and quantitative data (using the traditional quantitative methods).
700
 It also 
comprises analysing ‘both sets of information using techniques that “mix” the quantitative and 
qualitative data and results.’701 The challenge is in choosing an integrative strategy which meets the 
evaluative tasks of the research study. 
This section provides a brief overview of the analysis techniques used, the analysis software employed, 
outlines the descriptive and inferential statistics underpinning the quantitative analysis, and discusses 
integrative strategies which can be employed for MMR data analysis. 
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1 Quantitative Analysis 
Quantitative data is numerical data and analysis of uses statistical methods. The quantitative data from 
Qualtrics survey software were analysed in IBM SPSS Statistics software (SPSS). SPSS training was 
available to the researcher, huis supervisors were familiar with the package and were able to provide 
referrals to statisticians who could answer technical questions, and SPSS provides a breadth of 
descriptive and inferential statistics. 
Statistics are descriptive or inferential. Descriptive statistics describe characteristics of a sample 
population such as overall sample size, age distribution, gender, education,  measures of the sample 
population’s central tendencies (ie mean, median, mode), measures of variability (ie standard 
deviation), and the maximum and minimum values of measured variables. The descriptive statistics are 
presented as cross tabulations, frequency tables, graphs, and descriptive ratios. Descriptive statistics 
summarise the variables of the sample population but are incapable of being used to form generalised 
assertions. Inferential statistics allow generalisations to be drawn which can be applied to the wider 
population. Inferential statistics addresses issues such as how the sample population compares to the 
wider population, the differences, if any, between two or more subsections of the participants (ie 
gender), how the characteristics of participants has varied over time, and whether there is a relationship 
between variables.
702
 
It is noted that ‘the foremost goals of the social and behavioral sciences are to describe and explain 
different types of social, psychological, and behavioral phenomena’ by striving to understand how 
variables (individual characteristics) ‘relate to and potentially affect each other.’703 The three basic 
forms of individual characteristics are personal characteristics (ie age, gender), attitudes, and personal 
behaviour.
704
  
Variables (personal characteristics) can be categorised as descriptive, dependent, independent, and 
extraneous. Descriptive variables are those which are just reported without any inferences drawn as to 
their influence. A dependent variable is a characteristic which is influenced or caused by another 
variable or variables. An independent variable is a characteristic which influences or causes the 
dependent variable. An extraneous variable is a characteristic, not the one that is the focus of the study, 
which could provide an alternative causal explanation for an observed effect. 
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In this study, the relationship between the variables is investigated with t-tests and Pearson’s chi-square 
tests. The t-test assesses whether or not the ‘means’ of two groups are statistically different other. The 
t-test is suitable for evaluating the differences between two groups of sample participants in terms of a 
single dependent variable. In this study the t-test is used for comparing the group who chose the 
taxation incentive and the group which chose the government grant.  
A test of significance for 2 x 2 contingency tables, a Pearson’s chi-square test, ‘evaluates whether two 
variables are independent (ie not associated).
705
 The Pearson’s chi-square assesses whether there is a 
statistical difference between the observed frequencies and the expected relative frequencies.  If the 
chi-square statistic is large enough in value then independence between the variables is rejected and it 
can be concluded that the two variables are statistically associated.
706
 In this study the Pearson’s chi-
square test is used to determine whether or not there is an association between the participant’s 
demographics and their choice of the taxation incentive or the government payment. 
2 Qualitative Analysis 
One of the functions of qualitative data analysis is to ‘develop as thick and rich and as complete an 
account of the phenomenon under investigation as possible.’707 A rich engagement with the qualitative 
data requires the researcher to read and reread the data. The overall aim is to move from the raw data to 
theoretical insight.  
In analysing the qualitative data the researcher adopted the ‘simple approach’ outlined by Quinlan:708 
 The researcher closely reads and rereads the data; 
 While reading, the researcher identifies key concepts, key words or key phrases; 
 The researcher groups the key concepts into themes;  
 If possible, key themes are identified, listed, and categorised; and 
 The researcher attempts to further condense the key theme list.  
The participant’s comments from Qualtrics were downloaded into the Microsoft Excel 2010 
spreadsheet application. Comments were grouped according to the participant’s first ranking of the 
taxation incentive, the government payment, or the ROCP (‘the funding model group’). Where the 
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choice was limited to the taxation incentive and the government payment, comments were grouped 
according to the choice of model.  
In Excel the ‘fill colour’ tool was used to highlight key concepts, key words and key phrases. The key 
concepts were condensed and the participants’ comments were sorted using the Excel ‘data sort’ tool 
based on the highlighted colour. This process continued until the researcher was in a position to group 
the key concepts into themes. The themes distilled from the participants’ comments were maintained in 
the particular funding model group and compared to the themes distilled from the other groupings. The 
key themes were further condensed to the point where the researcher was satisfied that the themes 
represented the general views and opinions of the participants.  
3 Integration of Data 
Once the quantitative data and qualitative data have been separately analysed mixed methods 
interpretation involves looking across the quantitative results and the qualitative findings and making 
an assessment of how the information addresses the question.
709
 In this study the quantitative results are 
presented first and then the qualitative results. The presentation of results in this manner becomes the 
vehicle for comparing and compartmentalising pertinent issues and thus the means for addressing the 
research question.
710
 
L Biases and Preconceptions  
The researcher is a qualified accountant and legal practitioner. In professional practice the researcher 
observed that some clients were highly motivated to legally minimise their tax burden by claiming all 
their entitled deductions, using business structures to split income amongst family members, 
undertaking tax planning on a periodic basis, taking advantage of taxation incentives, and spending 
money close to the end of the financial year to ensure that they were assessed at a lower tax rate. Other 
clients had no interest in taxation issues other than lodging their taxation returns. At its most extreme, 
this category of client failed to keep receipts, was not interested in tax planning, did not care that they 
were paying more tax than they were legitimately required, and did not see any benefit in accessing 
taxation incentives. 
There does not seem to be any overall distinguishing demographic factors, such as level of income, 
gender, or occupation, between the taxation motivated clients and the unmotivated clients. For instance, 
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one client who was a highly successful business operator (ie extremely profitable business, a number of 
employees, a product which sold consistently in recessions) did not care that he did not claim all his 
legitimate deductions, had no interest in tax planning, and saw no reason to take into account taxation 
matters when making business decisions. In contrast, a client who was a wage earner on the lowest tax 
threshold consistently made appointments to discuss tax issues, would spend money on deductible 
items at the end of the financial year, and on several occasions entered into investment schemes where 
there was a taxation incentive to do so. Other clients varied between the spectrum of highly motivated 
and unmotivated.  
The researcher has helped many clients lodge applications for government grants. As with taxation, 
there did not seem to be any distinguishing demographic factors between those willing to apply for a 
government grant and those who were unwilling even though they met all the eligibility criteria. What 
was clear from the comments made by applicants and non-applicants alike was dissatisfaction with the 
reporting and administrative requirements imposed by grants. Eligible non-applicants cited that they 
were better off avoiding the time consuming and costly process for applying a grant and they had no 
wish for a government department ‘to be looking over their shoulder.’ 
Taking into account the researcher’s professional background and predisposition to analyse and 
describe financial structures in terms of their taxation effect, it was decided to avoid face-to-face 
interviews. This was done to avoid the risk that in supervising, answering queries and providing 
guidance on the funding models, the researcher may have influenced the participants to choose one 
funding model over another. A self-administered questionnaire helped to avoid bias. 
M Summary 
This chapter has provided details on the context of the research, philosophical underpinnings, reasons 
for adopting a mixed methods research approach, the research process, the analysis methods and the 
researcher’s biases and preconceptions. The methodology adopts an interdisciplinary stance, employing 
empirical methods to address both the policy and the behavioural impact of taxation incentives and 
government grants.  
Response to the hypothetical funding models, the taxation incentive, the government grant, and the 
ROCP (hybrid) model, were investigated using a survey instrument. The models are fashioned on real 
world attributes and fundamental legal concepts. In the self-administered questionnaire participants 
were asked to evaluate the model which they ranked first in terms of autonomy, cash flow, support, 
paperwork and encouragement to undertake conservation projects. The participants were also asked to 
204 
 
make a decision where their choice was limited to the taxation incentive and government grant. The 
questionnaire asked participants to comment on why they had chosen a particular model. By using 
closed ended and open ended questions, and by a mixed methods approach, it was hoped that a rich 
account of the participant’s attitudes would be gathered. 
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VII  RESPONSES AND DATA ANALYSIS OF SURVEY 
‘There are two kinds of spurs, my friend: those that come in by the door, and those that come in by the window.’ – Tuco 
The Good, the Bad and the Ugly: Extended English-Language Version (Directed by Sergio Leone, Metro Goldwyn Mayer, 
2003) 00:44:52. 
The author of this dissertation had the movie playing in the background while writing. The quote represents a point in the 
writing process where various ideas coalesced. 
A Overview 
In this section the results and analysis of the responses to the ‘conservation funding models’ survey 
questionnaire is presented. The objective was a preliminary test whether there was a likely difference in 
the behavioural response to a taxation incentive compared to other subsidies such as government 
payments. It was not intended (or feasible) to measure the differences in the margin of response. The 
work is intended to inform a more sophisticated investigation of the behavioural response differences 
between different types of environmental investment policy instruments. 
Chapter VI outlined the research design, data collection procedure, and statistical procedures. The 
survey questionnaire can be found in Appendix 2. 
 
B Online Survey Statistics 
This section provides information on the number of people who completed the quantitative type 
questions and biographical type questions in the survey. Table VII-1 summarises the number of people 
who completed the qualitative type questions (N Valid) and table VII-2 summarises the number of 
people who completed the biographical type questions (N Valid). Of the 160 people who commenced 
the survey, 98 people completed the quantitative section of the survey. While there is no feedback on 
why people dropped out in the early part of the survey it may be conjectured that the amount of reading 
at the start of the questionnaire (see Appendix 2) which outlined the conservation funding models 
discouraged people from continuing with the questionnaire.  
 
 
 
 
206 
 
Table VII-1 Quantitative Questions Completed by Participants 
 Consent Ranking the 
Models 
Reasons for 
Preferred Model 
Choice Limited to Tax Incentive 
or Gov’t Payment 
N Valid 160 105 98 98 
N Missing 3 58 65 65 
 
Table VII-2 Biographical Questions Completed by Participants 
 Primary 
Decision 
Maker 
Gender Age Education Land Usage Revenue  
N Valid 95 95 95 95 95 95 
N Missing 68 68 68 68 68 68 
C Biographical Attributes of Participants 
In this section the biographical attributes of the participants is outlined. It was believed when planning 
the survey that landholder characteristics such as age, gender, lifestyle, farm income, and education, 
would be predictive factors in the choice of funding model.
711
 It was expected that different types of 
landholders (eg hobby farmers, commercial farmers) and their corresponding operations would display 
different preferences for funding models.
712
 These assumptions were not supported by the data.  
Table VII-3 Primary Decision Maker on the Property 
 Response % 
 
 
81 
14 
 
 
14.74 
85.26 
 
Total 95 100 
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In 2010-11 the number of Australian farmers was approximately 192,600 representing 1.7% of all 
employed persons.
713
 
Table VII-4 Gender 
 Response % 
 
 
59 
36 
 
 
62.11 
37.89 
Total 95 100 
In 2010-11, the majority of farmers, 139,500 or approximately 72%, were male.
714
 The majority (77%) 
of respondents to the ABS’ Rural Environment and Agricultural Commodities Survey 2013-14 were 
male.
715
 In table VII-4 the majority (62.11%) of survey participants were male. 
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Table VII-5 Age Group 
 Response % 
 
 
0 
5 
13 
18 
22 
25 
9 
1 
2 
 
 
0 
5.26 
13.68 
18.95 
23.16 
26.32 
9.47 
1.05 
2.11 
Total 95 100 
 
In 2010-11, the median age of farmers was 53 which differed substantially to the median age of 39 for 
all employed persons.
716
 The age distribution of farmers in 2010-11 reveals an aging farm workforce 
with 71% of farmers aged 45 years or older compared to 39% for all employed persons.
717
 Moreover, 
23% of farmers were aged 65 or over but only 2% of farmers were aged between 15 and 24.
718
 The 
median age of respondents to the ABS’ Rural Environment and Agricultural Commodities Survey 
2013-14 was 57 with the average time involved in farming being 31 years.
719
 In table VII-5 the 
majority (60%) of survey respondents were 45 years or older. The age group range 55 – 64 captured the 
highest response (26.32%). 
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Table VII-6 Highest Level of Education 
 Response % 
 
 
7 
5 
6 
3 
10 
31 
30 
3 
 
 
7.37 
5.26 
6.32 
3.16 
10.53 
32.63 
31.58 
3.16 
 
Total 95 100 
 
In 1991, 42% of persons in rural areas aged 15 and over had left school before they were 16.
720
 In 
1993, 39% of Australia’s population aged 15 to 64 had completed a recognised post-school 
qualification.
721
 The most commonly reported post-school qualification was skilled vocational (eg trade 
qualifications) representing 13.59%.
722
 Those with bachelor degrees amounted to 7.09 %.
723
 Those with 
post graduate qualifications amounted to 3.03%.
724
 In table VII-6 the survey participants with tertiary 
qualifications amounted to 64.21% of the total respondents. In comparison to ABS information on 
education levels this is disproportionately high. It is conjectured that this occurred because the survey 
was publicised by tertiary institutes such as the University of Western Sydney and the Australian 
Centre for Agriculture and Law.  It is likely that a high proportion of subscribers listed in the e-mail 
directories of these institutions have tertiary qualifications. 
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Table VII-7 Land Usage  
 
In 2009–10, approximately 52% of Australia’s total land area was used for agriculture purposes and 
there were approximately 134,000 agriculture businesses.
725
 In 2011-12 the total number of farm 
businesses was 135,692.   In 2010–11, 48% of farmers were livestock farmers, 24% were crop farmers, 
and 20% were mixed crop and livestock farmers.
726
 As to the geographical distribution of farmers in 
2010-11, 31% worked in New South Wales, 25% worked in Victoria, 19% worked in Queensland and 
13% worked in Western Australia, with the remaining number spread throughout the other states and 
territories.
727
  In table VII-7 the highest response was ‘non-commercial’ (27.37%) which suggests that a 
high proportion of lifestyle / hobby farmers participated. 
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 Response % 
 
 
3 
19 
6 
18 
6 
26 
17 
 
3.16 
20.00 
6.32 
18.95 
6.32 
27.37 
17.89 
Total 95 100 
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Table VII-8 Total Receipts 
 
The ABS only collects data from farm businesses whose agricultural activity is valued at $5,000 per 
annum or more, this excludes the smaller 'hobby' type farms. In the Year Book Australia 2006 it was 
estimated that the annual average cash receipts per farm for businesses engaged in the broadacre 
industries of grain growing, sheep and beef farming, and beef cattle feedlot operations, in the 2003-04 
financial year was $280,700.
728
 In 2013-14 the average income split for farmers was agricultural 
production (70%), off-farm employment / business (23%), and other sources (6%).
729
 In table VII-8 
28.42% of survey participants collected receipts in the range of nil to under $100,000. A high 
proportion (28.42%) of survey respondents did not collect any receipts from their landholding. This 
underscores that a high proportion of lifestyle / hobby farmers participated in the survey. It is noted that 
research into the conservation of Box-Ironbark ecosystem remnants in northern Victoria found that 
there was an apparent difference between landholders with large landholdings and landholders with 
                                                 
728
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27 
27 
8 
11 
12 
3 
4 
3 
 
28.42 
28.42 
8.42 
11.58 
12.63 
3.16 
4.21 
3.16 
Total 95 100 
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small landholdings (property area less than 150 hectares).
730
 Both types of landholders had the basic 
motivation to conserve and manage the Box-Ironbark remnants but they faced different economic 
constraints. For large scale landholders ‘who derive their income largely on-property, considerations 
for the conservation and management of Box-Ironbark remnants must be tempered by the need for the 
property to be productive.’731 Small scale landholders ‘who derive their predominant income off-farm’ 
lack the time and knowledge to undertake conservation activities.
732
 
D Ranking of Conservation Funding Models 
In this section the ranking of the conservation funding models is summarised. Table VII-9 to table VII-
11 provides information on the frequency in which the models were ranked first, second and third. 
Table VII-12 compares the first preference allocations amongst the models. It is shown that 56.19 % of 
participants gave their first preference to the taxation incentive funding model. The ROCP received the 
next highest percentage of first preferences (24.76 %) with the government payment receiving the 
lowest percentage of first preferences (19.05 %). 
 
Table VII-9 Ranking the Taxation Incentive 1st, 2nd and 3rd  
 Frequency Percent % Valid Percent % Cumulative Percent % 
Valid 
1
st
  59 36.2 56.2 56.2 
2
nd
  22 13.5 21.0 77.1 
3
rd
  24 14.7 22.9 100.0 
Total 105 64.4 100.0  
Missing System 58 35.6   
Total 163 100.0   
 
Table VII-10 Ranking the ROCP 1st, 2nd, 3rd  
 Frequency Percent % Valid Percent % Cumulative Percent % 
Valid 
1
st
  26 16.0 24.8 24.8 
2
nd
  45 27.6 42.9 67.6 
3
rd
  34 20.9 32.4 100.0 
Total 105 64.4 100.0  
Missing System 58 35.6   
Total 163 100.0   
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Table VII-11 Ranking the Government Payment 1st, 2nd, 3rd 
 Frequency Percent % Valid Percent % Cumulative Percent % 
Valid 
1
st
  20 12.3 19.0 19.0 
2
nd
  38 23.3 36.2 55.2 
3
rd
  47 28.8 44.8 100.0 
Total 105 64.4 100.0  
Missing System 58 35.6   
Total 163 100.0   
 
Table VII-12 First Preference for Funding Models 
 Response % 
 
 
59 
26 
20 
 
 
56.19 
24.76 
19.05 
Total 105 100 
The majority first preference ranking for the taxation incentive model is significant. It suggests that 
contrary to economic conventions there is an important behavioural difference between government 
grants, taxation incentives and a farmer-led taxation leveraged approach to rural natural resource 
governance.  
E Reasons for Preferred Model 
It is not the purpose of this research to prove anything about reasons for preference however some 
indications about possible factors were sought. This is particularly relevant for possible future research. 
Participants were asked to look at certain statements and thinking about the model that they ranked 
first, they had to indicate whether or not they strongly agreed, agreed, neither agreed nor disagreed, 
disagreed or strongly disagreed with the statements (Likert-type scale). The statements are as follows: 
 Autonomy – The model allows me to independently decide on how to best achieve the 
conservation goals. 
 Cash flow – The model provides me with an external source of funds and as such, I do not have 
to rely on my own money to start a conservation project. 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70
Government Payment
ROCP
Taxation Incentive
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 Support – The model provides me with training and advice. 
 Paperwork – The model minimises paperwork and administration. 
 Encouragement – The model encourages me to plan conservation projects. 
 Increase –   I would increase my conservation activities under this model. 
 
Figures VII-1 to VII-6 summarise the responses of the participants (the median response based on the 
Likert-type scale). In comparing and contrasting the data it arguable that the ROCP model straddles the 
middle ground between the taxation incentive model and the government payment model in terms of 
autonomy, cash flow, support and paperwork. 
In applying t-tests to the taxation incentive model and to the government payment model it was 
discovered that: 
 Autonomy – The taxation incentive model (4.64) was significantly higher than the government 
payment model (3.32) (t (73) =7.43, p<.001). Thus, participants believed that the taxation 
incentive model offered more autonomy than the government payment model or those who 
wanted autonomy selected it. 
 Cash Flow - The taxation incentive model (2.55) was significantly lower than the government 
payment model (4.74) (t (73) =-8.09, p<.001) on the question of cash flow. Thus, participants 
highlighted the fact that the taxation incentive model relies initially on the funds of landholders 
or they selected on this basis. 
 Paperwork – The taxation incentive model (4.04) was significantly higher than the government 
payment model (3.37) (t (73) = 2.76, p=.007) on the question of paperwork. Thus, participants 
believed that the taxation incentive was more likely to minimise paperwork and administration 
or they selected on this basis. 
 Support – The taxation incentive model (2.79) was significantly lower than the government 
payment model (4.32) (t (73) =-7.00, p<.001). Thus, participants reiterated the point that the 
taxation incentive model relies on the self-motivation and self-determination of the landholder 
or they selected on this basis. 
 Encouragement – On the question of encouraging the planning of conservation works, there 
was no significant difference between the taxation incentive model (4.21) and the government 
payment model (4.00) (t (73) = 0.98, p>.05). 
 Increase –  On the question of whether or not the participant would increase their conservation 
activities under the model, there was no significant difference between the taxation incentive 
model (4.09) and the government payment model (4.00) (t (73) =-.475, p>.05). 
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Figure VII-1 Autonomy – Representation of Likert-type Responses 
 
 
Figure VII-2 Representation of Likert-type Responses 
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Figure VII-3 Support - Representation of Likert-type Responses 
 
 
Figure VII-4 Paperwork - Representation of Likert-type Responses 
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Figure VII-5 Encouragement - Representation of Likert-type Responses 
 
 
Figure VII-6 Increase - Representation of Likert-type Responses 
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F Comments on Reasons for Ranking Models 
The participants were asked to comment on why they ranked the funding models in the order that they 
did (first, second, and third). The full statements can be found in Appendix 3 where they have been 
grouped based on the first preference of the participants. 
For those who ranked the taxation incentive first, the key ideas, themes and concepts are as follows: 
 The taxation incentive with its 125% tax deduction for conservation work was ideal for 
landholders with cash reserves and allowed those landholders to ‘profit’ from conservation. 
From a cash flow perspective, the taxation incentive would be useful during years when 
agricultural production was poor.  
 The taxation incentive is the easiest to implement. It is straight forward, the quickest to initiate 
and causes the least administration. 
 The taxation incentive means that control for the conservation project remains with the 
landholder. 
 The taxation incentive supports the landholder who is the best position to look at the most 
appropriate conservation works for their land. The ROCP and the government payment 
detaches the landholder form the ‘planning and ownership’ of the conservation project. 
 The tax incentive is the most cost effective as there is minimal leakage of funds under the tax 
system. In contrast, the government payment requires an extra layer of bureaucracy. 
 Mistrust of the government payment as there is the risk that government policy will be changed 
without warning. 
 The ROCP is complex and cumbersome. It is also of concern that property rights must be 
assigned to someone else. 
 A problem with the ROCP is that you may have to rely on other landholders who may have 
different goals and priorities. The committee of local landowners which manages the ROCP 
may be biased, unskilled and unmotivated. 
 The government payment perpetuates the ‘hand out mentality.’ 
For those who ranked the ROCP first, the key ideas, themes and concepts are as follows: 
 The ROCP provides external funding. Landholders do not have to provide their own funds. 
 The ROCP provides significant autonomy but with the ability to call on others for help. 
 There are concerns in handing over property rights in perpetuity under the ROCP. 
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 Participating in local community organisations is an incentive. 
 If you are not in business then the ROCP is a good option. 
 The taxation incentive may be exploited. 
 Mistrust of government in prioritising the correct conservation projects. 
For those who ranked the government payment first, the key ideas, themes and concepts are as follows: 
 There is a preference for the upfront cash payment under the government payment model as 
generally farmers / landholders have little disposable income. 
 The ROCP is convoluted. There are concerns over the administration of the model and the sale 
of environmental credits. There is a preference to preserve property rights rather than assigning 
them. 
 The taxation incentive model is ineffective where the land holder is not receiving any business 
income. 
Overall this suggests that the specific characteristics of conservation funding mechanisms are relevant 
to conservation policy support. The comments indicate that the survey respondents distinguished the 
details of policy mechanisms that might be used to encourage conservation on private landholdings. 
The use of landholder preferred program characteristics may increase participation in conservation 
schemes. The underlying themes that may be of interest to future research include the value placed on 
autonomy, distrust of government involvement, attitudes to administration requirements, land 
management philosophies of landholders, and the barrier to participation which may be caused by the 
requirement to transfer property rights. 
G Choice Limited to Taxation Incentive and Government Payment 
After giving their reasons for ranking the funding models, participants were asked what their choice 
would be if their options were limited to the taxation incentive model and government payment model 
(ie excluding the option of the ROCP). Table VII-13 summarises the participant’s preferences with 
61.22% of participants preferring the taxation incentive model. With the removal of the ROCP the 
majority of those participants who chose the ROCP as their first preference in the previous section of 
the questionnaire, transferred their preference to the government payment model. This is significant as 
it may indicate the amount of government involvement in a program affects the behavioural response 
of landholders. 
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To determine if there was any correlation between the biographical information (demographics) of the 
participants and their choice of the taxation incentive model or the government payment model, t-tests 
(see table VII-14 to table VII-15) and chi-square tests (see table VII-16 to table VII-18) were utilised.  
 
Table VII-13 Preference where Choice Limited to Taxation Incentive and Government Payment 
 Response % 
 
 
60 
 
38 
 
61.22 
 
38.78 
 
Total 98 100 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70
 Government Payment
 Taxation Incentive
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Table VII-14 Biographic Information (Demographics) - t-test where Choice Limited to Taxation Incentive and Government 
Payment 
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Table VII-15 Biographic Information (Demographics) - Independent Samples Test where Choice Limited to Taxation Incentive 
and Government Payment 
 
 
The t-test assesses whether or not the ‘means’ of two groups are statistically different. The t-test is 
suitable for evaluating the differences between two groups of sample participants in terms of a single 
dependent variable. The t-tests did not show any significant differences between the taxation incentive 
group and government payment group with regards to the biographical variables except with education 
level. The government payment group education level (5.92) was significantly higher than the taxation 
incentive group (5.0) (t (90) = -2.33, p =.02). It may be conjectured that respondents with high 
education levels mainly sourced their income off–farm. Lifestyle / hobby farmers may lack the time 
and knowledge to undertake conservation activities. As such, they may have placed more weight on the 
characteristics of cash flow and support which was emphasised in the government grant model. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
223 
 
Table VII-16 Primary Decision Maker – Chi-square Test 
Crosstab 
 Are you the primary decision 
maker on the property? 
Total 
Yes No 
Choice limited to Taxation 
Incentive and Government 
Subsidy    Apart from your 
reasoning above, if y... 
Taxation Incentive (based 
on the Taxation Incentive 
model described 
above)&nbsp; 
Count 47 11 58 
Expected Count 49.5 8.5 58.0 
% within Choice limited to 
Taxation Incentive and 
Government Subsidy    
Apart from your reasoning 
above, if y... 
81.0% 19.0% 100.0% 
Government Payment 
(based on the Government 
Payment model described 
above)&nbsp; 
Count 34 3 37 
Expected Count 31.5 5.5 37.0 
% within Choice limited to 
Taxation Incentive and 
Government Subsidy    
Apart from your reasoning 
above, if y... 
91.9% 8.1% 100.0% 
Total 
Count 81 14 95 
Expected Count 81.0 14.0 95.0 
% within Choice limited to 
Taxation Incentive and 
Government Subsidy    
Apart from your reasoning 
above, if y... 
85.3% 14.7% 100.0% 
Chi-square Tests 
 Value df Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) Exact Sig. (2-sided) Exact Sig. (1-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 2.119
a
 1 .145 
  
Continuity Correction
b
 1.343 1 .246 
  
Likelihood Ratio 2.275 1 .132 
  
Fisher's Exact Test 
   
.235 .122 
Linear-by-Linear Association 2.097 1 .148 
  
N of Valid Cases 95 
    
a. 0 cells (0.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 5.45. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
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Symmetric Measures 
 Value Approx. Sig. 
Nominal by 
Nominal 
Phi -.149 .145 
Cramer's V .149 .145 
N of Valid Cases 95 
 
a. Not assuming the null hypothesis. 
b. Using the asymptotic standard error assuming the null hypothesis. 
 
Table VII-17 Gender – Chi-square Test 
 
Crosstab 
 What is your gender? Total 
Male Female 
Choice limited to Taxation Incentive 
and Government Subsidy    
Apart from your reasoning above, if 
y... 
Taxation Incentive (based on the 
Taxation Incentive model described 
above)&nbsp; 
Count 37 21 58 
Expected Count 36.0 22.0 58.0 
% within Choice limited to Taxation 
Incentive and Government Subsidy 
   Apart from your 
reasoning above, if y... 
63.8% 36.2% 100.0% 
Government Payment (based on 
the Government Payment model 
described above)&nbsp; 
Count 22 15 37 
Expected Count 23.0 14.0 37.0 
% within Choice limited to Taxation 
Incentive and Government Subsidy 
   Apart from your 
reasoning above, if y... 
59.5% 40.5% 100.0% 
Total 
Count 59 36 95 
Expected Count 59.0 36.0 95.0 
% within Choice limited to Taxation 
Incentive and Government Subsidy 
   Apart from your 
reasoning above, if y... 
62.1% 37.9% 100.0% 
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Chi-square Tests 
 Value df Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) Exact Sig. (2-sided) Exact Sig. (1-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square .180
a
 1 .671 
  
Continuity Correction
b
 .043 1 .835 
  
Likelihood Ratio .180 1 .672 
  
Fisher's Exact Test 
   
.672 .416 
Linear-by-Linear Association .178 1 .673 
  
N of Valid Cases 95 
    
a. 0 cells (0.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 14.02. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
 
 
Symmetric Measures 
 Value Approx. Sig. 
Nominal by Nominal 
Phi .044 .671 
Cramer's V .044 .671 
N of Valid Cases 95 
 
a. Not assuming the null hypothesis. 
b. Using the asymptotic standard error assuming the null hypothesis. 
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Table VII-18 Land Usage – Chi-square Test 
 
 
Chi-square Tests 
 Value df Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 3.524
a
 6 .741 
Likelihood Ratio 3.645 6 .725 
Linear-by-Linear Association .059 1 .808 
N of Valid Cases 95 
  
a. 6 cells (42.9%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 1.17. 
 
Symmetric Measures 
 Value Approx. Sig. 
Nominal by Nominal 
Phi .193 .741 
Cramer's V .193 .741 
N of Valid Cases 95 
 
a. Not assuming the null hypothesis. 
b. Using the asymptotic standard error assuming the null hypothesis. 
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A test of significance for 2 x 2 contingency tables, a Pearson’s chi-square test, ‘evaluates whether two 
variables are independent (ie not associated).
733
 The Pearson’s chi-square assesses whether there is a 
statistical difference between the observed frequencies and the expected relative frequencies.  If the 
chi-square statistic is large enough in value then independence between the variables is rejected and it 
can be concluded that the two variables are statistically associated.
734
 The chi-square tests did not show 
any significant distribution differences between the taxation incentive group and government payment 
group for primary decision maker, gender or land use. 
H Reasons when Choice Limited to a Taxation Incentive or Government Payment 
The participants were asked to comment on why they chose a particular model when the choice was 
limited to the taxation incentive and the government payment. The full statements can be found in 
Appendix 4, grouped based on the model that they chose. Many of the participants referred to their 
comments previously made when discussing the ranking of the conservation funding models. 
For those who chose the taxation incentive model, the key ideas, themes and concepts are as follows: 
 The taxation incentive is more reliable, provides autonomy, more landholder control and less 
paperwork. However, it excludes those who do not have the upfront capital to fund conservation 
works. 
 The landholder is in control of the project and can make decisions on the micro-level which is 
often overlooked when considering regional scale projects.  
 In relation to the government payment, grant funding usually runs out and there is too much red 
tape. Consequently there was distrust in the policy implementation. 
For those who chose the government grant model, the key ideas, themes and concepts are as follows: 
 Cash flow is king. The government payment model provides funds. 
 The government payment model provides limitations which is a good thing as it eliminates 
‘grandiose’ schemes. 
 The government payment model allows self-initiation but also provides training, support and 
advice. 
 The taxation incentive is inapplicable where the landholder is not receiving businesses income. 
                                                 
733
 Cooksey, above n 705, 190. 
734
 Ibid. 
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I Directions for Future Research 
The results discussed above indicate that there probably exists a material behavioural difference 
between tax, grant, and the ROCP (hybrid) model. This is significant in terms of conservation funding 
policy and economic theory. The results of this study provide a foundation for future research on 
behavioural impact of taxation incentives, government payments and other funding models. Future 
research should further attempt to clarify whether or not there is a correlation between biographical 
variables (ie income level, gender, land usage) or other independent variables, and the choice of 
funding model. From the data collected by this study there does not seem to be any overall 
distinguishing demographic features between the taxation incentive group and the government payment 
group. Future research should attempt to clarify the degree that different funding mechanisms 
encourage the propensity to undertake conservation works on private landholdings. This research 
suggests that the characteristics of conservation funding mechanisms are relevant to conservation 
policy support. To support optimal funding policy, future research should attempt to clarify landholder 
preferred program characteristics.  
J Summary 
From the results there probably exists a material behavioural difference in the participant’s attitudes 
towards the individual conservation funding models. Analysis of the statements reviewed under the 
Likert-type scale revealed significant differences between the taxation incentive model and the 
government payment model in terms of autonomy, cash flow, support, and paperwork.  
The t-tests did not show any significant differences between the taxation incentive group and 
government payment group with regards to the biographical variables except with education level. The 
government payment group education level (5.92) was significantly higher than the taxation incentive 
group (5.0) (t (90) = -2.33, p =.02). The chi-square tests did not show any significant distribution 
differences between the taxation incentive group and government payment group for primary decision 
maker, gender or land use. 
The comments made by the participants were enlightening. Those who favoured the taxation incentive 
highlighted the key concepts of control, autonomy, ease of implementation, efficiency, and minimal 
administration. Moreover, a number of individuals in this group made statements that indicated that 
they mistrusted the government payment model as it was possible that funding would be withdrawn 
with little notice. This suggests the potential for more precise segmentation of instruments and 
promotion of instruments. 
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Those who favoured the ROCP made comments to the effect that the model provided external funding, 
offered support and guidance, provided significant autonomy, it was a good option if the landholder 
was not carrying on a business, and it was an inducement to participate in conservation projects where 
there was local community involvement in the management of the structure. This group noted that 
taxation incentive may be exploited and governments may incorrectly prioritise conservation projects 
However, the comments indicated that the participants were concerned about signing over property 
rights in perpetuity under the ROCP. Also provides indications of broader ‘messaging’ and design 
issues. 
Those who favoured the government payment model made comments that underscored the provision of 
training and support, and the cash flow implications, that is, there was no need to use their own capital 
which is highly important where the landholder has little disposable income. This group noted that the 
taxation incentive was unsuitable where the landholder did not receive business income. 
It is probable that taxation incentives and government grants are not equivalent as indicated by 
economic theory. It is credible that taxation incentives do have a different behavioural impact in 
comparison to government grants. Depending on their individual circumstance, and arguably their past 
experience with accessing funding, some landholders prefer taxation incentives and some landholders 
prefer government grants because of the different and contrasting features of these funding 
mechanisms. The process for obtaining the benefit, the administration of the benefit, the indirect costs 
of obtaining the benefit, the training and support provisions, the cash flow implications, and other 
opportunity costs and transaction costs, all impact upon the choice of individual landholders.  
The specific characteristics of conservation funding mechanisms are relevant to conservation policy 
support. The results of this study provide a foundation for future research on behavioural impact of 
taxation incentives, government payments and other funding models. Future research should further 
attempt to clarify whether or not there is a correlation between biographical variables (ie income level, 
gender, land usage) or other independent variables, and the choice of funding model. Future research 
should clarify the degree that different funding mechanisms encourage the propensity to undertake 
conservation works on private landholdings.  
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VIII CONCLUSION  
‘And so Blondie ---- it’s goodbye.’ – Tuco 
The Good, the Bad and the Ugly: Extended English-Language Version (Directed by Sergio Leone, Metro Goldwyn Mayer, 
2003) 01:03:07. 
The author of this dissertation had the movie playing in the background while writing. The quote represents a point in the 
writing process where various ideas coalesced. 
This dissertation explored the following intertwined research issues: 
1. Contrary to economic conventions, is there a justification for a taxation based approach to 
economic incentives to encourage private rural conservation, from a policy and behavioural 
perspective? 
2. Is there a policy rationale for an alternative to the existing approaches to funding rural natural 
resource conservation and restoration activities on private farmland? 
3. To what extent is there a behavioural rationale for a tax-leveraged privately funded approach to 
rural natural resource governance? 
4. Is there a basis for the hypothesis that there is an important behavioural difference between 
government grants, taxation incentives and a farmer-led taxation leveraged approach to rural 
natural resource governance? 
This chapter summarises the conclusions from the research and discusses the limitations of the 
research. It reviews the justification for a taxation based approach to economic incentives to encourage 
private rural conservation, from a policy and behavioural perspective. It outlines the policy rationale for 
an alternative approach to the existing approaches to funding rural natural resource conservation and 
restoration activities on private landholdings. It reviews the behavioural rationale for a privately funded 
approach to rural natural resource governance. It suggests that there is empirical evidence for the 
hypothesis that there is an important behavioural difference between government grants, taxation 
incentives and a farmer-led taxation leveraged approach to rural natural resource governance. Together 
these elements suggest both opportunity and the need for an innovative financing model for rural 
governance. 
Economic theory does not distinguish between the behavioural impact of taxation incentives, 
government grants, and other funding models; all are subsidies. Economic theory is also predicated on 
the understanding that behaviour is a response to economic incentives. However, an individual’s 
behaviour cannot be fully explained by their reaction to financial inducements and self-interest and 
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people appear to respond differently to different types of incentive. Much of the public discussion of 
natural resource management centres on the assertion that landholders should be motivated by ideals of 
sustainability and good environmental outcomes to sacrifice their individual interests in order to protect 
the collective interests of society.  At the other end of the spectrum, many institutional designers take 
the view that they cannot rely on the virtue of landholders but instead must rely on regulations and 
market incentives which appeal entirely to the self-interest of landholders.  Perhaps a better view is that 
people are different: individuals may be subject to self-interest but they are not bereft of other 
motivations or concerns such as community interest.  Suitable incentives coupled with the goodwill of 
landholders, are the key ingredients to the promotion of conservation. It is in the difference in attitude 
and behaviour between individuals that an opportunity might lie for innovative funding mechanisms for 
natural resource governance, in the absence of sufficient public funding to meet all the needs. There are 
also sound policy reasons for attempting to minimise reliance upon government for the delivery of 
environmental public goods from rural areas. 
Under economic theory, the justification for government involvement in natural resource management 
is market failure such as negative externalities, the tragedy of the commons, missing markets and loss 
of public goods. Humans depend on natural capital to provide the conditions for a decent, healthy, and 
secure life.  With public goods (biodiversity, clean air, the ozone layer, scenic views, free flowing 
rivers, and the enjoyment of open spaces) the ordinary market process will lead to a low efficient 
demand for public goods despite the fact that the public needs these goods. The market system will not 
produce truthful preference revelation for public goods as it is in the selfish interest of individuals to 
conceal their true preferences so as to reduce their financial liability. Regardless of the policy tools 
used to address market failure, there is the possibility that government intervention will bring about an 
inequitable outcome.  
Governments often pay for public goods via general funds raised through borrowings and taxation. In 
practice, ministers and government officials decide what is best for the community with all decisions 
ultimately constrained by a budget allocation. With decreasing taxation revenue and increasing 
budgetary burdens imposed by an ageing population it seems highly unlikely that public funds can 
address the ‘scaled up’ challenges to the environment. Budgetary issues will become a fundamental 
barrier to environmental conservation. Unless an alternative conservation funding model is adopted, 
governments will have to rely on a diminishing taxation base and increased regulation, which may lead 
to economic inefficiencies, policy failures and political conflict. 
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Conservation reserves, even if greatly enhanced, are inadequate to meet conservation goals. Only 
7.41% or 569,240 km2 of Australia’s landmass has been dedicated to nature conservation. Other 
protected areas, which also includes use by Indigenous Australians, amounts to over 1 million km
2
 or 
13.21% of the Australian landmass. The wide scale application of a ‘lock up and leave’ strategy is not a 
viable option as it could restrain the production of food, fuel, and fibre; there is an estimated doubling 
of food demand by 2050 and increasing demand for plant-based products to replace fossil resources. 
The complications of a ‘lock up and leave’ strategy include: the possible deterioration of important 
eco-services provided by an agricultural landscape; some landscapes are so degraded that there is no 
potential for land use intensification; and in some regions there are limited alternatives for offsetting 
intensely used land in one location with a conservation reserve in another location that has similar 
spatial attributes. There are also environmental problems which will continue to get worse without 
active management, such as invasive species and some aspects of soil degradation. What seems to be 
clear is that maintaining biodiversity in an active agricultural landscape is an essential element in eco-
service production. 
Important ecosystems in Australia exist to a large extent on privately held freehold land or privately 
managed leasehold land (Crown leasehold). Over 60% of the land in Australia is managed by private 
landholders. Some species are only found on private land and many migratory species rely on dispersed 
habitats across regions including on private land.  The interconnection of conservation reserves with 
conservation management on private land has the potential to support conservation on an extensive 
scale. Approximately 52% (398,580 thousand hectares / 769,202 thousand hectares) of Australia's total 
land area was used for agriculture purposes. Agriculture can be viewed as a managed ecosystem in 
which eco-service production (marketable and non-marketable) depends on land use and land 
management. By incorporating conservation management into productive land usage there is the 
capacity to enhance the ecosystem functionality of the land while maintaining the production of food, 
fuel, and fibre. The participation of private land in conservation programs is essential in order to 
address conservation problems on an extensive spatial scale.  
One of the restraints on private landholder participation in conservation activities is a lack of financial 
support. Private landholders do not possess the resources necessary to undertake the required 
conservation activities. Without sufficient financial support conservation works on private land are 
unlikely to occur and deterioration in natural capital will continue. The problem lies in finding 
sufficient funds to meet the ever expanding requirements of environmental conservation.  
233 
 
The condition of the Australian environment is subject to drivers including climate change, population 
growth, and economic growth. These drivers individually and cumulatively affect the atmosphere, 
inland water, land, and the marine environment. With climate change there is the likelihood of an 
increased annual average temperature, increased warm nights, fewer frosts, longer heat wave duration, 
increased duration and frequency of droughts, decreased rain fall in southern areas of Australia, more 
extreme and frequent intense rainfall events, increased demand for resources, an expansion in the 
surface area taken up by settlements, and more waste being pushed into the environment.  Population 
growth is a potential cause of environmental degradation with increased demand for resources, 
expansion in the surface area taken up by settlements, and more waste into the environment. The main 
pressures affecting biodiversity include climate change, habitat fragmentation, altered land use, pests 
and diseases, altered hydrology, grazing, altered fire regimes, urban development, and human 
extraction of resources. Government funding is insufficient to combat the environmental risk drivers.  
A conservation funding gap exists between actual environmental expenditure and the funding required 
for landscape and biodiversity conservation. Even though the estimation for the required funding is 
contestable it cannot be denied that deterioration in natural capital has continued notwithstanding 
investment by the Commonwealth through natural resource management programs. This indicates that 
the current level of funding is insufficient to stem the deterioration in the natural landscape and 
biodiversity. Given the risks to government budgets such as falling terms of trade and lower economic 
growth, increased demand for health care, a slowing in real wages growth, an increase in welfare 
payments, and higher aged pension payments and aged care costs due to Australia’s ageing population 
it is unlikely that Australian governments can increase conservation funding. There is also the 
possibility that environmental funding by governments will decrease.   
From a policy perspective there is a justification for an alternative approach to funding rural natural 
resource conservation and restoration activities on private landholdings. New measures are required to 
attract significant private investment for conservation works. Unless an alternative funding model is 
created it is likely that conservation will continue to be underfunded by governments, the conservation 
funding gap will expand and biodiversity losses will increase. The Regional Onsite Conservation 
Program developed prior to this research is an example of the type of funding innovation that might 
help decrease reliance on government-funded conservation programs. The ROCP was designed to 
provide opportunities and incentives for investors, philanthropists, conservation groups, and private 
landholders. The ROCP’s purpose is to address the funding gap for conservation. 
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Contrary to the tenents of economic theory an individual’s behaviour cannot be fully explained by their 
reaction to financial inducements and self-interest. Behaviour which deviates from the economic 
rational model may occur due to internal factors such as habits, emotions, personal capacity, and 
biases. Behavioural aspects may affect the participation of landholders in conservation schemes. 
Consequently, it is important to take into account both economic and non-economic behavioural factors 
when seeking to effectively implement a conservation scheme. The behavioural aspects of private 
landholders must be taken into account when seeking to undertake conservation activities on an 
extensive scale. 
Unintended consequences may arise through the implementation of command and control regulation. 
Private landholders can use their land to satisfy their economic requirements and avoid the government 
restricting private usage for the benefit of society as a whole. Property rights may be limited by laws in 
order to manage negative externalities but unless there is some positive incentive, private landholders 
are less likely to enter into conservation that could trigger provisions that further restrict land usage. 
Government intervention in the form of the ‘stick’ (regulatory land use limitation) may allow 
governments to announce that they have taken action to fix the problem but whether or not it achieves 
its objectives is another matter. Regulation cannot force private landholders to pursue positive action. 
Furthermore, command and control may entail high monitoring and enforcement costs. 
Conservation scheme participation may be motivated by public (off-farm) benefits such as promoting 
public environmental goods (eg biodiversity) and private (on-farm) environmental benefits such as 
preventing soil erosion. Factors which may influence participation in a conservation scheme include the 
voluntary nature of the scheme; landholder autonomy in achieving conservation goals; the nature and 
extent of the financial and non-financial support offered by the scheme; market forces; transaction 
costs; administration complexity of the scheme; duration of the scheme; quantity and quality of 
information; awareness of the program; opportunity costs; landholder characteristics such as 
dependency on farm income; attitude towards the conservation; amount of stress experienced by the 
landholder (eg high levels of debt); the landholder’s ability to solve problems; the landholder’s 
business goals;  whether or not there are successors to the landholding; landholding characteristics; 
whether the landholding is held as freehold or under a lease; rate of neighbouring landholder 
participation; lack of trust in the government and their programs; and misalignment between the land 
management philosophies of landholders and program administrators.  
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Behaviour can be influenced by three broad categories of drivers: external factors, internal factors, and 
social factors. External factors encompass financial and opportunity costs; internal factors encompass 
habits and cognitive processes; and social factors encompass societal norms and cultural attitudes. 
Internal factors include habits, emotions, personal capacity, and biases. Social factors include networks, 
norms and social capital which affect individual behaviour and collective action simultaneously. 
Taking into account the drivers of behaviour suggests that conservation program administrators should 
take a holistic approach to conservation schemes and should offer more than financial incentives, 
including training, workforce support, expert advice, guidance on land management practices, and 
relevant information at a regional and individual landholding scale. The input of landholders should be 
sought in order to design appropriate on ground conservation programs that offer flexibility, foster a 
shared vision, meet landholder production objectives, and encourage two-way learning between 
landholders and administrators. Nonetheless, without economic support landholders are unlikely to 
pursue conservation practices. 
Conservation activities can be subject to high transaction costs, uncertainty, and economic risk.  High 
‘private transaction costs’ may deter private landholders from participating in conservation schemes. 
Low participation reduces the potential benefit of the scheme. Different program designs will have 
different effects on transaction costs and as such, some program designs will be more effective in 
minimising transaction costs than others. Local voluntary conservation programs built on trust and co-
operation will have extrinsically low transaction costs. Centrally administered government schemes are 
likely to incur high set up costs and impose high ‘private transaction costs’ on private landholder 
participants to ensure economic use of public funds; risk mitigation; probity; transparency; and 
enforceability. If a program fails to guarantee low transaction costs then it is likely that landholder 
participation in the scheme will be low despite financial support. 
A government grant is the predominant approach for funding rural natural resource conservation and 
restoration activities on private farmland outside of funding by the landholder. In general, a 
government grant is a direct financial payment usually by a government department to fund a specific 
project or a specific activity such as climate change adjustment programs or biosecurity.  There are 
usually eligibility criteria, conditions on how the funds can be used, and compliance and reporting 
requirements. The important feature is that a grant is a funding mechanism which can be utilised by 
government to encourage conservation outcomes. 
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A conservation funding gap exists between actual environmental expenditure and expenditure required 
to protect, and mitigate pressures on the environment arising from human activities. Australian 
governments lack the capacity to increase funding to the required levels. This raises the question of the 
viability of using government grant for funding rural natural resource conservation and restoration 
activities on private farmland.  Government grants (direct government payments) may be a viable 
funding mechanism if they are efficient and effective in achieving desired outcomes. However, it is 
unclear whether government grants are effective and / or efficient as the data just does not exist. 
Grant compliance and reporting requirements impose significant costs on recipients. Grants are 
increasingly made under competitive arrangements, and require disproportionate accountability, 
imposing undue compliance burdens. The amount of work involved in applying for some grants may be 
out of proportion with the limited amount of funding available under the relevant program. The ‘red 
tape’ created by funding and service agreements is based in part on risk mitigation and in part because 
of community expectations of the oversight role of government. Government ultimately controls the 
level and magnitude of the regulatory and administrative burden.  
An alternative approach to government grants should seriously be considered where it decreases 
reliance on directed government funding, is more efficient and effective in achieving conservation 
outcomes, and minimises transaction and opportunity costs from the perspective of government 
appointed administrators and private landholders.  ROCP type mechanisms could help decrease 
reliance on government-funded conservation programs. Depending on their implementation, ROCP 
type mechanisms have the capacity to reduce transaction costs, uncertainty and risk in the process of 
promoting conservation activities. A ROCP type mechanism can adopt a decentralised administrative 
process which may result is economic efficiencies, lower ‘private transaction costs’ through the 
reduction of administration, and lower costs through cooperative arrangements. 
Efficiently implemented ROCP type mechanisms have the capacity to provide opportunities for high 
levels of landholder motivation, initiative, and innovation. Landholder decision making in respect of 
conservation is a complex process influenced by many factors including social, economic, and 
cognitive. Administrators can take a holistic approach when implementing conservation schemes. A 
ROCP type approach has the potential to tailor financial incentives and legal arrangements to meet 
individual landholder’s requirements, to provide information, training and technical guidance, to 
promote conservation programs, and to involve participants in the design and implementation of 
conservation. Once the goals, objectives and guidelines are set, landholders, individually or as part of a 
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collective, choose the best means to carry out the conservation activity. Programs can be tailored to 
facilitate collective action to create networks, strengthen favourable social norms and build social 
capital. Collective action will encourage the provision of conservation works on an extensive spatial 
scale. 
 Depending on their implementation, ROCP type mechanisms have the capacity to reduce transaction 
costs, uncertainty and risk in the process of promoting conservation activities. A ROCP type 
mechanism can decrease ‘private transaction costs’ through training, professional advice, providing 
information, simplifying application and contractual arrangements, adopting or formulating a common 
ideology with landholders, streamlining monitoring processes, and building trust. A ROCP type 
mechanism can adopt a decentralised administrative process which may result is economic efficiencies, 
lower ‘private transaction costs’ through the reduction of administration, and lower costs through 
cooperative arrangements. 
To maximise conservation outcomes on private landholdings many activities must be carried out on an 
extensive spatial scale. ROCPs could operate at a variety of scales potentially involving a couple of 
farms, to a large regional scale involving many farms. Conservation is better achieved through 
coordinated intervention on an extensive spatial scale to optimise social, economic and environmental 
objectives. The voluntary nature of the ROCP means that a spatially extensive plan depends on the 
willingness of landholders to participate. The ROCP can implement conservation programs across the 
region by using the appropriate mixture of incentives taking into account the spatial context, to 
motivate the right mix of landholders. 
An underpinning of the ROCP business model is that taxation incentives will encourage private market 
funding which can then be distributed to fund conservation activities. In this instance the use of tax 
incentives addresses the under provision of conservation (market failure). Regardless of the policy tools 
used to address market failure, there is the possibility that government intervention will bring about an 
inequitable outcome. Government failure occurs when government intervention brings about inefficient 
allocation of resources and, hence, further inequalities than would have occurred without interference 
in the market. The probability of government failure can be minimised by limiting the scope of 
government intervention. Taxation incentives are a mild form of intervention. Taxation incentives may 
minimise or obviate the requirements for command and control. Using taxation incentives to encourage 
private sector conservation has the potential to promote social objectives at a relatively low social cost 
but this depends on the design and implementation of the tax structure.  
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The imposition of taxes and hence the availability of tax incentives, can influence the allocation of 
resources. Evidence suggests that for high-income individuals the elasticity of taxable income to 
marginal tax rate is substantial. Possible responses to higher marginal tax rates include increased 
leisure activities (ie the higher tax rate acts as a disincentive to work), tax evasion, incorporation (eg 
sole trader sets up a company to minimise tax liability), increased expenditure on deductible items (eg 
charitable donations), and rearrangement of salary package (eg salary sacrifice arrangements). Overall, 
taxation has a very powerful effect on certain individuals. The behavioural impact of taxation 
incentives on certain individuals brings about a dis-propionate response (even in the face of credible 
information about the riskiness of a business operation). Tax incentives have the potential to leverage 
significant funds for environmental protection and restoration. 
One of the subordinate funds under the ROCP investment trust is aimed at conservation philanthropy. 
Under the philanthropic fund the investor / contributor would receive an upfront tax deduction for their 
contribution but they would not receive any future benefit from the fund. Philanthropic tax incentives 
play a part in increasing donation amounts and help increase awareness about charitable causes. They 
are an economical means for government to encourage the provision of public goods. Overall, in 
comparison to direct government contributions, it is argued that tax deductible eligibility is a more cost 
effective method for government to support philanthropic causes. 
The ROCP has the purpose of raising funds from the private market for conservation activities and 
providing a low transaction cost structure for raising and managing those funds. At the heart of the 
ROCP’s ability to raise funds are taxation incentives. Research has found that while other factors are 
important determinants of investment behaviour, taxes have a significant influence. The successful 
implementation of the ROCP as a capital raising mechanism depends on government backing, an 
appropriate taxation incentive, and the willingness of investors to support socially worthy but 
economically uncertain programs. 
When discussing the ROCP with various farming groups it was noted that Landcare was strongly 
supported by many of the landholders in the local area. While the Landcare movement has many 
supporters it has been criticised as an instrument which shifts responsibility for natural resource 
management from government to local rural communities, and it does not provide substantial financial 
support. The Landcare movement is also very much dependent on government funding which means 
that decrease in funding may lead to a decrease in membership. Government funding for Landcare has 
significantly declined in the last two years.  Unless an alternative funding source is found it is likely 
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that government funding will further decline with the consequent deterioration in membership. A 
ROCP type mechanism has the ability to provide significant funds and support to ‘grass roots’ 
Landcare networks. 
One of the aims of this research was to compare the behavioural impact of a hypothetical conservation 
tax incentive, a hypothetical conservation government grant, and a hypothetical ROCP type funding 
model, which were designed to encourage conservation activities upon private landholdings. It was not 
the ambition of this dissertation to do more than indicate whether there is a probable difference in 
behavioural response to taxation incentives and other subsidies in relation to conservation investment. 
To test further the degree or causes of any indicated difference would be a major research task in own 
right. It would require behaviourally sophisticated research methods and probably large sample sizes, 
which are not testable at this early stage of the investigation of tax leveraged private conservation 
investment structures for Australia. However it was possible to provide indicative evidence that the 
received economic wisdom that a public subsidy, and a taxation instrument (and by implication a 
complex hybrid like the ROCP) were essentially equivalent in their capacity to leverage scarce public 
funds with private investment and voluntary effort.  This is an important issue, because it underpins the 
possibility for more innovative approaches to the use of limited public funding to achieve public 
interest benefits more efficiently than traditional subsidies. 
This dissertation adopted a mixed methods research approach, using both qualitative and quantitative 
methods within the same study. One of the advantages of a mixed methods approach is the potential for 
gaining a deeper and more complete understanding of the research issues by uniting both a qualitative 
and a quantitative stance. The behavioural response to the hypothetical funding models, the taxation 
incentive, the government grant, and the ROCP (hybrid) model, were investigated using a survey 
instrument. 
The survey results indicate that there probably exists a material behavioural difference between tax, 
grant, and the ROCP (hybrid) model. Analysis of the statements reviewed under the Likert-type scale 
revealed significant differences between the taxation incentive model and the government payment 
model in terms of autonomy, cash flow, support, and paperwork. The comments made by the 
participants were enlightening. Those who favoured the taxation incentive highlighted the key concepts 
of control, autonomy, ease of implementation, efficiency, and minimal administration. Moreover, a 
number of individuals in this group made statements that indicated that they mistrusted the government 
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payment model as it was possible that funding would be withdrawn with little notice. This suggests the 
potential for more precise segmentation of instruments and promotion of instruments. 
Depending on their individual circumstance, and arguably their past experience with accessing funding, 
some landholders prefer taxation incentives and some landholders prefer government grants because of 
the different and contrasting features of these funding mechanisms. The process for obtaining the 
benefit, the administration of the benefit, the indirect costs of obtaining the benefit, the training and 
support provisions, the cash flow implications, and other opportunity costs and transaction costs, all 
impact upon the choice of individual landholders. 
This research suggests that the characteristics of conservation funding mechanisms are relevant to 
conservation policy support. To support optimal funding policy, future research should attempt to 
clarify landholder preferred program characteristics. The results of this research provide a foundation 
for future research on behavioural impact of taxation incentives, government payments and other 
funding models. Future research should further attempt to clarify whether or not there is a correlation 
between biographical variables (ie income level, gender, land usage) or other independent variables, 
and the choice of funding model. Future research should clarify the degree that different funding 
mechanisms encourage the propensity to undertake conservation works on private landholdings.  
Doctoral studies are inevitably constrained by time, funds, and the fact that the investigator is learning 
whilst doing the work. These limits are particularly constraining when dealing with a complex public 
policy problem. In this case, however, the findings are significant at least at an indicative level. They 
confirm that there is a strong case for major innovation in the funding mechanisms for public support 
for landscape scale environmental conservation and restoration, including on private lands. They 
suggest that contrary to economic conventional wisdom there is a significant untapped potential to 
secure greater leverage on public funds than is currently being achieved. The findings also indicate that 
tying institutional design to a careful analysis of subjective decision making factors, and targeting 
funding mechanisms more precisely to behavioural and attitudinal segments does have great promise 
for substantially improving conservation and restoration outcomes at a time of shrinking government 
investment. 
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Appendix 1 – Background Information on Taxation and Conservation 
 ‘When you have to shoot, shoot. Don’t talk.’ – Tuco 
The Good, the Bad and the Ugly: Extended English-Language Version (Directed by Sergio Leone, Metro Goldwyn Mayer, 
2003) 1:57:43 
The author of this dissertation had the movie playing in the background while writing. The quote represents a point in the 
writing process where various ideas coalesced. 
A Overview 
Reactions to the terms environment and taxation, cause many to think of an instrument that penalises 
those who cause environmental harm. That is, an instrument that internalises a negative externality by 
spanning the gap between marginal social costs and marginal private costs. Whilst Pigouvian taxes 
provide an economic incentive to use resources efficiently, they provide little incentive for restoring the 
environment after damage, carrying out operations to prevent impacts on the environment, or 
enhancing habitats to encourage native fauna and flora. 
In the presence of positive externalities, such as unrewarded eco-services (ie bio-diversity on private 
land), those who benefit from their provision (the public) do not pay for them.
735
 This leads to 
undersupply and underinvestment. In contrast to Pigouvian taxes which internalise negative 
externalities, ‘[p]igouvian subsidies correct for positive externalities by subsidising the desired 
behaviour so that the market price reflects the social value of the good which is defined as its private 
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 Pigou, above n 100, 159-61. 
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value to consumers plus the value of the positive externalities it generates.’736 Pigouvian subsidies 
provide an incentive to increase production of desirable goods and services. Pigouvian subsidies to 
encourage eco-services could take the form of direct government payments (stewardship payments, 
conservation payments, and government grants), direct philanthropic payments, or indirect 
compensation such as tax incentives.  
Under economic theory, optimality in the payment of Pigouvian subsidies occurs where the subsidy 
equals the marginal social benefit. The inability to accurately calculate social benefits and social costs 
may mean that the subsidy is over paid or under paid. Transaction costs, such as monitoring and 
distribution fees also have an impact on the optimality of the payment. Given these limitations, propose 
the appropriate government intervention should involve an institution that minimises transaction costs, 
providing a suitable incentive taking into account the goodwill of landholders. At the end of this 
appendix, suggestions are made as to how tax may recognise positive externalities produced by 
conservation and encourage conservation on private land. 
In using the taxation system to encourage good social behaviour ‘taxation may also have unintentional 
and sometimes undesirable results.’737 This appendix will consider the concepts of tax planning, tax 
avoidance and tax evasion, along with an overview of anti-avoidance provisions.  
B Deductibility of Conservation Expenditure 
At present in Australia no tax deduction is available for non-business expenditure incurred principally 
in improving or protecting ecological assets. A tax deduction may be allowable if the expenditure can 
be linked to primary production, mining or some other profit motivated enterprise. It is unclear whether  
the creation of a ‘conservation business’ with a view to participating in eco-services markets will allow 
tax deductibility of expenditure incurred in generating the eco-services.  
Under Australian taxation law, taxable income is calculated using the formula in s 4-15(1) of the 
Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 (Cth) (‘ITAA1997’): 
‘Taxable income = Assessable income – Deductions’ 
Under this formula, income tax is calculated based on an individual’s net position. Deductions fall into 
the categories of general deductions and specific deductions under Division 8 of the ITAA1997. 
Broadly, a deduction may be claimed if: 
                                                 
736
 Lily L Batchelder, Fred T Goldberg and Peter R Orszag, 'Efficiency and Tax Incentives: The Case for Refundable Tax 
Credits' (2006) 59(1) Standford Law Review 23, 44. 
737
 Woellner et al, above n 209, 12. 
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 The expense has been incurred in earning an individual’s assessable income or incurred in 
carrying on a business for the purposes of producing income and it is not private or capital in 
nature; or 
 It is allowed under a specific provision. 
The benefits of a deduction vary according to the tax rate applicable to an individual. Those on the 
highest marginal tax rate will receive a higher benefit than those on the lowest marginal tax rate. In 
contrast, a tax offset (discussed below) is a tax credit / rebate which reduce the tax payable on taxable 
income. Consequently, a tax offset is more valuable than a deduction as it is does not depend on the 
taxpayer’s marginal tax rate. 
1 General Deduction Provision 
Section 8-1 of the ITAA1997 sets out the rules for deductibility. The provision has two positive limbs 
and four negative limbs.  
Positive Limbs: 
1. Any loss or outgoing to the extent that it is incurred in gaining or producing an individual’s 
assessable income is deductible from that assessable income; and 
 
2. Any loss or outgoing to the extent that it is necessarily incurred in carrying on a business for the 
purpose of gaining or producing assessable income is deductible from that assessable income.  
Negative Limbs: 
1. The general deduction denies a deduction for a loss or outgoing that is capital in nature; 
 
2. There is no deduction for a loss or outgoing to the extent that it is of a private or domestic 
nature; 
 
3. There is no deduction for a loss or outgoing incurred in relation to gaining or producing exempt 
income or non-assessable non-exempt income; and 
 
4. There is no deduction for a loss or outgoing where a provision of the taxation law denies the 
deduction. 
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Under s 8-1 there must be a nexus between the loss and outgoing and the production of income or the 
carrying on of a business. The loss or outgoing must be ‘incidental and relevant’ to the income or  
business activity. The expenditure must have the ‘essential character’ of an income producing or 
business expense.
738
  
Under the second positive limb of s 8-1, a loss or outgoing may be deducted if ‘it is necessarily 
incurred in carrying on a business for the purpose of gaining or producing’ assessable income. The 
term ‘necessarily incurred’ is not strictly interpreted by the courts. It places a qualification on 
deductibility to the extent that the expenditure must be desirable or appropriate in the pursuit of 
business goals.
739
 ‘Necessarily’ indicates that ‘the expenditure must be dictated by the business ends to 
which it is directed, those ends forming part of or being truly incidental to the business.’740 
Costs incurred on activities preliminary to carrying on a business or an income producing activity are 
not deductible. They are incurred too early to be part of the income producing activity. For example 
expenditure feasibility studies,
741
 initial research and development,
742
 and set up costs
743
 are generally 
not deductible under s 8-1. The temporal relationship between the incurring of an outgoing and the 
actual receipt of income is one of several facts relevant in determining whether or not a necessary 
connection exists. Thus, if expenditure occurs at a time that satisfies the requirements of s 8-1, it does 
not matter that the expenditure is unsuccessful in generating income.
744
 
The first negative limb of s 8-1 denies a deduction for capital losses or outgoings but there is no 
statutory definition of ‘capital’ or ‘revenue.’ The courts have struggled to articulate distinguishing 
features between capital expenditure and revenue expenditure.
745
 The leading Australian case is Sun 
Newspapers Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1938) 61 CLR 337 (‘the Sun Newspapers case’) 
in which Dixon J states:
746
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 Ronpibon Tin NL v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1949) 78 CLR 47;  Charles Moore & Co (WA) Pty Ltd v Federal 
Commissioner of Taxation (1956) 95 CLR 344;  Lunney v Commissioner of Taxation (1958) 100 CLR 478; Steele v 
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 Magna Alloys & Research Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1980) 11 ATR 276. 
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741
 Softwood Pulp & Paper Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1976) 7 ATR 101. 
742
 Howland-Rose v Commissioner of Taxation (2002) 118 FCR 61; Re Macpherson and Federal Commissioner of Taxation 
(2007) 65 ATR 944. 
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 Re Smeding and Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (2001) 48 ATR 1084. 
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 Steele v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (1999) 197 CLR 459. 
745
  Indeed in Inland Revenue Commissioners v British Salmson Aero Ltd [1938] 2 KB 482, 498 Lord Greene remarked that 
in distinguishing between revenue and capital  ‘in many cases it is almost true to say that the spin of a coin would decide 
the matter almost as satisfactorily as an attempt to find reasons.’ 
746
 Sun Newspapers Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1938) 61 CLR 337, 359. 
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The distinction between expenditure and outgoings on revenue account and on capital account corresponds 
with the distinction between the business entity, structure, or organization set up or established for the earning 
of profit and the process by which such an organization operates to obtain regular returns by means of regular 
outlay, the difference between the outlay and returns representing profit or loss.  
Justice Dixon’s ‘business entity test’ requires that the outgoing relates to the structure within which the 
profits are earned or part of the profit earning process. In applying the test Dixon J referred to three 
matters to be considered:  
 The character of the advantage sought (the lasting quality may play a part in this consideration) 
 The manner in which it is to be used relied upon or enjoyed (recurrent use may be a 
consideration); and 
 The means adopted to obtain it (ie periodical payments, outright purchase). 
In the Sun Newspapers Case, a company which held nearly all the shares in Sun Newspapers Ltd, 
agreed to pay £86,500 to those interested in the production of the new newspaper for their interest in 
the competing newspaper and in consideration for them agreeing not to become associated for a period 
of three years with the publication of any other newspaper in Sydney or within 300 miles of Sydney. 
The features in the case which led Dixon J to the conclusion that the outgoings were of a capital nature 
included that the outgoings were large, that they were incurred to remove competition, and that the goal 
of the outgoings was to shelter the taxpayer’s business structure and to obtain an asset. As a 
consequence, it can be asserted that expenditure relating to the profit yielding subject (such as the 
establishment or the enhancement of the business structure) will generally be capital in nature. 
Expenditure incurred in the administration of a business will generally be revenue in nature. 
The second negative limb of s 8-1 denies a deduction for losses or outgoings of a private or domestic 
nature. Expenditure that may prima facie satisfy the positive limbs may still be of a private and 
domestic nature. For example, travel between a taxpayer’s home and work is necessary to earn an 
income but the essential character of the expenditure is private in nature.
747
 The legal principle is that 
deductibility is limited to expenditure incurred in the ‘course of deriving assessable income’ rather than 
expenditure ‘incurred for the purpose of deriving assessable income.’748 A home office is essentially 
domestic in nature even though some deductibility may be allowed for heating and cleaning.
749’ In 
some situations, expenditure which is essentially relevant to gaining or producing assessable income 
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 Lunney v Commissioner of Taxation (1958) 100 CLR 478. 
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 Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Payne (2001) 202 CLR 93. 
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 Handley v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1981) 148 CLR 182 (Murphy J). 
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will be deductible even though it may have a private and domestic aspect. 
750
 Where expenditure is 
partially private and partially income gathering then it should be apportioned. 
Given the above, the general deduction provision hinders operations conducted in a businesslike 
manner that are setup for the purposes of promoting conservation. For example, say Chris is concerned 
about the biodiversity in his local area and he decides to take a hands-on-approach to the problem. 
Chris purchases land with the aim of planting native flora to attract and promote endangered native 
species. He decides that he will not conduct a primary production business such as grazing upon the 
land. He researches the endangered species and tailors his planting based on that research. Chris is 
aware that he may be able to sell marketable eco-services and conducts a feasibility study into the 
issues. After consulting with experts he decides that to protect the native species he will have to set up 
pest proof fences to keep out feral cats, foxes and rabbits. Once the fences are built he will have to 
conduct an eradication program to remove any pests upon the land. 
 If Chris were to claim the expenditure under s 8-1 then it is likely that it would be denied as some of 
the expenditure is preliminary in nature and the majority is capital in nature. Analogous reasoning is 
seen in fruit and nut tree plantations where in general, costs incurred (ie feasibility research, buying the 
trees, preparing the ground) in establishing a plantation at least up to the stage of planting seedlings in 
the ground are capital expenses.
751
 Chris’ subsequent expenditure may be challenged on the grounds 
that it is not ‘incidental and relevant’ to the operations of an income producing activity even though it 
is intended that money will be raised through the sale of marketable eco-services. It could be argued 
that any expenditure is private given that Chris is primarily concerned with conservation rather than the 
sale of eco-services. 
2 Specific Deductions 
Under s 8-5 of the ITAA1997, a specific deduction is an amount which is deductible under a provision 
other than the general deduction provision. A double deduction is not allowed. Where the same amount 
gives rise to a deduction under more than one provision as s 8-10 of the ITAA1997 states that the 
taxpayer must claim the deduction under the most appropriate provision. A checklist of specific 
deductions is provided in s 12-5 of the ITAA1997. Expenditure of a capital nature is not deductible 
under s 8-1 but specific provisions may allow deductions for capital allowances (ie depreciation), 
capital works (ie income producing buildings) at a specified rate over a period of time, and an outright 
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 Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Edwards (1994) 49 FCR 318; Mansfield v Federal Commissioner of Taxation 
(1995) 31 ATR 367. 
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 Commissioner of Taxation v Osborne (1990) 26 FCR 63. 
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deduction for other capital expenditure. Capital expenditure which is not covered by any other specific 
deduction provision may be deductible under s 40-880 of the ITAA1997. This allows expenditure to be 
written off over a five year period. Some provisions allow a deduction for some expenditure which is 
generally private and domestic in nature such as charitable donations, food, accommodation and 
clothing. Specific deductions may be limited to classes of taxpayers such as primary producers, mining 
companies, investors in specified schemes, and companies engaged in research and development.  
The current deduction provisions that are relevant to environmental concerns are: 
 Capital allowances on environmental protection activities, s 40-755 of the ITAA1997; 
 Capital allowances on landcare operations, s 40-630 of the ITAA1997; 
 Capital allowances on mining site rehabilitation, s 40-735 of the ITAA1997; 
 Capital allowances on trees in carbon sink forest, Subdivision 40J of the ITAA1997; and 
 Capital allowances on water facilities and horticultural plants, s 40-515 of the ITAA1997. 
Also of relevance are the tax provisions applicable to primary producers and that quarantine non-
commercial business losses.  
(a) Environmental Protection Activities 
Under s 40-755 of the ITAA1997 all expenditure (revenue and capital) incurred for the sole or 
dominant purpose of carrying on an environmental protection activity is deductible. An environmental 
protection activity is an activity carried out in preventing, remedying, treating, cleaning up or storing 
pollution or waste. Deductibility applies where pollution has resulted or is likely to result from an 
income earning activity of the taxpayer, is on a site on which the taxpayer carried on, carries on or 
proposes to carry on an earning activity. It also applies to cleaning up pollution on surrounding sites (ie 
neighbouring land, rivers, lakes). Under s 40-760 the scope of the deduction is curtailed. Deductibility 
is denied for expenditure for acquiring land, capital expenditure for constructing altering or improving 
buildings, expenditure upon environmental bonds or securities, expenditure that is deductible under 
some other provision such as the general deduction provision or capital allowances provisions, and 
expenditures restricted by other sections of the taxation law. The anti-avoidance provision in s 40-765 
limits the deductible amount to the market value of the activities. 
The label ‘environmental protection activities’ encourages the casual reviewer to expect a wide scope. 
In reality the provision is of limited relevance to conservation activities. For example, if a supermarket 
chain purchases a site for a shopping centre and wishes to replace contaminated soil with fresh soil and 
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for environmental and social purposes, plant a wildlife corridor of native trees, then under the 
environmental protection activities provision, the decontamination costs are deductible but if the social 
purpose is honestly disclosed, deduction for the planting of the trees is likely to be denied. 
The estimated loss of tax revenue because of the implementation of this concession from the 2008 to 
the 2011 financial years is outlined in table Appendix 1-1. 
752
 Underneath the Australian Treasury’s tax 
expenditure figure is the author’s estimate of the gross funds which would have to be spent by relevant 
tax payers, based on a constant tax rate of 30%, to claim such a deduction. 
 
 
Table Appendix 1-1 Tax Expenditure - Environmental Protection Activities 2007-08 to 2010-11 
Description 2007-08 
$ million 
2008-09 
$ million 
2009-10 
$ million 
2010-11 
$ million 
Tax Expenditure Code  
B90 
15 25 35 20 
Estimate of Taxpayer’s 
Gross Funds Applied 
(Tax Expenditure / 0.3) 
 
50 
 
83.333 
 
116.667 
 
66.667 
(b) Landcare Operations 
Section 40-630 of the ITAAA1997 provides a deduction for capital expenditure incurred on Landcare 
operations by a primary producer, a business using rural land in its earning activities (other than mining 
or quarrying), and rural land irrigation water providers. A lessee may claim a deduction as there is no 
requirement to own the land where the business is being carried on. A Landcare operation is defined in 
s 40-635 as: 
 The erection of fences in accordance with an approved land management plan to separate 
different classes of land; 
 The erection of fences to prevent or limit land degradation by livestock and pests and to assist 
in the reclamation of those areas; 
 The construction of levee banks or other similar improvements; 
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 The construction of drainage works principally for the purpose of controlling salinity or 
assisting in drainage control; 
 Eradicating or exterminating animals and plants that are pests; 
 Destroying plant growth that is detrimental to the land; and 
 Preventing or fighting land degradation by means other than by the erection of fencing.   
The provision does not apply to expenditure on plant and equipment other than that directly relevant to 
the Landcare operations such as levees, dams, drainage bores, piping, and fences. Deductibility is 
denied to expenditure incurred in the drainage of a swamp or low-lying land. 
This provision is pertinent to conservation activities but in the operations must be carried out primarily 
for the purposes stated in s 40-635. If the primary purpose for the erection of fencing is to safeguard 
native fauna from pests rather than to limit land degradation, then the deductibility will be denied. 
The estimated loss of tax revenue because of the implementation of this concession is included by the 
Australian Treasury in the estimated loss for the capital expenditure deduction for mining, quarrying 
and petroleum operations.
753
 
(c) Mining Site Rehabilitation 
Under s 40-735 of the ITAA1997 an outright deduction is allowed for revenue and capital expenditure 
on rehabilitating sites that have been used for mining, quarrying, petroleum operations or ancillary 
activities.  Section 40-735 defines mining site rehabilitation as ‘an act of restoring or rehabilitating a 
site or part of a site to, or to a reasonable approximation of, the condition it was in before’ the mining 
operations were first started on the site. 
No deduction is available under s 40-735 for the cost of an asset that may be depreciated under other 
provisions. The provision is concerned with rehabilitating the land, not with buildings or other 
structures which may have been on the land before mining operations commenced. Consequently, a 
deduction for mining site rehabilitation expenditure does not include constructing buildings or other 
structures to replace those which may have been on the mine site before operations commenced. 
This provision is pertinent to environmental restoration after mining operations have ceased. However, 
the provision would not allow a deduction for expenditure incurred above that necessary to restore a 
site to its original condition. Expenditure incurred for the purposes of enhancing a site for conservation 
would be denied. 
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The estimated loss of tax revenue because of this concession is not separately tracked by the Australian 
Treasury. 
(d) Carbon Sink Forests 
From the 2008 financial year till the 2012 financial year, an outright deduction was allowed under 
subdivision 40J of the ITAA1997 for expenditure incurred in establishing trees in a carbon sink forest. 
The deduction was to encourage progress towards Australia’s targets under the Kyoto Protocol.754  The 
conditions to be satisfied are contained in ss 40-1005 and 40-1010: 
 The taxpayer must be carrying on a business; 
 The taxpayer must incur expenditure on establishing trees in the year that the claim is made or 
based on expenditure from an earlier year; 
 The primary and principal purpose in establishing the trees must be carbon sequestration and 
the purpose can- not include future plans for felling the trees or using the trees in commercial 
horticulture; 
 The expenditure must not be incurred under a management investment scheme or a forestry 
managed investment scheme (a special class of tax-leveraged instrument); 
 To satisfy the ownership condition one of the following must apply: 
- The taxpayer owns the trees and any holder of a lease, lesser interest or licence relating to 
the land occupied by the trees does not use the land for the primary and principal purpose of 
carbon sequestration by the trees; or 
- The taxpayer holds a lease over land upon which the trees are situated or a quasi-ownership 
right granted by an exempt Australian government agency or an exempt foreign government 
agency. The lease or quasi-ownership right enables the taxpayer to use the land for the 
purpose of carbon sequestration by the trees. Any other holder of a lesser interest or licence 
relating to the land does not use the land for the primary and principal purpose of carbon 
sequestration by the trees; or 
 The taxpayer holds a licence relating to the land occupied by the trees and uses the land for the 
primary and principal purpose of carbon sequestration by the trees. 
 The taxpayer must provide the Commissioner a statement that the specific conditions are met: 
- at the end of the income year, the trees occupy a continuous land area in Australia of 0.2 
hectares or more;  
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 Woellner et al, above n 737, 738. 
282 
 
- at the time the trees are established, it is likely  that they will attain a crown cover of 20% or 
more, and a height of at least two meters; and 
- on 1 January 1990 the land was clear of trees that had attained or were likely to attain  a 
crown cover of 20% or and had or were likely to reach a height of at least two meters. 
From the 2013 financial year, establishment costs will be deductible over 14 years and 105 days, 
starting from the first day of the income year in which the trees are established, at a rate of 7% per 
annum. The deduction is limited to expenditure in establishing the trees. 
The deduction is limited to individuals carrying on a business. While the primary purpose for planting 
the trees must be for carbon sequestration, ‘this does not prevent the taxpayer for having a secondary 
purpose such as improving biodiversity.’755   
The estimated loss of tax revenue because of this concession from the 2008 to the 2011 financial years 
is outlined in table Appendix 1-2. 
756
 Underneath the Australian Treasury’s tax expenditure figure is the 
author’s estimate of the gross funds which would have to be spent by tax payers, based on a constant 
tax rate of 30%, to claim such a deduction. 
 
Table Appendix 1-2 Tax Expenditure - Carbon Sink Forests 2007-08 to 2010-11 
Description 2007-08 
$ million 
2008-09 
$ million 
2009-10 
$ million 
2010-11 
$ million 
Tax Expenditure Code 
B99 
- - 2 4 
Estimate of Taxpayer’s 
Gross Funds Applied 
(Tax Expenditure / 0.3) 
   
6.667 
 
13.333 
 
(e) Water Facilities and Horticultural Plants 
Section 40-515 of the ITAA1997 provides a deduction for depreciation of a water facility or a 
horticultural plant. A water facility is plant or a structural improvement, or an alteration, addition or 
extension to a plant or structural improvement (ie dams, water tanks, bores, pumps, windmills)  
                                                 
755
 Leslie Nielson, 'Tax Deductible Carbon Sink Forests?' (Research Paper No 4, Parliamentary Library, Parliament of 
Australia, 2008) 3. 
756
 The Australian Government the Treasury, above n 55, 107. 
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primarily for the purpose of conserving or conveying water (s 40-520(1)).  A horticultural plant is a live 
plant or fungus (ie citrus trees, nut trees, fruit trees) cultivated or propagated for its products (s 40-
520(2)).  
The estimated loss of tax revenue from this concession from the 2008 to the 2011 financial years is 
outlined in table Appendix 1-3. 
757
 Underneath the Australian Treasury’s tax expenditure figure is the 
author’s estimate of the gross funds spent by tax payers, based on a constant tax rate of 30%, to claim 
such a deduction. 
Table Appendix 1-3 Tax Expenditure - Horticultural Plants 2007-08 to 2010-11 
 2007-08 
$ million 
2008-09 
$ million 
2009-10 
$ million 
2010-11 
$ million 
Tax Expenditure Code 
B84 
5 5 5 6 
Estimate of Taxpayer’s 
Gross Funds Applied 
(Tax Expenditure / 0.3) 
 
16.667 
 
16.667 
 
16.667 
 
20 
The capital expenditure incurred on the water facility must have been incurred for the purpose of 
conserving or conveying water for primary production. To claim the horticultural allowance, the 
taxpayer must carry on a business of horticulture and own the plant or holds an interest to the land to 
which the plant is attached.  
The limiting conditions prevent landholders not carrying on primary production from accessing the 
deduction. The horticultural plant deduction is of slight relevance to conservation as it is unlikely that 
conservation objectives and the aims of horticultural plant propagation would converge. 
The estimated loss of tax revenue from this concession from the 2008 to the 2011 financial years is 
outlined in table Appendix 1-4. 
758
 Underneath the Australian Treasury’s tax expenditure figure is the 
author’s estimate of the gross funds spent by tax payers, based on a constant tax rate of 30%, to claim 
such a deduction. 
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 Ibid 104. 
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Table Appendix 1-4 Tax Expenditure – Water Facilities 2007-08 to 2010-11 
 2007-08 
$ million 
2008-09 
$ million 
2009-10 
$ million 
2010-11 
$ million 
Tax Expenditure Code 
B85 
20 15 15 20 
Estimate of Taxpayer’s 
Gross Funds Applied 
(Tax Expenditure / 0.3) 
 
66.667 
 
50 
 
50 
 
66.667 
3 Primary Producers 
Primary producers receive concessional treatment in recognition of the high costs of production, 
vulnerability to environmental factors, destruction of produce due to pests and disease, being price 
takers rather than price setters, restricted cash flow and irregular and intermittent profits. A ‘primary 
production business’ is defined in s 995-1 of the ITAA1997 as a business of:  
 Cultivating or propagating plants, fungi or their products or parts; 
 Animal husbandry for the purpose of selling them or their produce; 
 Dairy production; 
 Taking or catching of marine life; or  
 Plantation forestry and various activities requiring tree felling. 
Taxation Ruling TR 97/11
759
 provides indicia of whether an individual is carrying on primary 
production. Generally the activities must have a significant commercial purpose or character taking into 
account the size or scale of the activities, profitability or profit potential, repetition and regularity of the 
activities, similarity to other relevant businesses, and carried out in a businesslike manner. The 
definition of a primary production business and the indicia of such a business, point to the consumptive 
use of resources. It seems unlikely that conservation activities carried out in a businesslike manner 
would meet the criteria of primary production. Given increasing pressures on the environment and the 
emergence of eco-service markets, this restrictive definition of a primary production business requires 
reconsideration. 
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 Australian Taxation Office, Income tax: am I carrying on a business of primary production, TR 97/11, 4 June 1997. 
285 
 
4 Non-Commercial Business Losses 
Division 35 of the ITAA1997 prevents losses from non-commercial activities from being deducted 
against an individual’s other income unless the individual’s adjustable taxable income is less than 
$250,000 and one of the four prescribed tests is satisfied. Losses that are denied may be carried forward 
to be offset against future profits of the activity. According to the explanatory memorandum, the 
‘concept of what constitutes carrying on a business’ has been broadly interpreted which has ‘resulted in 
significant revenue leakage from individual taxpayers claiming deductions for unprofitable 
activities.’760 The provision was adopted to limit the degree to which non-commercial losses from 
‘hobbies and/or lifestyle choices’ can be used to reduce a taxpayer’s overall taxable income.761 
The term ‘non-commercial’ is not defined. It describes a business activity which does not satisfy the 
criteria in s 35-10. Adjustable taxable income must be less than $250,000 and one of the four objectives 
tests must be met:  
 Assessable income from the business activity must be at least $20,000; or 
 The business activity has produced a taxable income in at least three out of the last five 
financial years; or 
 The total reduced cost base of real property assets used in carrying on the business activities are 
at least $500,000; or 
 The total value of other assets (excluding motor vehicles) used in carrying on the business must 
be at least $100,000. 
The prohibition against offsetting non-commercial losses against other income does not apply to an 
individual carrying on a primary production business or a professional arts business if the income from 
other sources is less than $40,000. If the criterion denies an individual the ability to deduct losses, s 35-
55 allows them to apply to the Tax Commissioner to exercise his discretion to allow the application of 
the losses. 
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 Explanatory Memorandum, New Business Tax System (Integrity Measures) Bill 2000 (Cth) [1.7] - [1.9]. 
761
 Ibid. 
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C Tax Offsets 
A tax offset is a tax credit/rebate which reduces the tax payable on taxable income. Income tax is 
calculated with the formula in s 4-10(1) of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 (Cth): 
Income tax = (Taxable income x Rate) – Tax offsets 
The amount of tax offset which can be used by a taxpayer is independent of their marginal tax rate. 
Consequently, in taxation terms, a tax offset is more valuable than a deduction, which is subtracted 
from assessable income to calculate taxable income. For example, a taxpayer on a marginal tax rate of 
30 per cent is better off receiving a $100 tax offset rather than a $100 deduction as the offset reduces 
tax payable by $100 but the deduction only reduces tax payable by $30 ($100 x 30%). In the majority 
of cases, the amount of a tax offset which exceeds the amount of the tax liability is lost (‘non-
refundable tax offset’).762 Some offsets such as the research and development concession provide 
refundable tax credits. 
Batchelder, Golberg and Orszag argue that where price elasticities of demand and behaviour responses 
across different income levels are uncertain, refundable tax offsets are the most efficient means to 
encourage socially valued activities such as conservation. This is because:
763
 
… a uniform refundable credit minimizes the dead weight loss associated with errors in an incentive’s 
application, assuming evidence is non-existent or inconclusive regarding how different income groups vary in 
the marginal externalities generated by their engaging in the subsidized activity and in their responsiveness to 
the incentive. This is the case irrespective of whether the subsidy is delivered through the tax or transfer 
system and irrespective of whether the subsidized behaviour actually generates positive externalities. 
The benefit of tax deduction incentives is linked to the marginal tax rate. They favour higher income 
taxpayers. Tax deduction incentives are preferable to tax offset incentives where higher income 
taxpayers engage in activity which generates larger proportions of social benefits or they are more 
responsive to the incentive. 
764
 Regardless of the form of a tax incentive, it may be bad policy to use a 
tax incentive where the behavioural outcome does not generate the desired positive externality or 
because the transactions costs are high.
765
 
The tax provisions contain a number of tax offsets. Of particular relevance is the research and 
development concession which has the potential to generate positive externalities. 
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 Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Cth) s 160AD. 
763
 Batchelder, Goldberg and Orszag, above n 736, 43-4. 
764
 Ibid 24, 46-7, 49. 
765
 Ibid 73. 
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1 Research and Development 
Division 355 of the ITAA1997 provides an incentive to companies to conduct research and 
development (R&D) in Australia. Section 355 states that the object is to encourage R&D activities ‘that 
might otherwise not be conducted because of an uncertain return from the activities’ by providing a tax 
offset that increases after tax profitability. Eligible entities receive a tax offset for R&D commencing 
on or after 1 July 2011. A company is entitled to the tax offset if it satisfies the following conditions: 
 It is an eligible R&D entity; 
 It conducts experimental activities that meet the criteria for R&D activities; 
 The R&D activities are conducted by or on behalf of the company; 
 The notional R&D deductions for the income year are at least $20,000 (there are exceptions); 
and 
 The R&D activities are registered with AusIndustry within ten months of the end of the relevant 
financial year.  
A 45% refundable tax offset (equivalent to a 150% tax deduction for the 2012 financial year) applies to 
a R&D entity with an aggregated group turnover of less than $20 million unless it is 50% controlled by 
an exempt entity or group of exempt entities. A 40% non-refundable tax offset (equivalent to a 133% 
tax deduction for the 2012 financial year) applies to all other R&D entities.  R&D entities under s 355-
35 are: 
 body corporates under Australian law;  
 body corporates incorporated under a foreign law that are Australian residents for tax purposes; 
and 
 public trading trusts with corporate trustees.  
An R&D entity does not include exempt entities (ie universities), non-incorporated entities such as sole 
traders, partnerships, limited partnerships and most trusts.   
Sections 355-200 to 355-225 establish what expenditure can be included as notionally deductible R&D 
expenditure. This includes expenditure on eligible R&D activities, the decline in value of depreciating 
assets and balancing adjustments for depreciating assets used solely for R&D activities. Section 355-
225 excludes expenditure on buildings, including parts of buildings, capital expenditure included in the 
cost of depreciating assets under Division 40 of the ITAA1997, interest, and expenditure on core 
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technology. If expenditure is eligible for the R&D concession it cannot be claimed under any other tax 
deduction provision even if the R&D entity does not claim the R&D offset. 
Primary producers may have a strong incentive to fully fund R&D activities that increase productivity 
on their land but there seems to be little incentive for them to fund R&D into conservation activities.
766
 
The R&D offset,  by leveraging public funds, provides an incentive to producers to undertake core 
R&D activities, possibly through Rural Research and Development Corporations, to lead to technology 
and environmental management practices that reduce human impact on ecosystems.  
The estimated loss of tax revenue from this concession for environmental or conservation research and 
development is not tracked by the Australian Treasury. 
D Conservation Philanthropy 
Generally, businesses (including primary production businesses) can claim a tax deduction under s 8-1 
of the ITAA1997 for gifts to non-profit organisations if it is part of their normal commercial activities, 
regardless of the tax status of the recipient. For example, donations for the purpose of promoting 
business activities are deductible.  
A non-business donor is only entitled to a deduction for gifts if the recipient is a deductible gift 
recipient (DGR) or listed in the ITAA1997 or its regulations as eligible donees, or named in the 
Australian fund. Subdivision 30-B of the ITAA1997 lists potential donees of deductible gifts, and 
identifies special conditions. Of particular relevance is s 30-55 which identifies the types of 
environmental funds, environmental authorities or environmental institutions to which a deductible gift 
or contribution may be made. Organisations listed include the Australian Conservation Foundation, 
Greening Australia, Landcare and the Worldwide Fund for Nature. The department of Sustainability, 
Environment, Water, Population and Communities maintains a register
767
 of organisations eligible to 
receive tax deductible donations (see http://www.environment.gov.au/about/tax/reo/index.html).
768
 
According to subdivision 30-E, for an environmental organisation to be eligible to be listed: 
1. the organisation's principal purpose must be the protection and enhancement of the natural 
environment or environmental research related; 
                                                 
766
 See generally,  Productivity Commission, 'Rural Research and Development Corporations' (Report No. 52, Final Inquiry 
Report, Productivity Commission, 2011). 
767
  Established under item 6.1.1 of s 30-55(1) of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 (Cth). 
768
 Environment Department of Sustainability, Water, Population and Communities, Register of Environmental 
Organisations (17 August 2011) <http://www.environment.gov.au/about/tax/reo/index.html>. 
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2. the organisation must not pay any of its profit, surplus or give any of its property to members 
and on winding up assets must be transferred to another registered fund; 
3. it must have a policy of not acting as a mere conduit (ie it must not be a mere collection agency) 
for the transfer of gifts to other organisations or individuals; and 
4. it must provide data about its gift fund to and comply with any rules made by the Minister. 
A deduction for gifts is not allowed to lead to a tax loss or increase a tax loss
769
 but subdivision 30-DB 
of the ITAA1997 allows an individual from 1 July 2003 to elect to spread deductions for certain gifts to 
deductible gift recipients over a period of up to five years. An election may be made where the gift of 
money or property is more than $5,000.  ‘Property’ encompasses land, buildings, equipment, shares 
and securities. If the property was purchased within the previous 12 months, the deduction is the lesser 
of the cost price of the property and its market value when donated. Where the property has been held 
for longer than 12 months and is valued at more than $5,000 then the value of the deduction is 
determined by the Commissioner. Gifts of trading stock are a special situation and such gifts are not 
subject to the usual restrictions. Gifts of trading stock transferred out of the normal course of business 
are deductible regardless of when the stock was acquired.
770
 The amount of the deduction is the market 
value of the trading stock on the day the gift was made. 
1 Ancillary Funds 
An ancillary fund is a philanthropic trust fund that collects tax deductible donations which are 
distributed to deductible gift recipients such as registered environmental organisations.
771
 An ancillary 
fund may be either a private ancillary fund
772
 or a public ancillary fund. 
773
 Only public ancillary funds 
can accept tax deductible donations from the public.  
A private ancillary fund must be maintained under a Will or a Trust Deed as a vehicle for private 
philanthropy. The guidelines 
774
 specify that: 
 Each year a private ancillary fund must distribute at least 5 per cent of the market value of the 
fund’s assets or $11,000 whichever is the greater; 
 The market value of the fund’s assets (other than land) must be estimated at least annually and a 
valuation of land must be undertaken every three years; 
                                                 
769
 Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 (Cth) s 26-55. 
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 Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 (Cth) s 30-15. 
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 See generally Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 (Cth) s 30-15. 
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 Taxation Administration Act 1953 (Cth) s 426-105 in sch 1. 
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 Taxation Administration Act 1953 (Cth) s 426-102 in sch 1. 
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 Assistant Treasurer, Private Ancillary Fund Guidelines 2009, 28 September 2009. 
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 The trustee must keep proper accounts and financial statements must be prepared at the end of 
each financial year; 
 An audit of the fund must be undertaken each financial year, with the audit report submitted to 
the Commissioner along with the income tax return; 
 The trustee must maintain a current investment strategy. The investment strategy must include 
the investment objectives and a detailed outline of the investment methods that will be adopted. 
A general prohibition against borrowing exists. The fund must not carry on a business; and 
 The distinguishing feature of a private ancillary fund is that it is prohibited from receiving 
donations totalling more than 10 per cent of the market value of the fund’s assets from entities 
other than the founder of the fund, the associates of the founder or the employees of the 
founder. 
A public ancillary fund may be established and maintained under a Will or a Trust Deed as a vehicle 
for public philanthropy. It is subject to similar requirements and restrictions to a private ancillary 
fund.
775
 Of difference is that during each income tax year, a public ancillary fund must distribute at 
least 4 per cent of the market value of the fund’s assets or $8,800 whichever is the greater. The fund 
must invite the public to contribute as reflecting the intention of the founders or promoters of the fund. 
The public participates in the administration of the fund. 
Given the compliance costs (ie valuation costs, audit costs), the minimum distribution levels, and the 
restrictions on donors, it is questionable whether or not the ancillary fund income tax measures 
encourage private philanthropy by ‘everyday individuals’. The ongoing costs and minimum distribution 
levels would deter most individuals, families and small businesses from setting up such funds. 
Nonetheless, the tax measures are likely to be persuasive factor for wealthy individuals. 
2 Conservation Covenants 
Under s 31-5 of the ITAA1997 a deduction can be claimed where an individual enters into a perpetual 
conservation covenant with an authorised environmental organisation, government or government 
authority for no consideration. The conditions for the deduction are: 
 the covenant must be over land owned by the individual (it does not apply to leaseholds); 
 the covenant must be permanent and be registered on the title deed; 
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 the covenant must restrict or prohibit activities that could degrade the environmental value of 
the land; 
 the other party to the covenant is a deductible gift recipient, a government or government 
authority; 
 the covenant must be approved by the Minister; 
 The taxpayer must not receive any money, property or other material benefit for entering into 
the covenant; 
 The market value of the land must decrease as a result of the taxpayer entering into the 
covenant; and 
 At least one of the following conditions must be met: 
- the change in the market value of the land as a result of the covenant is more than $5,000; 
or  
- the taxpayer entered into the conservation covenant within 12 months of entering into a 
contract to acquire the land.  
The tax deduction is the Commissioner’s valuation of the reduction in market value attributable to the 
covenant.
776
 Under subdivision 30-DB of the ITAA1997 the deduction may be spread over five years. 
Under Capital Gains Taxation (CGT), a conservation covenant donation triggers CGT event D4.
777
 The 
capital proceeds from the event are equal to the amount that the individual can deduct from tax. This 
mirrors the situation where if a taxpayer were paid for a covenant then the CGT assessable gain would 
be the difference between the payment and the part of the cost-base of the land attributable to the 
covenant. Capital gains will be exempt if the land was acquired before 20 September 1985, and may be 
subject to the 12 months 50% CGT discount
778
 and the small business CGT concessions.
779
 
The conservation covenant affects the value of the entire land. As such the cost base apportioned to the 
covenant must be calculated with reference to the entire land. The relevant portion of the cost base is 
calculated using this formula: 
cost base of land x capital proceeds from entering into the covenant  / those capital proceeds plus the 
market value of the land just after the taxpayer enters into the covenant 
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 Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 (Cth) s 31-15. 
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 Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 (Cth) s 104-47. 
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For example, Mitchell decides to donate 20% of his farm to a registered environmental organisation 
through a conservation covenant. Mitchell bought the property in July 1997 for $1,250,000. Its market 
value before entering into the covenant was $2,100,000 and after was $1,680,000. Consequently, 
Mitchell could claim a tax deduction of $420,000 ($2,100,000 - $1,680,000). The CGT consequences 
of entering into the covenant are as follows: 
Cost base of the covenant - $1,250,000 x $420,000 / ($420,000 + $1,680,000) = $250,000 
Mitchell therefore makes a capital gain of ($420,000 - $250,000) = $170,000 
Less 12 month CGT discount (50%) = ($85,000) 
Less 50% small business concession = ($42,500) 
Net Capital Gain = $42,500 
Mitchell can claim a tax deduction of $420,000 but must include a net capital gain of $42,500 in his tax 
return. The requirement to declare a net taxable gain by the donor is an impediment to philanthropic 
donations.  
E Taxation Incentives and Conservation Investment 
Tax incentives to encourage investment are beneficial to society where the rise in revenue from the 
relevant sector plus the social benefits (ie positive externalities) from the increased investment are 
greater than the loss in tax revenue produced by the incentive plus the indirect costs (ie administration, 
monitoring) of the incentive.
780
 In Australia no major investment vehicles for collectively investing in 
conservation have been set up. However, there are vehicles such as Forestry Management Investment 
Schemes, Pooled Development Funds and Early Stage Venture Capital Limited Partnership, upon 
which a collective conservation investment structure could be modelled. At the heart of these vehicles 
are tax incentives to encourage investment. This section provides an overview of these vehicles and 
reviews their strengths and weaknesses.  
The opportunity to meet conservation goals on agricultural land is high. Managed investment schemes 
have been a popular vehicle for investing in agriculture projects for many years. Prior to 1 July 2008, 
investors in agriculture MIS could claim up front deductions as they were considered to be carrying on 
a business. On the 6th February 2007 the Minister for Revenue announced that investors in non-
forestry agribusiness managed investment schemes would be unable after the 2006-2007 financial year 
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to claim upfront tax deductions for their contributions to the schemes as the investors were not 
considered to be ‘carrying on a business.’781 The operation of managed investment schemes was the 
subject of a test case in Hance v Commissioner of Taxation (2008) 74 ATR 644. The Full Federal court 
held that the taxpayer, who had invested in an almond growing MIS, was carrying on a business and 
was entitled to deductions for outgoings such as rent and management fees associated with the conduct 
of the business. The consequence of the court’s determination is that agribusiness MIS should be 
treated the same as they were prior to the revised stance on the upfront deduction. This is not to say that 
the court case cannot be distinguished as a precedent on legal grounds. Certain other agribusiness MIS 
may not meet the criteria for deductibility set out in the case. 
Due to the uncertainty surrounding the upfront deductibility in agribusiness schemes, it is wise for 
scheme managers to seek a product ruling. A product ruling is a binding public ruling which sets out 
the Australian Taxation Office’s opinion as to the amount allowable as a deduction under a scheme. A 
product ruling does not guarantee the business fundamentals of a scheme but it does outline the tax 
consequences of investing. If a MIS was set up for conservation investment purposes it would be a 
good idea to seek a public ruling in order to clarify the tax consequences of the investment. 
Tax incentives to encourage collective investment could take the form of upfront tax deductions, a 
deduction for ongoing contributions, flow through tax concessions, concessional tax rates, income tax 
exemptions and CGT exemptions.  
F Forestry Managed Investment Schemes 
Division 394 of the ITAA1997 outlines the tax treatment of investments in forestry managed 
investment schemes. The tax concessions encourage investment in new plantations, and support 
secondary investment markets in forestry MIS. Under s 394-10 an initial investor receives a 100% 
deduction for their contribution, both initial and ongoing, provided that the conditions set out in the 
provision are met. Investors who acquire an interest in the scheme by purchasing it from the initial 
investor receive a 100% deduction for their ongoing contributions. According to s 394-10(3), a 
subsequent investor cannot claim their acquisition costs.  Investors in forestry MIS are not required to 
demonstrate that they carrying on a business to claim the upfront deduction, which was the position 
prior to 1 July 2008 and which is still the position with non-forestry agribusiness MIS.  
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Under ss 394-10 and 394-15, conditions that must be met include: 
 the purpose of the scheme must be for establishing and tending trees for felling; 
 the scheme must satisfy the 70% direct forestry expenditure (DFE) rule on 30 June of the 
financial year in which a participant first pays an amount under the scheme; 
 the investor must not have day to day control of the scheme;  
 there must be more than one participant, or the manager must arrange or promote other similar 
schemes; and  
 all trees must be established within 18 months of the end of the financial year in which the first 
payment is made by an investor. 
A forestry MIS will satisfy the 70% DFE rule in a financial year if it is reasonable to expect that by the 
end of the financial year 70% or more of the scheme’s expenditure is for direct forestry expenditure. 
DFE is defined in s 394-45 It includes an amount paid under a scheme attributable to establishing, 
tending, felling and harvesting trees and notional amounts reflecting the market value of goods, 
services or the use of land, provided by the forestry manager of the scheme, for establishing, tending, 
felling and harvesting trees.  
According to s 394-40, certain payments by a participant do not qualify as a payment under forestry 
MIS and are denied tax deductibility. These payments include interest, payments for borrowing, stamp 
duty, goods and services taxation, payments related to specific post-harvest activities, such as 
transportation of felled trees, processing and storage. 
Where the initial investor holds an interest in the forestry MIS at harvest time, the harvest proceeds are 
included in the participant’s income. The proceeds from the sale of the investment by an initial investor 
will be assessed under the income rules rather than the CGT rules, as the initial investment was 
deducted on a revenue account. If an initial investor disposes of their interest within the first four years, 
any claimed deduction will be denied. For example if an individual invested $10,000 in year 1 and 
contributed $7,000 over the next three years for ongoing expenditure then the total amount claimed is 
$17,000. If the initial investor sold the investment for $20,000 before the elapse of four years then they 
would be assessed on the $20,000 proceeds and the $17,000 deduction would be denied. However, a 
deduction for failing the four year holding rule will not be denied where a ‘CGT event’ occurs because 
of circumstances outside the initial investor’s control and which could not have reasonably foreseen the 
occurrence. Examples include the death of the initial investor, insolvency of the MIS manager, the 
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insolvency of the investor, an interest being compulsory transferred due to divorce, and the cancellation 
of the interest because the trees were destroyed by fire, flood or drought. 
A secondary investor who disposes of their investment prior to harvest is treated as receiving 
assessable income to the extent that the proceeds from the disposal exceed the net deductions. If the 
investment is held on a capital account, this amount is added to the cost base or reduced cost base of 
the forestry investment. Capital gains or losses are calculated for the CGT event. Harvest proceeds 
received by a secondary investor are treated in the same way as sales proceeds. 
G Pooled Development Funds 
The object of the Pooled Development Fund Act 1992 (Cth) ‘is to develop, and demonstrate the 
potential of, the market for providing patient equity capital (including venture capital) to small or 
medium‑sized Australian enterprises that carry on eligible businesses’ through the provision of tax 
incentives to encourage investment.
782
 Pooled development funds funnel capital to Australian resident 
companies with assets not exceeding $50 million.  
Under the Pooled Development Fund Act 1992 (Cth) ‘the board’ (Innovation Australia) has authority 
over the registration, revocation of registration and compliance monitoring PDFs.  PDFs require board 
approval for funds they can invest and therefore the tax incentives they access. This provides a 
mechanism for expanding or capping the taxation support and therefore the tax expenditure. 
The taxable income of a pooled development fund (PDF) is divided into two components where 
concessional tax rates apply:
783
  
1. the small and medium-sized enterprise (SME)  income component (taxed at 15%); and 
2. the unregulated investment component (taxed at 25%).  
The purpose of this twin-tier structure is to encourage PDFs to invest in SMEs in preference to holding 
interest-bearing investments.
784
 PDFs maintain a franking account in the same way as other companies 
and PDFs credit their franking accounts for tax paid but may frank a distribution up to the general 
corporate tax rate of 30 per cent. If the PDF is only taxed at 15 per cent this enables the entity to pass 
on a greater franking benefit to shareholders than is based on the actual tax paid. 
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Division 10E of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Cth) (‘ITAA1936’) deals with the income tax 
issues relevant to PDF shareholders. In general, dividends
785
 and income from the sale of PDF shares
786
  
are exempt from income tax. In any event, s 118-13 of the ITAA1997 provides that capital gains are  
disregarded in the disposal of PDF shares. Furthermore, non-resident shareholders are exempt from 
dividend withholding tax from PDF shares.
787
 
The PDF program is being phased out. PDFs will be gradually replaced by Early Stage Venture Capital 
Limited Partnerships from 1 July 2007. While the registration of new PDFs has now closed, existing 
PDFs will continued to be governed by the relevant tax provisions. Even though PDFs entities will 
disappear over time, there is no denying that they have been an effective mechanism in channelling 
funds to SMEs. From 1992 to 2006 PDFs invested over $750 million in Australian enterprises and as at 
30 June 2006, they held investments costing $292 million in 170 companies.
788
 
H Early Stage Venture Capital Limited Partnership – A Flow through Tax Entity 
Early Stage Venture Capital Limited Partnerships (ESVCLP) encourage investment in the early stage 
venture capital sector by granting flow through tax treatment and tax exemptions. An EVSLP is an 
attractive investment structure and overcomes many limitations of general law partnerships, 
corporations and standard limited partnerships. 
Partners in a general law partnership have unlimited liability.
789
 The liability of members in a 
corporation is limited to the amount invested in the corporation as it is a separate legal entity.
790
  
General law partnership are ‘flow through’ tax entities and the profits, the losses and in a general sense, 
the tax allowances of the firm flow through to the partners. If the partnership business makes a loss 
then the partners can offset their portion of the loss against personal income. As a separate legal entity, 
losses are carried by the company and can only be offset against the company’s profits.791  
In a limited partnership
792
 partners are categorised as ‘general partners’ or ‘limited partners’. General 
partners have the same rights and duties as partners in a general law partnership. They can manage the 
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business and share in the profits of the business but they also have unlimited liability.
793
 The liability of 
limited partners as the shibboleth suggests, is limited to the amount invested. While they may share in 
the profits of the business they are not allowed to participate in the management of the business.
794
 A 
downside of a limited partnership is that it is treated as a company for taxation purposes.
795
 The tax 
losses of the business cannot be deducted directly by the partners and the distributions of profits are 
treated as dividends. 
ESVCLPs are excluded from the tax provisions applicable to standard limited partnerships.
796
 ESVLPs, 
on the same footing as general law partnerships, are flow through tax entities except that the limited 
partner’s loss deduction is restricted to their financial exposure for that income tax year.797 ESVCLP 
income distributed to a partner, subject to certain investment requirements, is exempt from income 
tax.
798
 The gain or profit from the disposal of an investment in an ESVCLP is also exempt from income 
tax.
799
 Any loss from the disposal on an investment in an ESVCLP is restricted to the amount of a 
limited partner’s financial exposure.  The share of a capital gain or loss distributed to a partner of an 
ESVCLP is disregarded for CGT purposes.
800
 
An ESVCLP may be eligible for registration if it has funds of at least $10 million but less than $100 
million for the purpose of investment in relevant Australian businesses. An eligible investment for an 
ESVCLP meets the requirements of the Venture Capital Act 2002 (Cth), subdivision 118-F of the 
Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 (Cth) and is approved by the board (Innovation Australia). Broadly, 
an eligible investment will be an unlisted Australian business (cannot be a property developer, a real 
property investor, a financial provider or a construction firm) in its early stages of development. The 
total assets of the business are less than $50 million, an individual investment is less than 30 per cent of 
the ESVCLP’s committed capital and made for the acquisition of new shares or units. 
                                                 
793
 See for example Partnership Act 1892 (NSW) ss 5, 9, 12, 17. 
794
 See for example Partnership Act 1892 (NSW) ss 53B, 60, 66A, 67. 
795
 Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Cth) div 5A of pt III. 
796
 Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Cth) s 94D(2).  
797
 Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Cth) s 92. 
798
 Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 (Cth) s 51-52. 
799
 Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 (Cth) s 51-54. 
800
 Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 (Cth) s 118-407. 
298 
 
I Concerns over the Use of Taxation to Encourage Conservation Projects 
As with agribusiness MIS and carbon sink forests, concerns may be raised over the provision of tax 
incentives to encourage conservation projects. This section considers some of these based on the 
implementation of taxation incentives in other areas.
801
 The concerns may include: 
 Prime Agricultural Land Being Diverted: That prime agricultural land would be diverted 
from food production to be used for conservation purposes; 
 Loss of Critical Mass of Industry: If enough rural properties in a particular area are diverted 
for conservation then the critical mass of an industry will be lost. As a consequence it would 
become uneconomical to maintain processing plants and transport infrastructure; 
 Depopulation of Rural Areas: A change in existing patterns of production may alter the 
community constituency of an area and eventually lead to depopulation; and 
 Introduced Species Inappropriate for Local Area: Depending on how the terms of the tax 
incentive are drafted, the incentive may encourage the introduction of inappropriate or 
unsuitable fauna and flora. 
In addressing the concerns it is important to remember that agricultural landscapes produce traditional 
agricultural products (ie food, fuel, and fibre) and eco-services together rather than producing one to 
the exclusion of the other:
802
 
Agriculture can be viewed as a managed ecosystem, and the ecosystem services provided by agriculture are 
known to depend on agricultural land use and associated management practices. Consequently, it can be 
argued that the appropriate role for agricultural policy is to maximize the social value of both conventional 
agricultural products and the ecosystem services provided by agriculture …  
The erection of fences to exclude livestock, the planting of trees and other conservation works on 
agricultural land will prevent those sections from being fully used in food production.  This is not to 
say that productivity on the land will suffer as conservation activities may increase productivity. For 
example, some species of birds and gliders will contribute to farm productivity by pollinating plants 
and eating insect pests.
803
 Larger reptiles such as goannas and carpet pythons will contribute to 
productivity by eating rabbits and mice.
804
 The planting of trees can contribute to salinity control, flood 
damage minimisation and nutrient cycling. In addition, conservation outcomes can be met by changing 
production systems rather than by isolating sections of land. For example, a change in the management 
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of soil fertility and a change in pesticide practices can create rich repositories of biodiversity in 
agricultural landscapes.
805
 
Conservation taxation incentives targeted at private landholders will contribute partially to the cost of 
conservation works, with the rest of the costs borne by the landholder. It is unlikely that the benefit of a 
taxation incentive would be higher than the agricultural returns from prime productive agricultural 
land. Marginal and non-productive land is more likely than high productive sections / areas to be turned 
over to conservation activities. 
Conservation works may allow landholders to produce marketable eco-services. If the prices of eco-
service units (ie biodiversity credits, carbon credits) are sufficiently large then it may be worthwhile 
turning over large tracts of land to their production. Malcom, Makeham and Wright provide case 
studies regarding primary producer’s decisions in purchasing farm land.806 ‘The implied expected real 
rate of returns per annum after tax on extra capital featured in all the cases, to varying degrees, and 
ranged from 5% to 15% p.a.’807 In the case study of a beef business land with ‘full equity capital 
invested and no borrowings, the expected nominal rate of return after tax on the investment was 
calculated to be 5.3%.’808 If we apply similar selection criteria to land for the production of eco-
services, ceteris paribus, the same land would be used to principally produce marketable eco-services 
where the calculated nominal rate of return would be greater than 5.3%.  
If we turn to planting trees for creating carbon credits as an example of eco-service production, the 
Clean Energy Regulator states that individuals should only anticipate a modest return:
809
 
The environmental planting methodology requires proponents to calculate abatement using a specified 
reforestation modelling tool. The amount of abatement will vary according to factors such as the location and 
density of planting and whether there has been a significant reversal of abatement due to events such as fire. 
For example planting half a hectare with native trees in Victoria will deliver around 120 Australian carbon 
credit units over the 15 year crediting period. Returns on investment will be determined by the market and 
may be up to $3800 over this period. 
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The estimated total return of $3,800 over a 15 year period on half a hectare of planted trees is a gross 
figure. It does not take into account costs such as planting, maintenance, other overheads, interest on 
borrowings, and taxation. It is unlikely that prime agricultural land would be used solely to produce 
carbon credits as the financial returns do not justify it. It is more likely that a vibrant eco-service 
market would create an opportunity for cash flow from marginal and unproductive areas. If prime 
agricultural landholdings are unlikely to be converted primarily to the production of eco-services then it 
is unlikely that there would be major changes in the patterns of land use in regional areas.
810
 
As to the introduction of inappropriate fauna and flora, this is a possibility if the eligibility for the 
incentive is broadly stated. However, it is likely that the relevant incentive would be linked to some 
type of limiting factor. For example, as discussed above, a landcare deduction on the capital 
expenditure for the erection of fences may only be claimed if it is done in accordance with an approved 
land management plan. A similar limitation could be placed on a conservation taxation incentive such 
that it could only be claimed if the work is carried out in accordance with a conservation resource 
management plan. 
J Tax Liability for the Provision of Eco-Services 
The sale of eco-services or the receipt of a reward for the provision of eco-services can have taxation 
consequences. The position of the Australian Taxation Office (ATO) as to the taxation consequences 
on the receipt of payments for the provision of eco-services can be gleaned from class rulings such as 
CR 2007/92: Income tax: assessable income: treatment of payments received under the Western 
Catchment Management Authority Enterprise Based Conservation Program.
811
 The Enterprise Based 
Conservation (EBC) program promotes conservation as an alternative land use in the Western 
Catchment.
812
 The $1 million funding was sourced from the NSW state government and the federal 
government.  
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At its inception the EBC program aimed to have 12% of the land in the Western Catchment managed 
for conservation. Eligible landholders receive payments, equivalent to the alternative commercial land 
use (ie grazing), for voluntary entering into long term conservation agreements (minimum of 15 years) 
for the provision of eco-services. Payments under the program are based on the two linked forms of 
services for ongoing conservation management and on-ground establishment works. A lump sum 
payment is paid for the ongoing conservation management component which entails actively managing 
the land for conservation (ie exclusion of stock, pest eradication, encouraging native fauna and flora, 
and erosion control). Under the on-ground establishment works component, money is paid for capital 
works such as closing or moving watering points and fencing off areas. 
As per Class Ruling CR 2007/92, the ATO views the ongoing conservation payment as income 
according to ordinary concepts under s 6-5 of the ITAA1997. CGT event C2 (s 104-25 of the 
ITAA1997) applies once the entitlement conditions are satisfied and the payment is made. However, 
according to s 118-20(1)(a) of the ITAA1997 any capital gain made is reduced by any payment that is 
included in assessable income. Where the capital gain is the same as the amount included in assessable 
income the CGT amount is reduced to nil. 
As to the on-ground establishment work payments, the ATO views these payments as capital in nature 
and therefore they are not assessable as income under s 6-5 of the ITAA1997. However, where the 
landholder is carrying on a business, the payments may be assessable under s 15-10 of the ITAA197 as 
a bounty or as a subsidy. If a landholder is not carrying on a business, for example hobby or lifestyle 
farmers, then the payment is not assessable under s 15-10. CGT event C2 applies to the payment once 
all the entitlement conditions are satisfied and the payment is made. However, as the source of the 
funding is a scheme established under legislation by an Australian government agency, any capital gain 
or loss under event C2 is disregarded under s 118-37(2)(a) of the ITAA1997.  
While the opinion set out in Class Ruling CR 2007/92 is relevant only to the particular fact situation of 
the EBC program it does provide some guidance on the taxation provisions that are pertinent in the 
provision of eco-services for reward. As such, depending on the payment type and the nature of the 
services provided, landholders may be liable to pay income tax and/or capital gains tax. Even if an 
individual is liable to pay tax on the reward received it does not necessarily mean that they can claim a 
deduction for the expenditure incurred in providing those services as the expenditure may be of a 
capital nature, may be of a private or domestic nature or may be denied under a specific provision. 
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K Tax Evasion, Tax Avoidance and Tax Planning 
The implementation of conservation tax incentives may lead to undesirable behaviour. This section 
looks at tax evasion, tax avoidance, tax planning and the general provision to counter arrangements 
designed to avoid tax. Tax arrangements may be structured to comply with the strict tenets of the law 
but their main purpose will be to exploit ‘inconsistencies and anomalies to obtain a tax advantage not 
intended by the legislature.’813 Statutory anti-avoidance provisions have been created to thwart such 
contrived arrangements.  
Tax evasion is a criminal offence if an individual deliberately conceals assessable income or falsely 
claims deductions or offsets to which they are unentitled.
814
 Those individuals trying to avoid tax may 
comply with the letter of the law while ignoring the ‘spirit’ of the law.815 Tax avoidance is a civil 
offence. Individuals try to avoid tax consequences by entering into transactions or highly convoluted 
and manufactured schemes for the sole or dominant purpose of obtaining a tax benefit.
816
 In contrast, 
tax planning (also known as tax minimisation) is the organisation of an individual’s tax affairs within 
the limits of the law to minimise tax liability without resorting to unlawful tax avoidance.
817
 While it is 
theoretically easy to define the distinction between avoidance and planning, in reality the distinction is 
unclear and may depend on each individual fact situation. It is harder to define at what point aggressive 
tax planning crosses the line to become tax avoidance.  
An individual who has a negative attitude towards tax avoidance is more likely to comply with the full 
rigours of taxation law than an individual who has a positive attitude towards tax avoidance.
818
 
‘Australian taxpayers have a mixed attitude to paying tax: some are totally compliant, either voluntary 
or because of lack of opportunity, others are aggressively non-compliant and in between the many who 
will participate in the cash economy when the opportunity arises.’ 819 Empirical studies show that the 
‘majority of taxpayers are inherently honest and willing to pay their share.’ While it may be desirable 
to make sure that individuals contribute fully to the tax system, there is always a trade-off between 
enforcing tax compliance and administrative costs: 
820
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No country can afford the resources needed to enforce an absolute level of compliance upon all of its citizens. 
There is necessarily a compromise between what might seem theoretically desirable and the resources that the 
community can spare for tax administration in the light of other priorities. 
In many instances anti –avoidance provisions are reactionary in nature.821 It becomes apparent where 
the loopholes lie when individuals use the complexities of the tax law to try and avoid taxation. The tax 
legislation contains a number of provisions which are designed to counter identified avoidance 
activities. An example of a specific anti avoidance measure is the denial of a deduction for non-
commercial losses, is discussed above. It is beyond the scope of this dissertation to explore all the anti-
avoidance provisions. This section will outline the general anti-avoidance provisions contained in part 
IVA of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Cth) (‘Pt IVA’). For Pt IVA to apply the following is 
required: 
 There must be a scheme; 
 The scheme must have been entered into after 27 May 1981; 
 A tax benefit must be obtained in connection with the scheme; and 
 The scheme was carried out for the sole or dominant purpose of obtaining a tax benefit.  
Part IVA applies to a scheme entered into after 27 May 1981 under which the taxpayer has obtained a 
tax benefit. Under section 177A(1) a scheme is defined broadly to mean: 
(a)  any agreement, arrangement, understanding, promise or undertaking, whether express or implied and 
whether or not enforceable, or intended to be enforceable, by legal proceedings; and  
(b)  any scheme, plan, proposal, action, course of action or course of conduct.  
Section 177A(3) expands the definition to include ‘a unilateral scheme, plan, proposal, action, course 
of action or course of conduct. In short, the definition covers almost anything that could be undertaken 
to avoid taxation. 
The taxpayer must obtain a tax benefit in connection with the scheme before Pt IVA will apply. 
Sections 177C and 177CA provide that a tax benefit can arise where: 
 An amount not included is assessable income which would have been included or it is 
reasonable to expect that it would have be included but for entering into the scheme; 
 A deduction amount is claimed which would not have been claimed or it is reasonable to expect 
that it would not have been claimed but for entering into the scheme; 
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 A capital loss is incurred which would not have been incurred or it is reasonable to expect that it 
would not have been incurred but for entering into the scheme (for schemes entered into after 3 
pm 29 April 1997) ; 
 A foreign tax credit is allowable which would not have been allowable or it is reasonable to 
expect that it would not have be allowable but for entering into the scheme (for schemes entered 
into after 13 August 1998); and 
 Withholding tax is not levied which would have been levied or it is reasonable to expect that it 
would have be levied but for entering into the scheme (schemes entered into after 20 August 
1996). 
The scheme must have been entered into with the sole or dominant purpose of obtaining a tax benefit 
(ss 177A(5) and 177D of the ITAA 1936). Dominant purpose is not defined but s 177D lists eight 
factors that must be considered scheme: 
 Manner - the manner in which the scheme was entered into or carried out;  
 Form - the form and substance of the scheme;  
 Time and Duration - the time at which the scheme was entered into and the length of the 
period during which the scheme was carried out;  
 Result - the result that would be achieved, but for the application Pt IVA; 
 Change in financial position of the taxpayer - any change in the financial position of the 
taxpayer that resulted, will result, or may reasonably be expected to result, from the scheme;  
 Change in financial position of an individual connected to the taxpayer - any change in the 
financial position of any person who has, or has had, any connection with the taxpayer, being a 
change that resulted, will result or may reasonably be expected to result, arising from the 
scheme;  
 Any other consequences - any other consequence for the taxpayer, or any other person 
connected to the taxpayer of the scheme having been entered into or carried out; and  
 Nature of connection between the taxpayer and other person - the nature of any connection 
between the taxpayer and any other person.  
 The eight factors are objective in nature. It is impermissible to consider the intentions of the 
individuals who enter the scheme.
822
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Once the conditions in Pt IVA have been satisfied the Tax Commissioner may make a determination 
under s 177F(1) of the ITAA 1936 to cancel any tax benefits obtained by a taxpayer. The 
Commissioner also has the discretion to impose penalties (see generally ss 284-140 to 284-160 of the 
Tax Administration Act 1953 (Cth)).  
L Suggested Taxation Strategies to Encourage Conservation 
This appendix has reviewed the implications of taxation upon conservation. The tax deduction 
provisions as they stand are likely to deny deductibility for expenditure on conservation unless a link 
can be formed with profit making undertakings such as primary production or mining. Where price 
elasticities of demand and behaviour responses across different income levels are uncertain, refundable 
tax offsets are the most efficient means to encourage socially valued activities such as conservation. 
Tax deduction incentives are preferable to tax offset incentives where higher income taxpayers engage 
in an activity which generates larger proportions of social benefits or they are more responsive to the 
incentive.  
Taxation has the advantage of being an established system which can be used to achieve social 
objectives. Given this, and the issues explored in the body of this appendix, the taxation regime could 
better encourage conservation by implementing the following: 
 Allow a conservation expenditure (revenue and capital in nature) deduction for activities carried 
out in a business-like manner. This could be achieved by broadening the definition of primary 
producer under the tax provisions and executing a specific conservation deduction provision 
similar to the provisions for landcare operations, mining site rehabilitation, and carbon sink 
forests; 
 Extend the R & D concessions to cover core research activities with potential to lead to 
technology and environmental management practices that reduce human impact on ecosystems. 
Consideration should be given to allowing this concessions to flow through to investors in  a 
conservation scheme rather than having it trapped in a corporate structure; 
 Make conservation covenant donations CGT exempt; and 
 Create tax incentives that support investment vehicles for conservation. Such incentive could 
take the form of an upfront tax deduction, a deduction for ongoing contributions, flow through 
tax concessions, concessional tax rates, income tax exemptions, and CGT exemptions. These 
incentives would provide a strong impetus for privately funded conservation investment. 
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Appendix 2 – Questionnaire Cover Letter 
Locked Bag 1797 
Penrith NSW 2751 Australia 
School of Law 
 
 
Invitation to participate in a PhD research project being conducted by Mr Kip Werren 
 
This is an invitation to participate in a PhD research project conducted within the School of Law, 
University of Western Sydney. This research is being conducted by Mr Kip Werren (PhD student, 
University of Western Sydney). I am seeking opinions from landholders (the primary decision 
maker on the property) with regards to their views on conservation funding. The questionnaire 
should not take more than 25 minutes. There is some initial reading with questions following. 
Participation in this survey is voluntary. However, a high level of producer involvement is needed 
for the survey to be a success and to accurately reflect the views of landholders. The confidentiality 
of any information you provide will be protected. The University of Western Sydney undertakes not 
to publish or release data that may identify you or your landholding. The combined data from the 
survey will be kept for at least five years as prescribed by the University of Western Sydney 
regulations. 
I take this opportunity to thank you in anticipation of your assistance.  
 
Detailed Information 
Purpose 
 
 The project is designed to gain an understanding of whether or not certain conservation 
funding models will encourage conservation. 
 
 This research is being conducted by Mr Kip Werren (PhD student, University of 
Western Sydney). 
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The type of questions you will be asked 
 
Participation in this survey study is entirely voluntary and anonymous. The survey is conducted 
online and no one including the researcher will be able to associate your responses with your 
identity. Participation in the survey DOES NOT require you to enter your name or contact details. If 
you agree to participate, you will be asked to make certain choices in different scenarios. I will also 
ask you some questions similar to those asked in the population Census, or in surveys conducted by 
the Australian Bureau of Statistics and the Australian Bureau of Agricultural and Resource 
Economics (ABARE). The purpose of these questions is to allow me to compare the answers of 
different types of people - for example, I want to compare holders of different size parcels of land, 
graziers with hobby farmers etc. 
 
What will be required of you 
 
 Completion of the questionnaire. 
 
 The questionnaire should take no longer than 25 minutes. 
 
 Participation in the survey is completely voluntary. 
 
 Responses are strictly confidential and answers cannot be linked with individual persons 
or households. 
What happens to this information? 
 
   The results of this study will help to better understand landholder’s views on 
conservation and conservation funding. 
 
   Once the study has been completed, a brief summary of the findings will be made 
available through the Law School’s web site. Notification of the location of the 
summary will be advertised through the e-mail lists and the web sites of participating 
farming and conservation organisations. 
 
  The results will be communicated in a PhD to be written by Mr Kip Werren. 
 
  The results may be communicated in an academic journal in law and  may be presented 
at an academic conference 
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  Only the combined results of all participants will be published. 
 
   Only the researchers will have access to the coded data, which will be stored for at least 
five years as prescribed by the University of Western Sydney regulations. 
 
Informed Consent 
 
By reading this explanatory statement, it will be understood that you have signified consent to 
participate in this research. Your completion and submission of the survey serves as your voluntary 
agreement for your answers to be included in the combined results of all participants. If you have 
any queries regarding this research, please email:kwerren2@une.edu.au or telephone: 02 67732351. 
 
Should you have any complaint or reservations concerning the manner in which this research 
(Approval No. H8971: “Utilising Taxation Incentives to Promote Private Sector Funded 
Conservation”) is conducted, please do not hesitate to contact the University of Western Sydney 
Human Research Ethics Committee. You may contact the Ethics Committee through the Office of 
Research services on Tel 02 47360883, Fax 02 47360013 or e-mail: humanethics@uws.edu.au. 
 
Any issue you raise will be treated in confidence and investigated fully. You will be informed of the 
outcome of the investigation.  
--------------------- 
Thank you, 
 
 Mr Kip Werren 
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Appendix 3– Survey Questionnaire 
 
1. Conservation Funding Models 
 
This survey seeks your views on the following conservation funding models. 
Taxation Incentive 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Imagine the Commonwealth Government has decided to encourage conservation by creating a 125% 
tax deduction for expenditure on conservation projects. That is, if you spend $10,000 for conservation 
purposes then you receive a $12,500 tax deduction. The expenditure must be for the sole or dominant 
purpose of ‘the protection, preservation, management, or restoration of native wildlife and / or of 
natural resources such as native vegetation, soil, and water.’ 
 
The tax incentive is limited to taxpayers who carry on a business for the purposes of gaining or 
producing assessable income from the use of ‘rural land’. The land use must be certified by a farm 
land consultant or by a land conservation agency. A full deduction is available in the income year (ie 
year ending 30
th
 June) and for both general income deductions and capital expenditure. There are no 
restrictions on how little or how much may be spent on conservation purposes but expenditure must 
be substantiated by receipts. In order to claim the 125% taxation incentive, you must first pay for the 
expenditure and claim this back in your tax return. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Business Landholder initially 
puts up 100% of funds 
Undertake Conservation Project 
Lodge Tax Return 
125% Tax Deduction 
for conservation work 
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Regional Onsite Conservation Program 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Imagine that a private sector ‘Regional On-site Conservation Program’ funding scheme is set up. The 
program is managed by local landowners who are very familiar with the local wildlife, vegetation, 
soil types, average rain fall, and agriculture in the area. Besides providing conservations funds, the 
program also provides conservation advice and training. 
 
The program will provide conservation funds in exchange for environmental services such as carbon 
credits, biodiversity credits and native vegetation clearing credits (Enviro Credits). Enviro Credits can 
be created through activities such as feral animal control, weed control, planting trees, fencing to 
exclude stock, and creating habitat for native wildlife. 
 
The amount paid for the environmental services is determined by negotiations. Once you agree on the 
price, you will enter into a legally binding contract for the sale of the Enviro Credits. The program 
takes care of all of the paper work but asks you to seek independent legal advice before signing the 
contract. There may also be checks to ensure that the conservation work meets the requirement for 
creating the Enviro Credits. The sale of the Enviro Credits will have income taxation consequences. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ROCP Incorporated 
body 
Negotiations leading 
to an agreement as to 
the conservation 
program 
Landholder 
l 
Sale of Enviro 
Credits 
Provision of 
Training and 
Funds 
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Government Payment 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Imagine the State government has set up a funding program to encourage conservation projects. The 
State government has identified a number of high value environmental assets that it wishes to focus 
on and will only provide funding for conservation projects that deal with those environmental assets. 
The relevant government department provides training on how to best achieve the conservation goal.  
Furthermore, government officers can be contacted for advice and guidance. 
 
In order to receive the funds, you fill in an application which must outline the proposed project, 
provide a budget and a timeline. The application must be lodged with the relevant government 
department and it may take up to 10 weeks to be notified of a decision. There is no guarantee that you 
will receive funding as the matter is at the discretion of the Minister. If you do receive funding, a 
requirement is that you provide yearly reports to the government department on the progress of the 
conservation project. The government department has the right to audit the project to ensure that the 
funding is being utilised in the way as stated in the application. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Government department 
Application (may take up to 
10 weeks to be approved) 
Landowner 
Conservation 
Program for 
Identified High 
Value 
Environmental 
Asset 
Funds, Advice 
and Guidance 
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2. Ranking the Conservation Funding Models 
This section will ask you to rank the conservation models in order of preference.  
Assume that you wish to undertake a conservation project over a 5 year period. You have researched 
the project and there are NO consequences with regards to native vegetation legislation and there is No 
affect on the lands productivity (ie it does not increase nor does it decrease productivity).  
With 1 being your top preference and 3 being your bottom preference, rank the funding models. 
Model (as described previously) 
 
Rank 
Taxation Incentive 
 
 
Regional Onsite Conservation Program  
 
 
Government Payment  
 
3. Reasons for Preferred Model 
We would like to know why you chose the model you did as your preferred model and the potential 
that the model will encourage conservation. Thinking about the model that you ranked number 1, 
please indicate whether you a Strongly Agree, Agree, Neither Agree Nor Disagree, Disagree, or 
Strongly Disagree with the following statements: 
 Strongly 
Agree 
Agree Neither 
Agree Nor 
Disagree 
Disagree Strongly 
Disagree 
 
Autonomy – The model allows me to independently 
decide on how to best achieve the 
conservation goals. 
 
o  o  o  o  o  
Cash flow – The model provides me with an external 
source of funds and as such, I do not have 
to rely on my own money to start a 
conservation project. 
 
o  o  o  o  o  
Support – The model provides me with training and 
advice. 
 
o  o  o  o  o  
Paperwork – The model minimises paperwork and 
administration. 
 
 
o  o  o  o  o  
Encouragement – The model encourages me to plan 
conservation projects. 
 
o  o  o  o  o  
Increase –   I would increase my conservation activities 
under this model. 
 
o  o  o  o  o  
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4. Reasons for Ranking 
Please comment on why you ranked the funding models in the above order. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5. Choice limited to Taxation Incentive and Government Subsidy 
Apart from your reasoning above, if you were limited to choosing between a Taxation Incentive and a 
Government Payment (of the types described earlier), which one would you choose? Please choose 
only one. 
o  Taxation Incentive (based on the 
Taxation Incentive model described 
above) 
 
o  Government Payment (based on the 
Government Payment model described 
above) 
 
6. Reasons when choice limited to a Taxation Incentive or Government Payment 
Following on from question 5, in this section we seek your comments on why you chose the way that 
you did. Please comment on why you prefer the Taxation Incentive or the Government Payment. 
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7. Background Information 
Finally, we would like to ask some questions about you to help us interpret the survey results better. 
Are you the primary decision maker on the 
property? 
 
o  Yes 
o  No 
 
What is your gender? 
 
o  Male 
o  Female 
 
Into which of the following age groups do you fall? 
 
o  Less than 18 
o  18 - 24 
o  25 - 34 
o  35 - 44 
o  45 - 54 
o  55 - 64 
o  65 - 74 
o  75 + 
o  Prefer not to say 
 
What is the Highest level of education you 
achieved? 
 
o  School Certificate or less 
o  TAFE Trade Course 
o  TAFE Certificate Level 
o  Agriculture College Course 
o  School Leaving Certificate (eg HSC) 
o  Tertiary Graduate 
o  Post Graduate 
o  Prefer not to say 
 
What is your postcode?  
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What is the total area of your property including all leased land and any unused land at 30 June 
2011 (in hectares)? 
 
 hectares 
 
What best describes your usage of the land? 
 
o  Wheat and other crops industry  
 
- farms engaged mainly in growing rice, other cereal grains, coarse grains, oilseeds 
and/or pulses 
 
o  Mixed livestock-crops industry  
 
- farms engaged mainly in running sheep or beef cattle, or both, and growing cereal 
grains, coarse grains, oilseeds and/or pulses 
 
o  Sheep industry  
 
- farms engaged mainly in running sheep 
 
o  Beef industry  
 
- farms engaged mainly in running beef cattle 
 
o  Sheep-beef industry  
 
- farms engaged mainly in running both sheep and beef cattle 
 
o  Hobby Farmer 
 
- non-commercial farm enterprise 
 
 
o  Other (please specify) 
 
 
How much approximately did you spend on conservation work 
in the 2010 financial year (1
st
 July 2009 – 30 June 2010)? 
 
 
$ 
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What was the total receipts (revenue) for your farm business in the 2010 financial year (1
st
 July 
2009 – 30 June 2010) 
 
o  Nil 
 
o  Under $100,000 
 
o  $100, 000 – under $200,000 
 
o  $200, 000 – under $500,000 
 
o  $500, 000 – under $1million 
 
o  $1million – under $5 million 
 
o  $5 million or more 
 
o  Prefer not to say 
 
o  Don’t know 
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Appendix 4 – Participant Comments on Reasons for Ranking Models 
 
Table Appendix 3.1 Participant Comments from those who Ranked the Taxation Incentive first. 
Survey Identifier Participant Comments 
R_ehWoIUPQU1ezd4g Money in the hand is more reliable than the risk of change in Government policy 
as in the solar rebates 
R_1FARDf9dOWDQYyE The first model allows me to profit from conservation, which may be helpful in 
years where crops are poor. The second model seems acceptable and also 
valuable and it was hard to choose between the two, but the third model sounds 
like a lot of paperwork wth no real outcome guaranteed. Option two is difficult - 
not sure about the tax consequences. 
R_d6XQfgWXCg6FWwA The taxation model provides a means for landholders to retain their property 
rights around water, biodiversity, carbon etc and does not rely on other brokers 
which can create transaction costs and governance issues and recognition issues. 
R_5uK9xhikjarjIj2 I felt that this model was the easiest to implement and there is an strong incentive 
with the tax deduction 
R_78Vg9HWZN8YuSPy The first option is ideal for landholders who have good cash reserves but deters 
conservation efforts by those whom are struggling financially.  It does away with 
the current NRM model where landholders are bribed with funding to do what 
they ought to be oing anyway. And it helps to limit the current NRM processes 
that are highly bureaucratic and wasteful.  In an ideal world I would rank the first 
option way ahead of the second two because it puts the onus on the landholder to 
get in and do their own reserch and get the job done. I am no neoliberalist but the 
current system of incentives only pretends to create a 'market' situation.  The so 
called commercial basis for many government processes is a farce.  The current 
incentives only perpetuate the handou mentality among landholders. 
R_8cvTR6F4EiOc51i For the above reasons 
R_bBdv8ZFXmMWScw4 The first model seemed to be the least amount of hassle and the quickest method. 
It is also the greatest guarantee of a return for undertaking the conservation. It 
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also alows me to choose what methods best suit me. The governement incentive 
is good howeve it is up to the minister's discretion. 
R_d1fVgXNzlrnI35O Not being business minded at all, this seems to make the most sense to me. 
R_9mDBLn7ezQ48QQY With accelerated depreciation and tax incentives, producers can  control the 
options, that best suit their management style and present situation. even though 
Enviro credits, sound good, they can be considered close to subsides, whereas 
acclerated deprecition, are production focused decision, that most probably 
would have been made, but are accelerated. 
R_42F2YrztuGIM8w4 Taxation incentive model allows more efficient use of money. Money collected 
as tax and process, redistributed by Government means that only a small portion 
of that money gets down to the job on the ground. The extra tax deductibility is 
the wider communiy's contribution. Local knowledge is allowed to be a 
significant part of the planning allowing ownership of the process by the land 
manager which will create a greater chance of success for the project. This also 
reduces the likelihood of a 'one size fitsall' plan developing which does not take 
into account environmental variability. Model 'Govt payment' and to a lesser 
extent 'ROCP' remove the planning and ownership of the program from the land 
manager hence a greater likelihood of 'Start and not Finish'or complete failure. 
The taxation incentive model also means that predominatly profitable businesses 
will carry out the Conservation works allowing an 'indicator of the health' of the 
agriculture sector. Happy Healthy people, Profitable businesses and Heathy 
Enironment are all interrelated. When one of those three fails the 'whole' three 
fail over time and hence adverse environmental outcomes.. 
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R_di3GtREg2eEpl4w I like this model simply because it is simple, and therefore reduces the 
government spending on more bureaucrats, offices, and departments. As I find 
now alot of the money that could go to conversation work is spent on government 
payees/administrators and would be better spent on actually doing the work ie 
planting trees, perrenial grasses and protection of river banks, destroying weeds 
and ferial animals. Plus real farmers who have to make at least 80% of their 
income from their rural land and the activits on that land, therefore should know 
their land and its problems and needs. However I do think you need some checks 
and balances, to oversee all programs and to be able have people trained and 
available to give advise, guidance on programs, and to make ure programs are 
done and managed correctly into the future. I like the idea of landowners actually 
doing the jobs and then claiming it back as a tax refund which would work in the 
productive years. But how would that help in the years of drought, like te decade 
of drought, which we have just gone through, as nothing would get done. Maybe 
that is a good idea as alot of the tree plantings did die in the drought. However it 
definitely should not be set up like the farm forestry schemes which were only set 
p for tax deductions, so there would have to be strict guidelines against that, as it 
would cause inflated rural land prices, just like the farm forestry which ended up 
using up productive agriculture land just for a tax deduction. Farm forestry 
should hae only been allowed on non productive agriculture land, and never be a 
mono-culture alongside water supplies and preferably in native plants.  
The second program does have some merits too. 
R_esno5DVK7ZFnpY0 tax model is straight forward, appeared to give best ability to recognise that 
landowners already engage heavily in conservation and don't need specialist 
training to tell them so. It will have inbuit incentive to use cash when available to 
undertake incrased work, feral animal control, weed control, nature plantings. I 
wonder if recognition to the change to farming practice with purchase of min till 
where possible is rewarded. 
R_0SThx59jc72Z1t2 Model simplicity via an established system (tax office) and can be dealt with by 
existing professionals (Accountant).  Useful in profit years. 
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R_3rTZdEtpEh7DPDe Generally prefer the simplest system. Support for regional body model may 
depend on who the local 'agents' are that must be dealt with. Might better suit 
some landholders who like advice/discussion of plans, etc. Govt Payment model 
seems similar to ederal Landcare/NRM schemes. OK, but lots of paperwork! 
R_8fcHsd9r0GWsY04 1st option Simplest, guaranteed reimbursement, simplest with paperwork and 
provides greatest autonomy and not subject to state government changing their 
mind over what they will fund which has been a problem with other initiatives. 
2 - sounds a bit cumersome with too many people involved although it does 
provide more support and assistance than the other options however we are 
experienced in native reveg projects so don't necessarily need that assisitance. 
3rd option - no guarantee, lots of paperwok, meeting govt deadlines, state govt 
may change the rules on you midstream as they have done with other initiatives. 
R_3EFZD4BxGZS7sgs Ease of red tape 
R_6x5mdjt6OSdXLz6 The model I chose gives me more of an incentive whereas the other two models 
increase paper work, waiting times and frustration 
R_bk30y67Vs3gYeDa this seems like the most simple model and tax rebate is a good incentive. 
R_2azwTUW2TNay07i The chosen model provides the least contact with government agencies and the 
least involvement from other parties, allowing me to develop programs that suit 
my land, my lifestyle and my financial situation. 
R_4Hp3ovBHnSui9Ba Most simple model with the most autonomy. 
R_bxdG3sC4KuonssQ Simplicity 
R_eWeJmJlQYAbAT08 The Taxation Incentive provides broad goals with no cap and is the least 
bureaucratic/consultative - offers flexibilty without interference. (However it's 
usefulness is predicated on the entity making a profit!).  The Government 
Payment is a model that dos provide some support/training within guidelines and 
is more like what the average farmer is used to (ie. Drought Relief Applications.  
The ROCP is the most complex and requires an understanding of many features 
along with tax consequences.  The ROCP woud in my view be more difficult for 
the average farmer who is adverse to paperwork (such as responses to your 
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survey may attest).  Furthermore, given farmers often use their accountants for 
drought relief forms the administration of the ROCP may put many of.  
R_egQCwwY5lA7rjAo It's guaranteed where the other options are subject to Government approval and a 
siginificant time lag and control 
R_8tYZCDtTGhpvHV2 Conservation activities can be time consuming and costly to start up, with little 
return seen in the first two years, the five year time scale and tax incentives 
would encourage me to look at conservation projects more seriously. 
R_bmi3nrKAfDJmuqM i want control of projects & minimum of funds going to admin 
R_bEJExOYexIfhPJq I think the first model would be best for the landholder, and I have answered 
from that point of view. However I don't think it would necessarily be best for the 
environment. The other models would be more bureaucratic and offputting for 
the landholder bu may result in a better environmental outcome, albeit at a 
considerable overhead cost. 
R_1SRK3erZ2pHcz9a Less complicated- can makeown decisions 
R_emov1TG3xflzOtv 1/gives me full control over spending good tax incentive- Less time consuming 
and practical   
2/you may not agree on a price Legal fees incurred. Tax consequences.  
3/Time used on training.- To long to wait on decision No guarantee on funding. 
R_cGXNHngxFwwMBxP The 'taxation incentive' model ensures there is a profit at the end of project. Net 
positive cash flow is the primary goal of any business. 
R_3fRGp5MvKRFSf2d Taxation Incentive- simple and flexible Regional Onsite- to time consuming- 
don't like legally binding Govnt payment- to uncertnin 
R_b1KNOIR1Zsoqqb3 Feel that the taxation rebate model to be most reliable 
R_8GrnqKWEHOffweF The taxation deduction model would encourage me because I detest paying tax. 
At least I can see my money doing some good for my own conservation. 
R_78ICMrONnujkGu9 The tax incentive sounds the most definite program with guarantee. The Regional 
Conservation Program sounds alright but pending on govt. negotiations with the 
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government doesn't sound like a promising agreement 
R_81cUHjO0koXbRVb No 1 gives direct control to landowner. 
R_e3A0v4ZBQJLAFzT Less beaurocratic is better Regional Conservation Plan is most attractive in 
theory, could well be difficult to manage and costly to administer 
R_3pYPFZrOP97sh6t 1.  The owner desides what program he wants. 
2.  Less paperwork with taxation. 
3.  We organise our own program. 
4.  We plan our own conservation program. 
5.  We shouldn't have interference from outside enviroment people 
R_54lDGs73qz323C5 Funding is controlled through the Taxation So it would be guarenteed  
We would have controll of our own program 
R_b930ZFfqJTH9Y5n Possible the less government interference 
R_cUyUfvKC3kOYUYt I ranked the taxation scheme first as it provides a way to offset business earnings 
whilst enabling an increase in property biodiversity etc.  This is without links to 
government projects or monitoring and although it doesn't include training it 
would hav links with farm consultants and also allows me to use my own local 
knowledge to guide the type of project, not relying on obtaining money for 
whatever is on offer from the government at the time.   
This being said i would take the government subsidy befre the regional onsite 
conservation model as this may work well in other areas but i feel it wouldn't 
work well where we are.  I see the regional onsite conservation model as being 
similar to Landcare and am dubious of the EnviroCredits idea. 
R_0OrcENpUIJNhCzb ROCP model plauged by reliance on skilled/unbiased/engaged producers- rare! 
Credits also dislocate enviro legislation and actions credited= risk of conflicting 
signal's (esp from CMA). Tax models (at 125% v (tick)) most advantageous and 
Govt payment is largely status quo for CFOC programs. 
R_6lNitzxBzDS6ktv Please realise I have conserved native timber on my farm as I developed it. I 
don't intend getting involved in any type of conservation project as I dont trust 
any Gov. dept. I do my own conservation in my own way and personally don't 
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believe in private lnd conservation, as farms are for sustainable productivity, not 
conservation unless the owner so wishes to conduct it in his own way. 
R_e8uZ2mCpPPlJSPb I would be able to undertake conservation initiatives that suit my block of land 
without having to take into account the regional priorities. Gives me the greatest 
autonomy & the biggest personal return without having to negotiate with others 
or wait upondecree by government employees. The ROCP Incorporated Body is 
the most likely to be locally exclusive and corrupt (Yes, burnt by local 
experience) 
R_09t4gpSD7jSr4Hz Main reason is the autonomy the option offers 
R_4HJVEGdfHf7K4HH Taxation incentives help gain payment. The other 2 options can't and farmily and 
self are attempting to get rid of govt incentives and controls 
R_a46kNqE9HmlwE6x I like the idea of being in control of your own decisions 
R_24SLMS0bZS8V8Wx No cash incentive. Offer people money to conservate & they are more likley to 
do it. I've wanted to plant trees for koalas but cant pay if getting nothing back. 
R_1B15CwkF7Jqt16R Least paper work, less over head costs 
R_9NNP0cHSe9gf6Fn Levels of simplicity and reduced beaurocracy. 
 
 
Table Appendix 3.2: Participant comments from those who ranked the ROCP first. 
Survey Identifier Participant Comments 
R_77Emx3moLLwzaZK I do not have to bring my money first! 
R_8DhuFRRmEO5EB24 Option 1 appears open to exploitation. Option 2 utilises local knowledge and as 
such would appear more likely to be effective. Although the Environment Credits 
sound overly complicated. The third, grants based system would limit the level of 
participation which is something that I think is not ideal as we would want broad-
based action. 
R_d0GkFynYzDuEkFS The concept of an enviro-credit market has a great deal of appeal as the range of 
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outcome is limited by my understanding of the relevant requirements of my 
landscape and I have significant autonomy in the project selection. It also steps 
back from a cargocult mentality. 
R_bPcUZfbNiSCwYe0 Simple system I believe is best.  Input from other agencies complicates and slows 
the process.  The lack of flexibility in current funding models is currently 
restricting on ground work.  An example is that to get funding for riparian 
fencing I need to fece no less than 5 metres each side of the water course which 
results in too much productive land loss to justify.  I feel that landholders are in 
the best place to assess the need and outcome of the work on their properties and 
should be encouraged to do o without restriction. 
R_9GYTpXlkc63KXoU Preferred model allowed some autonomy within a group consultation situation. 
R_79W5GyWxOq0PXk8 ? 
R_2tOOKRuTPc3sISw I would want some choice in the scheme instituted but also like to have some 
education re the options and support in their institution because I admit there is a 
lot I don't know about land conservation 
R_9uYcs1FAuKNs67W Need to have expert advice provided by experts. 
Govt authority can ensure regional and local cooperation and ensure consistency 
of aims of projects. Government funding models provide accountability and set 
limits on amounts that can be spent on a projec (tend to eliminate grandiose plans 
and provide 'down-to-earth' approaches.) Eliminates need to find 'up front' 
funding - other financial pressures will probably always take priority when facing 
spending money in advance on a project that is not obviousl related to increasing 
productivity. 
R_0BAnFDGagBCMsWU When the types of conservation projects that 'merit' support are selected by the 
government, this leaves the conservation-minded taxpayer at a disadvantage to 
the extent that projects supported by the government are narrower than or not in 
line with the tpes of projects of interest to the taxpayer. An environmentally 
lukewarm or hostile government could undermine such a scheme by narrowly 
defining eligible projects or through administrative delay or rejection. 
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R_eh5pCW3l0acwi2M Due to our financial situation a taxation incentive is unlikely to be of great 
benefit to us whereas a cash payment would, but we would be more interested in 
participating in a community organisation run project than one which requires an 
agreement with a government department. 
R_5jUopIbnr14RIeE I would be able to complete more conservation work under this model 
R_b2A2RYMSsLjcpUx I do not trust the government to adequately prioritise conservation areas. The 
taxation model only works if you are a 'business (our 64 Hectare is totally a 
conservation area- no live-stock, no business) I have reservations re the Regional 
Cons. plan but t seems the best for us 
R_6PBD7P5TIZWq5lH I chose the ROCP because I am not in business. 
R_egpr1U7yg68Q2IR No capital outlay Has the ability to created income than credits Outside help with 
expertise. Ongoing into future-yrs-programmes. 
R_6L7xhPEuW8pvSgR I don't pay enough tax to consider that model. The block we own is very small 
and probably would not interest state authorities. We already practise 
conservation activities on our small block. 
R_7PQhGSFrUNJf19r Being a small landholder, and not earning much from the land means the regional 
onsite conservation model appeals to me however i must say having something 
linked to my title in perpetuity is not ideal as i see this block as an investment (a 
covenant may educe the ability to sell the property).  A government payment 
would be ok however it would entail on going monitoring which for my land area 
would be an unnecessary hassle.  The no income status of my hobby farm means 
the tax incentive option is redundat. 
R_3BOQixROGmlHFaZ The local influence, I feel conservation is important however many regions are 
different from each other, the 2nd models I feel allows local knowledge to play a 
greater part in achieving the conservation goals. 
R_064DUp49Q0WyZx3 Cashflow is usually limited, revegetation can in some cases affect capital values. 
Autonomy is important. 
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Table Appendix 3.3: Participant Comments from those who Ranked the Government Payment first 
Survey Identifier Participant Comments 
R_80sYIoRUfzAfTIU Preference for cash payment ie no out of pocket 
R_6R35Awo9Cszh2UA Option 2 (ranked last) would be overly prescriptive and inevitably require CMA 
(or similar) dictate activites. Federal government compliance and oversight may 
be prescriptive on paper but does not end up so for on the ground activities. 
Model 1 is best bt would require checkoff prior to work to prevent activities 
being carried out which don't qualify. 
R_e9fJ5KNjsJ6QlkE Cash is perceived as actually being acknowledged for work rthat is done 
R_8dX2pqXfzsJjOWE Initial cash outlay is minimised. 
R_bkdTK2yBO2Du9Y8 The Government Payment is most attractive as it provides funds upfront and you 
have a good idea before you start if your planned project will comply. Yearly 
reporting is not very onerous.  The Taxation Incentive is very attractive if you 
know you are goin to make a profit - but this is often not guaranteed.  The 
Taxation Incentive also assumes there is the cashflow to undertake the project 
and as a consequence may see conservation spending as a June (tax planning 
undertaking) to minimise the negative cashlow effect until the ITR is lodged.  
The ROPC is very convoluted and has lots of interference/consultation. 
R_efUqTceXJzSpvDv I am on a low income and the Gov pay seems less complicated. I would not have 
the funds to spend on conservation projects in the initial stages of the RCO 
program 
R_cOvzpKrZ49sixAV ROCP last (3) because it involves a committee & just not interested in having to 
tie in with others of different skills & motivations. Been there & done that. 
Tax incentive (2). Autonomy. but already paying lots tax. 
Govnt payt (1) Autonomy. Just workin on own timelines much better. Some 
concern about paperwork. Money to do project. 
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R_07GyeF0fHQpKfEV Taxation Incentive- Taxation is a seprate issue & complicated enough 
Regional Program- OK but it is yet another organisation to be created & delt 
with. More acceptable if delt with by existing organisation such as LANDCARE 
Govt Payment- similar to indusry stewardship program which is workable 
R_bregqOVvL5WNUmp 1. Govt Pmt. Cash up front to undertake project. Assistance in planning etc. 
Satisfies KISS' principle  
2. Regional Onsite: Beurecratic 'Dodgy' enviro credit concept (looks like a 
'carbon credit' lookalike. Has planning merit/appeal & local input but souds like a 
'nightmare' to be part of.  
3. Taxation: Very few primary producers generate a 'taxable income' so tax 
credits are of no value. Refer to ABARE  
PS Kip 
As a rule farmers have very little money/taxable income. They, as a rule are very 
intereted in environmental issues and would like to achieve improvements while 
maintaining productivity and the little income they have. They are on average- is 
it 57 or 58 years of age. They are naturally wary of government and most will not 
'apply' for anythig. If the government seeks to 'implement a plan' it needs to apply 
to landholders and make them an offer they cannot afford to refuse. The upshot 
being that to be part of a plan becomes part of their business model providing 
valuable income in return for aking their land available to extend or preserve the 
environmental 'national estate.' The return should be by way an 'anuity' in 
perpetuity as any work needs to be looked after by whoever succeeds them. This 
comes at an ongoing cost- weeds, fences, stock xclusion, feral animal control etc 
etc. It is not a 'one off' expense- it often adds to a property's reccerrent costs. 
R_5d9umrYFvoPVvN3 I regard carbon credits, biodiversity credits and enviro credits with extreme 
suspission. a load of shit. Tax credits effectiveness will vary depending total 
yearly tax and thus effectiveness is not constant. Govnt funding creates a level of 
beauracy butat least some cash gets to the landowner 
328 
 
R_8vwWTpirOMG9ldP GIP 1. Involves govt. approval, but the preferred activity is known so farmer has 
a choice about applying or not.  1. Involves annual reports- boring but a good 
thing: we should have to account for taxpayer funds and report on outcomes.  
IROCP 2. I am nt keen on losing control of my 'enviro credits'  3.  Not a bad idea 
but who audits the projects? 
R_6mbZTB8GKLC9I2x Having incentives based on tax deductions is undesirable because it encourages 
the minority of people with high incomes as distinct from the general community 
to take conservation measures, and will contaminate the legitimate concerns of 
conservation/sustinability/biodiversity with the unrelated concern of tax-
minimization.  
Privatizing funding will inevitably lead to formation of an "elite" group which 
favors itself at the expense of the rest of the community. This kind of local 
insider politics can b minimized by maintaining control within a department of 
the state government. 
R_6PuA4b0RV2kbT37 - Option 3: the funding body (CMA) has provided expertise and ongoing support 
during the course of the project (visits to the site, discussion of whether the 
chosen weed management program is going according to plan.) In every way it 
has been successful. he funding model is easy to understand and non-negotiable, 
meaning that I know where I stand.  
- Option 1 (the tax model) As my income is now below the income tax threshold 
(as I stumble into retirement), this would not work for me.  
- Option 2:  sounds attractive, but knowing my neighbours and the unliklihood of 
them enetering into any conservation agreement, I prefer to go it alone. Maybe 
the results will exert an influence. 
R_0Ja96TQXCTovM2x The problem with the tax deductability is that farm income varies from year to 
year Hard to plan for this model also poorer degraded areas often that need work 
will be in areas of low farm income. Model 2 comes a close 2nd to model 3 
R_6zNt2XgGPtjCfI1 *The Government Payment Model allows me to initiate the conservation project 
but still provides me with advice & support. It also prevents landowner being out 
of pocket. 
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*The Taxation Incentive Model provides self initiation but requires out of pocket 
exenses before tax benefit.  
*The Regional Onsite Program appears too convoluted & bureacratic 
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Appendix 5 – Participant Comments when Choice Limited to Taxation Incentive and Government 
Payment 
 
Table Appendix 4.1 Comments from Participants who Chose the Taxation Incentive Model 
Survey Identifier Participant Comments 
R_ehWoIUPQU1ezd4g Tax incentive is more reliable and less paperwork 
R_1FARDf9dOWDQYyE Get more than you set out 
R_d6XQfgWXCg6FWwA Retaining of property rights and recognition of sustainable land management 
outside of government welfare style programs. Also the landholder can make 
decisions on a micro level about conservation outcomes that are often missed at a 
regional/catchment scae. 
R_5uK9xhikjarjIj2 This seems to be the fairest choice of the above options and would encourage me 
to be more active and realistic as to what I could achieve without feeling I was 
just recieving a Government payment 
R_78Vg9HWZN8YuSPy As stated above, although it is not fair to those without the capital to fund 
improved land management practices, overall the use of tax incentives puts the 
responsibility for sustainable land management back onto the landholder where it 
belongs.  There i more than enough information available. Now it's time farmers 
did what needs to be done. 
R_8cvTR6F4EiOc51i Autonomy, less paperwork, greater incentive 
R_77Emx3moLLwzaZK Because then, the paperwork is not that long. 
R_bBdv8ZFXmMWScw4 It appears more flexible in what you can do and you are guaranteed a return. 
R_d1fVgXNzlrnI35O As above 
R_6R35Awo9Cszh2UA Taxation incentives tend to be larger than grants - more money = more 
conservation work. Very simple. 
R_42F2YrztuGIM8w4 See previous points. 
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R_di3GtREg2eEpl4w As stated above, keeping it simple and therefore with less government employees 
costing huge sums of money ie cars, offices etc 
Years ago the old scheme of local Landcare groups with just one 
advisor/controller per shire was a much more effecient scheme,and they had 
better contact with the landholders and knew the farmers and the farms well, plus 
helped give good advise and programing. 
While the new large Catchment Management groups are too removed, not hands 
on, and employ a lot of people to manage papr and themselves I think - alot of 
wastage is happening, time and money, with less help and contact for 
landowners. 
R_esno5DVK7ZFnpY0 I think it goes further to recongise that farming practices being undertaken now 
are conservational. Grant funding usually runs out, has so much red tape that the 
documents require interpretors. 
R_0SThx59jc72Z1t2 Govbernment payments appear complex and arbitary.  Funds are necessarily 
limited which may involve a landholder in a competitive process where time is 
invested and returns uncertain.  Money does not benefit farm directly. 
R_3rTZdEtpEh7DPDe Simplicity. Drawback is the up-front payment, but compared to my previous 
participation in schemes like the Govt Payment model (which were good), the tax 
incentive just seems easier. 
R_8fcHsd9r0GWsY04 As detailed above -  Simplest, guaranteed reimbursement, simplest with 
paperwork and provides greatest autonomy and not subject to state government 
changing their mind over what they will fund which has been a problem with 
other initiatives. 
R_9ogk4nBQrJCSAra The less dealing with government departments the better!  Minimises paperwork! 
R_3EFZD4BxGZS7sgs Ease of red tape and paperwork 
R_6x5mdjt6OSdXLz6 Pepper work would be simpler 
R_6rn9dha1YA5lFM8 I feel that getting a taxation incentive is a way of ensuring money is spent etc 
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before they are rewarded. 
R_bk30y67Vs3gYeDa it's easier to follow this model. Everyone pays tax - and a 125% rate of return is 
good incentive 
R_2azwTUW2TNay07i As we are self-funded, the ongoing managment of our finances on a yearly basis 
is something we have to do, therefore this could be incorporated into that system, 
rather than becoming a cumbersome project that involves dealing with a gov 
agency that potentally has no idea of my situation. 
R_4Hp3ovBHnSui9Ba I prefer the taxation incentive because you get 125% of what you put into it back 
at the end of the tax year, making it a financial incentive. 
R_bPcUZfbNiSCwYe0 The tax system is currently set up to administer collections and payments to tax 
payers.  A separate system would require additional government departments to 
be established and funded.  Therefore i believe the Tax option would be the most 
cost effective or government. 
R_bxdG3sC4KuonssQ After participating in numerous conservation projects over time I believe that the 
cost of applying for funds and compliance costs have probably been greater than 
the benefits received. In this case the paperwork should be minimised and 
although it would ot persuade me to take on any major expensive project it could 
push me over the line with a smaller project. 
R_79W5GyWxOq0PXk8 Another government department would just be inefficent and hard to deal with 
R_2tOOKRuTPc3sISw I feel like I have some control and choice in what happens 
R_3kONPHZdqSq0fEE You can decide how you put the program into place and decide on all options 
rather then being controlled 
R_eWeJmJlQYAbAT08 The Taxation Incentive does provide more independence as to how and when the 
money can be spent.  The Government Payment must first be approved and 
timing is up to 10 weeks and the nature of spending may be more limited. 
R_egQCwwY5lA7rjAo It would encourage me to invest the way I want and also it would help me with 
structuring my tax obligations and hopefully minimise my tax 
333 
 
R_8tYZCDtTGhpvHV2 The Taxation allows me the best return for my investment into conservation. 
R_bmi3nrKAfDJmuqM gives me full control 
R_1SRK3erZ2pHcz9a Make own decisions 
R_emov1TG3xflzOtv more flexable- Less hassles. good years you can spend more with a larger tax 
incentive. 
Less profitable years you can spend Less or Nil. 
Very good because it also includes capital expenditure. 
R_cGXNHngxFwwMBxP Same reasons as above. 
R_3fRGp5MvKRFSf2d see above 
R_b1KNOIR1Zsoqqb3 Its all a  matter of trust isn't it.! The government was going to try to back out of 
its 60c rebate on solar. That is why I would choose the tax incentive. 
R_8GrnqKWEHOffweF I believe that the less that a government dept. has to do with anything, the better 
& more efficient it would run. 
R_78ICMrONnujkGu9 The govt. payment is a slower process with no guarantee of funding. The thought 
of yearly audits sounds painful to say the least. 
R_81cUHjO0koXbRVb Taxation Incentive much simpler and cleaner to be involved with. 
R_3pYPFZrOP97sh6t The government Incentive would be a mile of paper work and a long time 
coming through. 
R_54lDGs73qz323C5 Government Incentive would be a drawn out process 
R_b930ZFfqJTH9Y5n The tax incentive is the most likely way to have your expenditure returned 
promptly. 
R_cUyUfvKC3kOYUYt See above. 
R_0OrcENpUIJNhCzb Compensation for environmental services most accurately reflected by Tax 
option, and allows full producer decision making, instead of on/off periods for 
application of grants. Work therefore becomes core/everyday part of enterprise 
activities 
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R_6lNitzxBzDS6ktv As I have already stated I don't believe in private land conservation unless it is 
the owners choice. If I had to get involved I would prefer a taxation incentive. I 
could not tolerate some damn dumn city centric Gov paying me.  
 
You need to realise tha for 17 years farmers have been belted with native 
vegetation legislation  which delivers a most adverse environmental, economic 
and social outcome. The vast majority of us have no trust, faith or confidence in 
any politician or gov. dept. as a result. Alot of us have conserved various 
elements of flora and fauna on our private land, but are not willing to get 
involved with people and Depts who don't understand the way the bush, the rural 
communities and the rural economy all works. I developed a rough 
nderdeveloped property in the 70's, 80's and early ninties, and enjoy & am proud 
of the way I went about & what it has achieved. I am very wary of any 
interference by any Government Dept. 
R_e8uZ2mCpPPlJSPb Some reason as outlined below. Greatest autonomy. 
R_09t4gpSD7jSr4Hz As for 4 
R_4HJVEGdfHf7K4HH self help.- Govt out of regulatory business as it has no business being there. 
R_a46kNqE9HmlwE6x To much red tape with government payment 
R_24SLMS0bZS8V8Wx You pay me to conservate I will do it. 
R_1B15CwkF7Jqt16R as above 
R_9NNP0cHSe9gf6Fn Don't like to spend time preparing a submission for approval by someone else 
which may be time wasted if it is then rejected. 
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Table Appendix 4.2 Comments from Participants who Chose the Government Payment Model 
Survey Identifier Participant Comments 
R_80sYIoRUfzAfTIU Perception that the government payment would be received before a tax incentive 
R_8DhuFRRmEO5EB24 Cashflow. 
R_e9fJ5KNjsJ6QlkE Goverment payment is actual money that can be put into a project rather than a 
tax deduction which may or may not actually give a full monetary benefit for 
work done 
R_d0GkFynYzDuEkFS Primarily from a cashflow point of view - in reality they are both equal as the 
failings of one model offset the good points of the other. I'm assuming that the 
NRM funding body has the knowledge and skill set available. Another 
shortcoming of the Gov't fnding model is that their targets may not necessarily be 
appropriate for my landscape or worse - a refusal to accept that their target 
landscape exists outside their sphere of knowledge. E.g. Upland wetlands do not 
exist in the Liverpool ranges because noone has told the Government agencies, so 
they can't be funded whilst in danger. 
R_9GYTpXlkc63KXoU Clearly separates funding from all taxation transactions. May be doing other 
unrelated conservation work. 
R_8dX2pqXfzsJjOWE Initial cash outlay is Zero. 
R_9uYcs1FAuKNs67W Government funding models provide accountability and set limits on amounts 
that can be spent on a project (tend to eliminate grandiose plans and provide 
'down-to-earth' approaches.) 
Eliminates need to find 'up front' funding - other financial pressures wll probably 
always take priority when facing spending money in advance on a project that is 
not obviously related to increasing productivity. 
R_bkdTK2yBO2Du9Y8 Farmers want a hand out and undertaking a conservation project without an 
upfront payment is attractive.  Not having to make a profit to take advantage of 
this incentive is also very important. 
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R_0BAnFDGagBCMsWU Taxation incentive not preferred because it is limited to businesses/commercial 
uses of property. 
R_eh5pCW3l0acwi2M Due to our financial situation a taxation incentive is unlikely to be of great 
benefit to us whereas a cash payment would. 
R_bEJExOYexIfhPJq Many farms may not qualify for taxation (?), These farms may be much better 
candidates for conversion to conservation, due to marginal farming quality, poor 
management etc. 
R_5jUopIbnr14RIeE easier on cash flow 
R_b2A2RYMSsLjcpUx Again the taxation incentive is dependant on a business- we do not farm but only 
conserve- no business involved so would missout 
R_8eP1Bx936aD9lnT Maybe little Taxation return in my case (25%?!) 
R_6PBD7P5TIZWq5lH I would prefer the Taxation Incentive but I am not in business. 
R_efUqTceXJzSpvDv I prefer Gov. Payment as the tav incentive probably wont make much difference 
as I dont pay a lot of tax. My income does not come from rural use of the land, 
except for occassional agistment. 
R_cOvzpKrZ49sixAV $ up front for Govt payment would be useful rather than tax deduction later.  
Govnt payment may be more straightforward in terms of the projects & criteria. 
Clearer idea of requirements befoer decide to participate. Govnt want, rather than 
Tax incentive own project" which might not be approved anyway. 
R_07GyeF0fHQpKfEV Answered ie 4 above 
R_bregqOVvL5WNUmp Refer Reasons for ranking 
R_5d9umrYFvoPVvN3 see question 4 answer 
R_8vwWTpirOMG9ldP As above, the tax incentive isn't a bad idea but would need some audit of the 
actual projects. GP. has best audit process. 
R_egpr1U7yg68Q2IR No outlay with money or capital Training provided. 
R_6L7xhPEuW8pvSgR Reason as per above- I pay little tax and could not claim back what I don't pay. 
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R_6mbZTB8GKLC9I2x Having incentives based on tax deductions is undesirable because it encourages 
the minority of people with high incomes as distinct from the general community 
to take conservation measures, and will contaminate the legitimate concerns of  
conservation / sustainability / biodiversity with the unrelated concern of tax 
minimization. 
R_6PuA4b0RV2kbT37 As mentioned above, my income is below the tax threshhold. 
R_7PQhGSFrUNJf19r Government payment is more appropriate/ more useful due to low income from 
my property. 
R_3BOQixROGmlHFaZ More because of cash flow, also it sets out goals for farmers to achieve so thay 
are more likely to try and get a good result. 
R_af0jd9LJ8835pcN To use other people money. NOT MINE. 
R_0Ja96TQXCTovM2x With all the different pulls on income upfront payment seems to work best 
R_064DUp49Q0WyZx3 Government payment engages taxpayers in environmental outcomes that are and 
have social expectations. 
R_6zNt2XgGPtjCfI1 *The Government Payment Model is preferred allows both self initiation & 
training advice. It also prevents initial put of pocket expenses.  
*The Taxation Incentive Model does not provide support & advice & requires 
initial out-of-pocket expenses 
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Appendix 6 – Institutions Contacted and Asked to Publicise the Survey 
Table Appendix 5 Institutions Contacted and Asked to Publicise the Survey 
Name of Organisation Contacted by Researcher 
Animal Genetics and Breeding Unit 
Armidale Dumaresq Council 
Australian Centre for Agriculture and Law 
Australian Livestock Exporters’ Council 
Corporate Agricultural Group 
Hawkesbury Environment Network 
Landcare Australia Limited 
Landcare – Tablelands & Slopes of the New England North West region of NSW 
Liverpool Plains Land Management Committee 
New England Livestock Health and Pest Authority 
Northern Territory Cattleman’s Association 
NSW Farmers Association 
Ridley Corporation 
Tasmanian Farmers and Graziers Association 
University of Western Sydney 
Victorian Farmers Federation 
WA Farmers Federation 
 
 
 
 
 
